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This thesis presents a normative yet practical account of how Scots and English 
criminal law should assess the culpability of careless persons. At present, the law in 
both jurisdictions distinguishes between two types of culpable, unjustified risk-
taking: recklessness and negligence. In everyday language, these concepts have 
blurred edges: persons are labelled “reckless” or “negligent” with little thought to the 
difference, if any, that exists between these terms. 
 Although unproblematic in the “everyday” context, this laxity in definition is 
inappropriate in the criminal courtroom. Negligence is not usually a sufficient form 
of culpability for serious offences, whilst recklessness typically is. In the most 
serious crimes, recklessness thus marks the limit of criminal liability. The concept 
ought, therefore, to be well understood and developed. Unfortunately, courts both 
north and south of the border have had difficulty defining and distinguishing between 
recklessness and negligence. This thesis explores the resulting jurisprudential 
quagmires and contends that, in both jurisdictions, the absence of a visible theory of 
culpable carelessness accounts for the courts’ difficulties. It then looks to criminal 
law theory to construct a defensible account of culpable carelessness which can 
distinguish clearly between recklessness and negligence and explain the 
circumstances in which the latter ought to be criminally culpable. Finally, the thesis 
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This thesis presents a normative yet practical account of how Scots and English1 
criminal law should assess the culpability of careless persons. At present, both 
jurisdictions distinguish between two types of culpable, unjustified2 risk-taking: 
recklessness and negligence. In everyday language, these concepts have blurred 
edges:3 persons are labelled “reckless” or “negligent” with little thought to the 
difference – if any – that exists between these terms. 
 Although unproblematic in the “everyday” context, this laxity in definition is 
inappropriate in the criminal courtroom. Negligence is not usually a sufficient form 
of culpability for serious offences,4 whilst recklessness typically is.5 In the most 
serious crimes, recklessness thus marks the limit of criminal liability.6 The concept 
ought, therefore, to be well understood and developed.7 Unfortunately, Scots and 
English courts have had difficulty defining and distinguishing between recklessness 
and negligence. This thesis explores the resulting jurisprudential quagmires and 
contends that, in both jurisdictions, the absence of a clear theory of culpable 
carelessness accounts for the courts’ difficulties. It then looks to criminal law theory 
to construct a defensible account of culpable carelessness which can distinguish 
clearly between recklessness and negligence and explain the circumstances in which 
                                                
1 Hereinafter, “English law” is used as shorthand for the law of England and Wales. References to 
“England” should similarly be read to include Wales. 
2 Justification is explored below at §5.A(1). Hereinafter (unless otherwise stated), “risk” refers to an 
unjustified risk. 
3 Banditt v R [2005] HCA 80 at para 108 per Callinan J. On the matter of whether settled meanings for 
“everyday” terms exist, see G Ryle, “Ordinary language” (1953) 62 Philosophical Review 167. 
4 The exception to this rule in English law is “gross” negligence manslaughter (see §3.D, below). On 
negligence in Scots law, see §2.B, below. 
5 Some crimes cannot be committed recklessly: e.g. assault requires “evil intent” in Scotland (Lord 
Advocate’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) 1993 JC 43) and murder cannot be committed recklessly in 
England. 
6 ATH Smith, “Law reform proposals and the courts”, in I Dennis (ed), Criminal Law and Justice: 
Essays from the WG Hart Workshop 1986 (1987) 35 at 49; V Tadros, “Recklessness and the duty to 
take care”, in S Shute and AP Simester (eds), Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part 
(2002) 227 at 229. Again, the exception in English law is “gross” negligence manslaughter (see §3.D, 
below). 
7 G Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd edn (1983) 97. 




the latter ought to be criminally culpable. Finally, the thesis considers the practical 
implications of this theory. 
 Section A of this chapter defines the scope of the thesis. Section B then offers 
a sketch of the argument. The thesis’s original contributions to knowledge are 




The following matters will not be considered at length here, but some short 
comments are necessary to give context to the subsequent chapters. 
 
(1) Responsibility, culpability and liability 
First, there is the relationship amongst criminal responsibility, criminal culpability 
and criminal liability. Responsibility “means different things to different people”,8 
but some general points can be made. Theories of responsibility seek to demonstrate 
when an actor can be held accountable (to another) for various things, including her 
actions. At its most basic, responsibility entails answerability.9  
 The answer that an agent gives will depend on her reasons for action. This 
brings in consideration of “reason-responsiveness”, i.e. the agent’s ability to notice 
and respond to the reasons which bear upon her in a situation.10 Theorists rarely say 
more than that responsibility requires responsiveness to reasons. It is not clear, for 
example, which reasons must be responded to for an agent to be responsible.11 As 
responsibility is not the focus of the investigation here,12 this question will not be 
addressed.13 It is sufficient to note that responsibility deals with calling a reason-
responsive person to account, and that criminal responsibility is a special kind of this 
                                                
8 P Hieronymi, “Responsibility for believing” (2008) 161 Synthese 357 at 359. 
9 Duff, AFC 15. 
10 See: ibid 39-40; JM Fischer, “Responsiveness and moral responsibility”, in F Schoeman (ed), 
Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (1987) 81; G Watson, 
“Reasons and responsibility” (2001) 111 Ethics 374; Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 55-57; 
Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability 17.  
11 DN Husak, “Answering Duff: RA Duff’s Answering for Crime” (2010) 29 Law & Phil 101 at 105-
109. 
12 See, however, §5.C(3)(a), below. 
13 See, however, the references in Duff, AFC 39 (n 2). 





practice – i.e. the public calling to account of a citizen, before her fellow citizens, for 
her alleged wrongdoing.14 
 Much of the thesis will assume that a person is capable of being held to 
account: that she is reason-responsive and has perpetrated the sort of action which is 
declared criminal by the polity. 15  It considers ways in which people can be 
blameworthy for performing such wrongs, which brings in considerations of 
culpability. Culpability is a neglected topic in Anglo-Scottish criminal law theory,16 
and this thesis does not present a systemic account of it.17 The argument merely 
concerns two specific ways of being culpable: through recklessness and negligence. 
The thesis is not, therefore, too concerned with other ways of being culpable, such as 
intentional and knowing wrongdoing. These are considered only briefly18 to show 
how they relate to recklessness and negligence. 
 Finally, culpability must be separated from liability. Liability, Duff explains, 
can only be imposed where the (responsible) accused’s answer for her wrongdoing is 
insufficiently exculpatory.19 It is possible for a citizen to be criminally responsible 
(i.e. answerable) for her conduct without being held liable for it. Defeaters of liability 
are institutionalised in the criminal law. For instance, self-defence might defeat a 
finding of liability entirely. A person who kills in legally-recognised20 self-defence is 
still responsible for her conduct – she must answer for it – but her answer will defeat 
a finding of liability. Other answers for wrongdoing merely impact upon the amount 
of blame attached to the agent’s conduct. For instance, provocation reduces murder 
to culpable homicide/manslaughter because provoked actors are apparently less 
blameworthy than cold-blooded killers.21 
                                                
14 See, generally, ibid. 
15 See §1.A(3), below. 
16  Cf the situation in the US since GP Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978) introduced 
comparative conceptions of culpability to American audiences. 
17 See, however, L Zaibert, Five Ways Patricia Can Kill Her Husband: A Theory of Intentionality and 
Blame (2005). 
18 At §6.C. 
19 Duff, AFC 15-16, ch 11. 
20 On the requirements of self-defence in Scots and English law, see F Leverick, Killing in Self-
Defence (2006). 
21 D Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes, Vol I, 4th edn with notes by BR 
Bell (1844) 239-240. 




 What these examples show is that culpability is linked to the matter of 
liability. Nevertheless, there might be considerations which militate against holding a 
culpable actor liable.22 For instance, the fact that evidence against her was extracted 
by torture (or other irregular means) might lead the court to cease the inquiry into 
liability in order to preserve the “moral legitimacy” of the criminal justice system.23 
Although culpability explains much about liability, it does not therefore explain the 
whole. 
 
(2) Culpability as insufficient concern 
Secondly, it must be asked what culpability means. Its dictionary definition – 
“responsibility for a fault or wrong; blame”24 – is unhelpfully vague, and collapses 
the distinctions introduced above. 
 Culpability is no doubt connected to an understanding of responsibility and to 
the rationale(s) for punishment. It is, however, possible to separate out these 
concepts. For instance, Alexander, Ferzan and Morse and Tadros adopt different 
approaches to the matter of criminal responsibility (Alexander, Ferzan and Morse are 
choice theorists; Tadros is a character theorist) and punishment (Alexander, Ferzan 
and Morse are retributivists; Tadros supports (in Criminal Responsibility) a 
communication view of punishment).25 They agree, however, that the element of 
culpability required for a criminal conviction is a demonstration of insufficient 
concern for the interests of others.26 This basic understanding of culpability will be 
employed throughout the thesis, and will be expanded upon in chapters five and six. 
 
(3) Crimes as “public wrongs” 
Thirdly, persons are not held criminally liable for culpable conduct – i.e. an act 
demonstrating insufficient concern for others – alone. A person could, for instance, 
                                                
22 Alexander et al, Crime and Culpability 8-9. Cf PH Robinson and M Cahill, Law without Justice: 
Why Criminal Law Doesn’t Give People What They Deserve (2006). 
23 See, further, F Stark “Moral legitimacy and disclosure appeals” (2010) 14 EdinLR 205. 
24 See http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0979290#m_en_gb0979290. 
25 See: Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability 7-10; Tadros, Criminal Responsibility ch 3. Tadros’s 
view on punishment have since changed: see V Tadros, “A human right to a fair criminal law?”, in J 
Chalmers, F Leverick and L Farmer (eds), Essays in Criminal Law in Honour of Sir Gerald Gordon 
(2010) 103. 
26 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 83-90; Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability ch 2. 





buy a television knowing that doing so risks her being unable to pay her bills. This is 
unlikely to be a matter for the criminal courts, but it could be described as “reckless” 
(as that term is understood in chapter six). It could, however, be that the polity thinks 
that such fiscal carelessness is so wrong that it becomes the concern of the 
community and may be declared a “public wrong”; a concern of all citizens.27 This is 
a matter of criminalisation, and will arise at various points of the thesis. The thesis 
does not, however, aim to give a complete account of the criminalisation of 
carelessness – it seeks only to outline some principles which could provide guidance 
to the polity in that task. Without these, there would be a significant hole in the 
theory presented in chapters five and six.28 
 
(4) Blame and Punishment 
Fourthly, this thesis is concerned with two ways of establishing the amount of 
blameworthiness that a person’s act attracts in virtue of its demonstration of 
insufficient concern for the legally-protected interests of others. Such an account 
cannot be separated entirely from a theory of punishment, and it is useful to say 
something in this regard.  
 Although no account of blame will be given,29 it is assumed that it is not the 
same as punishment.30 Blame might be conceived of as private, based on personal 
relationships,31 whilst punishment is an institutionalised public, political enterprise.32 
In consequence, a theory of culpability (concerned with blameworthiness) might be 
taken up by those who support different theories of punishment. For instance, 
retributivists might accept the points made in chapter six; as might some 
consequentialists. As long as culpability is seen as a necessary (if not sufficient) 
                                                
27 See: W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: Book IV (1770) 5; RA Duff, Trials and 
Punishments (1986); SE Marshall and RA Duff, “Criminalization and sharing wrongs” (1998) 11 
CJLJ 7; RA Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (2001); Duff, AFC ch 6; RA Duff and 
SE Marshall, “Public and private wrongs”, in Chalmers, Leverick and Farmer (eds), Essays in 
Criminal Law (n 25) 70. 
28 I am grateful to Neil Walker for making this point. 
29 See, however, G Sher, In Praise of Blame (2006). 
30 Cf Duff, Trials and Punishments (n 27) ch 2. 
31 See e.g. TM Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (2008) ch 4. 
32 JER Squires, “Blame” (1968) 18 Philosophical Quarterly 54 at 54. 




condition for punishing, then the insights in later chapters might be appropriated by 
various theoretical schools.33 
 The thesis will nevertheless rely at various points on the communication 
theory of punishment.34 This has both backward- and forward-looking aspects. It is 
backward-looking insofar as it concentrates on culpability for past acts.35 It looks 
forward by seeking, through punishment, to communicate – to the offender, the 
victim and the public more generally – that the offender and her conduct should be 
condemned. This is done in the hope of communicating and cementing the limits of 
acceptable action in the community. It will be explained in chapters five and six how 
the theory of culpable carelessness defended there can be understood in light of 
communication theory. 
 
(5) Free will and determinism 
Fifthly, the debate over free will and determinism will be largely ignored. Although 
the resolution of this philosophical struggle would aid a deeper understanding of 
responsibility which could inform the criminal law,36 there is not space to explore 
this issue in acceptable depth. 
 As a result, this thesis does not seek to add to the free will/determinism 
debate.37 Various arguments made in the body of the thesis are open to objections 
from determinists, and no real answers are provided. For instance, the idea that 
persons are responsible for shaping their characters (the basis of the argument 
developed in chapter five) is open to the objection that, even if a person can change, 
such change will have been determined by pre-existing causes, and the actor is 
therefore not really responsible for changing.38 The same might be said of actors who 
fail to change: this failure was determined, and is nothing to do with them. In order 
                                                
33 If culpability is not accepted as a necessary condition for punishment, theorists may still argue that 
this thesis identifies some particularly apt candidates for punishment. Strict liability, where culpability 
is less apparent (or absent) will be ignored here. See, however: AP Simester (ed), Appraising Strict 
Liability (2005); Duff, AFC ch 10. 
34 See, generally, Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (n 27). 
35 This aspect of communication theory has led to it being labelled “enhanced retributivism”: AW 
Norrie, Punishment, Responsibility and Justice: A Relational Critique (2000) 119. 
36 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 69. 
37 For brief introductions, see: AJP Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (1978) 22-25; Alexander et al, 
Crime & Culpability 13-15. 
38 G Strawson, “The impossibility of moral responsibility” (1994) 75 Philosophical Studies 5 at 18-19. 





to avoid the force of these arguments which – at their strongest – seem to undermine 
the whole idea of moral (and therefore legal) responsibility, culpability and any 
attendant liability to punishment, the thesis necessarily assumes a compatibilist 
standpoint (i.e. a standpoint that assumes that responsibility is possible, even in a 
determined universe), but the content of this view will not be elaborated upon. 
 
(6) Is risk-taking harmful? 
Sixthly, there is the issue of whether imposing a risk on another person is harmful 
even if the risked consequence does not materialise (or circumstance exist). This 
issue is related to concerns of criminalisation if the “harm principle” is adhered to 
but, as noted above, the thesis does not concern itself overly with matters of 
criminalisation. It is therefore assumed that risk-taking is harmful, and no more will 
be said in this regard. The most plausible explanation for this conclusion is offered 
by Oberdiek, who argues that imposing a risk impacts upon the autonomy of others 
by limiting their safe options.39 A person who carelessly fires a rifle limits the 
available safe options of bystanders: (presuming they are not suicidal) they are no 
longer free to stand safely in the path of the bullet when, without the careless firing 
of the rifle, they would have been. Alternative theses have been presented as to why 
risk-taking is,40 and is not,41 harmful, but these will not be discussed further. 
 
(7) Case law 
Finally, the thesis states the laws of Scotland and England as of 1 June 2011. 
 
 
B. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The thesis is split into six substantive chapters, together with this introduction and a 
concluding chapter. 
                                                
39 J Oberdiek, “Towards a right against risking” (2009) 28 Law & Phil 367 (particularly at 373-374). 
40 E.g.: C Finkelstein, “Is risk a harm?” (2002-2003) 151 U Pa L Rev 963; J Steele, Risks and Legal 
Theory (2004) 116-117. 
41 E.g. SR Perry, “Harm, history and counterfactuals” (2003) 40 San Diego L Rev 1283. 




(1) Chapter two 
Chapter two examines Scots criminal law’s approach to recklessness and negligence. 
It begins with a brief literature review, which demonstrates that academic opinion on 
this topic is confused. The chapter then moves on to consider the Scots jurisprudence 
on recklessness and negligence.  
 It will be contended that the courts have developed five distinct types of 
culpable carelessness: 
 
(i)  Allan v Patterson42  recklessness: recklessness is identified with careless 
conduct. It is unnecessary to consider the accused’s mental state. 
(ii)  Quinn v Cunningham43 recklessness: recklessness consists of acting with an 
“utter disregard” for or “indifference” towards risk. Although the courts have 
stressed the importance of mens rea in such cases,44 it is unclear whether it is 
necessary for the accused to have adverted consciously to a risk attendant 
upon her conduct.45 
(iii)  Jamieson46 recklessness: recklessness is understood in a “subjective”47 sense: 
the accused must have either been “indifferent” to the risk that his partner was 
not consenting to sex, or have acted in spite of his belief that she might not be 
consenting.48 This definition of recklessness is superseded by the Sexual 
Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, which does not utilise the concept of 
recklessness in relation to consent.49 
(iv)  “Wicked” recklessness: recklessness accompanies an intentional physical 
attack which demonstrates “indifference” towards whether the victim lives or 
dies.50 “Wicked” recklessness is exclusive to murder. 
                                                
42 1980 JC 57. 
43 1956 JC 22. 
44 E.g. Transco plc v HM Advocate 2004 JC 29. 
45 See TH Jones and MGA Christie, Criminal Law, 4th edn (2008) para 3.30. 
46 Jamieson v HM Advocate 1994 JC 88. 
47 Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 2001) 2002 SLT 466 at para 29 per the Lord Justice-General 
(Cullen). “Subjective” and “objective” are discussed below at §1.D(1). 
48 These gender terms are consistent with the law when Jamieson was decided. 
49 Instead, the accused must have lacked a “reasonable belief” in consent to be convicted: s 1(1)(b). 
For discussion, see §2.E(2), below. 
50 See HM Advocate v Purcell 2008 JC 131. 





(v)  Brennan51 recklessness: recklessness is found in the act of becoming acutely, 
voluntarily intoxicated. If the accused commits an offence of recklessness52 
whilst in this state, she is to be convicted, even if – at the time of acting – she 
lacked the capacity to form mens rea. 
 
 Little thought, if any, has gone into how these categories inter-relate. 
Decisions within each category seem mutually contradictory: some hint at a need for 
advertence to risk in order to be reckless; others point in the opposite direction; 
others still remain equivocal on the advertence/inadvertence issue. The chapter thus 
concludes that the law is intolerably confused and suffers for its lack of a coherent 
theory of culpable carelessness. 
 
(2) Chapter three 
Scots criminal law is undeveloped:53 judgments concerning mens rea tend to be 
vague and infrequent; few academics write extensively about them.54 It might, 
therefore, be doubted that chapter two’s examination of the Scottish jurisprudence 
has uncovered anything beyond the appeal court’s inconsistent approach to core 
criminal law terms. This would undermine the contention that the absence of a 
theoretical understanding of culpability for risk-taking is the cause of Scots law’s 
problems.  
 This necessitates chapter three’s examination of a more developed system of 
criminal law to see if it has encountered similar difficulties. The jurisdiction chosen 
is England – primarily because of the availability of English materials to the 
researcher, but also because of the tumultuous history of recklessness and negligence 
in English criminal law. 
 In the early twentieth century, the English courts adopted a “subjective” 
understanding of recklessness in relation to most offences,55 requiring the Crown to 
establish that the accused consciously foresaw the relevant risk and acted in spite of 
                                                
51 1977 JC 38. 
52 This approach  is also adopted in crimes requiring intention – e.g. assault (Ebsworth v HM 
Advocate 1992 SLT 1161).  
53 See V Tadros, “Review of Chalmers and Leverick, Criminal Defences” 2006 SCOLAG 230. 
54 This situation has improved over time: see Gordon, Criminal Law viii. 
55 R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396. 




this awareness.56 In the 1980s, the decisions in R v Caldwell57 and R v Lawrence58 
introduced an “objective” test for recklessness: if, even though the defendant did not 
foresee it, the risk would have been foreseen and avoided by the reasonable person in 
the defendant’s circumstances, the defendant would be reckless for taking it. 
Academic reaction to these decisions was resoundingly negative59 and, for a time, 
English law was thrown into the same confusion that Scots law presently finds itself 
in. Caldwell never influenced much of the criminal law, however,60 and so it was 
easy enough for the House of Lords to finally remove its influence in 2003 (in R v 
G).61  
 This “subjectivist” victory is, as chapter three demonstrates, hollow: 
Lawrence is still authoritative in relation to road traffic offences; 62  “gross” 
negligence is still employed in involuntary manslaughter, and it is unclear how it 
differs from recklessness; the Sexual Offences Act 2003 employs a “mixed” 
approach to recklessness;63 certain statutory offences necessitate an “objective” 
approach; and becoming acutely, voluntarily intoxicated is still necessarily 
“reckless”. In short, there remain multiple understandings of recklessness (some of 
which are difficult to distinguish from negligence) in English criminal law. 
England’s positive criminal law64 does not therefore adhere to pure “subjective” 
theory.65 Adding to this doctrinal doubt, there are still those who are dissatisfied with 
the “subjective” approach in theory. 66  This means that – in spite of some 
                                                
56 Foresight of risk is usually inferred from the circumstances. If a risk was so obvious that any 
ordinary person would have appreciated it, the accused will have difficulty convincing the court that 
she was, in fact, unaware of it. Exceptions are imaginable: e.g. the accused might be young and/or of 
limited intelligence – see: Elliott v C (A Minor) [1983] 1 WLR 939; S v HM Advocate, unreported, 
High Court of Justiciary, 15 Oct 1999. 
57 [1982] AC 341. 
58 [1982] AC 510. 
59 See §3.C(2), below. 
60 See ibid. 
61 [2004] 1 AC 1034. 
62 For reasons explored in §3.E(4), this is relatively unimportant in practice.  
63 “Mixed” approaches are introduced below at §2.E(2). 
64 “Positive law” is used as shorthand for the law declared by the courts or set out in legislation. 
65 Although there has been a recent trend towards “subjective” mens rea, some areas of English 
criminal law (e.g. implied malice in murder) defy it. 
66 See §3.F, below. 





“subjectivist” tendencies in English criminal law – it would not be impossible for 
Caldwell’s brand of inadvertent recklessness to reappear in the future.67 
 English law is thus also in want of a coherent theory of culpable carelessness 
which could be used by the courts when defining the mens rea terms recklessness 
and negligence. At the close of chapter three, Scots and English law will thus have 
been diagnosed as suffering from the same disease. The thesis then moves on to 
consider if a common cure is available. 
 
(3) Chapter four 
Chapter four investigates “subjectivism”, which is pervasive in theoretical 
approaches to recklessness and negligence. The chapter distinguishes between three 
different schools of “subjective” thought, all of which are related – in some way – to 
the accused’s choices. First, there is “strict choice” theory, which holds that a person 
can only be culpable for her conscious choices to do wrong. On this view, 
recklessness is defined by reference to the accused’s decision to take an unjustified 
risk and negligence is identified with non-culpable inadvertence.68  
 After some popular arguments against negligence liability which stem from 
strict choice theory are shown to be weak, the chapter moves on to contrast the 
“correspondence principle”69 and Ferzan’s critique of the need for “conscious” 
awareness in cases of recklessness.70 These two approaches show the flexible limits 
of strict choice theory and that there exists disagreement over what strict choice 
theory actually requires. This diminishes its attractiveness as a theory to inform 
reform of Scots and English criminal laws’ approach to culpable carelessness. 
 Given its potential malleability, strict choice theory has been warped by some 
authors to accommodate instances of inadvertent risk-taking within the criminal law. 
The second type of choice theory to be discussed is “choice and capacity” theory, 
which concentrates on whether an inadvertent actor could have chosen to act 
                                                
67 Cf AP Simester et al, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 4th edn (2010) 
144. 
68 See e.g. Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability ch 3. 
69 See Ashworth, Principles 76-77. 
70 Ferzan, “Opaque recklessness”. 




differently in the circumstances. This approach has some appeal, but it is still tied 
(somewhat unconvincingly) to the idea that only choices are truly culpable.  
 A third approach – “choice and character” theory – explains culpable 
negligence by reference to the actor’s previous choices concerning her character 
development. It requires both an implausible view of character development and an 
illiberal approach to criminal fault. It too must be rejected. 
  
(4) Chapter five 
Having rejected “subjectivism” in its three forms, chapter five adopts a different 
approach to culpability for inadvertent risk-taking, i.e. negligence. Negligence tends 
to connote the breaching of societal expectations about acceptable risk-taking. In the 
civil law,71 this is certainly how liability for negligence is understood. The strict 
choice theorist’s worry is not that there is nothing faulty in failing to meet a standard 
of care that society demands. Rather, it is that such failures are not viewed as 
culpable in the sense required for criminal fault.72 This view is most defensible in 
cases where there was no clear duty of care owed by the accused to the complainer 
(for instance, that which arises in the context of a doctor/patient relationship). Where 
there are such duties, which have been taken on voluntarily and are governed by 
well-publicised standards of conduct, the situation seems to be different. In such 
cases, it will be argued that a form of culpable negligence – negligence as failure of 
conduct – may arise where the actor acts incompatibly with her duties.  
 Chapter five also explains another form of culpable inadvertence – 
negligence as failure of belief. This manifests itself where the accused has failed to 
form the belief that a certain risk is attendant upon her conduct where she had the 
opportunity to do so. Most such failures of belief will result from a failure to exercise 
control over desire. A desire to get home quickly to watch a football game73 might, 
for example, prevent an actor from combining her background knowledge about risks 
in general and her perceptions to form beliefs about the safety of her conduct. This 
sort of desire might be one which the accused may legitimately be expected by 
                                                
71 “Civil law” is used as shorthand for the laws of delict and tort. 
72 A Brudner “Is negligence blameless?”, in PH Robinson, SP Garvey and KK Ferzan (eds), Criminal 
Law Conversations (2009) 285. 
73 See Tadros, Responsibility 260. 





society to control, and thus the accused’s failure to advert to risk – which makes her 
conduct nonetheless dangerous – can be a basis for finding culpability. 
 This failure to control desire ought to be the focus of any criminal inquiry 
into culpable negligence where the accused does not owe clear duties to others. It is 
nevertheless possible that the desire which motivated the accused was not truly a 
reflection of her settled character. In searching for culpability, it should further be 
asked whether the accused had accepted the relevant desire as part of her character. 
This is because, although we blame for actions, not character, it is the accused – as 
an agent of character – that we punish.74 This exercise seems pointless if the action 
was not truly a reflection of the accused’s character.75 Negligence as failure of belief 
thus lends itself to a character-based approach to inadvertent risk-taking. 
 Once negligence has been explained, the thesis moves on to consider 
recklessness. 
 
(5) Chapter six 
“Subjectivists” accept that recklessness is culpable, but deny that it exists in the 
absence of conscious, chosen risk-taking. This focus has been criticised by 
philosophers of the criminal law, and chapter six considers these objections. 
 Wider conceptions of recklessness, which found on the attitude of 
“indifference”, are analysed at the beginning of the chapter. Some of these rely on 
the accused’s earlier choices concerning what to pay attention to; others employ 
counter-factual estimations of what the accused would have done had she been 
consciously aware of the risks she was taking. Both of these approaches struggle to 
distinguish recklessness from negligence. A different approach is defended by Duff, 
who contends that the concentration should be on the accused’s attitude (of “practical 
indifference”) as revealed through her conduct.76 Although “practical indifference” is 
a robust theoretical account of recklessness, it also encounters difficulty in 
distinguishing between recklessness and negligence in all but a limited class of cases. 
                                                
74 See Tadros, Criminal Responsibility. Cf KK Ferzan, “Act, agency and indifference: the foundations 
of Criminal Responsibility” (2007) 10 New Crim LR 441 at 444. 
75 See, further, below at §5.C(3)(a). 
76 Duff, IACL ch 7. 




 Indifference-based theories are not, therefore, commendable as models for 
reform of the law on culpable carelessness. It will again be argued that a character-
based, belief-centred conception of culpability better distinguishes between different 
types of culpable carelessness. Just as desire can prevent the formation of a belief 
concerning risk in certain circumstances, it can stop a person’s beliefs concerning 
risk from motivating her to (for instance) investigate risks which she is dimly aware 
of. Negligence as failure of belief and recklessness thus share the same core; they are 
both failures to be motivated sufficiently in the formation of beliefs about risk. 
Importantly, recklessness does not therefore require a conscious choice to take a 
concrete risk. 
 At the end of chapter six, then, a theory of negligence and recklessness will 
have been presented. Chapter seven moves on to consider how this theory could 
inform reform of Scots and English law. 
 
(6) Chapter seven 
It would be naive to assume that the courts would be able to adopt wholeheartedly a 
character-based, belief-centred conception of recklessness and negligence to solve 
the problems identified in chapters two and three. There are, nevertheless, some core 
lessons from this thesis which the courts should take seriously, and chapter seven 
examines them.  
First, the thesis aims to separate out negligence and recklessness as distinct 
motivational failures. They should therefore be kept separate in the criminal law as – 
in most cases – being negligent is less blameworthy than being reckless with regard 
to the same risk.77  
Secondly, chapters five and six tease out the central wrongs inherent in being 
negligent and reckless. It will be contended that these wrongs do not change 
depending on the crime charged, so there should only be one understanding of 
recklessness and negligence in the criminal law. The positive law denies this, and 
requires rethinking. Chapter seven explains, with statutory definitions and jury 
                                                
77 See, further, §6.B(4), below. 





instructions, how the theory developed in chapters five and six provides a defensible 
model for reform. 
 The realities of the criminal trial mean that some theoretical concessions are 
nevertheless necessary. For one thing, the rules on admissibility of character 
evidence (particularly bad character evidence) might prohibit the Crown from 
proving that the accused’s act of negligence or recklessness was truly a reflection of 
her settled character. The solution defended in chapter seven is that there should be a 
presumption that acts were in character. The accused may rebut this presumption by 
presenting evidence, and the human rights implications of this reverse burden are 
considered towards the end of the chapter. 
 
 
C. ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
It is submitted that this thesis makes four original contributions to knowledge. 
 
(1) Analysis of the Scottish jurisprudence 
First, chapter two is, to date, the most extensive treatment of Scots law’s approach to 
recklessness and negligence.78 At present, the most useful account is contained in 
Gordon’s landmark text.79 The latest edition (published in 2000-2001) is beginning 
to show its age and, despite being superior to anything else in the existing literature, 
Gordon’s treatment of culpable carelessness is still too brief.  
 Chapter two is also original in its attempt to categorise the Scottish decisions 
and apply structure to them. Although an improvement on existing accounts of the 
law, chapter two’s approach nevertheless only papers over cracks in the 
jurisprudence, since the Scottish courts have failed to develop a coherent approach to 
recklessness and negligence. 
 
                                                
78 J Barton, “Recklessness in Scots criminal law: subjective or objective?” 2011 JR, forthcoming 
considers only a few cases, largely ignoring the bigger (more confused) picture. 
79 Gordon, Criminal Law paras 7.35-7.77. 




(2) Comparison of Scots and English law 
A second original contribution to knowledge is the comparison of Scots and English 
laws’ approaches to recklessness and negligence. Chapter three explores the English 
jurisprudence and relates it back to the discussion of Scots law in chapter two. Such a 
comparison is useful to academic debate, as the differences between Scots and 
English law are rarely studied in detail. There is, however, much that the two systems 
could learn from each other. 
 
(3) Use of modern criminal law theory 
It was mentioned above that Gordon’s Criminal Law contains the most useful study 
of recklessness and negligence in Scotland. Since the last edition (2000-2001), much 
theoretical work on recklessness and negligence has been produced, and this is useful 
in analysing both Scots and English law. Chapters four, five and six thus make a 
third original contribution to knowledge in their analysis of this theory, particularly 
in relation to Scots law. 
 Although some theorists make use of Scottish authority in relation to their 
arguments concerning recklessness and negligence (for instance Duff 80  and 
Tadros),81 their accounts – despite being useful – discuss only a fraction of the 
existing jurisprudence considered in chapter two and are wholeheartedly normative, 
rather than descriptive. The theory propounded in this thesis aims at being both. 
 
(4) The practicalities of character theory 
A final original contribution to knowledge concerns the important role that character, 
desire and belief play in the account of culpable risk-taking developed in chapters 
five and six. Such a theory has not yet been developed in detail, and so there has 
been no consideration of how various procedural difficulties might need to be 
overcome. Chapter seven sketches answers to these difficult procedural questions. 
 
 
                                                
80 Duff, IACL ch 7. 
81 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility ch 9. 





D. DEFINITIONAL MATTERS 
There are two definitional points to be made before proceeding. 
 
(1) “Subjective” and “objective” 
References to “subjective” and “objective” accounts of mens rea are common.82 Put 
simply, “subjective” accounts focus on the accused’s mental state at the time of 
acting, whilst “objective” accounts concentrate on external standards such as the 
reasonable person. 83  This leads to talk of “subjective” definitions of culpable 
carelessness (which concentrate on the accused’s awareness of risk) and “objective” 
definitions (which concentrate on what the reasonable person would have been aware 
of). As will be seen throughout the thesis, the “subjective”/“objective” dichotomy is 
neither descriptively nor normatively useful. There are three further reasons why the 
labels “subjective” and “objective” are more problematic than is usually recognised. 
 First, even “subjective” accounts of culpable carelessness require 
unjustifiable risk-taking. Justification is typically assessed with reference to 
“objective” standards.84 Recklessness is, therefore, rarely truly “subjective”.85 If it 
were, the Crown would have a difficult time proving any offender had been reckless. 
It would be easy for the accused to argue that she thought the instance of risk-taking 
was justifiable and escape conviction. This would have important ramifications for 
the effectiveness of – and the respect accorded to – the law. 
 Those who are wedded to the idea that culpability turns on the accused’s 
perceptions86 might reply that the merit of their theory is its concentration solely on 
the actor (hence the label “subjective”). This raises a second problem: “subjectivists” 
are not the only theorists concerned with the actor. Character theorists concentrate on 
the accused’s character traits; indifference theorists focus on the accused’s attitude. 
                                                
82 GH Gordon, “Subjective and objective mens rea” (1974-1975) 17 Crim LQ 355 at 368. 
83 Whilst appearing to be gender neutral, the change from “reasonable man” to “reasonable person” 
has been labelled superficial by some feminists, who contend that the standard is still (male) gendered. 
See, further, M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the 
Objective Standard (2003) ch 6. 
84 See §5.A(1), below. 
85 D Stuart, “Mens rea, negligence and attempts” [1968] Crim LR 647 at 652; C Wells, “Swatting the 
subjectivist bug” [1982] Crim LR 209 at 210. 
86 E.g. Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability 63. 




These matters are surely just as “subjective” as the accused’s mental state.87 In 
consequence, the label “subjectivist” is typically misleading, providing another 
reason to use it sparingly. 
 Thirdly, the terms “subjective” and “objective” are used by different authors 
to mean different things. Over and above the usages mentioned thus far, reference to 
“objective” ways of proving “subjective” mental states is common.88 The Crown 
could point to (“objective”) external evidence of how obvious a certain risk was and 
ask the court to draw the appropriate inference (that the accused foresaw the risk, or 
ought to have) without the need to establish what happened in the accused’s mind at 
the time she acted.89  This method, although epistemologically questionable, is 
necessitated because of the presumption of innocence and the connected right to 
silence. If the accused chooses to exercise this right, the Crown must rely on 
“objective” facts. Even if the accused does give evidence, she surely has good reason 
to lie about her state of awareness.90 The judge or jury might therefore prefer 
“objective” inferences of culpability over a “subjective” claim of innocence. 
 For these reasons, the terms “subjective” and “objective” will continue to 
appear in inverted commas. Typically, these terms will be replaced with more 
accurate ones. For instance, in chapter four, “subjectivists” become various species 
of “choice theorist”; “objective” recklessness will be referred to as “inadvertent 
recklessness” (or, sometimes, “negligence”), and so on. 
 
(2) The accused 
One final point concerns the label given to the citizen accused of a crime. As the 
thesis covers both Scots and English jurisprudence, terminological clashes will 
occur. Care has been taken to use the appropriate label (accused in Scotland; 
defendant in England) when discussing individual cases. Where no specific 
jurisdiction is being referred to, the term “accused” will be used. 
                                                
87 Cf Duff, IACL 157. 
88 See Gordon (n 82) at 368. 
89 If such a demonstration is possible: it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss whether risk 
perception could be measured by scientific methods (e.g. brain-scanning). 
90 J Chalmers, “Lieser and misconceptions” 2008 SCL 1115 at 1119. 





 Now that the structure, scope and definitions of the thesis have been 
explained, it is time to turn to the substantive argument. It begins by exploring the 





2 An “Utter Disregard” for Clarity: the Scottish 
Approach 
 
This chapter argues that recklessness1 and negligence are unclear concepts in Scots 
criminal law.2 This is due to the absence of a coherent theoretical framework for the 
courts to work within.3 Demonstrating this will act as a prelude to theoretical 
consideration of culpability for carelessness which will be used to appraise Scots 
(and English)4 law’s approach,5 before reforms can be proposed.6 
Section A considers the views of Scottish writers concerning recklessness and 
negligence, to show up some deficiencies in approach. In order to demonstrate that 
Scots law’s approach to these terms is incoherent, section B moves on to discuss the 
troublesome concept of “negligence” in the criminal law. Then, sections C-G identify 
five separate forms of “recklessness” in the Scots jurisprudence: 
 
i) Allan v Patterson recklessness (employed in most statutory offences); 
ii) Quinn v Cunningham recklessness (used in most common-law offences); 
iii) Jamieson recklessness (found, at common law, in rape); 
iv) “Wicked” recklessness (exclusive to murder); and 
v) Brennan recklessness (utilised in cases where the accused was voluntarily 
intoxicated to the extent that she was unable, at the time of performing an 
actus reus,7 to form mens rea). 
 
                                                
1 Recklessness as to circumstances will not be distinguished from recklessness as to consequences. 
This dichotomy has not developed in the Scots jurisprudence. 
2 There is not space to deal here with recklessness and negligence in attempts and art and part liability. 
3 V Tadros, “Recklessness, consent and the transmission of HIV” (2001) 5 EdinLR 371 at 376. 
4 See ch 3, below. 
5 See chs 5-6, below. 
6 See ch 7, below. 
7 Strictly, an action cannot be an actus reus if mens rea is absent: Gordon, Criminal Law para 3.04. 




The courts have put little, if any, thought into how these categories inter-
relate.8 There are also contradictory decisions within each category: some hint at 
advertence to risk as being necessary for recklessness; some point in the opposite 
direction; and others are equivocal on the advertence/inadvertence issue. The 
categorisation exercise undertaken in this chapter does not, therefore, add much 
clarity to the concepts of recklessness and negligence in Scots criminal law – the 
cases are simply too disjointed to make that aim attainable. The chapter instead seeks 
merely to expose the problems in the Scots jurisprudence, so that later chapters can 




It is helpful to first consider the early Scots writers, before examining modern 
treatments. 
 
(1) The early writers 
The works of the early Scots writers are largely unhelpful when considering modern 
mens rea terms like recklessness and negligence. Some of these writers nevertheless 
continue to exert influence on the development of the law, and so the following brief 
overview justifies largely ignoring them from hereinafter. 
 Mens rea was not discussed by Scottish writers until relatively recently. 
Mackenzie (1699) introduces the alternative concept of dole – a “wicked design” 
which must be present to make an action criminal.9 Dole was inferred from the 
circumstances and, in serious offences, negligence was not equivalent to it.10 This 
much is clear, but matters are complicated by Mackenzie’s view that, if the accused’s 
act was viewed as wrongful enough in itself (for instance, sodomy), dole need not be 
proved.11 
                                                
8 See, similarly, ibid para 7.48. 
9 G Mackenzie, The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal Wherein it is to be Seen how 
the Civil Law, and the Laws and Customs of Other Nations doth Agree with, and Supply, Ours, 2nd edn 
(1699) 5. The first edition (1678) speaks in identical terms. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 




 Bayne’s account (1730) is similar, describing dole as “a malevolent 
Intention... an essential Ingredient to constitute an Action criminal; but no 
Negligence is equal to [dole]... Unless the Negligence is so extremely supine, as can 
hardly be conceived without implying Dole”.12 
 Both Mackenzie and Bayne mention negligence, then, but it remains unclear 
what role it undertook. Was negligence a form of acting, from which a(n 
intentional?) mental state could be inferred, or an alternative head of 
blameworthiness meriting punishment? 
 Hume’s discussion of dole (1844)13 is hardly more helpful in establishing the 
origins of recklessness and negligence. Dole is an inference from the circumstances 
that the accused possessed “a corrupt and malignant disposition, a heart 
contemptuous of order, and regardless of social duty”.14 This description goes 
beyond the accused’s thoughts at the time of acting, and countenances a wider, 
normative judgement of the accused’s motives and whether she had any defences.15 
Dole was not, therefore, a synonym for mens rea. It was a much broader concept,16 
concerned more with the circumstances of the offence than the mental state of the 
accused.17 
 After Hume, discussions of culpability do not appear in many Scottish works. 
Burnett’s Treatise (1811) begins with the crime of murder, and he requires a specific 
element of intention in order for that crime to be complete.18 Burnett’s focus is on 
how this is to be proved by inference from the circumstances. A similar approach is 
adopted by Alison (1832), who also allows for “utter recklessness as to the life of the 
                                                
12 A Bayne, Institutions of the Criminal Law of Scotland: For the Use of the Students Who Attend the 
Lectures of Alexander Bayne, JP (1730) 9-10. See, similarly, J Erskine, The Principles of the Law of 
Scotland: In the Order of Sir George Mackenzie’s Institutions of that Law, Vol II (1754) 469-470. 
13 D Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting Crimes, 4th edn with notes by BR Bell 
(1844) 21. The discussion remains largely unaltered from the first edition (1797). 
14 Ibid 22. 
15 See: ibid 254; HM Advocate v Maclean, February 1710 (see J MacLaurin, Arguments and 
Decisions, in Remarkable Cases, Before the High Court of Justiciary, and the Other Supreme Courts, 
in Scotland (1774) 24). 
16 V Tadros, “Insanity and the capacity for criminal responsibility” (2001) 5 EdinLR 325 at 328. 
17 L Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order: Crime and the Genius of Scots Law, 1747 to 
the Present (1997) 150-151. 
18 J Burnett, A Treatise on Various Branches of the Criminal Law of Scotland (1811) 4-5. 




sufferer, whether he live or die” to satisfy the fault element of murder.19 This might 
suggest a move towards consideration of recklessness as a mental state, but the 
discussion is almost immediately related back to Hume’s wider discussion of dole, 
which does not mention recklessness.20 This makes the drawing of any settled 
conclusions unwise:21 even though the terms “recklessness” and “negligence” appear 
in writings from the mid-nineteenth century, it is unclear what they meant or if they 
were terms of legal art. 
 The next major writer, Macdonald (1948),22 deals with individual culpability 
quickly, concentrating on the moralistic notion of wickedness, with copious 
reference to Hume’s discussion of dole.23 Anderson’s account (1904) similarly cites 
Hume and emphasises considerations of motive and the role of intention in the 
criminal law.24 Nothing specific is said about risk-taking – either in the guise of 
recklessness or negligence.  
 From these early texts, it is clear that, until at least the mid-twentieth century, 
the concepts of recklessness and negligence (and the notion of culpability in general) 
remained opaque in Scotland. There were no clear distinctions between act, mind and 
character. This is indicative of the broader point, that nobody knows what relevance 
dole has for modern lawyers.25 It is safer to discard the concept and proceed on the 
assumption that the early writers can offer no assistance in clarifying the meanings of 
recklessness and negligence in Scots criminal law. 
 Modern accounts are slightly more helpful in this regard. 
 
                                                
19 A Alison, Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland (1832) 1 (emphasis added). The quoted text 
comes from the case of Colin Telfer (1815) (see Hume, Commentaries (n 13) 257 (n 3). 
20 Alison, Principles (n 19) 2 (n 1). 
21 Cf J Barton, “Recklessness in Scots criminal law: subjective or objective?” 2011 JR, forthcoming. 
22 The first and second editions of Macdonald’s work aim to concentrate on offences which imply 
“malice or criminal recklessness”: JHA Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of 
Scotland, 2nd edn (1877) 1. This ambition is expressed in later editions. 
23 JHA Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland, 5th edn by J Walker and DJ 
Stevenson (1948) 1-2. 
24 AM Anderson, The Criminal Law of Scotland, 2nd edn (1904) 1-4. 
25 RS Shiels, “The unsettled relevance of dole” 2010 SCL 421.  




(2) Modern treatments 
The word “modern” is used loosely, as a detectable sea-change occurred in the 
1960s, with the publication of works by Smith26 and Gordon.27 
 Smith (1962) is the first author to use mens rea as a synonym for dole28 and 
identifies it with a “guilty intention or negligence”.29 These elements are familiar, but 
Smith also states that the culpable accused’s “mind must have intended or been 
reckless with regard to the actus reus”.30 Again, recklessness is not defined and it 
becomes clear that dole cannot exist where the accused had a defence.31 Dole was 
thus still not the same as mens rea. This makes Smith’s account unhelpful for present 
purposes.  
Gordon’s text (1967) is more original. Gordon is critical of most of the 
Scottish writers since Hume,32 and addresses the matter of culpability afresh, with 
reference to the Anglo-American understanding of mens rea. He thus dispenses with 
talk of “dole”33 and separates out mens rea and the defences that do not impact upon 
it.34 This approach has proved influential: modern Scottish authors35 shy away from 
talk of dole36 and employ Anglo-American commentary, typically to good effect. 
 Gordon’s treatment of recklessness and negligence is relatively extensive – 
totalling thirty-four pages in the most recent edition37 – and is clear on the mental 
aspects of these terms. Gordon’s account is also noteworthy in its use of criminal law 
theory. Unfortunately, the works cited now look dated. Gordon’s views on the case 
                                                
26 TB Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (1962) chs 5-6.  
27 GH Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland (1967). 
28 Taylor equated mens rea with dole in his lectures. See J Chalmers, “Thomas Taylor’s lectures on 
criminal law”, in HL MacQueen (ed), Miscellany Five by Various Authors (2006) 189 at 198-200. 
29 Smith, A Short Commentary (n 26) 132. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid 133, 137-153. 
32 See, particularly, GH Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, 2nd edn (1978) para 0.02. 
33 GH Gordon, “Cawthorne and the mens rea of murder” 1969 SLT (News) 41 at 44-45; Gordon, 
Criminal Law para 7.02. 
34 Some “defences” (e.g. mistake) might impact upon mens rea. 
35 The judiciary has not always followed suit. See e.g.: Transco plc v HM Advocate 2004 JC 29 at para 
3 per Lord Osborne, para 42 per Lord Hamilton; Docherty v Brown 1996 JC 48 at 54 per the Lord 
Justice-Clerk (Ross); Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) 1993 JC 43 at 47-48 per the Lord 
Justice-Clerk (Ross); Ross v HM Advocate 1991 JC 210 at 213 per the Lord Justice-General (Hope); 
Roberts v Hamilton 1989 JC 91 at 94 per the Lord Justice-Clerk (Ross); Dean v John Menzies 
(Holdings) Ltd 1981 JC 23 at 29 per Lord Cameron. 
36 See Shiels (n 25) at 424-427. 
37 Gordon, Criminal Law paras 7.35-7.77. 




law are also showing their age. For instance, the important decision in Transco plc v 
HM Advocate38 (discussed below) post-dates the most recent edition by three years.39 
 Since Gordon, there has been little in-depth treatment of recklessness and 
negligence in the Scottish literature. Christie (2005) 40  undertakes a lengthy 
discussion of dole,41 and considers recklessness specifically.42 He views mental 
awareness of risk as irrelevant to recklessness, which blurs the line he draws between 
recklessness and negligence. Christie’s view nevertheless relies almost exclusively 
on cases which – as explained below – should be used with caution.43 The same 
criticism may be made of the Scottish Law Commission (1983)44 and the authors of 
the Draft Criminal Code for Scotland (2003),45 both of whom endorse whole-
heartedly an “objective” approach to recklessness on the basis of some vague 
decisions, with little or no normative argument marshalled in their support.46 
 There have been only a few articles on recklessness and negligence (although 
“wicked” recklessness has been discussed more often).47 An early work by Ferguson 
(1985)48 draws parallels from murder cases which (again, as demonstrated below)49 
is unsafe. A more contemporary article by Chalmers (2008) is refreshingly critical of 
the influence of some decisions on recklessness, demonstrating their limitations.50 
This insight is taken forward in a recent essay – again by Ferguson (2010) – which 
seeks to draw principled distinctions in the law of recklessness.51 The cases discussed 
                                                
38 2004 JC 29. 
39 Transco is mentioned briefly in GH Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland: Third Edition 
Supplement by MGA Christie (2005) para 7.59. 
40 See his contributions to the chapter “Criminal law”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2005). 
41 Ibid at paras 56-59. 
42 Ibid at paras 81, 89. 
43 Prime offenders are Allan v Patterson 1980 JC 57 and Ward v Robertson 1938 JC 32. 
44 The Mental Element in Crime (Scot Law Com No 80, 1983) paras 4.29-4.39. 
45  See E Clive et al, A Draft Criminal Code for Scotland with Commentary (2003) 32-33. 
Recklessness is defined in section 10 of the Code. 
46 See, also, the Judicial Studies Committee’s Jury Manual (2011), available at http://www.scotland-
judiciary.org.uk/Upload/Documents/JuryManual_1.pdf, which describes recklessness as “objective” 
throughout, without adverting to the decisions that cast doubt upon that contention. 
47 See §2.F, below. 
48 PW Ferguson, “Recklessness and the reasonable man in Scots criminal law” 1985 JR 29. 
49 At §2.F. 
50 J Chalmers, “Lieser and misconceptions” 2008 SCL 1115 at 1116-1120. 
51 PW Ferguson, “The mental element in crime”, in J Chalmers, F Leverick and L Farmer (eds), 
Essays in Criminal Law in Honour of Sir Gerald Gordon (2010) 141 at 153-157. 




by Ferguson are, nevertheless, drawn very selectively52 and, because he looks at the 
mental element in crime more generally, the discussion of recklessness is extremely 
brief. Finally, Barton has argued recently (2011) that recklessness was always 
understood in an “objective” sense in Scots law before the decision in Transco.53 His 
survey is limited to statutory and common law forms of recklessness and is thus not 
as expansive as that conducted below. Furthermore, the cases Barton relies on are 
mostly vague, and do not support his strong conclusions.  
 That leaves the textbooks.54 These give the impression that recklessness is a 
monolithic (“objective”) concept in Scots law,55 before qualifying that statement to a 
greater,56 or lesser,57 extent. Some accounts of the law are utterly confused. For 
example, a recent student textbook reports that: “Recklessness requires that the actor 
should have been aware of the existence of the risk. It is difficult to see how one can 
be reckless in relation to a risk which had escaped one’s attention.”58  These 
sentences seem contradictory concerning the accused’s awareness of risk, which is 
an important consideration in discussions of culpable carelessness. The first sentence 
suggests that recklessness does not require awareness of risk (should have been 
aware), whilst the second suggests that a person cannot be reckless if unaware of a 
risk (escaped... attention). The confusion that these sentences evidence is, however, 
somewhat understandable: the law is in such disarray that saying anything concrete 
about recklessness in Scots criminal law requires an in-depth analysis of the 
jurisprudence, such as that undertaken below in sections C-G. It certainly requires 
more than a few pages in a generalist textbook, or the posing of a simple question 
regarding whether recklessness is “subjective” or objective”. 
                                                
52 This chapter does not analyse all decisions on recklessness and negligence. It is, nevertheless, more 
thorough than anything else in the existing literature. 
53 Barton (n 21). 
54 Recklessness is mentioned briefly in some monographs: e.g. C McDiarmid, Childhood and Crime 
(2007) 80-81. 
55 TH Jones and MGA Christie, Criminal Law, 4th edn (2008) paras 3.30, 3.32. 
56 See: PR Ferguson and C McDiarmid, Scots Criminal Law: A Critical Analysis (2009) para 6.15.1; 
CHW Gane, CN Stoddart and J Chalmers, A Casebook on Scottish Criminal Law, 4th edn (2009) para 
2.29; C McDiarmid, Criminal Law Essentials 2nd edn (2010) 85. 
57 See e.g. Jones and Christie, Criminal Law (n 55) para 3.31. 
58 AM Cubie, Scots Criminal Law, 3rd edn (2010) 42. See, similarly, S Christie, Introduction to Scots 
Criminal Law, 2nd edn (2009) 40-41. 




 Before embarking on the survey of the Scots decisions on recklessness, it is 
necessary – for reasons which will become apparent – to discuss briefly the place of 
negligence in the criminal law. 
 
 
B. “GROSS” NEGLIGENCE 
Ferguson and McDiarmid suggest that talk of “negligence” is unhelpful in the 
context of Scots criminal law, as it confuses matters.59 Other authors are similarly 
dismissive, dealing with negligence in a few pages,60 or ignoring it entirely.61 This 
makes sense if recklessness can exist where the accused ought to have foreseen the 
risk. This allows for the possibility that the accused was inadvertent, which is usually 
the mark of negligence. Recklessness and negligence can, therefore, be collapsed 
together if an “objective” approach towards culpable carelessness is adopted.62 
 In some contexts, the view that Scots law collapses recklessness and 
negligence is defensible. As seen below, in statutory offences, there is arguably no 
practical distinction between recklessness and “gross” negligence.63 In some cases, 
the courts have treated the two as synonyms, with “mere” negligence being confined 
to the civil courts.64  
 Common law crimes have also, at times, been defined with reference to 
negligence. At one point, the standard of fault required for a conviction of “lawful 
act” culpable homicide was: “gross, or wicked, or criminal negligence, something 
amounting, or at any rate analogous to a criminal indifference to consequences”.65 
This was accepted, for some time, as being the standard of recklessness required for 
many common law offences.66 It was, however, criticised by Lord Osborne in 
                                                
59 Ferguson and McDiarmid, Scots Criminal Law (n 56) para 6.17.1. 
60 Negligence is dealt with in a single paragraph in Jones and Christie, Criminal Law (n 55) para 3.34.  
61 See e.g. Gane, Stoddart and Chalmers, Casebook (n 56). 
62 Cf the provisions on criminal negligence (defined with reference to “reckless disregard” for life or 
safety) in the Criminal Code of Canada s 219. 
63 Cf: Connell v Mitchell 1913 SC (J) 13 at 17 per Lord Guthrie ; Ferguson (n 48) at 32 (both of which 
try to explain such a distinction). 
64 See: HM Advocate v Smillie (1883) 5 Coup 287 at 292 per Lord Young; Dalzell v Dickie and 
Murray (1905) 4 Adam 693; Waugh v Campbell 1920 JC 1 at 16-17 per Lord Salveson. 
65 Paton v HM Advocate 1936 JC 19 at 22 per the Lord Justice-Clerk (Aitchison). Cf Charles v HM 
Advocate, unreported, High Court of Justiciary, 2 April 2002. 
66 Quinn v Cunningham 1956 JC 22 at 24-25 per the Lord Justice-General (Clyde). 




Transco.67 This is primarily because the definition employs the term “criminal 
negligence” when that was what it sought to define. It is thus partially circular.68 
Once the offending parts of the definition have been removed, in substance all that is 
left is “gross or wicked... indifference to consequences”.69 Although this might still 
be conceived of as a standard that can be satisfied even where the accused was 
unaware of the relevant risk, the court in Transco was clear that, to be guilty of 
culpable homicide, the actor must have a “state of mind” in relation to the risks she 
was taking with the lives of others.70 
 The law’s development suggests that “gross” negligence and recklessness are 
not always collapsible, particularly in common law offences. This causes problems 
for the normal tendency to ignore negligence, as recklessness is not necessarily 
synonymous with it. Although the label “gross negligence” is now rare,71 there is still 
arguably widespread use of negligence liability (i.e. inadvertent risk-taking) in 
Scotland. This will become clear during the discussion in the rest of the chapter 
concerning the jurisprudence of the Scottish courts on the meaning of “recklessness”. 
 
 
C. ALLAN v PATTERSON RECKLESSNESS 
When considering most statutory offences capable of reckless commission, the 
Crown need not prove that the accused adverted to the risks attendant upon her 
conduct, as long as a reasonable person in the accused’s position would have 
adverted to the relevant risk and chosen not to take it (or would, at least, have taken 
additional precautions). 
 This position is stated in Allan v Patterson,72 where the appeal court had to 
decide whether the (now repealed) offence of reckless driving73 required the Crown 
                                                
67 At para 4. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See §2.D(3), below. 
71 This development began before Transco: L Farmer, “Debatable land: an essay on the relationship 
between English and Scottish criminal law” (1999) 3 EdinLR 32 at 43. 
72 1980 JC 57. 
73 Road Traffic Act 1972 s 2 (as amended). Reckless driving was abolished by the Road Traffic Act 
1991 s 1 and replaced with dangerous driving (Road Traffic Act 1988 s 2). 




to show that the accused had adverted to the risks upon his driving. In deciding that it 
did not, the Lord Justice-General (Emslie) reasoned that:74 
 
Inquiry into the state of knowledge of a particular driver accused of the offence... is 
not required... The statute diverts attention to the quality of the driving in fact but not 
the state of mind... of the driver... Parliament requires the court or the jury to 
consider and determine... the degree to which the driver in question falls below the 
standard to be expected of a careful and competent driver in all circumstances of the 
particular case, and whether the degree is such as properly to attach... the epithet 
‘reckless’... [This] requires a judgment to be made quite objectively. 
 
From this judgment, it is “crystal clear”75 that, unless the accused can offer a 
suitable explanation for her conduct,76 then her mental state is ignored entirely. As 
such explanations are rarely (if ever) accepted,77 an (“objectively”) unjustified act of 
risk-taking will suffice. “Reckless” thus qualifies an action,78 not the actor.79  
 Allan v Patterson recklessness has been employed most often in statutory 
offences, and their regulatory nature has meant that the use of inadvertent 
recklessness has proved uncontroversial. For example, Allan v Patterson recklessness 
has been used in causing death by reckless driving,80 unlawfully and maliciously 
causing an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious injury to property,81 
vandalism,82 and dangerous driving.83 
 This is in contrast to common law offences. There, as will be seen shortly, the 
description of recklessness in Allan v Patterson has been disapproved of. It will be 
argued that the common law test for recklessness appears to turn more on whether or 
not the accused was aware, mentally, of risk. Chalmers is thus correct that “Allan v 
                                                
74 At 60. 
75 McNab v Guild 1989 JC 72 at 76 per the Lord Justice-Clerk (Ross). 
76 Allan v Patterson at 60 per the Lord Justice-General (Emslie). 
77 An immediate threat of death or serious injury might be a suitable explanation for dangerous 
conduct: McNab v Guild at 75 per the Lord Justice-Clerk (Ross) (the accused’s plea of necessity was, 
however, rejected in that case). 
78 See, also, Skeen v Peacock 1970 SLT (Sh Ct) 66. Cf HM Advocate v Campbell 1994 SLT 502 (to 
drive “recklessly” with defective brakes would require knowledge of the fault). Campbell suggests a 
dichotomy between cases where it is the manner of driving which is complained of, as opposed to 
driving at all. This distinction has not appeared in subsequent cases. 
79 For criticism of this approach, see S Cunningham, “Recklessness: being reckless and acting 
recklessly” (2010) 21 KLJ 445. 
80 Under the Road Traffic Act 1972 s 1 (repealed): Crowe v HM Advocate 1990 JC 112. 
81 Under the Explosives Act 1883 s 2: McIntosh v HM Advocate 1994 SLT 59. 
82 Under the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 s 78 (repealed): Black v Allan 1985 SCCR 11. See 
now the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 s 52. 
83 Under the Road Traffic Act 1988 s 2: McDowall v HM Advocate 1998 JC 194. 




Patterson is a case which is cited... far more often than it should be.”84 That case’s 
conduct-based approach to recklessness is confined to certain regulatory, statutory 
offences. Its influence should not stretch beyond this. 
 
 
D. QUINN v CUNNINGHAM RECKLESSNESS 
The approach adopted in relation to recklessness in common law crimes is far from 
clear. Early cases of “lawful act” culpable homicide demonstrate the widespread use 
of negligence liability in a serious common law crime.85 The role that the accused 
occupied – and her failure to fulfil any associated duties – appears to have been more 
relevant than her mental state.86 This perhaps has more to do with the process of 
industrialisation (and a desire to “send a message” to those who showed undue 
regard for the risks involved in it),87 rather than a considered view of individual 
culpability.88  
 As noted above, this has been reflected in a move away from talk of 
negligence, in favour of “objective”, inadvertent recklessness. “Gross” negligence 
and recklessness are treated as synonyms. This might, however, be a misconception, 
because the courts have expressed a “wave of disfavour”89 over applying the 
“objective” test in Allan v Patterson to common law crimes. This means that the 
understanding of recklessness in common law offences is different from that in the 
majority of statutory crimes. Unfortunately, the courts have struggled to explain why 
this is the case, with three possible ways of limiting the ambit of Allan v Patterson 
recklessness being presented. These will be considered in turn. 
 
 
                                                
84 J Chalmers, “Lieser and misconceptions” 2008 SCL 1115 at 1117. 
85 See e.g.: HM Advocate v McHaffie 1827 Syme 38; HM Advocate v Young (1839) 2 Swin 376. There 
appears to have been a presumption of culpability in certain cases, e.g. where boats collided: HM 
Advocate v MacPherson and Stewart (1861) 4 Irv 85 at 87 per Lord Neaves. 
86 This is similar to “negligence as failure of conduct”, introduced below at §5.B. 
87 See e.g. HM Advocate v Latto (1857) 2 Irv 732 at 737 per the Lord Justice-Clerk (Hope). 
88 L Farmer, Criminal Law, Tradition and Legal Order: Crime and the Genius of Scots Law, 1747 to 
the Present (1997) ch 5. 
89 J Chalmers, “Fireraising: from the ashes?” 2000 SLT (News) 57 at 61. 




(1) The limits of Allan v Patterson recklessness 
 
(a) Conduct v mens rea 
First, in Carr v HM Advocate,90 the Lord Justice-General (Hope) opined that the 
definition of recklessness in Allan v Patterson:91 
 
 [I]s entirely in point… where the accused is charged with doing something which is 
otherwise lawful but with doing it in a manner which can be described as reckless. 
But in a case of fire-raising it is not the manner of doing an act which would 
otherwise be lawful which is in issue but… [instead] whether the accused had the 
mens rea necessary for the commission of a crime. 
 
 Lord Hope highlights an important distinction between a careless act and a 
reckless or negligent agent.92 This distinction might be better put as being between 
wrongdoing (the taking of an unjustified risk) and culpable wrongdoing (the taking 
of an unjustified risk combined with a further, “subjective” element of fault). On first 
blush, Allan v Patterson dealt with the former, whilst Carr – being concerned with a 
common law crime – focussed on the latter.93  
 This is questionable, because there is surely more than just wrongful conduct 
present in cases of Allan v Patterson recklessness. There is a personal element of 
fault insofar as the accused could have acted in the proper way. Two things merely 
obfuscate matters. First, the elements of wrongdoing and culpability are largely 
indistinguishable, assuming the accused was capable of performing better than she 
did. In the majority of cases, the concentration will thus simply be on conduct. 
Secondly, if mens rea is understood to simply mean a state of (conscious) awareness 
then, arguably, the element of personalised fault in inadvertent risk-taking is not 
mens rea. This argument has, in fact, been made by a number of Anglo-American 
authors.94 The problem is that, as noted above, mens rea is not understood terribly 
well in Scots criminal law. 
                                                
90 1994 JC 203. 
91 At 208. 
92 Gordon, Criminal Law para 7.35. 
93 Cf HM Advocate v S, unreported, High Court of Justiciary, 5 October 1999, where Lord Caplan 
suggested that “[t]he crime of reckless conduct requires not only recklessness but culpability”. 
94 See §4.A(2)(a), below. 




  It is thus difficult to decide whether the court in Carr was correct to draw a 
distinction between the definitions of recklessness in offences requiring conduct 
alone and those requiring mens rea. Further doubts arise when consideration is given 
to the fact that Allan v Patterson recklessness has been applied almost exclusively to 
statutory offences. Although most statutory offences fall into the conduct-only 
category, some do not.95 It is also not the case that only statutory offences are 
concerned with careless action – some common law crimes (e.g. reckless injury and 
reckless endangerment) are concerned with conduct alone. Should these offences be 
dealt with on Allan v Patterson grounds? The answer appears to be no,96 which 
makes the distinction drawn in Carr questionable. 
 Finally, as there is no list of crimes and offences which require only conduct 
and those which require mens rea (whatever this term is taken to mean), the 
definition of recklessness to be employed will be established on an ad hoc, case-by-
case, basis. This seems intolerably uncertain given the serious consequences which 
might flow from conviction, and so this potential limit on Allan v Patterson 
recklessness should be dispensed with. 
 
(b) The court’s knowledge 
Secondly, it has been pointed out that the behaviour to be expected of the accused in 
many statutory contexts (most obviously, driving), is within the common knowledge 
of the court, meaning that Allan v Patterson’s “objective”, conduct-based approach is 
acceptable. Where the conduct expected of the accused is specialist, “objective” 
recklessness is apparently inappropriate.  
This argument was presented in Cameron v Maguire,97 which involved the 
culpable and reckless discharge of firearms. The trial judge, following an earlier case 
(Gizzi v Tudhope),98 directed the jury in terms of Allan v Patterson. On appeal, Lord 
Marnoch doubted this approach, noting “that while the standard of driving to be 
                                                
95 Consider the offence of being reckless as to the truth of a statement under the Marine (Scotland) Act 
2010 s 42(1)(b), which surely relates to the accused’s appreciation of the veracity (or falsity) of a 
statement, rather than the conduct of making the statement itself. 
96 On reckless injury, see HM Advocate v Harris 1993 JC 150. On reckless endangerment, see 
MacPhail v Clark 1983 SLT (Sh Ct) 37. 
97 1999 JC 63. 
98 1983 SLT 214. 




expected of a competent and careful driver may... be within the knowledge of judge 
or juror, the matter of the discharge of a firearm may not be so familiar to either”.99 
Again, the court preferred a different definition of recklessness in cases where the 
court might need expert evidence to assess the gravity of the accused’s risk-taking 
(see below).100 
 This account of the boundaries of Allan v Patterson recklessness is, again, 
dependant on the individual crime charged. It is therefore unclear whether the court 
will focus on the accused’s conduct alone, or also consider her mental state. Again, 
this uncertainty is unsettling in the context of the criminal law, and the second 
possible limit on the extent of Allan v Patterson recklessness must be rejected. 
 
(c) Statutory offences v common law crimes 
A third distinction was drawn in Transco, where Lord Hamilton (as he then was) 
noted that the crime of culpable homicide required the Crown to show a higher 
standard of fault than that described in Allan v Patterson.101 The implication of this is 
that statutory offences can allow for criminal liability in circumstances where the 
standard of recklessness required for a common law crime (particularly one of the 
severity of culpable homicide) would not be met.102 His Lordship thus decided to 
“respectfully question” the reasoning in an earlier case which had suggested that “the 
statutory and common law tests are interchangeable”.103 
 This distinction between statutory and common law offences demarcates 
clearly where Allan v Patterson recklessness is, and is not, to be employed. It cannot, 
however, continue sensibly. Consider the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 
(discussed below),104 which legislates on many (though not all)105 sexual offences. If 
recklessness is a component of these offences, is it now to be understood in a 
                                                
99 At 65. 
100 At §2.D(2). 
101 At para 39. 
102 See, similarly, Dunn v HM Advocate 1960 JC 55 at 59 per the Lord Justice-Clerk (Thomson). 
103 Transco plc v HM Advocate 2004 JC 29 at para 39 (referring to comments made in Gizzi v 
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conduct-based manner? The answer, at least in relation to consent, must be no, as the 
legislature has outlined the approach the court should take in assessing the accused’s 
risk-taking (the position with regard to other elements of the offences is, however, 
less clear). If more common law offences are to be legislated upon, it would be best 
to avoid a sharp distinction between statutory and common law offences in terms of 
when Allan v Patterson recklessness is, and is not, to be applied. The distinction 
might be reconceptualised as mirroring that between mala prohibita and mala in 
se,106 but this is, at points, a fine line. Furthermore, the court has not relied upon it in 
discussing recklessness and so it will not be considered further. 
 This means that none of the three suggested limits on Allan v Patterson 
recklessness are workable. Of course, this would not matter if the understanding of 
recklessness applied in other criminal offences was qualitatively similar, but it is 
unclear whether or not this is the case. 
 
(2) The test in Quinn v Cunningham 
The definition of recklessness employed in most common law crimes comes from 
Quinn v Cunningham,107 a case involving reckless cycling causing injury to a 
pedestrian. There, the Lord Justice-General (Clyde) opined that recklessness requires 
“an utter disregard of what the consequences of the act in question may be” and 
“indifference to the consequences for the public generally”.108 
Insofar as it appears to necessitate public endangerment, the judgment in 
Quinn v Cunningham may now be doubted. 109  Nevertheless, the qualities of 
“indifference” and “utter disregard” are now accepted as forming the basis of 
common law recklessness.110 This suggests two things. First, the reckless accused 
must have acted extremely carelessly. 111 In this respect, Quinn v Cunningham 
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recklessness is similar to Allan v Patterson recklessness. This seems appropriate 
given that – once more – it was harm attendant on conduct (careless cycling) under 
examination in Quinn v Cunningham. Secondly, in spite of this similarity, the 
requirements of “utter disregard” and “indifference” hint at the need for some 
additional element of fault. Exactly what this element consists of has proved 
controversial: some cases suggest that it is the accused’s disregard of a risk of which 
she was aware; others suggest that it is the same as in Allan v Patterson recklessness 
(i.e. the accused could have foreseen the relevant risk and acted more safely). It is 
useful to consider the arguments for each position separately. 
 
(3) Quinn v Cunningham recklessness and advertence 
A more advertence-based approach to Quinn v Cunningham recklessness can be 
detected in Transco, where Lord Osborne noted that:112 
 
[W]here there is an issue of involuntary culpable homicide, the resolution of the 
issue [of guilt] depends, not upon some objective assessment of the conduct of the 
perpetrator alone, but upon an assessment of his “state of mind at the time of the 
accident”, in other words, an enquiry into whether he possessed the necessary 
criminal intent at the material time, namely a “complete disregard of potential 
dangers and of the consequences of his driving for the public”. 
 
 This dictum points to the need for mental fault, although it is slightly 
confusing that the notion of “utter disregard” (associated, in Quinn v Cunningham, 
with recklessness) is referred to as a form of intention.113 It is submitted that Lord 
Osborne should be read as referring to recklessness, and the need for awareness of 
risk, rather than intention. 
 In his judgment in Transco, Lord Hamilton gave further support to the view 
that a mental state is required for recklessness in culpable homicide:114 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Advocate v Smillie (1883) 5 Coup 287; McCue v Currie 2004 JC 73 at paras 24-25 per Temporary 
Judge Nicholson. 
112 At para 4 (emphasis added). The text in inverted commas is from McDowall v HM Advocate 1998 
JC 194 at 198 per the Lord Justice-General (Rodger). 
113 This was not the first time that intention and recklessness were confused by the courts. See e.g. 
Allenby v HM Advocate 1938 JC 55 at 59 per Lord Wark. Lord Wark suggests that intention can be 
inferred from recklessness, but see Byrne v HM Advocate 2000 JC 155. 
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[T]he mental element in crime (mens rea) is and remains a necessary and significant 
element in the crime of (“lawful act”) culpable homicide. That element may... be 
proved in various ways, including proof by inference from external facts. But it is... 
erroneous to suppose that the actual state of mind of a person accused of culpable 
homicide of this kind can be ignored and guilt or innocence determined solely on the 
basis of proof that the conduct in question fell below an objectively set standard. 
 
 Taken together, Lord Osborne and Lord Hamilton’s statements suggest that 
the Crown must prove (from the circumstances, usually) that the accused possessed a 
level of awareness of a risk of death. 115  To show “utter disregard” of or 
“indifference” towards that risk – and thus be reckless as to it – the accused must be 
aware of that risk.116 
 It might be objected immediately that Transco is unrepresentative. This is for 
three main reasons.  
 
(a) Authority and advertence? 
First, it might be alleged that the court in Transco was simply wrong, and that fault 
in culpable homicide may be proved by reference to the accused’s conduct alone. 
Support for this proposition might be taken from Sutherland v HM Advocate117 and 
McDowall v HM Advocate.118 In Sutherland, the court dwelt on the actions of the 
accused (setting fire to a property in order to defraud insurers) and the obvious risks 
attendant thereon, rather than his mental state regarding the obvious risk of death he 
was posing to his co-conspirator. The trial judge linked this focus to the idea of 
reckless disregard for life in his charge to the jury and the appeal court spoke in 
terms of “criminal negligence”.119 
 In McDowall, the court concentrated again upon what the accused did.120 It is, 
however, plain that this was done in aid of discovering what the accused’s state of 
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mind was at the time of acting. That aspect of McDowall casts doubt on Sutherland, 
rather than Transco. The Lord Justice-General (Rodger)’s statements in McDowall 
were, in fact, relied on expressly by Lord Osborne in Transco.121 
 What this demonstrates is that previous modern culpable homicide cases did 
not exclude the need for awareness of risk in cases of recklessness: they were vague 
on this issue because it never arose directly. The court in Transco undertook an 
extensive review of the existing case law, and it would therefore be a glaring 
omission to overlook binding “objective” decisions if these had existed. Furthermore, 
if this oversight had occurred, the comments in Transco would presumably have 
been attacked in a subsequent reported case. This has not happened. 
 
(b) Corporate confusion? 
A second assault on the comments in Transco might be based upon the fact that the 
court was concerned, in that case, with corporate criminal liability, and the need for 
the Crown to establish mens rea in the company’s “directing mind”.122 This might 
have confused the judges and led them to imply that recklessness required awareness 
of risk. 
 Although there are elements of the charge in Transco which refer explicitly to 
what the company’s management knew, this argument seems weak: the court 
carefully split the discussion of culpable homicide specifically and corporate liability 
generally.123 This, it is submitted, significantly minimises (if not excludes) the 
possibility of confusion. 
 
(c) A “special” case? 
Thirdly, it might be argued that culpable homicide is a “special” case, and that the 
court’s judgment in Transco should be confined to the context of that specific 
crime.124 If Transco is simply authority in relation to culpable homicide, the court did 
not make this clear. The frequent references to culpable homicide in the judgment are 
                                                
121 See the text accompanying n 112, above. 
122 I am grateful to Claire McDiarmid for raising this point. 
123 Lord Osborne split the relevant parts of his judgment using headings. Lord Hamilton’s judgment 
clearly has separate elements concerning culpable homicide (paras 35-45) and corporate criminal 
liability (paras 46-63). 
124 Cf J Chalmers, “Lieser and misconceptions” 2008 SCL 1115 at 1119 (n 29). 




explainable on the basis that the court was dealing with that particular crime in the 
case before it. Furthermore, the Transco court endorsed the Quinn v Cunningham 
definition of recklessness,125 which was developed in a case of reckless cycling, not 
culpable homicide. It would be peculiar (and detrimental to the accessibility of the 
law) if one definition of recklessness were to be employed in different circumstances 
to mean different things. 
 There is, then, a strong case for arguing that Quinn v Cunningham 
recklessness requires that the actor was aware of the risks that she was taking.126 
Unfortunately there is an equally strong (if not stronger) argument pointing to the 
opposite conclusion. 
 
(4) Quinn v Cunningham recklessness and inadvertence 
One case presented as evidence of Quinn v Cunningham recklessness’s “objective” 
approach is Cameron v Maguire.127 There, the accused had discharged a rifle in his 
back garden without checking to see if this would endanger people walking nearby. 
In questioning, the accused admitted that he thought his conduct was safe,128 which 
suggests that he was not aware of the unjustifiable risk that he was taking. In that 
case, recklessness was ascribed to the accused when he was – on one view – unaware 
of the risk that he was posing to the lives of others.  
 There is, however, an aspect of Cameron v Maguire that is often 
overlooked.129 The accused’s admission might, for instance, be taken to mean that he 
had thought about the risks (in which case, he was aware of them) and discounted 
them, incorrectly, as being of marginal importance. This is different from the accused 
being found reckless for failing to think at all.130 
There are, nevertheless, other cases where the accused gave absolutely no 
thought to the risk attendant on her conduct and was still found to have been 
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reckless.131 An example that is relied upon occasionally is Ward v Robertson,132 
which dealt with the common law offence of malicious mischief. The court 
concentrated on the accused’s conduct in deciding whether or not he was culpable. In 
McIntosh v HM Advocate133 (which dealt with a statutory offence),134 the Lord 
Justice-Clerk (Ross) suggested that it was plain from Ward v Robertson that “the test 
of recklessness to be applied is an objective one”.135 
Lord Ross’s view points to two separate confusions in the case law. First, he 
suggests that the same test could be used in statutory and common law offences (a 
matter which, as seen above, has proved controversial). Secondly, Lord Ross implies 
that a focus on conduct necessarily involves ignoring the accused’s mental state. 
With regard to the second of these points, the judgments in Ward v Robertson do not 
appear to advocate an approach to recklessness which is premised on the reasonable 
person’s (rather than the accused’s) ascertainment of risk. At best, the judgments are 
ambiguous,136 focussing more on whether or not the magistrate was entitled to infer 
mens rea from the accused’s acts.137 In other words, the judges concerned themselves 
with the inference of a “subjective” mental state from “objective” facts (conduct, the 
wider circumstances, etc).138 
In fact, the accused’s mental state in Ward v Robertson still appears to have 
borne upon the question of culpability. As Lord Pitman remarked, “[a] person who 
thinks he is doing no harm cannot rightly be convicted of doing something 
maliciously.”139 One problem with this statement is that it is difficult to discern 
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whether malice was co-extensive with recklessness140 – the term malice was never 
understood well in Scots law.141 On reflection, this does not matter: if malice is the 
same as recklessness, then Lord Pitman’s statement suggests the need for awareness 
of risk; if malice is different, then Ward v Robertson has nothing to do recklessness, 
and so “objectivists” ought not to rely on it. Ward v Robertson is thus not useful for 
those who argue that inadvertent recklessness applies in common law crimes. 
 Another point that harms the “objectivists’” perspective relates back to the 
discussion of Transco above. If homicide is a “special case”, much of the 
commentary which holds that “objective” recklessness is applicable in common law 
offences appears to be based on unsound authority.142 For example, Ferguson has 
relied on the “objective” approach adopted in “wicked” recklessness (which only 
applies in murder)143 to argue that recklessness, in general, is not “subjective” in 
Scots law.144 Jones and Christie also base their assertion that recklessness is assessed 
“objectively” upon a murder case.145 
 Admittedly, these points damage, but do not silence, the “objectivists’” 
argument: it remains unclear what “utter disregard” requires. The most extensive 
modern discussion of recklessness in relation to common law offences indicates how 
vague the law is. In HM Advocate v Harris,146 Lord Prosser made the following 
lengthy147 comment, worthy of repetition:148 
 
I see no need here to embark upon a definition of recklessness: in relation to reckless 
conduct causing injury or danger it has... the same meaning as it has in relation to 
culpable homicide, where death has been caused by reckless conduct, and is not a 
crime of intent, with the death being caused by an assault. Whether one uses the 
word recklessness, or such descriptions as gross negligence, that is a familiar 
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concept which I think is readily conveyed to and understood by juries. But it 
involves an assessment of duties owed to others, which... depend upon the 
foreseeability of harmful consequences. Analysis probably becomes unreal; but I 
think that... in deciding that some conduct has been reckless, one will always be at 
least very close to saying that it involved a failure to pay due regard to foreseeable 
consequences of that conduct, which were foreseeably likely to cause injury to 
others, and which could correspondingly reasonably be called dangerous in relation 
to them. 
 
 Five points should be noted. First, Lord Prosser expresses an unwillingness to 
define recklessness. This judicial reluctance to define core mens rea terms is, it is 
submitted, the root cause of the confusion over culpable carelessness in Scots 
criminal law.149 Secondly, Lord Prosser obviously thought that recklessness meant 
the same thing in reckless injury and culpable homicide – again suggesting the latter 
is not a “special case”. Thirdly, nothing in this long quote actually requires or does 
away with advertence. Lord Prosser talks of “failure to pay due regard to foreseeable 
consequences” and, admittedly, discusses “gross negligence”, but that does not 
necessarily endorse full-blooded “objectivism”. It could instead relate to the regard 
that the accused pays to the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a risk that she 
has foreseen.150 Fourthly, Lord Prosser’s conflation of recklessness and “gross” 
negligence – although hinting at support for inadvertent recklessness – proves only 
that the law is utterly confused. Furthermore, given the discussion of “gross” 
negligence above,151 it is difficult to know what to make of the use of this term. 
Fifthly, Lord Prosser is doing much to clarify what kind of risks matter for 
recklessness, which is a matter entirely independent of the actor and her state of 
awareness or unawareness. 
 In short, the case law following Quinn v Cunningham is vague and apparently 
inconsistent, with the question of what recklessness requires in terms of awareness 
being raised indirectly in a handful of cases. Further evidence for this point is present 
in a branch of case law concerning the “reckless” supply of drugs. There, a more 
“subjective” approach might be alleged, and it is thus necessary to consider these 
cases in detail. 
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(5) The drug supply cases: a new frontier? 
It might be objected that grouping many common law offences together in this part 
of the chapter is disingenuous. Perhaps more distinctions should be drawn. A likely 
candidate for a new (more “subjective”) category might be thought to arise from the 
case law on the “reckless” supply of drugs,152 and this section makes the case for not 
considering these as different from other common law offences that employ Quinn v 
Cunningham recklessness. 
 The difficulty posed by the drug supply cases is, again, that they concern 
recklessness only indirectly. Primarily, they are concerned with causation. Khaliq v 
HM Advocate153 established that the voluntary act of a purchaser (in that case, 
children) in ingesting a drug (solvent, sold as part of a “glue-sniffing kit”) did not 
break the causal chain: the suppliers could be held liable for any adverse results of 
the ingestion of the substances, provided they had been “culpable and reckless” in 
relation to the risk of harm to the purchasers. At the preliminary diet, Lord Avonside 
concentrated upon: how much control the accused persons possessed over whether or 
not the children abused the drugs; the criminal act of giving another drugs in 
knowledge of their intentions; that the public knew about solvent abuse and should 
be concerned; and that the accused’s knowledge should have made them desist from 
profiting.154 Nowhere is knowledge related to the question of recklessness; it merely 
seems to make the circumstances seem (for want of a better expression) more 
criminal. 
 A similar approach was adopted on appeal. The Lord Justice-General 
(Emslie) considered separately the matters of culpable and reckless supply and 
knowledge.155 Again, Lord Emslie dealt with the charge as the Crown had set it out 
and identified correctly the core relevance of the accused’s knowledge: the matter of 
whether or not the accused had caused the children to inhale the solvents.156 Lord 
Emslie moved on to consider the “purpose and intention” behind supplying the 
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kits,157 which does not sound like discussion of recklessness. Again, the relevance of 
this purpose was to establish that the accused had caused the children to abuse 
solvents.  
 When read carefully, Khaliq thus says little of worth concerning recklessness. 
It certainly cannot stand for the proposition that, as a matter of law (rather than 
charging practice), certain common law offences of recklessness require awareness 
of risk, as opposed to the (confused) form or recklessness explained first in Quinn v 
Cunningham. In fact, the court in Khaliq is clear that, without the matter of causation 
being included in the charge, the offence of “wilful and reckless conduct to the 
danger of the lieges”158 would not be made out. This adds force to the submission 
that causation, not recklessness, is all that Khaliq is instructive with regard to. 
 Ulhaq v HM Advocate159 extended the principles in Khaliq to cover the 
supply of copious amounts of lighter fluid to adults. The Lord Justice-General 
(Hope) again concentrated on the accused’s knowledge (as inferred from the 
frequency with which lighter fluid was being bought and the accused’s 
admissions). 160  As in Khaliq, this knowledge was important to establishing 
causation; that the supply of substances was equivalent to their administration. 
 The next decision in this line of cases is Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 
1994),161 which concerned a charge of culpable homicide arising from the supply of 
proscribed drugs, which resulted in the user’s death. It was held that the same 
principles at work in Khaliq and Ulhaq applied: a supplier of drugs could still have 
caused the ingestion of those drugs even if a voluntary act on the part of the drug-
user would be required.162 Importantly, the requirement for culpable and reckless 
conduct was emphasised, with the court holding that the supply of proscribed drugs 
was “equivalent to” it.163 Nothing useful is said about recklessness as a form of mens 
rea.  
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 The final case, MacAngus v HM Advocate; Kane v HM Advocate164 also fails 
to reveal anything helpful about recklessness, particularly as a “subjective” mental 
state. This case narrowed the ambit of the Reference decision:165 the Lord Justice-
General (Hamilton) maintained that, contrary to the Reference court’s view, the 
Crown must libel166 and prove that the supply of drugs was “culpable and reckless” 
(rather than “equivalent to” it).167 In such cases, the reckless conduct of the accused 
is a circumstance that weighs against any breaks in the chain of causation which may 
otherwise arise from the voluntary decision of the deceased to ingest the drugs.168 
Again, the focus is on causation, not the accused’s mens rea. 
 All of this means that, although the drugs supply cases are apparently 
concerned with recklessness and the accused’s (“subjective”) knowledge of risk, they 
do not shed any light on the definition of that term in Scots law, and so they do not 
necessitate the formation of a new category in this chapter. With this conclusion in 
mind, it is useful to draw together the discussion concerning Quinn v Cunningham 
recklessness. 
 
(6) Summary: the law in common law offences 
The understanding of recklessness in Quinn v Cunningham is unclear. The difficulty 
is that the question of what it means to show “utter disregard” for, or “indifference” 
towards, risk has rarely been touched upon by the courts. This leads to a confusing 
situation, where the courts apply the same test in seemingly different ways – 
sometimes apparently requiring advertence to risk; other times not. 
 As Gordon cautions, deciding whether the accused has been “reckless” is a 
matter of guilt or innocence – it is important not to read too much into what is strictly 
obiter dicta, or read a judge’s opinion too literally.169 There are, however, some 
general points which can be discerned from the cases discussed above. First, there is 
consensus that the test for common law recklessness is different from that employed 
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in statutory offences – it is just not clear where this distinction lies. Secondly, it is 
unclear what Quinn v Cunningham recklessness requires in terms of awareness of 
risk; any firm conclusions are unsafe. It might be thought that this shows that the 
courts simply do not, in practice, bother themselves with what is, again, a moral 
judgement regarding culpability. That said, the confusion and contradiction pointed 
to above might explain why the courts sometimes concentrate on what the accused 
“must have known”170 from the circumstances – an unhappy compromise between 
“subjectivity” and “objectivity”.  
 The courts have, however, been somewhat clearer in relation to recklessness 




E. JAMIESON RECKLESSNESS 
The Scots law on rape has recently undergone reform following the passing of the 
Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009.171 On paper, the 2009 Act removes talk of 
recklessness from many offences, including rape. As will become apparent, however, 
recklessness might still have a role to play in that offence. 
 It is useful to start by considering the common law of rape. This is for two 
reasons: first, recklessness in rape was distinct from recklessness in other common 
law offences; and, secondly, it gives context to the 2009 Act’s provisions. 
 
(1) The common law 
The common law of rape was described most authoritatively in Lord Advocate’s 
Reference (No 1 of 2001).172 This case concerned the actus reus of rape (and, in 
particular, whether force was required), but the Lord Justice-General (Cullen) noted 
that rape could be committed recklessly. It was important, nevertheless, to:173 
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[D]istinguish between the man who failed to think about, or was indifferent as to, 
whether the woman was consenting (... subjective recklessness); and the man who 
honestly or genuinely believed that the woman was consenting but had failed to 
realise that she was not consenting when there was an obvious risk that this was the 
case. The latter might be described as objective recklessness. 
 
Only the former type of recklessness was sufficient for conviction.174   
 Lord Cullen was clearly influenced by the approach towards errors about 
consent adopted in Jamieson v HM Advocate.175 There, the appeal court held that a 
man176 who had sexual intercourse with a woman could not be found guilty of rape if 
he honestly believed she was consenting. 177  This belief did not have to be 
reasonable.178 
 The concentration in rape, at common law, was therefore on the accused’s 
beliefs and thought processes. It is important to note, however, that Lord Cullen’s 
distinction between “subjective” and “objective” recklessness is peculiar. 
“Subjective” recklessness is usually understood as requiring advertence to risk, but 
Lord Cullen identifies it with a failure to think about consent. This sounds like 
inadvertence, which tends to be the mark of “objective” recklessness, or negligence. 
Admittedly, “indifference” can be read so as to require, or do away with, awareness 
of risk.179 
 Lord Cullen’s distinction is thus unhelpful. It is submitted that Jamieson was 
– however – more “subjective” than previous case law, because the accused could 
argue that he thought there was no risk of non-consent and be acquitted. This is 
contrary to the approach taken in relation to Quinn v Cunningham recklessness. For 
instance, the accused in Cameron v Maguire thought his conduct was safe, but was 
still found to have been reckless with regard to the safety of others. 
 This “subjective” aspect of Jamieson proved extremely controversial. First, it 
was inconsistent with the general Scottish approach to error, which has tended – 
historically – to require that the accused’s mistake be reasonable for it to 
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exculpate.180 Jamieson was therefore anomalous.181 Secondly, commentators pointed 
out the moral indefensibility of the decision.182 As Ashworth notes in the context of 
the equivalent English decision of DPP v Morgan (itself now overruled by 
statute):183 “even if [it] is defensible as a case on general principles [of “subjective” 
mens rea], it is unacceptable as a rape decision.”184  
It was argued that the law should take a more “objective” approach when 
considering whether the accused was mistaken or reckless as to the matter of 
consent. 185  Points raised by commentators were: that the (physical and 
psychological) consequences of risking non-consensual sex were sometimes 
severe;186 that the accused could easily have checked if there was any doubt over the 
matter of consent;187 and that the accused could not “undo” the consequences of his 
mistake. Given these arguments, Ferguson and Raitt supported the approach of the 
Draft Criminal Code for Scotland,188 which included inadvertent recklessness as to 
consent in the fault element of rape.189 
 Soon after this argument was made, the Scottish Law Commission (SLC) 
published its Report on Rape and other Sexual Offences.190  
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181 Lieser v HM Advocate 2008 SLT 866 at para 12 per Lord Kingarth. 
182 See: CHW Gane, Sexual Offences (1992) 45; PR Ferguson, “Controversial aspects of the law of 
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Clive et al, A Draft Criminal Code for Scotland with Commentary (2003) 125. 
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(2) The Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 
In its Report, the SLC sought to ensure that the law on sexual offences showed 
adequate respect for sexual autonomy.191 Given this goal, it was perhaps inevitable 
that the Commission would propose to supersede the rule in Jamieson192 (which paid 
more attention to the accused’s beliefs than whether the complainer’s sexual 
autonomy has been respected) – a view reflected in the resulting Sexual Offences 
(Scotland) Act 2009. 
 Rather than requiring mens rea in the form of an intention to have sexual 
intercourse without consent, or recklessness as to consent, the 2009 Act indicates that 
the accused may only be acquitted of rape if he possessed a reasonable belief in 
consent.193 Section 16 states that, “[i]n determining... whether a person’s belief as to 
consent... was reasonable, regard is to be had to whether the person took any steps to 
ascertain whether there was consent... and if so, to what those steps were”. 
 This means that, instead of the accused’s belief in consent being unassailable 
if it were “honest”, the trier of fact has to assess the reasonableness of that belief. 
This is a departure from the rule in Jamieson and introduces a level of “objectivity” 
into the Scots law of rape. The SLC, which drafted this provision, certainly felt it 
was introducing such an element, but emphasised the “subjective” focus on the 
accused’s actions. This apparently leads to a “mixed” test for recklessness (even 
though the word “recklessness” is nowhere mentioned).194  
 It is important to probe this idea of a mixed test further, as it is a novel 
approach to recklessness in Scots criminal law. A good starting point is why a mixed 
test was preferred over a purely “subjective” or “objective” approach. The SLC’s 
Report disapproved of Jamieson, noting that its “subjectivity” was inappropriate in 
rape cases.195 The SLC was, however, against a fully “objective” test, because such 
an approach “moves attention too far from the actual accused.”196 There was a 
concern, in other words, that the accused might be found guilty of rape – a very 
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serious crime – on the basis of acting in a sub-standard way, which was felt to be 
inappropriate. 
The SLC therefore wanted to tread a middle ground between “subjectivism” 
and “objectivism”. It is clear that “objective” concerns were, nevertheless, in the 
ascendency. The SLC intentionally distanced itself from “subjectivism” by omitting 
reference to the circumstances of the sexual encounter from its reasonable belief 
provision, for fear that the accused’s characteristics would influence unjustifiably the 
question of reasonableness in certain cases.197 This was in response to a worry, raised 
in relation to similar English provisions, that the accused’s “subjective”, abhorrent 
beliefs about consent might unduly sway the trier of fact’s decision regarding what 
was “reasonable” for the accused to do in the circumstances,198 leading to unmerited 
acquittals. Consequently, all reference to the surrounding circumstances was 
removed from what is now section 16 of the 2009 Act. An element of “subjectivity” 
remains, however, in that it is the accused’s actions, and how these relate to the 
formation of a belief in consent, which must be considered. 
This is fine in theory, but there are two related scenarios which might defeat 
the spirit of the Scots reforms. First, despite the emphasis on the accused’s actions, 
there is still a danger that the trier of fact, in assessing whether the steps the accused 
took led his belief to be “reasonable”, makes (explicit or implicit) reference to what 
they themselves (or the reasonable person/man) 199  would have done in the 
circumstances. If so, the Commission’s “mixed” test might, in fact, be applied in a 
fully “objective” manner. 
The SLC (and the legislature) might not object to this turn of events, but there 
are doubts over the efficacy of applying external standards of conduct in 
circumstances where there is little social consensus about what is expected of a 
citizen.200 This idea is returned to at various points later in the thesis. 
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Of more concern, for present purposes, is a second way in which section 16 
might be misapplied. Although, cosmetically, the 2009 Act emphasises the role of 
communication regarding consent,201 it does not answer the vital question of to whom 
a belief in consent must appear reasonable.202 As a result of this omission, it is 
possible that the jury will be swayed unduly by the accused’s views on consent, 
which might be (“objectively”) outrageous.203 Furthermore, research on mock rape 
trials has demonstrated that juries tend to be biased against the complainer, 
particularly where she was voluntarily intoxicated and an acquaintance of the 
accused.204 A belief in consent that appears “reasonable” to the average jury might, 
accordingly, seem quite unreasonable to others.205 It might therefore be that, in 
practice, the 2009 Act’s provisions on beliefs in consent continue to over-emphasise 
the accused’s views on consent and “rape myths”, despite the SLC’s (and the 
legislature’s) goal of achieving reasonableness and increased “objectivity” in the law 
of sexual offences.206 
The 2009 Act’s approach to recklessness in rape (and related offences)207 is, 
thus, liable to go in a “subjective” or “objective” direction. Neither option seems 
unproblematic. 
 
(3) Summary: the law in rape 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the question of whether the accused was 
reckless as to the matter of consent was assessed somewhat “subjectively” at 
common law, though it is important to be clear about what this means. If the accused 
thought his conduct was safe, he could not be convicted of rape. This rule was 
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undesirable and the 2009 Act’s more “objective” approach is laudable, at least on 
paper. 
 The test of section 16 will be its application in practice. There is nothing 
preventing a purely “objective” approach, which considers what a person other than 
the accused would have done, from being employed. Furthermore, the legislation 
does not, in removing talk of the “circumstances”, remove the danger that the 
accused’s “subjective”, abhorrent beliefs about sexual intercourse (and other “rape 
myths”) are taken into account. If either of these approaches influences the jury’s 
consideration of whether the accused was reckless with regard to consent, the 
legislative wording becomes largely irrelevant. 
 Again, then, it is clear that – no matter what the law on recklessness is “on 
the books” – in emotive crimes such as rape, the jury might reach conclusions based 
on intuition and/or preconception. This moves consideration from the doctrinal 
content of the law to its moral content. The difficulty that this poses for orthodox 
thought is that the “subjective”/“objective” dichotomy so often used to analyse 
culpable carelessness does not map these moral concerns particularly well. As will be 




F. “WICKED” RECKLESSNESS 
Macdonald holds that murder is “constituted by any wilful act causing the 
destruction of life, whether intended to kill, or displaying such wicked recklessness 
as to imply a disposition depraved enough to be regardless of consequences”.208 The 
second aspect of this definition – “wicked recklessness” – appears only in the law of 
murder.209 Unfortunately, it is rather opaque.  
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 Four explanations can be given for this. First, the courts have been reluctant 
to define wicked recklessness neatly.210 Secondly, as a plea of the Crown, murder is 
always heard by juries, which means the factors that determine whether or not a 
person was wickedly reckless are never made public. Thirdly, the Crown might be 
persuaded, on the basis of the available evidence, to take a guilty plea for culpable 
homicide, rather than risk the accused’s acquittal of murder at trial. 211  The 
boundaries of wickedly reckless murder have thus never been pushed too severely. 
Fourthly, wicked recklessness has classically been seen as a moral issue, meaning it 
defies classification in terms of the “subjective”/“objective” dichotomy which is 
often employed to explain the law on culpable carelessness. 
 The sections below expand upon this fourth point, and argue that wicked 
recklessness is nevertheless reliant on some “subjective” mental elements being 
present. 
 
(1) The need for intention 
Following HM Advocate v Purcell,212 the wickedly reckless accused must at least 
intend to do physical injury to the deceased. Mere carelessness is not enough,213 but 
it is otherwise unclear what will satisfy the test in Purcell and if – in particular – 
“physical injury” should be read as “assault”, or a similar action.214 In Petto v HM 
Advocate,215 a bench of three judges remitted the question of whether wilful fire-
raising could count as an act intended to cause physical injury (assuming the answer 
to be “yes”).216 At the time of writing, a full bench is considering the issue. 
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 What is clear is that an intention to do physical injury is not, in itself, 
sufficient mens rea for murder.217 The wickedly reckless accused must also have 
displayed “a wicked disregard of fatal consequences.”218 Once again, there is debate 
over what this means, particularly in terms of the accused’s awareness of risk. 
 
(2) Is wicked recklessness advertent recklessness? 
Prior to Purcell, wicked recklessness was commonly viewed as “objective”.219 This 
belief was typically220 premised on Cawthorne v HM Advocate,221 where the Lord 
Justice-General (Clyde) opined that:222 
 
[T]he reason [wicked recklessness is accepted as mens rea] is that in many cases it 
may not be possible to prove what was in the accused’s mind at the time, but the 
degree of recklessness in his actings, as proved by what he did, may be sufficient to 
establish proof of the wilful act on his part which caused the loss of life. 
 
This quotation is instructive in two respects. First, it points at the vagueness of the 
concept of wicked recklessness: is it an independent form of mens rea or merely 
evidence from which an intention to kill can be inferred? Secondly, Lord Clyde 
endorses an approach which concentrates to such an extent upon the accused’s acts 
that what the accused really thought becomes irrelevant. 
The first point above has proved controversial, but need not be dealt with 
here.223 The second contention does find support in older cases such as Cawthorne 
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and Miller and Denovan v HM Advocate,224 where the accused were found to be 
wickedly reckless in striking the deceased on the head with a piece of wood. The 
accused were, apparently, so focussed on their plan to steal from the deceased that 
the risk of death did not enter their minds. Taken together,225 these cases might 
suggest that murder could be committed through inadvertence (i.e. negligence),226 
which might be thought troubling.227  
Now that an intention is required on the part of the accused, however, it 
should be228 impossible to ignore what the accused actually thought about what she 
was doing.229 This might not be particularly revolutionary: wicked recklessness was 
always a moral judgement and, consequently, perhaps never could ignore fully what 
the accused thought (or failed to think) about her acts and her attitudes towards the 
interests she threatened (surely a “subjective” matter).230 For instance, if the accused 
was an experienced “heavy”, and thought – on the basis of previous “jobs” – that 
shooting a person through the kneecap would injure – but not kill – her, then this 
would be relevant to the question of whether the accused was wickedly reckless. It is 
assumed that she would not be (though she would have committed culpable 
homicide).231 
 If there ever was a question, then, of “whether the objective dangerousness 
of... conduct... compelled findings of wicked recklessness”,232 the answer must be 
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“no” unless the accused intended to – at least – do physical injury. Purcell has thus 
added a level of clarity to the law on unintentional murder.233 
 The decision in Purcell appears sensible because wicked recklessness is 
supposed to (implicitly) refer to a state of mind that deserves to be treated as being as 
depraved as the intentional killer’s. 234  As a form of mens rea, then, wicked 
recklessness is heavily dependent on the circumstances (and the “objective” 
inferences which can be drawn from them), but not “objective” standards such as the 
“reasonable person”. 
 
(3) The law in murder 
It might come as a surprise that so little can be said about the mens rea of 
unintentional murder in Scots law, a matter which ought really to be clear.235 Wicked 
recklessness is, however, a very flexible236 (or, less charitably, vague)237 concept and 
this owes much to the lack of clarity in its definition.238 As its function is to equate 
unintentional – yet extremely culpable – killers with their intentional counterparts, it 
is difficult to analyse wicked recklessness in terms of foresight of risk; of 
“subjectivity” and “objectivity”. This is one reason why wicked recklessness in 
murder is “very different from ‘recklessness’ encountered elsewhere in the criminal 
law and in particular... as it relates to... culpable homicide”.239  
 The next type of recklessness to be considered is, however, closely related to 
wicked recklessness – indeed, it was developed in a murder case, Brennan v HM 
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Advocate.240 Brennan recklessness has, however, stretched into other contexts where 
the accused attempts to rely on the “defence”241 of voluntary intoxication. 
 
 
G. BRENNAN RECKLESSNESS 
Brennan had stabbed his father repeatedly and was convicted of his murder. 242 He 
argued that as, prior to the violence, he had consumed between twenty and twenty-
five pints of beer, a microdot of LSD and – possibly – a glass of sherry,243 he lacked 
the mens rea for murder and should have been convicted instead of culpable 
homicide.244 In repelling this argument, the Lord Justice-General (Emslie) opined 
that: 245 
 
Self-induced intoxication is itself a continuing element and therefore an integral part of 
any crime of violence, including murder, the other part being the evidence of the actings 
of the accused who uses force against his victim. Together they add up or may add up to 
that criminal recklessness which it is the purpose of the criminal law to restrain in the 
interests of all the citizens of this country. 
 
This suggests a form of “transferable” recklessness, which exists from the moment 
the accused becomes acutely, voluntarily intoxicated until she commits a criminal 
act. This is objectionable for four reasons. 
 
(1) Problems with Brennan recklessness 
First, as Chalmers and Leverick note, Lord Emslie “assumes that recklessness is a 
single, interchangeable concept. While the concept of recklessness is not well-
developed in Scots law, it is at least possible (and appropriate in principle) that it 
requires that the accused is reckless as to a particular circumstance or 
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consequence.”246 They use the example of rape to illustrate their point. At common 
law, the mens rea of rape was existed where “the man... [knew] that the woman is 
not consenting or... [was] reckless as to whether she is consenting”.247 Rape, then, 
required that the accused was reckless as to the matter of consent. If such a focal 
point was absent, it appears intuitively wrong to hold that recklessness in relation to 
another circumstance (for example, whether the woman with whom the accused was 
having unprotected sexual intercourse had a sexually transmitted infection) would 
justify his conviction.248 
It is submitted that it is similarly unfair to hold that Brennan’s “recklessness” 
in becoming acutely, voluntarily intoxicated should suffice as mens rea for a murder 
conviction. Unless he foresaw that, as a consequence of getting into such a state, he 
would be likely to do another person serious physical harm, such a conclusion is 
troubling.249 Although there is a strong – common sense – correlation between 
(particularly alcoholic) intoxication and violence,250 it is untenable to argue that 
everybody who drinks or takes drugs tacitly accepts the risk that they might kill 
someone.251 An inference of “recklessness” is only plausible where the accused has 
past experience of a particularly adverse, violent reaction to a state of intoxication.252 
Even in these circumstances, however, it is difficult to see how the accused has been 
more than negligent in failing to exercise self-control and abstain from drink and/or 
drugs.253 
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 Secondly, a conception of “wicked” recklessness that does not require that 
the accused intended to do physical injury to the deceased is incompatible with 
Purcell.254 As noted above, that case states that an intention to do physical injury 
must be coupled with a “wicked disregard of fatal consequences” if the accused is to 
be found guilty of reckless murder.255 The point of Brennan’s argument was that he 
was too intoxicated to form mens rea, and that presumably included an intention to 
do physical injury. The view that inducing a state of acute, voluntary intoxication is 
itself wickedly reckless thus appears difficult – if not impossible – to reconcile with 
Purcell.256 
It could again be argued that the “common sense” link between intoxication 
and violence means that the accused accepts that causing another physical injury is 
an inevitable “side effect” of her intention to risk becoming acutely, voluntarily 
intoxicated.257 This argument must again be judged implausible where the accused 
has no prior knowledge of a tendency towards intoxicated violence.258 
 Thirdly, if mens rea is found to exist at the time the accused became acutely, 
voluntarily intoxicated, this offends the requirement that actus reus and mens rea 
occur contemporaneously. As Gordon notes:259 
 
There will always be something unsatisfactory in convicting A of murder because he 
killed someone at his home at midnight as a result of embarking on a drunken spree 
at a public house hours earlier and miles away… If principle requires that the 
accused be shown to have had mens rea at the time of the killing, then the decision 
in Brennan is to that extent in breach of it. 
 
Despite Lord Emslie’s insistence in Brennan that a state of acute, voluntary 
intoxication is a “continuing element”,260 Gordon’s point is persuasive. The only 
circumstances in which it appears necessary to extend the “timeframe” under 
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258 See, similarly, Plaxton (n 254) at 24. 
259 Gordon, Criminal Law para 12.13 (footnotes omitted). 
260 Possibly to argue that the events in Brennan were “one transaction” and, accordingly, the 
“timeframe” under examination was correctly extended: Meli v R [1954] 1 WLR 228. 




investigation are: first, where the accused (soberly) intended to commit a crime and 
got drunk/high to steel herself;261 and secondly where the accused knew that she was 
prone to criminality (most probably violence) whilst acutely intoxicated and 
nevertheless continued to (voluntarily) get into that state.  
 Finally, if inducing a state of voluntary intoxication is “reckless”, the rule in 
Brennan has no application in crimes which require intention.262 Given the court’s 
concern about intoxicated violence in Brennan,263 it would be strange if assault – 
which requires “evil intent”264 – were to be excluded from the “no excuse” voluntary 
intoxication rule. As Gane, Stoddart and Chalmers ask rhetorically: “Does this 
mean... [that] a person who... while acutely intoxicated, stabs someone with a knife, 
can only be guilty of reckless injury?”265 Subsequent cases have not been decided on 
this basis, suggesting that Lord Emslie’s remarks have not been read literally by the 
courts.266 
These points support Ferguson’s belief that Brennan is “the most prominently 
unreflective of criminal appeals in the history of the mental element in crime.”267 The 
problem with Brennan recklessness is that it appears to be beyond “objective”, 
inadvertent recklessness. It is not so much a matter of what the reasonable person 
would have foreseen as emanating from the act of inducing a state of extreme 
intoxication. Instead, “recklessness” seems to be an amorphous concept, which exists 
from the moment that the accused could no longer form mens rea until she commits 
the actus reus of an offence. This is, of course, to misuse the term “recklessness” 
which is understood as mens rea (and the rule in Brennan of course only applies 
where the accused cannot form mens rea). 
 
                                                
261 This would be an instance of actio libera in causa. See Gordon, Criminal Law para 12.03. 
262 It is admittedly misleading to refer to “crimes of recklessness” and “crimes of intention”, as 
offences might contain elements of both intention and recklessness: DM Treiman, “Recklessness and 
the Model Penal Code” (1981) 9 Am J Crim L 281 at 291. 
263 E.g. Brennan at 42, 51 per the Lord Justice-General (Emslie). 
264 See Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) 1993 JC 33. 
265 CHW Gane, CN Stoddart and J Chalmers, A Casebook on Scottish Criminal Law, 4th edn (2009) 
para 7.53. 
266 See Ebsworth v HM Advocate 1992 SLT 1161. Another offence which can only be committed 
intentionally is theft. Finegan v Heywood perhaps indicates that voluntary intoxication would not be a 
defence to this crime, but this point was not considered directly by the appeal court. 
267 PW Ferguson, “Recklessness and the reasonable man in Scots criminal law” 1985 JR 29 at 35. 




(2) An alternative foundation 
Given the concerns over the court’s (ab)use of “recklessness” in Brennan, it is 
encouraging that subsequent decisions suggest a more transparent rationale for Scots 
law’s voluntary intoxication rule. In Ross v HM Advocate,268 the Lord Justice-
General (Hope) suggested that Brennan was an “exception based on public policy 
where the condition which has resulted in an absence of mens rea is self-induced. In 
all such cases the accused must be assumed to have intended the natural 
consequences of his act”.269  
 In other words, the denial of a “defence” of voluntary intoxication is justified 
on “policy” concerns, presumably over public protection from intoxicated violence 
or the view that intoxication is itself an alternative species of fault.270 Talk of 
recklessness was therefore misleading. Accordingly, the “recklessness” encountered 
in cases involving an acutely, voluntarily intoxicated accused can largely be ignored. 
Brennan is, nevertheless, a decision by seven judges on the meaning of “wicked” 
recklessness and is further support for the argument that recklessness is an incoherent 
concept in Scots criminal law. 
 
(3) The law in voluntary intoxication cases 
The law on voluntary intoxication is justified on grounds other than the 
“recklessness” involved in getting intoxicated, but the fact remains that Lord 
Emslie’s description of how the refusal of an intoxication “defence” interacts with 
the law on recklessness has not been expressly overruled. In fact, it has continued to 
be followed even after Ross.271 As Brennan was a murder case, the court’s judgment 
is inextricably bound to the law on wicked recklessness, but it now appears to run 
counter to the High Court’s conception of that form of mens rea in Purcell. It 
certainly defies categorisation as either “objective” or “subjective” in a unique way. 
 Now that the five forms of Scots criminal recklessness have been identified, 
the conclusions of this chapter can be drawn together. 
 
                                                
268 1991 JC 210. 
269 At 214. 
270 For discussion, see F Stark, “Breaking down Brennan” 2009 JR 155 at 165-169. 
271 Donaldson v Normand 1997 JC 200. 





This chapter has shown that viewing recklessness as a monolithic concept in Scots 
law is misguided. There are (at least) five forms of recklessness, which fall on both 
sides of the “subjective”/“objective”, advertent/inadvertent dichotomy, or – as in 
murder and voluntary intoxication cases – are not susceptible to being explained in 
such terms.  
 What the murder and intoxication (and, to a degree, common law rape) cases 
demonstrate is that Scots law’s approach to recklessness might be bolstered or 
undermined by moral and/or policy judgements, and that the ‘“subjective” or 
“objective”?’ orthodoxy distracts attention from this. This has allowed Scottish 
courts and commentators to tie themselves in knots when trying to explain culpable 
carelessness. 
 What is required is a coherent, unifying theory of culpability for risk-taking, 
which would be capable of explaining better the role of negligence (the elephant in 
the room when the alleged “objectivity” of Scots recklessness is seen through) and 
provide a solid foundation upon which to build an understanding of recklessness 
which is clear and capable of being translated to the jury. Such a theory is presented 
in chapters five and six. 
 Before embarking on this theoretical exercise, it is pertinent to deal with a 
potential objection to the argument made thus far. Although Scots law is 
incontrovertibly confused, this might just be a result of poor judicial decision-
making, rather than the lack of a theory of culpable carelessness. To demonstrate that 
this objection is misguided, it is helpful to consider a more developed system of 
criminal law to see if it has encountered similar problems to Scotland. In the next 
chapter, it will be argued that English law has also suffered for want of a coherent 
theory of culpable risk-taking. 
 




3 Calm in the Storm: The English Experience 
 
This chapter argues that English criminal law has, like its Scottish counterpart, 
struggled to define recklessness1 and negligence consistently.2 This conclusion should 
allay any concerns that Scots law’s difficulties in explaining culpable carelessness are 
simply a side-effect of its generally undeveloped nature. 
 English law is more developed than Scots law for numerous reasons. Most 
obviously, England has a larger population than Scotland (which produces a greater 
number of criminal appeals per annum). There are also more appeal stages south of 
the Tweed3 (Scots procedure allows for only one appeal). Furthermore, England has a 
larger, theoretically-minded academy. The criminal law has thus been analysed in 
greater depth. 
 None of these factors has led to the development of stable accounts of 
recklessness and negligence in English criminal law. The presence of many 
“subjectivist” theorists (who understand conscious choices as central to culpability)4 in 
England has not resulted in the adoption, by the courts, of a wholly advertence-based 
understanding of culpable risk-taking.5  The chapter thus serves as an empirical 
demonstration of how “subjectivism” has not been accepted universally in English 
law, which gives a practical context to chapter four’s normative evaluation of 
“subjectivism”. 
                                                
1 Again, a distinction between recklessness as to consequences and recklessness as to circumstances will 
not be drawn here. This has developed most clearly in relation to attempts, which deserve separate 
consideration. See: R Buxton, “The working paper on inchoate offences: (1) incitement and attempt” 
[1973] Crim LR 656 at 662-664; G Williams, “The problem of reckless attempts” [1983] Crim LR 365; 
R Buxton, “Circumstances, consequences and attempted rape” [1984] Crim LR 25; RA Duff, “The 
circumstances of an attempt” (1991) 50 CLJ 100; RA Duff, Criminal Attempts (1996) (particularly 371-
374). 
2 The chapter does not focus on the exact language employed in the various “model” directions that 
have been drafted by the higher courts. See, however, A Halpin, Definition in the Criminal Law (2004) 
ch 3. 
3 The number of appeals available to the defendant will depend upon which court she is originally 
convicted in. 
4 See ch 4, below. 
5 Cf CMV Clarkson, HM Keating and S Cunningham, Clarkson and Keating: Criminal Law: Text and 
Materials, 7th edn (2010) 177-178. 




 The simplest way to explain the “jungle”6 of authority on recklessness and 
negligence in English law is chronologically, following the leading cases. As 
background to this inquiry, Section A explains the development of recklessness and 
negligence in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Section B considers the 
attempted concretisation of recklessness – and its demarcation from negligence – in R 
v Cunningham,7 before section C discusses the mayhem caused during the 1980s, 
when the House of Lords changed the law’s approach to recklessness in R v Caldwell8 
and R v Lawrence.9 Sections D and E explain the retreat back to “gross” negligence in 
involuntary manslaughter10 (in R v Adomako),11 and advertent recklessness in many 
other offences (following R v G).12 Finally, section F questions the stability of 
recklessness and negligence in modern English law. 
 
 
A. THE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES 
In the mid-nineteenth century, English law’s approach to culpable carelessness was 
unclear.13 As the Scots had “dole”,14 their English contemporaries had general mens 
rea and, later, “malice”. Recklessness and negligence grew uneasily out of these vague 
terms. 
 When the courts did discuss recklessness and negligence expressly, a variety of 
descriptions of those terms were offered. Recklessness was most commonly identified 
with “carelessness” or “not caring”15 and seemed indistinguishable from negligence, 
insofar as mental awareness of risk on the part of the defendant seemed unnecessary. 
                                                
6 See JC Smith, “Commentary: Large v Mainprize” [1989] Crim LR 213 at 214.  
7 [1957] 2 QB 396.  
8 [1982] AC 341. 
9 [1982] AC 510. 
10 Involuntary manslaughter excludes cases where the defendant has a partial-defence to murder. 
11 [1995] 1 AC 171. 
12 [2004] 1 AC 1034. 
13 On the history of recklessness and negligence in English criminal law, see KJM Smith, Lawyers, 
Legislators and Theorists: Developments in English Criminal Jurisprudence (1998) (particularly chs 5, 
9). Given Smith’s thorough treatment of early English writers (and the fact that they have not had much 
effect on English law’s treatment of culpable carelessness), it is unnecessary to consider them here. 
14 See §2.A(1), above. 
15 See e.g.: R v Holroyd (1841) 2 M&R 339 at 341 per Maule J; R v Welch (1875-1876) LR 1 QBD 23 
at 24 per Lindley J; Williams Brothers Direct Supply Stores, Limited v Cloote [1944] 60 TLR 270 at 272 
per Viscount Caldecote CJ.  




Further confusion was caused by the courts’ treatment of negligence in involuntary 
manslaughter, where the level of fault required for conviction was sometimes left to 
the jury’s discretion.16 This meant that the standard of culpable carelessness required 
could be extremely low,17 even if various emphatic epithets were attached to the word 
“negligence” in charges to the jury.18 
 In consequence, recklessness and negligence were opaque notions in English 
criminal law at the turn of the twentieth century. Decisions were presumably reached – 
as it is assumed they still are in many modern Scottish cases – on the basis of intuition, 
rather than the application of a concrete understanding of culpable carelessness.19 
 This situation remained largely unchanged throughout the early twentieth 
century. Recklessness continued to be defined with reference to “carelessness” (an 
“otiose synonym for negligence”)20 or “indifference”21 until the 1950s,22 making it 
difficult to distinguish from negligence.23 This problem was exacerbated when it was 
decided in Andrews v DPP24 that involuntary manslaughter was made out where the 
defendant had acted with “gross” negligence which had caused the death of another. 
“Gross” negligence did not require awareness of risk,25 but Lord Atkin nevertheless 
suggested that a useful synonym for it was “recklessness”.26 
 This confused situation (familiar to the Scots lawyer) began to be addressed in 
the mid-twentieth century. 
                                                
16 R v Docherty (1887) 16 Cox CC 306 at 309 per Stephen J. 
17 Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576 at 582 per Lord Atkin. 
18 See: R v Williamson (1807) 3 C&P 635 at 635 per Lord Ellenborough CJ (“criminal”); R v Noakes 
(1866) 4 F&F 921 (“complete”); R v Spencer (1867) 10 Cox CC 525 at 526 per Willes J (“gross”); R v 
Pittwood (1902) 19 TLR 37 at 38 per Wright J (“gross and criminal”). Cf R v Crick (1859) 1 F&F 519 
(“rashly and carelessly” preferred over “negligent”). 
19 Smith, Lawyers, Legislators and Theorists (n 13) 193-194. 
20 G Williams, “Recklessness in criminal law” (1953) 16 MLR 234 at 235. 
21 See e.g. JL Edwards, Mens Rea in Statutory Offences (1955) 202. Edwards cites the civil case of 
Hudston v Viney [1921] 1 Ch 98 as authority for his view on criminal recklessness, demonstrating that 
the term originally had identical meanings in both civil and criminal contexts. See, further: Derry v 
Peek (1889) LR 14 App Cas 337 at 350 per Lord Bramwell; In Re City Equitable Fire Insurance 
Company, Limited [1925] Ch 407 at 434. 
22 R v Bates and Russell [1952] 36 Cr App R 175. 
23 Attempts were, however, occasionally made to separate the “criminal mind” from negligence. See 
e.g. Lee v Dangar Grant & Co [1982] 2 QB 337 at 350 per Fry LJ. 
24 [1937] AC 576. 
25 See e.g. R v Burdee (1917) 12 Cr App R 153. 
26 At 583. See, further: R v Bonnyman (1943) 28 Cr App R 131; R v Larkin (1944) 29 Cr App R 18 at 23 
per Humphreys J. Where “recklessness” was not present, this might have secured an acquittal: e.g. R v 
Lowe [1973] QB 702. 




B. R v CUNNINGHAM 
The first significant case is R v Cunningham,27 which was not actually a decision on 
recklessness,28 but instead sought to define malice in relation to the Offences against 
the Person Act 1861.29 The trial judge had directed the jury that “maliciously” simply 
meant “wickedly”.30 On appeal, this was deemed a misdirection. The Court of Appeal 
preferred31 the definition of malice in Turner’s reworking32 of Kenny’s Outlines of 
Criminal Law, which provides that:33  
 
[I]n any statutory definition of a crime, malice must be taken not in the old vague 
sense of wickedness in general but as requiring either: (1) an actual intention to do the 
particular kind of harm that in fact was done; or (2) recklessness as to whether such 
harm should occur or not (i.e. the accused has foreseen that the relevant kind of harm 
might be done and yet has gone on to take the risk of it). 
 
“Malice” thus included intention and recklessness, and recklessness required foresight 
of the relevant risk on the part of the defendant (distinguishing it from inadvertent 
negligence). 
 The Cunningham definition of recklessness brought a new level of clarity to 
the law on culpable carelessness, and it was soon applied to other offences under the 
1861 Act. 34  There, directions that suggested recklessness was a synonym for 
“carelessness” – or “not caring” – were potential misdirections.35 This forced judges to 
be clearer on the matter of advertence when directing juries.36 R v Stephenson,37 an 
                                                
27 [1957] 2 QB 396.  
28 Horder thinks Cunningham should not have impacted upon recklessness at all: J Horder, “Two 
histories and four hidden principles of mens rea” (1997) 113 LQR 95 at 118-119. 
29 On the importance of this point, see §3.C(2), below. 
30 This was apparently the traditional understanding of the term – see CS Kenny, Outlines of Criminal 
Law, 16th edn by JWC Turner (1952) 20. Cf Horder (n 28) at 117. 
31 At 399 per Byrne J. 
32 Turner substantially reworked the text to suit his “subjectivist” leanings, so the definitions relied on in 
Cunningham are properly attributable to him. See, further, Smith, Lawyers, Legislators and Theorists (n 
13) 301-304. 
33 Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law (n 30) 186. The requirement of foresight of risk appears for the first 
time in the sixteenth edition. Previous editions did not speak in terms of recklessness, or – if they did – 
did not define the term: see e.g. CS Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, 15th edn by GG Phillips (1947) 
171, 189. 
34 E.g. R v Venna [1976] QB 421 (s 47 (assault occasioning actual bodily harm)). 
35 See, also, R v Briggs [1977] 1 WLR 605. 
36 If foresight was not in issue, “malice” did not require definition: R v Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421 at 427 
per Diplock LJ. 
37 [1979] QB 695. 




arson case,38 demonstrates this point. The defendant was a schizophrenic, and it was 
thus unclear if he would (at the time of acting) have been capable of appreciating the 
risks attendant upon starting a fire in a large haystack. The Queen’s Bench Division 
upheld his appeal against conviction: recklessness in criminal damage required that the 
Crown had proved awareness of risk beyond reasonable doubt, and it had failed to do 
so. 
Despite this renewed focus on advertent risk-taking in certain contexts, the law 
still faced difficulties. In some areas of the law, recklessness continued to be defined 
in different ways that did not necessarily fit the advertence model adopted in 
Cunningham. 39  Recklessness was also still used in its “ordinary” – apparently 
inadvertent – sense in involuntary manslaughter.40 It was thus unclear, in some 
contexts, whether recklessness required that the defendant had foreseen the relevant 
risk. There was accordingly no single “true” definition of recklessness by the 1950s.41 
Instead, decisions were taken on a case-by-case basis, resulting in the same variation 
in approach which still exists in Scots law.42 
Further difficulties for advertent recklessness arose following the passing of 
section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967,43 which provides that: 
 
A court or jury... – (a) shall not be bound in law to infer that [the defendant] intended 
or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable 
consequence of those actions; but (b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that 
result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as 
appear proper in the circumstances. 
 
                                                
38 Criminal Damage Act 1971 ss 1(1), 1(3). 
39 See e.g. R v Mackinnon and Others [1959] 1 QB 150 at 155 per Salmon J, where recklessness in the 
Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939 s 12 (now repealed) was interpreted to mean “not caring” 
(which is non-committal on the point of awareness of risk). See, also, R v Grunwald and Others [1963] 
1 QB 935 at 939-940 per Paull J.  
40 R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981 at 990 per Sachs LJ; R v Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110 at 114 per Lord 
Widgery CJ. 
41 R v Stephenson [1979] QB 695 at 699 per Geoffrey Lane LJ. 
42 See ch 2, above. 
43 The 1968 Act was passed as a response to DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290. For explanation, see JC 
Smith, “The trend towards subjectivism in English criminal law”, in D Mendes da Costa (ed), The 
Cambridge Lectures 1979 (1981) 176 at 178-180. 




This enactment meant that mens rea became a central issue in a greater number of 
trials and appeals, resulting in a rise in the number of appellate decisions concerning 
the definition of mens rea terms during the 1970s and 1980s.44 
 In relation to recklessness, these appeals focussed upon cases where advertence 
was not apparent, but (at least to the courts) it seemed that culpability was. Three 
examples illustrate the perceived shortcomings of Cunningham recklessness. These 
are:  
 
(i) Where the defendant acted impulsively;  
(ii) Where the defendant “could not care less” about the riskiness of her conduct; 
and 
(iii) Where the defendant was unable to foresee risks at the time of acting because 
she was acutely, voluntarily intoxicated.  
 
Each will be considered in turn. 
 
(1) Impulsive defendants 
R v Parker45 provides a good example of an impulsive actor who failed to think about 
the risks attendant upon his conduct. The defendant had suffered a series of mishaps 
and took out his anger by slamming down the receiver of a public telephone, 
damaging it. His response to a charge of criminal damage46 was that – in his excited 
state – he did not think about the risk he posed to the phone. 
 The problem with this explanation was that it put Parker outwith the scope of 
Cunningham recklessness. If he was to be believed, the defendant had not foreseen the 
risk of breaking the telephone at the time of acting. Accordingly, if the requirement of 
advertence (recognised in the context of criminal damage in R v Briggs)47 were applied 
strictly, Parker should have been acquitted. 
                                                
44 J McEwan and SJ Robilliard, “Recklessness: the House of Lords and the criminal law” (1981) 1 LS 
267 at 276. 
45 [1977] 1 WLR 600. 
46 Criminal Damage Act 1971 s 1(1). 
47 [1977] 1 WLR 605. 




Clearly wanting to avoid the situation where a state of ignorance brought about 
by the defendant’s (unreasonably)48 excited emotional state could exculpate him, the 
Court of Appeal explained that Parker should be considered as “reckless” because a:49  
 
[M]an is reckless in the sense required [by the Criminal Damage Act 1971] when he 
carried out a deliberate act knowing or closing his mind to the obvious fact that there 
is some risk of damage resulting from that act but nevertheless continuing in the 
performance of that act. 
 
Insofar as this statement deals with the defendant knowing that there was a risk, it 
simply repeats what was said in Cunningham and Briggs. Of more importance is the 
court’s belief that a person who closes her mind to obvious risks is reckless. Two 
points fall to be considered in more detail. First, what constitutes an “obvious” risk? 
Secondly, what does it mean to “close one’s mind” to a risk? 
 
(a) An “obvious” risk? 
A matter left unaddressed by the court in Parker is to whom the risk taken by the 
defendant must appear obvious. Is it the defendant, or the “reasonable person”? If the 
question of whether a risk is obvious is determined by asking whether the reasonable 
person in the defendant’s circumstances would have foreseen it, the standard becomes 
external (or “objective”). The matter of whether a risk was “obvious” need not, 
however, rely on the adoption of an external standpoint. It could, for example, be 
asked whether the defendant would, had she thought about it, have recognised the risk 
as being “obvious”. This would be an internal (“subjective”) standpoint. As will be 
seen, neither of these perspectives preserves the focus on advertence adopted in 
Cunningham and Briggs. 
Given the allegedly “subjective” nature of those judgments, it makes sense to 
begin with the internal perspective. If concentrating on a risk that the defendant could 
have foreseen, the law would still require “subjectivity” insofar as the defendant must, 
generally, be able (i.e. have the “general capacity”) to foresee the unjustifiable risks 
                                                
48 Not all failures to foresee risk because of a strong desire or emotion will necessarily be culpable. See 
§5.C(3)(a), below. 
49 Parker at 604 per Geoffrey Lane LJ (emphasis added). 




attendant on her conduct, even if she failed to do so (have the “specific capacity”) at 
the time of acting.50 
Although this approach remains focussed on the defendant, it distorts the 
situation by asking what Parker would have foreseen had he not been angry. This 
requires artificially extending the “timeframe” under investigation in order to establish 
his calm character and (hypothetically) ask what he might have done had the 
circumstances been different. This approach is dubious when it is compared with the 
understanding of recklessness in Cunningham and Briggs. The very point of the 
defendant’s argument in Parker was that he could not foresee risk at the time of 
acting;51 that the matter was beyond his control.52 To hold him responsible and liable 
on the basis of suppositions about how he might have acted in an alternative reality is, 
Parker could contend, to convict him on the basis of conjecture, not culpability. This 
argument is strong, for reasons that are explored in more depth below.53 It is thus 
appropriate to abandon the internal perspective for now. 
The external perspective is also unacceptable. Under this approach, it would be 
reckless to fail to notice a risk, which – although “objectively” obvious to the 
reasonable person – did not (or could not) occur to the defendant when acting. This 
might give rise to injustice if, through no fault of her own, the defendant was unable to 
appreciate risks. There are clear concerns – considered below – about treating those 
who were not, at the time of acting, “reasonable people” as being such.54 Nevertheless, 
this issue was not aired in Parker (presumably because the defendant was at fault for 
becoming that angry).55 
The internal perspective thus seems to depart from factual culpability, whilst 
the external position seems conducive to injustice if the defendant is, in some 
meaningful sense, not a reasonable person. Furthermore, neither approach remains true 
to the spirit of advertent recklessness (i.e. conscious risk-taking). 
                                                
50 See T Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (1999) ch 7. 
51 Cf Briggs at 608 per Jones J. 
52 See Duff, AFC 59. 
53 At §6.A(2)(c). 
54 See §3.C(3), below. 
55 E Fruchtman, “Recklessness and the limits of mens rea: beyond orthodox subjectivism” (1986-1987) 
29 Crim LQ 315, 421 at 444-445. 




Given these points, it has been assumed that the fiction in Parker was intended 
for use only in certain circumstances – primarily, where the risk (inadvertently) taken 
by the defendant was inherent in her action.56 To understand this point, it is useful to 
consider Briggs in more detail. The defendant, a landlord, had entered into a dispute 
with his tenants. He set about removing their property from a garage. One tenant’s car 
was obstructing the garage door and the defendant pushed the vehicle towards the 
garage wall. One of the car’s door handles was later found to be broken and Briggs 
was charged with criminal damage. 
The trial judge directed the jury in terms of whether the defendant had been 
“careless” in his treatment of the car, which is non-committal on the matter of 
awareness.57 The Court of Appeal deemed this a misdirection: as the risk of damage to 
the car’s door handle was not inherent in the defendant’s action, the jury had to be 
convinced beyond reasonable doubt that he had been “subjectively” aware of it. An 
“objectively” obvious risk was not itself sufficient, and this meant that the trial judge’s 
charge was unclear on a crucial point concerning culpability. Briggs’ conviction was, 
accordingly, quashed. 
It is not clear why this “inherent risk” approach is compatible with 
Cunningham’s brand of advertent recklessness. For one thing, Briggs seems to allow a 
conviction where the defendant failed to foresee an “inherent” risk – and such 
unawareness is the antithesis of advertent recklessness. Even if this objection is 
overcome, there is surely scope for reasonable disagreement about whether a risk is 
“inherent” in a certain type of conduct, making the approach in Briggs questionable.58 
For instance, just as the risk of breakage is inherent in slamming down a phone’s 
receiver, so is the risk of damage to a car in pushing it against a wall. Arguing about 
which part of the car was damaged seems to split hairs to save a defective theoretical 
standpoint. 
Matters are further complicated by the fact that the way that an action is 
described surely impacts upon the question of whether a risk was inherent in it. Was 
Parker “acting out” or “taking out” his anger? The first indicates no structure to his 
                                                
56 AP Simester et al, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law, 4th edn (2010) 142. 
57 Briggs at 607. 
58 See §6.A(4)(c), below. 




action (and therefore the matter of an inherent risk of damage seems less clear), whilst 
the latter does (indicating a strong connection between Parker’s action and the risk of 
damage). 59 The courts did not deal with these points, but they undermine any 
theoretical headway that could be made by adopting the “inherent risk” approach in 
Briggs, leaving it unclear what constitutes an “obvious” risk.  
Further doubts are raised by the view that the defendant in Parker had “closed 
his mind” to the risk he was taking with the phone. 
 
(b) Closed minds 
Again, there are two possible interpretations of the “closed mind” aspect of the 
judgment in Parker. First, it might mean that the defendant deliberately chose not to 
ascertain the risks attendant on his conduct, as he did not want to think about the 
possible consequences.60 It must be asked, however, how Parker could (meaningfully) 
have chosen to avoid investigating whether he was taking an unjustified risk of 
damage if he was genuinely unaware of the presence of any risk of such harm.61  
Whether a person ought to investigate a risk depends on whether the context 
demands such action. Whilst reading this thesis, the reader is presumably not 
wondering if there is a risk that the building is on fire. Such an investigation would 
require a number of prompts (the smell of smoke, a fire alarm going off, etc). If the 
court is correct, and Parker could have a-contextually decided to ignore a risk of 
property damage, then a great many people are “recklessly”, and deliberately, closing 
their minds to unjustified risks on a daily basis.62 The reader is presently choosing not 
to investigate a risk of fire (which might, in the circumstances, be unjustifiable), and 
this is apparently culpable if, despite a lack of evidence, there is a fire somewhere in 
the building. 
                                                
59 Ibid.  
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61 See: DJ Galligan, “Responsibility for recklessness” (1978) 31 CLP 55 at 68; R v Caldwell [1982] AC 
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 Given how bizarre this conclusion seems, it might alternatively be contended 
that Parker was culpable for getting into a state of anger that prevented him from 
noticing the prompts which would have urged him to assess the risks involved in his 
actions.63 This approach lacks the aspect of deliberate evasion of knowledge, avoiding 
the problems mentioned above. It is still not quite correct to say that he “closed his 
mind” to risk, however. It is surely preferable to say that Parker surrendered his 
capacity to foresee risks at a time before risk-perception was called for. 
 In this case, Parker failed to live up to societal expectations about self-control 
and, as a result, missed an “obvious” risk (whatever this means). Although he might, if 
challenged, have been able to appreciate that his conduct carried certain dangers, he 
was – in virtue of his angered state – unable to think enough about them at the time of 
taking the risk to have enough reason for not acting. This would put Parker in no better 
a position than a person asked, at random, what the risks of slamming a phone down 
might be.64 Both would have to stop and think, engaging their knowledge about risks 
in general and applying it to the instant circumstances. This seems far removed from 
recklessness as defined in Cunningham or Briggs. If anything, it is negligence and it is 
advisable – for reasons explored in more detail later65 – to distinguish this concept 
from recklessness. 
Accordingly, the court in Parker did not approach recklessness in a helpful or 
convincing manner. The defendant was either (consciously) wilfully blind or (more 
conceivably) negligent.66 Negligence – i.e. inadvertent risk-taking – cannot satisfy 
advertent recklessness, even if Parker is “a good advertisement for [an] objective 
test”.67 Ibbetson is thus right that, if the courts wish to convict actors like Parker, they 
“have no choice but to recognise that the purely subjective analysis of recklessness is 
not in itself enough”.68 The court in Parker did recognise this, but was presumably 
unhappy with the notion that a negligent actor can be convicted of a (fairly serious) 
criminal offence. It therefore extended the notion of “awareness” to accommodate an 
actor who did not fit the Cunningham/Briggs model. 
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The court was assisted in this enterprise by the fact that, following 
Cunningham, the law did not have a clear understanding of what “awareness” of risk 
entailed. This meant that the decision in Parker could be neither manifestly “right” nor 
“wrong” in its approach. Perhaps all that was clear following Parker was that the 
courts were dissatisfied with the consequences of advertent recklessness.  
A similar unease is detectable in the second problem case: where the accused 
“could not care less” about the risks attendant on her conduct.  
 
(2) Defendants who “could not care less” 
In R v Murphy,69 the defendant – who had been racing in his car – collided with 
another vehicle, killing the driver. At Murphy’s trial for causing death by reckless 
driving,70 the jury was not directed on the meaning of recklessness, even when it asked 
the recorder to clarify the meaning of that term. Murphy was convicted and argued on 
appeal that the jury may have reached its verdict without being convinced that he had 
foreseen the risk he posed to the other driver at the time of acting. That risk had not 
occurred to him, he contended, because he was too engrossed in racing. 
 Murphy’s argument caused further problems for the “subjective” 
understanding of recklessness which had been employed (albeit hesitantly) in an 
earlier case on reckless driving.71 This is due largely to the context of the case: 
because driving soon becomes habitual, awareness of the attendant risks slips from the 
forefront of a driver’s mind. The Court of Appeal got around this difficulty in Murphy 
by extending the law’s understanding of “knowledge” of risk: knowledge was 
information which could be called upon by the defendant, and did not need to be at the 
forefront of his mind.72 If the defendant was indifferent to this “knowledge” of risk, 
then he was reckless.73 
 Just as “awareness” had been extended in Parker, the notion of “knowledge” 
of risk was thus extended in Murphy. Again, conscious awareness of risk became a 
sufficient, but not a necessary, ingredient of recklessness. 
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 What this meant, in practice, was that conduct became important, as 
background knowledge of the risks of the roads could readily be assumed (because 
driving is licensed and (legal) drivers must past a driving test). This view was 
bolstered (as it was in Allan v Patterson)74 by consideration of the specific offence in 
Murphy, which dealt with reckless conduct (driving), rather than a reckless state of 
mind.75 
 Murphy expanded the law’s understanding of recklessness considerably. At 
first blush, the Court of Appeal’s approach and the “internal” perspective described 
above have much in common. What was important was that (somewhere)76 in the 
defendant’s mind, there was information relevant to the risks he was taking. Taking an 
unjustifiable risk in spite of this knowledge was reckless, even if the defendant was 
consciously ignorant of risk at the time of acting. This is difficult to distinguish from 
negligence, perhaps leading to the view that Murphy did not offer an understanding of 
recklessness at all.77 The fact remains, however, that Murphy is a decision on the 
definition of recklessness. 
 Murphy again demonstrates that the search for one definition of recklessness 
that applied across the criminal law was being frustrated in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Cunningham’s (conscious) advertence-focussed approach was not suited to 
habitual activities such as driving, and new conceptions of recklessness were being 
turned to in order to avoid (what the courts saw as) unmerited acquittals. 
 These efforts to get around the implications of advertent recklessness were 
taken to extremes in the final problematic case: the acutely, voluntarily intoxicated 
offender. 
 
(3) Acutely, voluntarily intoxicated defendants 
A person can drink alcohol, or consume other drugs, to the point where she cannot 
foresee the risks attendant upon her conduct. This poses significant problems for 
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advertent recklessness: it seems inevitable that intoxicated actors must be acquitted if 
they could not foresee relevant risks at the time of acting.78 
 In attempting to overcome this difficulty, English law adopted the same 
approach as Scots law.79 In fact, this is to misrepresent the situation: the court in 
Brennan v HM Advocate80 borrowed liberally from the House of Lords’ decision in 
DPP v Majewski.81 There, it was decided that:82 
 
If a man of his own volition takes a substance which causes him to cast off the 
restraints of reason and conscience, no wrong is done to him by holding him 
answerable criminally for any injury he may do while in that condition. His course of 
conduct in reducing himself by drugs and drink to that condition... supplies the 
evidence of mens rea, of guilty mind certainly sufficient for crimes of basic intent. It 
is a reckless course of conduct and recklessness is enough to constitute the necessary 
mens rea in assault cases... The drunkenness is itself an intrinsic, an integral part of 
the crime, the other part being the evidence of the unlawful use of force against the 
victim. Together they add up to criminal recklessness.  
 
 This statement is almost identical to Lord Emslie’s observations in Brennan, 
leaving it open to many of the objections raised above83 in relation to Scots law. Those 
difficulties are, however, more pronounced in the English context, because Scots law 
lacks a coherent approach to recklessness. Post-Cunningham, English law had a clear 
view of what recklessness required in many (though not all) offences. Included in this 
list was assault occasioning actual bodily harm,84 one of the crimes with which 
Majewski was charged. 
 This meant that Lord Elwyn-Jones’s views on intoxication were strikingly 
peculiar.85 Through holding that recklessness could be supplied by the act of becoming 
acutely, voluntarily intoxicated, Majewski introduced further complexity into the 
definition of recklessness in English criminal law, once again in order to escape the 
consequences of Cunningham. 
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 The situation in England is slightly better than that in Scotland, however, 
insofar as only “basic” intent offences (understood, typically, as crimes of 
recklessness)86 can be committed by acutely, voluntarily intoxicated actors. If the 
crime is one of “specific” intent (usually understood as requiring an additional element 
of intention beyond the basic act) then the defendant’s intoxication will negate mens 
rea and result in an acquittal. Helpfully, most “specific” intent offences have “basic” 
intent partners, meaning voluntary intoxication will rarely result in a full acquittal.87 
For instance, a charge of murder, a “specific” intent offence, will be defeated by proof 
that the defendant was too intoxicated to form “malice aforethought” (essentially, an 
intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm).88 The same is not true of manslaughter – 
a basic intent offence – where evidence of voluntary intoxication is not allowed to 
negate mens rea.89 Intoxication does not, therefore, offer much of a “defence”.90 
 This mitigates, though does not remove, the impact of the intoxication rule in 
English law. Again, it seems that the rationale for it is “policy”,91 or a view that 
intoxication is another variety of fault which defies classification in the normal mens 
rea typology. Whatever its basis, Majewski introduced another interpretation of 
recklessness into English criminal law, further clouding matters. In fact, Majewski 
might be seen as a hiatus in the quest for a singular definition of recklessness in 
England.92 The definition of recklessness in Cunningham was becoming one possible 
description of that term. As the next sections explains, the House of Lords capitalised 
upon this idea in the early 1980s. 
 
(4) R v Cunningham: summary 
It is useful, before proceeding, to summarise the argument thus far. By the 1950s, a 
more “subjective”, advertence-based approach to recklessness had been adopted in 
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certain contexts, but had failed to take hold across the criminal law. This is because of 
the courts’ unhappiness with the consequences of the approach to recklessness in 
Cunningham. The understanding of recklessness as advertent, unjustified risk-taking 
seemed to be overstretched in some cases (Parker and Murphy) and completely 
abandoned in others (Majewski). This once again collapsed the distinction between 
recklessness and negligence in the criminal law93 and led to a view in some cases that 
“recklessness” covered both cases of advertence and inadvertence.94 The continuing 
influence of Andrews (with its “ordinary” recklessness) on the law of involuntary 
manslaughter exacerbated matters.95 
 Recklessness had, then, scarcely moved forward by the 1980s. In a 1981 
case, 96  recklessness was equated with “not caring” and the term “recklessly 
regardless” was employed.97 These concepts were contrasted with actual awareness of 
risk, indicating that the House of Lords did not view Cunningham recklessness as 
being applicable to all contexts. This was confirmed as the 1980s progressed and the 
law of recklessness entered a new era of uncertainty.98 
 
 
C. R v CALDWELL; R v LAWRENCE 
By passing the Criminal Damage Act 1971, Parliament aimed at modernising the law 
on property offences.99 Part of this project involved removing the outdated language of 
“malice” and – as Turner had – replacing it with modern mens rea terms, such as 
intention and recklessness.100 In Briggs, Parker and Stephenson, it was assumed that 
                                                
93 This makes the view that Caldwell ruined a pure “subjective” law doubtful. Cf G Williams, “Intention 
and recklessness again” (1982) 2 LS 189 at 197. 
94 R v Stone; R v Dobinson [1977] QB 354 at 363 per Geoffrey Lane LJ. 
95 See: ibid; R v Cato [1976] 1 All ER 260; C Wells, “Perfectly simple English manslaughter” (1976) 39 
MLR 474. 
96 R v Shepherd [1981] AC 394. 
97 At 412 per Lord Diplock. 
98 Theoretical doubts about Cunningham had already been raised by the early 1980s (e.g. RA Duff, 
“Recklessness” [1980] Crim LR 282 – on which, see §6.A(4), below). 
99 See, previously, the Malicious Damage Act 1861. 
100 The first statutory mention of “recklessness” in England appears in the Motor Car Act 1903 s 1. Cf 
the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1887 Sch A. 




advertent recklessness was required. In R v Caldwell,101 the correctness of these 
decisions was questioned before the House of Lords. 
 In order to settle a grudge, the defendant – who had been drinking – started a 
fire at his previous place of employment (a hotel). The fire was extinguished quickly, 
but ten guests were staying in the hotel at the time, and their lives had apparently been 
put in danger by Caldwell’s actions.  
 Given the unconvincing treatment of recklessness in Majewski, it is wise to 
leave Caldwell’s voluntary intoxication to one side and concentrate on the House of 
Lords’ treatment of the meaning of “recklessness” under the 1971 Act. For the 
majority, Lord Diplock remarked that Turner had chosen recklessness in his edition of 
Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law as a term for describing an aspect of malice, and 
that one proper meaning of recklessness was “careless”.102 Recklessness thus:103  
 
[P]resupposes that if thought were given to the matter by the doer before the act was 
done, it would have been apparent to him that there was a real risk of its having the 
relevant harmful consequence; but, granted this, recklessness covers a whole range of 
states of mind from failing to give any thought at all to whether or not there is any risk 
of those harmful consequences, to recognising the existence of the risk and 
nevertheless deciding to ignore it. 
 
In other words, Cunningham had concentrated on one understanding of recklessness, 
whereas other cases (such as Parker, Murphy and Majewski) had concentrated on 
others, such as where: risks were “implicit” in the defendant’s conduct; the defendant 
possessed background knowledge of risks that she might have called upon; or the 
defendant had voluntarily surrendered her risk-perception abilities. There were still 
further ways of being reckless, including giving “no thought at all” to risk. 
 Lord Diplock thought these various ways of taking an unjustified risk were 
equally blameworthy,104 and clearly felt the law was being unduly constrained from 
recognising moral wrongs by a focus on conscious risk-taking.105 His views on 
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recklessness may thus be seen as the logical conclusion of the gradual erosion of 
advertent recklessness that had begun in the 1970s. 
 Another familiar theme in Lord Diplock’s judgment is his belief that the 
distinction between advertence and inadvertence – however theoretically attractive – 
was difficult for juries to apply in practice106 and ought, therefore, to be abandoned. 
This view is substantiated by comments about the difficulty of establishing the 
“subjective” mental state of another person, and – again – the problematic cases of 
angry and/or intoxicated actors.107  
These matters of course cause problems in relation to all mental states and do 
not seem to cause significant problems for the day-to-day running of courts in 
Scotland and England. Nevertheless, in Lord Diplock’s opinion, the line between 
advertence and inadvertence had become an “obsession”108 and it was preferable to 
dispense with it in the law of recklessness. Parliament had aimed at revising the law on 
property offences, and – as a result – advertent recklessness was not to be assumed (as 
it had been in Briggs and Parker).109 
 Instead, the jury was to be directed that a person charged under the 1971 Act 
was reckless if:110 
 
(1) He does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that property will be destroyed 
or damaged and (2) when he does the act he either has not given any thought to the 
possibility of there being any such risk or has recognised that there was some risk 
involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it. 
 
This “model direction” was to be the subject of contention over the next twenty 
years. Importantly, Lord Diplock was providing just that: a direction. He was not 
really defining recklessness, viewing that activity as fruitless. As Halpin points out, 
Caldwell thus heralded a definitional hiatus: the courts simply ceased to define 
recklessness in general terms.111 
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 Lord Diplock’s model direction on recklessness in Caldwell was, however, 
applied stringently. In criminal damage cases (including those involving danger to 
life), foresight of risk on the part of the defendant was not required. All that the Crown 
had to establish was that an “ordinary prudent bystander would have perceived an 
obvious risk that property would be damaged and that life would thereby be 
endangered”. 112  It became clear that this test ignored entirely the individual 
defendant’s state of mind. 
 In the following sections, various facets of the decision in Caldwell will be 
discussed. It is prudent to first consider the dissenting opinion, before moving on to 
explain the limits of Caldwell recklessness that developed in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
(1) Dissent and driving 
Although Caldwell was seen as “the destruction of recklessness”,113 it was not a 
unanimous decision: the Lords were split three to two. In his dissent (concurred with 
by Lord Wilberforce), Lord Edmund-Davies focussed on the reliance placed by Lord 
Diplock on the “ordinary” meaning of recklessness, and argued that “[t]he law... 
compiles its own dictionary. In time, what was originally the common coinage of 
speech acquires a different value in the pocket of the lawyer... [Outlines of Criminal 
Law] used lawyer’s words in a lawyer’s sense”.114  
 Although plausible in the context of some offences, it is – for the reasons 
indicated above – doubtful that English law possessed one “lawyer’s” understanding 
of recklessness before Caldwell. This weakens Lord Edmund-Davies’s first point, but 
it remains noteworthy for its strong belief in the need for definition of core mens rea 
terms such as recklessness. 
 Lord Edmund-Davies’s second argument is more convincing. The Law 
Commission – whose proposals115 led to the 1971 Act – had defended Cunningham’s 
approach to recklessness at length. 116  It was therefore inconsistent with the 
                                                
112 R v Sangha [1988] 1 WLR 519 at 525 per Tucker J. 
113 C Wells, “Swatting the subjectivist bug” [1982] Crim LR 209 at 210. 
114 At 357. 
115 Criminal Law: Offences of Damage to Property (Law Com No 29, 1970). 
116 Codification of the Criminal Law: The Mental Element in Crime (Law Com Working Paper No 31, 
1970) 47-54; A Criminal Code for England and Wales (Law Com No 177, 1989) cl 18(c), paras 8.17-
8.21). 




Commission (and, by extension, Parliament)’s intention to decide that the word 
“reckless” included inadvertent, unjustified risk-taking. Although powerful and clear, 
it was twenty-four years before this aspect of Lord Edmund-Davies’s dissent gained 
favour in the Lords.117  
 Dissent was not raised when, almost immediately after Caldwell was decided, 
Lord Diplock delivered another speech on recklessness. In R v Lawrence,118 the 
defendant had been convicted of causing death by reckless driving.119 This time, a 
differently-constituted 120  panel decided unanimously that driving “recklessly” 
included inadvertent, unjustified risk-taking. Lord Diplock again relied upon the 
“ordinary” understanding of recklessness and referred extensively to his earlier 
judgment in Caldwell. 121  The model direction presented in Lawrence was, 
accordingly, worded in almost identical terms. The jury had to be satisfied:122 
 
First, that the defendant was in fact driving the vehicle in such a manner as to create 
an obvious and serious risk of causing physical injury to some other person... or doing 
substantial damage to property; and, second, that in driving in that manner the 
defendant did so without having given any thought to the possibility of there being any 
such risk or, having recognised that there was some risk involved, had nonetheless 
gone on to take it. 
 
The effect of this judgment was clear: “recklessness” (at least in the contexts of 
criminal damage and driving offences) was to be understood in at least two, equally 
culpable, senses: advertent and inadvertent. 
 The decisions in Caldwell and Lawrence meant that the definition of 
recklessness in Cunningham looked to become largely irrelevant. The crucial matter 
became whether Caldwell and Lawrence would impact on other areas of the law in due 
course. This was the subject of debate during the 1980s and 1990s. 
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(2) The extent of inadvertent recklessness 
Contemporary academic reaction to Caldwell and Lawrence was resoundingly 
negative. Smith (a devout “subjectivist”) asked whether English law could “really 
afford the House of Lords as an appellate court”123 and criticised the approach in 
Lawrence as paying “the merest lip-service” to the mental element in crime.124 
Williams (another “subjectivist”) abhorred the “fine conceptual mess” that Lord 
Diplock had left behind.125 Some writers even wondered whether Lord Diplock’s 
failure to give effect to Parliamentary intent was unconstitutional.126 
 This academic debate was rarely alluded to by the courts, which continued to 
deal inconsistently with recklessness. Caldwell and Lawrence were accepted in some 
contexts: most usually in relation to little-known statutory offences. 127  More 
significant victories did, however, occur in time. In R v Miller, 128  inadvertent 
recklessness was found to exist where the defendant had failed to notice the risks 
attendant upon leaving a fire (which he had started accidentally) unattended. This gave 
rise to a conviction under the 1971 Act, widening the scope of inadvertent recklessness 
in arson significantly.129 In R v Seymour,130 inadvertent recklessness was employed in 
relation to “motor” manslaughter, 131  essentially heralding the end of “gross” 
negligence manslaughter:132 as soon as it was clear that the defendant had created an 
obvious risk to life, it was open to the jury to convict her.133 This made the offence of 
manslaughter extremely broad, but this did not stop Seymour from being followed 
consistently.134 
                                                
123 JC Smith, “Commentary: R v Caldwell” [1981] Crim LR 392 at 393. 
124 JC Smith, “Commentary: R v Lawrence” [1981] Crim LR 409 at 410. 
125  G Williams, “Recklessness redefined” (1981) 40 CLJ 252 at 262. See, also, G Williams, 
“Recklessness and the House of Lords” [1981] Crim LR 580. 
126 ATH Smith, “Law reform proposals and the courts”, in I Dennis (ed), Criminal Law and Justice: 
Essays from the WG Hart Workshop 1986 (1987) 35 at 50. 
127 See e.g. the charge to the jury in R v Warburton-Pitt (1991) 92 Cr App R 136 (repeated at 141 per 
Tucker J), a case concerned with the Air Navigation Order 1980, SI 1980/1965. See, further, the 
treatment of the Data Protection Act 1984 s 5 (now repealed) in Data Protection Registrar v Amnesty 
International [1995] Crim LR 633. 
128 [1983] 2 AC 161. 
129 See, further, R v Cullen [1993] Crim LR 936. 
130 [1983] 2 AC 493. 
131 See, also, Kong Cheuk Kwan v R (1986) 82 Cr App R 18. 
132 Until 1994: see §3.D, below. 
133 It is unclear how major a change this was: G Syrota, “Mens rea in gross negligence manslaughter” 
[1983] Crim LR 776 at 786. 
134 Kong Cheuk Kwan; R v Madigan (1982) 75 Cr App R 145; R v Goodfellow (1986) 83 Cr App R 23. 




 There were, however, limits placed on Caldwell and Lawrence. Although the 
inadvertence-based approach adopted in those cases was applied in rape135  and 
indecent assault,136 it was quickly reconceived of as an “indifference” or “couldn’t 
care less”137 test, which omitted reference to the “ordinary” or “reasonable” person.138 
This made the law of reckless rape an outlier in the Cunningham/Caldwell, 
“subjective”/“objective” debate. 
 Further rebellion against “objective” recklessness can be detected in the case 
reports. Despite decisions indicating that the Lawrence direction should be quoted 
ipsissima verba,139 some charges and judgments where it ought to have been applied 
continued to speak in terms of knowledge of risk, implicitly rejecting inadvertent 
recklessness.140 In other areas, the impact of Caldwell and Lawrence was expressly 
denied.141 Crimes under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 still required 
advertent recklessness – a proposition that was reaffirmed (somewhat)142 consistently 
by the higher courts on the basis that Caldwell did not amend the understanding of 
“malice”143 (where Cunningham applied).144 Accomplice liability also still required 
“subjective” foresight of risk.145 
 In R v Morrison,146 Lane LCJ despaired that this mess of conflicting decisions 
meant that “[u]nhappily, there are now in the law of this country two types of 
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recklessness according to the nature of the crime which is charged.”147 This sense of 
“indefensible” confusion was captured well in an example used by Smith and 
Hogan.148 If the defendant unthinkingly shot an air rifle at a person wearing glasses, 
she would be guilty of criminal damage if she broke the glasses (Caldwell), but not of 
an offence against the person if she hit the victim’s eye (which would require 
Cunningham recklessness). If the victim died, the defendant would be guilty of 
manslaughter (Seymour). 
 Adding to this confusion are the facts that the “indifference” test in rape surely 
constituted its own category149 and, in other contexts, some judges continued to use 
the term “negligence” as an alternative (presumably) to Cunningham recklessness.150 
This made the law on culpable carelessness utterly incomprehensible, having 
implications for some doctrines developed under Cunningham. For instance, it became 
unclear how evidence of voluntary intoxication was to be considered in criminal cases. 
If basic intent offences were crimes of “recklessness”, then which type of recklessness 
was required and how did intoxication interact with it?151 
 At least some of this confusion resulted from the various interpretations of 
recklessness presented in judicial opinions, and it is important to bear in mind that 
these should not be read as statutes. 152 Despite this, even where Caldwell and 
Lawrence were clearly the applicable source of authority (most clearly under the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971 and the Road Traffic Acts), there were still decisions that 
demonstrated judicial disquiet with Lord Diplock’s model direction. Such criticism 
was most vocal in cases where the defendant was, for some reason, not an “ordinary” 
or “reasonable” person. 
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(3) Recklessness and (in)capacity 
As noted above,153 the defendant’s (non-culpable) lack of capacity to foresee risk 
could ground an acquittal under Cunningham. For instance, in Stephenson, the 
defendant’s schizophrenia raised reasonable doubt over whether he had foreseen a risk 
of property damage when he set fire to a haystack to keep warm. His conviction for 
arson was thus quashed. 
  It was doubtful whether Stephenson would be followed after Caldwell, as the 
“ordinary prudent bystander” would presumably not have characteristics peculiar to 
the defendant. There were, however, hopes that an incapacity exception was built in by 
consideration of the “ordinary person”.154 It was envisaged that the defendant would 
be able to secure an acquittal by showing that, although an “ordinary” or “reasonable” 
person would have foreseen the risk, she could not (through no fault of her own).155 
 These hopes were soon dashed. The Queen’s Bench Division confirmed that 
Caldwell did not include an incapacity exception in Elliott v C (A Minor).156 The 
defendant was fourteen and of low intelligence. After spending the night wandering 
the streets, she happened upon a shed, which contained white spirit. She decanted the 
spirit onto the floor and set fire to it. The shed was destroyed. 
 Because of her limited intelligence, there were doubts over C’s ability to 
foresee risks. As a result, she was acquitted and the prosecution appealed. On appeal, 
the court denied that C’s incapacity made a difference to the matter of recklessness.157 
If the “ordinary” person would have foreseen the relevant risk, then the defendant was 
reckless for taking it. 
 Other cases involving young 158  or mentally-incapable 159  defendants were 
decided similarly. This was unsurprising given the terms of Lord Diplock’s directions 
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in Caldwell and Lawrence. What is surprising is the vocal reluctance with which the 
court in C reached its decision. Goff LJ explained his “unhappiness” about reaching 
the conclusion that C was properly convicted.160 He was aware of the academic 
commentary to Caldwell which suggested that an exception, where the accused could 
not have foreseen the risk (even if she had paused to consider it), was consistent with 
Lord Diplock’s judgment in that case. Goff LJ nevertheless regarded it as improper for 
a lower court to impose a capacity exception on Lord Diplock’s model direction.161 
 The decision in C meant that the law “admitted of no exceptions”.162 This 
situation was criticised strongly by academics, 163  and the Law Commission. 164 
Glanville Williams referred to C’s conviction as “scandalous”,165 Stannard claimed it 
made “a mockery of the whole concept of mens rea”,166 and Mitchell argued that the 
decision defied “common sense”. 167  The imposition of criminal liability (for a 
relatively serious offence) on a child of low intelligence further seemed to 
communicate little to the individual defendant (other than she was expected to act 
better than she could have done), the shed’s owner, or the public more generally. It 
thus seemed fruitless.168 
 Other criticisms of the result in C concentrated upon its intuitive injustice. Goff 
LJ had reached his conclusion on the basis of interpretation, but it must be wondered 
why the “gravitational pull”169 of Caldwell excluded a distinction “on the facts”. This 
“would surely not have stretched any consciences or raised any eyebrows”.170 As 
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noted above, Lord Diplock provided a direction, rather than a wholesale definition of 
recklessness.171 Goff LJ’s hands were not, therefore, tied. 
 It has further been pointed out that C could have been decided on the basis that 
the defendant was not at fault for being of low intelligence.172 She was not, as in 
Caldwell, voluntarily intoxicated or, as in Parker, unreasonably angry. Such 
distinctions might well have explained why Caldwell and Parker should have been 
convicted but C (and others like her)173 should have been acquitted. They were not, 
however, made. 
 In consequence, C remained an unwelcome side-effect of inadvertent 
recklessness until 2003.174 The only glimmer of hope was offered in R v Coles,175 
where it was suggested that “meritorious cases” would attract lenience.176 No reported 
case indicates that this discretion was ever exercised. 
 The controversy over C meant that an important escape route from inadvertent 
recklessness was cut off. There was, however, another possibility: where the defendant 
had thought about her conduct – and the attendant risks – and (wrongly) come to the 
conclusion that there was no unjustifiable risk involved before proceeding to act.177 
This was dubbed the “Caldwell lacuna”,178 and it never arose directly in a reported 
case. 179  The decision in Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v 
Shimmen180 nevertheless showed its limits. 
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(4) The “Caldwell lacuna” 
Shimmen was an accomplished martial artist, and – to impress his friends – aimed to 
demonstrate that he could stop a kick just short of a shop window. The feat failed, the 
window was broken, and Shimmen was charged with criminal damage. Caldwell was 
thus directly in point. 
  At trial, Shimmen argued that he had thought about the risk of breaking the 
window and taken steps to mitigate it (he moved further away from the window). This 
was not enough to avail him of criminal liability: the court found that the presence of 
even a reduced risk of damage rendered his action unjustifiable. 181  The court 
specifically reserved opinion on cases where the defendant had satisfied himself that 
his conduct was entirely safe. 
 In the early 1990s, the lacuna was again considered in obiter statements in R v 
Reid.182 Lord Goff suggested that “if... the defendant is addressing his mind to the 
possibility of risk and suffers from a bona fide mistake [of] fact which if true would 
have excluded the risk, he cannot be described as reckless”.183 It is unclear what to 
make of this exception, given the above discussion of C. An actor who thought about 
risk and excluded it could not be reckless unless her mistake was mala fide, but a child 
who could not hope to foresee a risk was doomed to be adjudged reckless. There is 
clearly something wrong with these two propositions184 and it is unlikely that Lord 
Diplock intended either of them when crafting the model direction in Caldwell.185  
 It is further unclear what a bona fide mistake is. Is it a mistake that most people 
might make?186 Or is it something more “subjective”? In rape, until the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003, a man could not be guilty of rape if he honestly (even if 
unreasonably) believed his partner was consenting.187 If this is a bona fide mistake, 
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then it seems that a person who – completely unreasonably – came to the conclusion 
that there is no risk attendant on her activity cannot be reckless.188 If Caldwell and 
Lawrence were decisions about recognising equivalent levels of culpability, it must 
again be wondered how a capable, but epistemically callous,189 adult came to be 
regarded as less blameworthy than a child of limited intelligence.190 
 Despite these difficulties, the lacuna at least provided a means of escaping the 
unabashed “objectivity” which had become synonymous with Caldwell and Lawrence. 
Beyond these cases, it was clear that wholesale inadvertent recklessness had 
unappealing, unforeseen consequences. This made another change in approach seem 
inevitable. 
 
(5) R v Caldwell; R v Lawrence: conclusion 
Caldwell and Lawrence had the potential to revolutionise English criminal law. That 
they failed to do so is testament to strong academic and judicial misgivings about the 
culpability of inadvertent risk-takers. As a result of these doubts, Caldwell and 
Lawrence were interpreted in a variety of ways, resulting in “inconsistent and 
contradictory”191 decisions, which failed to explain why recklessness was understood 
differently in different contexts.192 By 1992, Lord Diplock’s model directions were 
“emasculated”, 193  and became specimen directions. 194  “Indifference” was again 
making frequent appearances in the case law,195 and the line between recklessness in 
manslaughter and certain other offences remained unclear, despite the clarifications in 
Seymour.196  
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 This chaos was enabled by Lord Diplock’s focus on “ordinary” language. As 
Smith noted – “[t]he fact is that there is no single ordinary meaning of ‘recklessly’”.197 
Even in the relatively isolated context of the criminal law, there were vast differences 
in opinion about what this word meant. 
 The areas of the law that continued to apply Cunningham were, therefore, 
relative islands of calm for pessimists (such as Williams) who could not conceive of 
the House of Lords overruling Caldwell. 198  These bastions of advertence were 
bolstered by the fact that Caldwell and Lawrence failed to spark a revolution in 
recklessness around the Commonwealth.199 The quest for a universal approach to 
recklessness was again being compromised, and cracks soon began to show in 
inadvertent recklessness. This began with the re-emergence of “gross” negligence as 
an independent form of mens rea in the law of involuntary manslaughter. 
 
 
D. R v ADOMAKO 
Seymour had made “gross” negligence a largely irrelevant concept by the 1990s.200 
The House of Lords’ decision201 in R v Adomako202 changed things. Adomako was a 
hospital anaesthetist who had failed to notice that a ventilator tube had come undone 
during an operation.203 This resulted in the death of the patient and Adomako was 
convicted of manslaughter. 
 When Adomako’s appeal reached the House of Lords, his counsel argued that 
Seymour should be applied in all forms of manslaughter.204 The Lords decided against 
this path (again consigning Lord Diplock’s direction in Lawrence to the “specimen 
direction” scrap heap) and instead returned to the definition of involuntary 
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manslaughter in Andrews: there must have been a duty of care between the defendant 
and the victim, the “grossly” negligent breach of which must have caused the death of 
the victim.205 This “gross” negligence standard applied in all cases of involuntary 
manslaughter. 
 Following Adomako, the law on involuntary manslaughter had gone full circle, 
largely ameliorating the difficulties encountered in the 1980s and early 1990s. The 
decision did, however, exhume two problematic areas: the matter of when a duty of 
care exists; and the issue of what “gross” negligence means. Both of these are crucial 
to an understanding of “gross” negligence as a mens rea standard, and will therefore 
be considered further. This inquiry also has relevance for the discussion in chapter 
two, where it was noted that the Scottish courts had, on occasion, discussed the need 
for consideration of the duties owed by citizens to each other when deciding whether a 
person was “reckless” or “grossly negligent”.206 Not much has been made of this idea 
in Scotland, which is in sharp contrast to the position in English law. 
 
(1) Duties of care 
Three points should be made concerning duties of care in the English law of 
manslaughter. 
 
(a) Establishing and extinguishing a duty 
First, “ordinary principles of negligence” apply when determining whether the 
defendant owed the deceased a duty of care.207 The standard civil law test for 
establishing whether a duty existed – from Caparo Industries v Dickman208 – will thus 
be applied.209 Death must be foreseeable, the defendant and the deceased must be in a 
proximate relationship and it must be “fair, just and reasonable”210 to impose a duty of 
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care upon the defendant. In the absence of specific statutory duties,211 this general 
guidance is all the judge and jury are left with. 
 Some have doubted whether the “pragmatic” approach of the civil law to 
establishing duties – which deals with distributing loss, rather than liability to 
punishment – is appropriate in the criminal context.212 There are also obvious concerns 
over fair notice regarding when a duty of care might be found to exist, which are far 
more pertinent when it is imprisonment, not damages, in question. 
 Furthermore, confusion exists concerning whether a duty of care would be 
found in both a civil and a criminal context.213 There are some cases in which a 
criminal duty of care has been found to exist (e.g. R v Stone; R v Dobinson)214 where 
civil liability might not have arisen and vice versa.215 The principles and policies at 
work in each area of the law are different,216 and this usually makes analogies between 
the two areas unhelpful.217 Lord Prosser’s discussion of duties of care in the context of 
recklessness in HM Advocate v Harris218 thus seems overambitious. 
 Establishing the existence of a duty of care in the criminal law is, despite Lord 
Prosser’s short treatment, thus a complicated matter. In England, it has been done on a 
case-by-case basis, using seemingly arbitrary factors. In one case, a duty was found to 
exist where the defendants were friends with the deceased.219 Other persons, who were 
not the deceased’s friends (but were present), were not found to owe a duty of care. 
This probably does not, however, give rise to a general duty of care to assist friends in 
distress – everything will depend on the facts, which is again unsatisfactory from the 
perspective of legal certainty.  
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 There is also the question of when a duty of care is extinguished.220 Exactly 
what must a person do in order to ensure that she is not opening herself up to potential 
manslaughter liability? An answer to this question has not been forthcoming. 
 It must be accepted that, as manslaughter covers a wide range of factual 
situations, judges must take care not to overgeneralise. The points above should, 
nevertheless, make legislators and judges wary of premising criminal liability for 
inadvertent risk-taking on duties of care as understood in the civil law. 
 
(b) Defeaters of liability 
A second point, which again hints at the different policies at work in criminal and civil 
law, is that certain civil law doctrines are not applicable in the context of involuntary 
manslaughter.  
 For instance, a civil action for negligence is incompetent (on “public policy” 
grounds) where the two parties were engaged in a joint criminal enterprise.221 This is 
the doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio, and it has not been applied in the 
context of involuntary manslaughter. In R v Willoughby,222 the defendant and the 
deceased were both involved in an attempt to defraud insurers by burning down a pub. 
The deceased’s participation in this action did not prevent a manslaughter charge 
against his co-conspirator.223  
 The refusal to apply the ex turpi causa... doctrine in manslaughter is apparently 
based on the “policy” that the law is seeking to advance through the criminal law.224 It 
is unclear what this policy is, or exactly how it differs from that at work in the civil 
law of negligence.225 
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(c) Questions of law and fact 
Thirdly, it should be noted that the question of whether there was a duty of care is one 
of law. The judge should not let a case go to the jury unless there is sufficient evidence 
to warrant a finding of duty, and the jury should be directed only to find a duty of care 
existed if certain facts are proved.226 This has been emphasised in order to ensure that 
the offence of manslaughter is compliant with the certainty provisions of Article 7 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 This suggests that, if duties of care were used more widely in the criminal law 
(as Lord Prosser would have it), judges would have to take responsibility for deciding 
when a duty exists. Simply leaving the matter to the jury, with little or no guidance, 
would potentially breach the ECHR. 
 Duties of care are not, therefore, as straightforward as they might first seem. A 
second general area of concern arising in law on involuntary manslaughter is the 
meaning of the term “gross” negligence. 
 
(2) “Gross” negligence 
The re-emergence of “gross” negligence in Adomako reignited doubts over the line 
between civil and criminal liability for death.227 The courts have been vague over this 
distinction for some time. For instance, Lord Hewart CJ suggested in R v Bateman228 
that “gross” negligence exists where:229  
 
[I]n the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter 
of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of 
others, as to amount to a crime against the state and conduct deserving of punishment. 
 
More guidance is needed to assist the judge or jury in distinguishing civil and criminal 
negligence, and to avoid the danger of potential inconsistency230 (which is surely 
inherent in the Scottish approach to culpable carelessness). 
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 Such inconsistency is fostered by the view in Adomako that, in directing the 
jury on the meaning of “gross” negligence, it is “perfectly appropriate that the word 
‘reckless’ should be used”, in the “ordinary” sense that it was employed in Andrews.231 
To complicate matters further, the “objective” direction in Lawrence may, but need 
not, be used.232 Once again, then, the law on culpable carelessness scarcely seems 
further ahead than it was in the 1950s. 
 The practical result of this confusion is that “reckless” has continued to be used 
by trial judges to explain “gross” negligence.233 It is not clear what meaning is to be 
attributed to recklessness in this context today, but the decision in G (discussed below) 
appears irrelevant here.234 This suggests that involuntary manslaughter still has its own 
understanding of recklessness, which judges are unwilling to define. Any clarity that 
Adomako apparently brought to the mens rea of involuntary manslaughter is thus 
limited by the vagueness of the terminology employed to replace Lawrence. One non-
definition of recklessness has been replaced by another. 
 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) demonstrates the results of this 
approach.235 There, it was decided that the “gross” negligence test in Adomako was 
“objective” and that inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind was unnecessary.236 The 
Court of Appeal nevertheless went on to say that, in certain circumstances, proof of 
advertent recklessness would be crucial.237 This suggest that the word “reckless” might 
be used in two different senses – “ordinary” (which can exist in cases of inadvertence) 
and advertent – in relation to one crime, which is potentially confusing. 
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 Smith argued in his commentary to R v DPP, ex p Jones238 that proof of 
advertence might convince the jury to convict in cases where it is not entirely clear 
that, “objectively”, the defendant’s breach was “grossly” negligent. This might be 
taken to mean that advertent recklessness might act as a substitute in cases where 
“ordinary” recklessness is not clear on the facts. If this is the true state of the law 
following Adomako, then the law is incomprehensible. 
 One way of saving the logic of Adomako, and subsequent cases, might be to 
hold that it is possible that very many seemingly inadvertent, “grossly” 
negligent/“ordinarily” reckless actors were, in fact, aware of the risk of death (i.e. 
advertently reckless).239 If “ordinary” (apparently inadvertent) recklessness is made 
out on the facts, then advertent recklessness might be inferred (and vice versa, 
presumably). It is, of course, open to the jury to disbelieve the defendant’s claim of 
inadvertence, or the Crown’s claim of advertence, and make a contrary inference from 
the circumstances. The point remains, however, that it is potentially confusing that, in 
the law of involuntary manslaughter, the concept of recklessness is interpreted in two 
apparently different ways.  
 With the abdication of definitional responsibility by the courts, the jury is, of 
course, required to take up the slack. This has given rise to human rights challenges 
(on the basis of Article 7 of the ECHR) concerning the fact that the jury is, in effect, to 
decide what is criminal. Primarily, this is of concern because it is unlikely that juries 
can declare something criminal legitimately, given that they do not give public reasons 
for their decisions.240 It was, nevertheless, held in R v Misra241 that the definition of 
“gross” negligence is sufficiently certain to be compliant with the Convention.242 
Given the discussion immediately above, this is hardly convincing.243 
 The court’s treatment of the second issue in Misra was slightly better. The 
appellant argued that, even if the jury was capable of defining the standard of fault 
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required, “gross” negligence was not a proper basis upon which to pin criminal 
liability. This is apparently because “gross” negligence did not require a positive 
mental state, and thus offends the principle that actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea; 
“[a]n act does not make a man guilty of a crime, unless his mind be also guilty”.244 
This argument was rejected (properly) on the basis that mens rea can refer to fault, 
rather than simply a “subjective” mental state.245 “Gross” negligence is apparently a 
form of fault which demonstrates mens rea.246 
 The discussion of “gross” negligence above demonstrates two things. First, the 
law on involuntary manslaughter remains intolerably vague and the confusion of 
recklessness and “gross” negligence is unfortunate when trying to state the meaning of 
those terms. Secondly, as in Scotland, mens rea is not a particularly well-understood 
concept in English criminal law, a theme returned to in section F, below.  
 
(3) R v Adomako: conclusion 
The decision in Adomako raised a number of questions that have not been answered 
satisfactorily. This is instructive, as it points to the shortcomings of approaches to 
recklessness (such as that proposed by Lord Prosser in Harris) premised on “gross” 
negligence and duties of care. 
 The main problem has been the tendency of the higher courts to leave 
decisions to trial judges and juries and for “recklessness” to be used to mean different 
things in different instances. Occasionally, it is given its “ordinary” (apparently 
inadvertent) meaning; at other times it requires advertence. One can supply the other, 
and in some cases advertence will be all-important. The fact that the courts have not 
elucidated clearly when (or why) advertence matters adds further doubt as to whether 
the law on involuntary manslaughter makes sense, particularly when compared with 
the law on other serious crimes. The virtue of Lord Diplock’s direction in Lawrence 
was, perhaps, its comparative clarity.247 
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 Fortunately, Adomako’s treatment of recklessness and negligence has had no 
influence beyond the context of involuntary manslaughter. In relation to other 
offences, the war over the meaning of recklessness has nevertheless waged on, 
culminating in the 2003 decision by the House of Lords in R v G.248 
 
 
E. R v G 
By the early 2000s, the difficulties described in this chapter meant that Caldwell’s 
influence was, in practice, limited to cases of criminal damage.249 G provided the 
House of Lords with the opportunity to reassess this last stronghold of inadvertent 
recklessness. There, two children had set fire to some newspapers. They had placed 
the burning paper in a bin and left, expecting the fire to extinguish itself on the 
concrete floor beneath. The fire took hold and destroyed a number of buildings. The 
defendants were convicted of criminal damage.  
 Following their unsuccessful appeal,250 the defendants proceeded to the House 
of Lords to take on the “ambitious”251 target of Caldwell. Given their past reluctance 
to tamper with Lord Diplock’s model direction,252 the Law Lords’ “determination to 
hear the appeal” made it “apparent that Caldwell’s days were... numbered”.253 The 
Lords proceeded on the assumption that Caldwell required at least modification. 
Accordingly, three options were considered:  
 
(i) A capacity exception for children;  
(ii) A test that asked if the defendant could have foreseen the risk had she thought 
about it; and 
(iii) Departing from Caldwell.  
 
Each option will be dealt with in turn. 
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(1) The capacity of children 
The first proposed modification of Caldwell would have meant that, in the case of 
children, the risk the defendant failed to foresee would have to be one which would 
have been obvious to the “normal reasonable child” of the same age, rather than the 
reasonable adult.254 This option, advocated by some commentators,255 was rejected by 
Lord Bingham.  
 First, under this test, the defendant could still be convicted despite lacking 
mens rea, because it would be unnecessary for her to have foreseen the risk at the time 
of acting.256 All that would be required would be that children of the defendant’s age 
would be able to foresee risks of that type. This would still result in injustice in cases 
such as C. C was fifteen, and a “normal reasonable” fifteen year old would presumably 
have seen the risk of destroying the shed. C would thus still have been convicted, and 
that result would have remained unacceptable for the reasons discussed above.257 
 This problem could have been resolved by considering C’s individual attributes 
that differentiated her from a “normal” child of the same age. Lord Bingham wisely 
rejected this option, as it would open up a complicated debate concerning the 
characteristics of the defendant that should be taken into account when asking what 
the “reasonable normal child” would have foreseen.258 It is notoriously difficult to 
decide – in a consistent way – on principles for differentiating one form of incapacity 
(e.g. stupidity) from another (e.g. a medical condition).259 Similar problems were 
encountered in deciding which of the (allegedly) provoked defendant’s characteristics 
were to be ascribed to the “reasonable person”, which resulted in a voluminous, and 
unstable, jurisprudence.260 
 Furthermore, Lord Bingham argued, any such exception for children would be 
anomalous, and he found that nothing in the Criminal Damage Act 1971 or the 
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relevant preparatory materials that warranted this. It would therefore be a(nother) 
misinterpretation of Parliamentary intent to create a capacity exception.261 Given that 
Parliament could not have possibly foreseen Lord Diplock’s attack on advertent 
recklessness in Caldwell, it is unsurprising that they did not include a capacity-
exception for children in the 1971 Act, but Lord Bingham’s point is a good one. 
 For these reasons, the House felt that more substantial inroads into Caldwell 
were required. 
 
(2) Could the defendant have foreseen the risk? 
In “Recklessness redefined”,262 Williams presented a modification of Caldwell which 
would have held, in Lord Bingham’s words, “that a defendant should only be regarded 
as having acted recklessly by virtue of his failure to give any thought to an obvious 
risk that property would be destroyed or damaged, where such risk would have been 
obvious to him if he had given any thought to the matter.”263 
 This option appears attractive in that the defendant’s individual capacities and 
knowledge, rather than the class of actor to which she belongs (child, schizophrenic, 
etc), matter in terms of culpability.264 This, however, hints at the reason why the 
House of Lords rejected this option in G: the defendant will have good reason to lie 
about her capacities for thought and foresight, and extensive expert evidence might be 
required. This would likely overcomplicate the fact-finder’s task, increasing the risk of 
unreliable verdicts.265  
Furthermore, Lord Bingham argued, allowing for hypothetical decisions about 
what the defendant might have thought had she been prompted to do so would again 
misinterpret Parliament’s intention in enacting the 1971 Act.266 Williams’ thesis 
apparently also did not “meet the objection of principle” to Caldwell: it caught actors 
who, although capable of foreseeing the risk – if they had thought about it – did not, in 
fact, foresee that risk before acting. Such actors could not, therefore, have mens rea 
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and convicting them of a criminal offence would be contrary to the actus non facit 
reum... principle described above.267 The wider interpretation of mens rea as meaning 
“fault”, which has been accepted in the context of involuntary manslaughter (see 
above), was not considered.  
Accordingly, the third option available to the House – to depart entirely from 
Caldwell – fell to be considered. Although the Law Lords took this route unanimously, 
support was not unwavering. 
 
(3) Departing from Caldwell 
Of the Law Lords who gave full opinions, Lord Rodger evidenced the most trepidation 
over departing from Caldwell. His Lordship suggested,268 with reference to Hart,269 
that “subjectivism”, as enshrined in Cunningham, might not be the best solution to the 
problem of recklessness. Lord Rodger concentrated on the fact that the exceptions 
mentioned above270 (where foresight was absent, but culpability appeared to be 
present) would still be required to avoid (supposedly) unmerited acquittals.271 For him, 
these ad hoc responses merely addressed particularly distressing side-effects of the 
underlying problem: that “subjectivism” is too constrained in its appreciation of moral 
culpability, and this – combined with problems of proving advertence – suggested that 
an alternative approach should be adopted.272 
Unfortunately, Lord Rodger’s misgivings did not prevent him from giving his 
(qualified) blessing to the departure from Caldwell. His doubts nevertheless hint at the 
shortcomings of “subjectivism” which have not, to date, troubled Scots law. This 
attitude towards “subjectivism” might suggest Lord Rodger’s preferred approach, 
“[involving] the addition of a subtle but important gloss to the [Caldwell] direction, 
requiring the risk to have been obvious to the accused if he had stopped to think about 
it”.273 It is unfortunate that this argument, explicitly rejected by Lord Bingham, was 
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not the basis of a dissent.274 As Lord Rodger concurred that Caldwell should be 
departed from and replaced with flood-blooded “subjective” recklessness, the 
argument concerning “objective” recklessness, circumscribed by a capacity exception, 
appears to have been taken less seriously than it perhaps deserved. The House of 
Lords appears to have wholeheartedly endorsed advertent recklessness for no fewer 
than seven reasons. 
 First, it is apparently unjust to convict those without a guilty mind (unless this 
resulted from voluntary intoxication).275 Again, the wider meaning of mens rea as 
“fault” was ignored.  
 Secondly, “[i]t is neither moral nor just to convict a defendant (least of all a 
child) on the strength of what someone else would have apprehended if the defendant 
himself had no such apprehension”.276 A lenient sentence apparently does not solve 
this problem,277 but surely the difficulty of convicting a person when, at the time of 
acting, she did not apprehend risk remains present in cases like Parker (which is 
presumably again good authority on the interpretation of the 1971 Act).278  
 Thirdly, the Lords held that the criticisms of eminent judges and academics 
who have deplored Caldwell should not be ignored.279 Although encouraging to 
academics, this argument is hardly compelling. Many areas of English criminal law 
are criticised relentlessly by academics, and the courts rarely take notice.  
 Fourthly, the Lords noted correctly that the majority in Caldwell misinterpreted 
the will of Parliament. Materials prepared by the Law Commission280 (not laid before 
the House in Caldwell) demonstrate that “reckless” in the Criminal Damage Act 1971 
was supposed to be interpreted in the way it had been in Cunningham.281 Accordingly, 
the House in G felt that the majority’s decision in Caldwell had foundered on a 
misinterpretation and should therefore be departed from.282 
                                                
274 See, similarly, H Keating, “Reckless children?” [2007] Crim LR 546 at 557. 
275 R v G [2004] 1 AC 1034 at para 32 per Lord Bingham; DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443. 
276 G at para 33 per Lord Bingham. 
277 G at para 52 per Lord Steyn. 
278 See §3.E(4), below. 
279 G at para 34 per Lord Bingham, para 57 per Lord Steyn. 
280 Criminal Law: Offences of Damage to Property (Law Com No 29, 1970). 
281 G at para 29 per Lord Bingham, paras 46-50 per Lord Steyn, para 64 per Lord Rodger. See e.g. 
Damage to Property (n 280) para 44. 
282 G at paras 30, 35 per Lord Bingham, para 64 per Lord Rodger. 




 Fifthly, it was noted that Caldwell was an intoxication case and – given moral 
intuitions about acquitting those who lack mens rea because they are voluntary 
intoxicated283 – makes perfect sense in its individual circumstances.284 This is an 
obvious attempt to preserve the fiction advanced in Majewski. 
 Sixthly, the Lords felt that no one (other, presumably, than acutely, voluntarily 
intoxicated or unreasonably angry offenders) acquitted under an advertent model of 
recklessness requires, in the interests of public policy, to be convicted.285 If the 
defendant is young, for instance, there are allegedly compelling reasons for 
acquittal.286 How are these compelling reasons to be identified? Tribunals of fact will, 
apparently, bring “common sense” to their role and answer this question.287 This might 
be objected to as overly optimistic. Furthermore, if inadvertent risk-taking is culpable 
(and chapter five argues that it can be), then the House of Lords should have presented 
a stronger moral case for moving from “objectivism” and endorsing “subjectivism” 
than it did in G.  
 Finally, the Law Lords were guided by the fact that English law was, by the 
early 2000s,288 gradually becoming more “subjective”.289 The decision in Caldwell 
was contrary to this trend and that anomaly was to be removed.  
 For these seven reasons, Cunningham’s brand of advertent recklessness was 
revived in the context of criminal damage. If the defendant did not foresee a risk of 
damage, then she should be acquitted.290 
 
(4) After G 
Since G was decided, there have been clarifications of the content and scope of 
recklessness. It was argued in R v Brady291 that the decision in G meant that the 
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defendant must have foreseen “an obvious and significant risk” in order to have been 
reckless. The defendant in that case had (whilst voluntarily intoxicated) perched upon 
the railings of a balcony in a nightclub. He (claimed that he had) slipped292 and landed 
on a woman, breaking her neck and rendering her quadriplegic. The defendant was 
convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm (GBH).293 On appeal, Brady’s argument 
was that he had not foreseen an “obvious and significant risk” of injury (whatever 
these terms mean)294 and ought, therefore, to be acquitted. The Court of Appeal 
rejected this argument: the Crown only had to prove foresight of a risk of harm, which 
apparently had existed in the circumstances. 
 This is consistent with the approach taken towards GBH throughout the 
Caldwell/Lawrence era,295 but it does raise the question: of which risk(s) must an 
advertently reckless actor be aware?296 This matter is yet to be settled definitively in 
English law. 
As Brady (which concerned the Offences against the Person Act 1861) 
demonstrates, although the House of Lords in G dealt with recklessness under the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971, “general principles were laid down”.297 Despite this, the 
spectre of inadvertent recklessness looms large in certain contexts. The decision in 
Lawrence remains good law in road traffic offences,298 although this does not matter 
much anymore as dangerous,299 and careless and inconsiderate,300 driving have their 
own definitions, which do not refer to recklessness. It is also still possible for 
Parliament to create offences that are expressly capable of commission through 
inadvertent recklessness.301 It is thus clear that although inadvertent recklessness is 
almost gone from English criminal law, it is yet to be eradicated entirely.  
                                                                                                                                        
291 [2006] EWCA Crim 2413. 
292 Though one witness thought Brady had jumped deliberately: ibid at para 3 per Hallett J. 
293 Offences against the Person Act 1861 s 20. 
294 See §3.B(1)(a), above. 
295 R v Mowatt [1968] 1 QB 421; R v Rushworth (1992) 95 Cr App R 252. 
296 This is a matter of “correspondence”. See §4.A(3)(a), below. 
297 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 2003) [2005] QB 73 at para 12 per Pill J. See, similarly: 
Brady at para 13 per Hallett J; R v C [2007] EWCA Crim 1068 at para 20 per Hughes LJ. 
298 G at para 28 per Lord Bingham. 
299 Road Traffic Act 1988 s 2A. 
300 Ibid s 3ZA. 
301 See e.g. the Enrichment Technology (Prohibition on Disclosure) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/1818 reg 
2 (cited in D Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal Law, 12th edn (2008) 109 (n 86)). 




Further doubts about the wisdom of “subjective” recklessness are raised when 
consideration is given to the fact that G has raised afresh the problematic issues 
discussed at the beginning of the chapter.302 
 
(5) A problematic revival? 
In Booth v Crown Prosecution Service,303 the defendant had (drunkenly) run out in 
front of a car, and the driver could not avoid a collision. Booth was charged with 
recklessly causing damage to the vehicle.304 
 Although the defendant argued he had not foreseen the risk of collision (he had 
not looked before crossing the road), the magistrates found that he had “deliberately 
closed his mind completely to the risks” involved in walking into the road.305 This is a 
clear nod to the decision in Parker, but did not resolve the problems associated with 
that case.  
 Whilst hearing Booth’s appeal, the Divisional Court argued that “if [the 
defendant] was aware of the risk of a collision, inherent in that risk... was not only the 
risk of personal injury but the risk of damage to property”.306 This view was reached 
by considering the defendant’s knowledge of the risks of crossing the road generally (a 
reference to Murphy), rather than what he actually foresaw at the time.307  
 As in Parker and Murphy, it appears that, in refusing Booth’s appeal, the 
Divisional Court punished him for what he should have taken the time to foresee even 
if, at the time, he would have been incapable of thinking rationally because of his state 
of intoxication (which brings in elements of Majewski). Booth therefore demonstrates 
that the various devices developed during the Cunningham era to avoid the perceived 
shortcomings of “subjective” recklessness have once again been brought to the fore. 
The English courts continue, where possible, to avoid the unsavoury side-effects of 
advertent recklessness. 
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(6) R v G: conclusion 
Given the argument in this chapter, it is perhaps unsurprising that the decision in G has 
not been praised universally. Advertence, as Davies notes, is occasionally an inept 
“barometer of culpa”:308 
 
[I]t is likely... that the inclination of the ordinary person would be that the law ought to 
recognise [inadvertent] actors as being equally culpable... this can be achieved only by 
dint of the jury adopting an objective, “he must have appreciated the risk (perhaps to 
then block it from his mind)” approach (“we would have done”). Those actors who we 
feel sympathy for will... be acquitted by application of the same... reasoning. 
 
In other words, G’s requirement of actual foresight of risk might be under-inclusive 
and act as a catalyst for inconsistent judgments based on intuition. It is not implausible 
that a jury might decide that a defendant is guilty because she is advertently reckless – 
as G requires – or, alternatively, reach the same conclusion based on their gut instinct 
even where the defendant did not foresee the relevant risk. If these cases of inadvertent 
culpability exist (and the history of recklessness in English criminal law, together with 
the argument in chapter five, suggests that they do), this means that the test in G may 
not be consistent with at least some conceptions of moral blameworthiness.309 This 
was, of course, the catalyst for Lord Diplock’s destruction of advertent recklessness in 
Caldwell. The impression is, then, that G represents victory in a battle, not a war. 
 
 
F. SOME DOUBTS 
“Subjectivists” have, however, celebrated the fact that, since G, “it is possible once 
again confidently to draw a clear distinction between recklessness and negligence”.310 
The decision in G might be clear on the need for advertence, but statements such as 
this are misleading. English law on culpable carelessness is not clear, uniform and 
consistent.311 There are, as noted in this chapter, at least three avowed approaches to 
recklessness in English criminal law (advertent, inadvertent and “ordinary” (which 
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seems to be related to inadvertent recklessness)). When consideration is given to 
“mixed” tests, such as those discussed in chapter two, 312  matters get further 
complicated. Although these tests – employed throughout the Sexual Offences Act 
2003 – have replaced indifference-based approaches to recklessness, they add a layer 
of complexity to the law on culpable carelessness which commentators often ignore. 
 This shows that, although clearer than Scots law in many respects, English 
law’s approach to recklessness and negligence remains multifaceted. Cunningham 
accounts for this fact by arguing that “recklessness” is being misused in road traffic 
offences and other crimes where only conduct is involved (where, she argues, 
negligence is really at issue).313 The solution she proposes is to remove talk of 
recklessness in conduct-only crimes and reserve it for crimes concerned with 
consequences or circumstances. 
 Cunningham’s proposals would remove some of the law’s difficulties, but it is 
doubtful that the English courts, having grown used to “reckless” conduct and 
“reckless” minds, will adopt them. Furthermore, Cunningham cannot explain the law 
on manslaughter using her theory314 and so she cannot solve all of the problems 
identified above. This means that other approaches (such as calling for advertent 
recklessness to be the mens rea for manslaughter)315 would have to supplement 
Cunningham’s distinction. The merit of her account is its simplicity, and this is lost 
when she considers its practicalities.  
Added to the law’s inconsistent approach is the fact that nothing prevents the 
Supreme Court (which has assumed the House of Lords’ jurisdiction) from changing 
the law’s approach again and re-establishing the understanding of recklessness in 
Caldwell. 316  As Lord Rodger noted in G, were it not for Lord Diplock’s 
misinterpreting the will of Parliament, Caldwell was a “legitimate choice between two 
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legal policies”: “subjectivism” and “objectivism”; advertence and inadvertence.317 
Absent a specific legislative enactment, such as that proposed in the Draft Criminal 
Code,318 recklessness (and, connectedly, negligence) will thus continue to have an 
unsure foundation in English criminal law. 
 Again, this uncertainty is – it is submitted – attributable to the lack of a 
coherent theory of culpability for risk-taking. In G, for instance, Lord Rodger doubted 
that advertent recklessness was truly an apt indicator of culpability in all cases,319 and 
similar reservations have been expressed by academics in the aftermath of that 
decision.320 Lord Diplock certainly thought he was engaging morality in his definition 
of recklessness in Caldwell, rather than simply clothing a moral term in politically-
neutral legal language concerned with conscious mental states.321 The retreat behind 
this veil in G has only given English law the veneer of a system that has overcome the 
difficulties that have baffled Scottish lawyers and judges for so long. Both systems 





This chapter has shown two things. First, in comparison with their Scottish 
counterparts, the English courts have confronted more directly and openly the issue of 
what it means to be reckless or negligent. Secondly, although authoritative definitions 
of recklessness and negligence have been offered, English law’s treatment of culpable 
carelessness has been inconsistent. It would be foolish to think that Adomako and G 
represent the conclusion of this saga: “gross” negligence is still a very unclear type of 
fault; multiple definitions of recklessness still exist. 
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 English law is not, therefore, much further forward than Scots law in tackling 
the problem of criminal risk-taking. It is submitted that this is because both systems 
lack a clear theoretical understanding of what it means to be culpable in taking a risk.  
Once again, this argument gives rise to an obvious objection, which must be 
dealt with before progressing. English law has been influenced, at some times more 
strongly than at others, by a theory of culpability: “subjectivism”. This chapter has 
demonstrated that “subjectivist” theorists, although influential, have failed to assert 
dominion over the full extent of English law’s approach to culpable carelessness. It 
will be demonstrated in the next chapter that this is fortunate, given “subjectivism’s” 
normative shortcomings. 
 




4 Untangling “Subjectivism” 
 
The previous two chapters have demonstrated the doctrinal mess that results when a 
theory of culpable carelessness is not adopted consistently by the criminal courts. A 
case has therefore been made for proposing a theory of culpability that the courts 
could use to gain stability and coherence in their approach. The next three chapters 
build to such a theory. 
 This chapter considers the dominant theory of culpable carelessness: 
“subjectivism”.1 Although this is normally treated as a monolithic theory, it will be 
contended that “subjectivists” typically adopt three distinct theoretical positions on 
culpable carelessness. These theories (discussed in sections A-C) will be referred to 
as: 
 
(i)  Strict choice theory; 
(ii) Choice and capacity theory; and 
(iii) Choice and character theory. 
 
 The main distinction between these theories is their treatment of inadvertent 
risk-taking (or “negligence”). 2  Strict choice theorists do not sanction criminal 
liability for inadvertent, unjustified risk-taking. Choice and capacity, and choice and 
character theorists do (in limited circumstances), but for different reasons. 
 It will be argued that strict choice theorists fail to explain compellingly why 
only conscious choices to do wrong are culpable.3 Choice and capacity theory fares 
better because it emphasises the unfairness of holding actors to a standard they 
                                                
1 The label “subjectivism” is misleading. Some theories, such as Duff’s, do not fall into one of the 
categories below, yet may properly be described as “subjective” insofar as they concentrate on the 
accused‘s attributes (see §1.D(1), above). The focus on choice (albeit to different extents) is what the 
theories discussed in this chapter have in common. 
2 This might mean that the latter two theories are not “subjectivist” at all: negligence liability is seen 
as being the heart of the debate between “subjectivists” and “objectivists”. See e.g. J Gardner and H 
Jung, “Making sense of mens rea: Antony Duff’s account” (1991) 11 OJLS 559 at 559. This again 
calls into question the usefulness of the label “subjectivism”. 
3 See, similarly, J Horder, “Cognition, emotion and criminal culpability” (1990) 106 LQR 469 at 474. 




cannot reach – a problem English law encountered following Elliott v C (A Minor).4 
It is, nevertheless, still tied unconvincingly to the idea that choice is the be-all-and-
end-all of culpability, making it seem misguided. Choice and character theory is 
unrealistic and/or illiberal and ought to be discarded.  
 The chapter thus concludes that “subjectivism” is not the impressive theory of 
culpable carelessness it is sometimes held out to be. Accepting this point allows for 




A. STRICT CHOICE THEORY 
As its name suggests, strict choice theory is concerned only with an accused’s 
conscious choices to do wrong. 5  The standard strict choice view of criminal 
recklessness thus holds that a reckless person consciously chooses to disregard an 
unjustifiable risk that a circumstance exists or a consequence will result.6 Although 
there are modifications of this view (discussed below), the choice to take a foreseen, 
unjustified risk is the essence of recklessness in strict choice theory.7 
 If accepted, strict choice theory causes problems for negligence liability in 
the criminal law: negligent (i.e. inadvertent) actors do not usually8 choose to do 
wrong. On the strict choice view, they cannot – therefore – be culpable.9 Strict choice 
theorists thus argue that advertent recklessness is the baseline of criminal fault.  
                                                
4 [1983] 1 WLR 939 (see §3.C(3), above). 
5 See Moore, Placing Blame 590. See, more recently: MS Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An 
Essay in Law, Morals and Metaphysics (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 203; MS Moore and HM Hurd, 
“Punishing the awkward, the stupid, the weak and the selfish: the culpability of negligence” (2011) 5 
Crim Law & Philos 147. Some “subjectivist” authors have considered the subconscious aspects of 
risk-taking: see §4.A(3)(b), below. 
6 See Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability ch 2; Model Penal Code s 2.02(c). 
7 Some strict choice theorists think that advertent recklessness explains the entirety of culpability, 
making other mens rea terms superfluous: Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability ch 2. Cf J Dressler, 
“Does one mens rea fit all? Thoughts on Alexander’s unified conception of criminal culpability” 
(2000) 88 Cal L Rev 955. 
8 It is theoretically possible to choose to risk being inadvertent at a future time. Accepting this point 
would allow strict choice theorists to accommodate some cases where, at the time of acting, the 
accused was inadvertent. See, further: People v Decina 138 NE 2d 799 (1956); Alexander et al, Crime 
& Culpability 80. 
9 See Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability ch 3. 




 Given this strong claim, strict choice theorists need to explain convincingly 
why conscious choices explain the whole – and not merely a part – of culpability. As 
seen below, such explanations (when given) are unconvincing. 
 
(1) The importance of choice 
Alexander and Ferzan’s view is fairly typical:10 
 
An actor is culpable when he exhibits insufficient concern for others. Actors 
demonstrate insufficient concern for others when they (irrevocably) decide to harm 
or risk harming other people (or their legally protected interests) for insufficient 
reasons. 
 
 Alexander and Ferzan present no real argument as to why insufficient 
concern is manifest only where the actor chooses to do wrong, but this view 
permeates the remainder of their article 11  and their subsequent book. 12  The 
correctness of this position is simply assumed, as though it was self-evident,13 but it 
is not. There is nothing in the definition of culpability as “insufficient concern for 
others” that ties a theorist to the view that only conscious choices to do wrong are 
culpable.14 Other authors who conceive of culpability as insufficient concern have 
avoided this conclusion.15 
 Alexander and Ferzan look, therefore, to be declaring – rather than arguing – 
that culpability is coextensive with conscious choices to do wrong. Without 
explaining the basis of this decision, Alexander and Ferzan’s view seems arbitrary, 
making their argument that negligence cannot be culpable seem ill-conceived.16 
                                                
10 L Alexander and KK Ferzan, “Culpable acts of risk creation” (2007-2008) 5 Ohio St J Crim L 375 
at 378 (footnotes omitted). 
11 Ibid at 378-388. 
12 Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability chs 2-3. 
13 Strict choice theorists also assume that “choice” has a settled meaning, which is disputable: SH 
Pillsbury, “The meaning of deserved punishment: an essay on choice, character and responsibility” 
(1991-1992) 67 Ind LJ 719 at 738. 
14 In fact, the notion of insufficient concern for others might suggest that culpability should be 
understood (at least partially) by reference to the relationship between the accused and others: VF 
Nourse, “Hearts and minds: understanding the new culpability” (2002-2003) 6 Buff Crim L Rev 361. 
15 E.g. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 61-66. 
16 See Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability ch 3. 




 Alexander and Ferzan might reply by pointing to their commitment to 
retributivism.17 Conscious choices, the argument goes, are connected uniquely to 
desert. This is not terribly edifying: one of the problems for retributivist18 theories of 
punishment is that it is debatable what constitutes negative desert.19 Desert need not 
necessarily be determined only on the basis of conscious choices, and it is thus 
possible to argue that inadvertent wrongdoing deserves to be punished.20 Again, if 
strict choice theorists think that desert can only exist where a conscious choice to do 
wrong has been made, a substantive argument explaining why this is the case must be 
presented. If it is not, then it again appears that a concept (desert) is being defined 
restrictively to fit underlying assumptions about culpability. 
 Thus far, the strict choice theorist’s explanation of why conscious choices 
explain the full extent of culpability is the equivalent of declaring that oranges are 
not simply a type of fruit, but instead the be-all-and-end-all of fruit. Apples, on this 
account, are not fruit. Such a position would be manifestly arbitrary and irrational. 
This same criticism can be made of certain accounts of strict choice theory and their 
commitment to denying that inadvertent, unjustified risk-taking may be culpable. 
Some strict choice theorists have, however, defended their brand of “subjectivism” in 
a more developed manner. 
 
(a) Choice and alignment 
One approach is to emphasise that consciously choosing to risk a certain 
consequence (or take the risk that a certain circumstance exists) aligns the actor with 
that consequence or circumstance in a special way.21 On this view, conscious choices 
make actions (and their consequences) belong to the actor.22 In relation to culpable 
carelessness, a choice to take an unjustified risk demonstrates clearly the accused’s 
                                                
17 Alexander, Ferzan and Morse are “moderate retributivists”: Crime & Culpability 7-10. Moore 
defends retributivism in Placing Blame chs 2-4. 
18 For others, see D Boonin, The Problem of Punishment: A Critical Introduction (2008) ch 3. 
19 See PH Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal law: Who Should be Punished, How Much? 
(2008) ch 7. 
20 KW Simons, “Culpability and retributive theory: the problem of criminal negligence” (1994) 5 J 
Contemp Legal Issues 365 at 365. 
21 See: Duff, IACL 154; AP Simester, “Responsibility for inadvertent acts” (2004-2005) 2 Ohio St J 
Crim L 601 at 603. 
22 G Sher, Desert (1987) 161; CT Sistare, “Models of responsibility in criminal theory: comment on 
Baker” (1988-1989) 7 Law & Phil 295 at 301-302. 




agency and attitude towards the interests of others. Holding her responsible and, if 
necessary, liable for that act of risk-taking – and perhaps its consequences – is 
accordingly unproblematic. 
 This approach will be dubbed “the alignment view”. It may be defended by 
reference to the relationship between practical reasoning and choices.23 In order to 
understand this argument, it is necessary to take a brief detour into the realm of 
responsibility. As noted in chapter one,24 to be a proper candidate for criminal 
responsibility, an actor must have the capacity to appreciate the reasons for and 
against conduct that bear upon her. She must, in other words, be capable of engaging 
in practical reasoning.25 Such actors may be referred to as “status-responsible”.26  
 Absent status-responsibility, a person is not an apt candidate for the 
communicative process of the criminal trial. If the accused cannot appreciate reasons 
for and against acting, it seems impossible to explain the community’s disavowal of 
her conduct, just as it would be pointless to explain to a cat why it had reason to do 
otherwise than it did. Although others might learn from the punishment of a non-
status-responsible person, this would be to (presumably illegitimately) use her as a 
means to an end (communication to others). 
 The alignment view builds on the relationship between conscious choices and 
practical reasoning in status-responsible actors. In every action she performs, a 
status-responsible actor is presented with reasons for and against acting in a certain 
way. She is faced with a choice that requires her to exercise her capacity to reason: 
do the reasons against acting outweigh those for acting, or vice versa? It is this aspect 
of decision-making, of choosing on the basis of the reasons open to an agent, which 
the alignment view links to culpability. As Moore explains, “one is culpable if he 
chooses to do wrong in circumstances when that choice is freely made”.27 The 
intrinsic culpability in such a choice, he argues, is the intending or believing that 
one’s conduct is wrongful (i.e. there is reason not to do it).28 
                                                
23 Moore, Placing Blame ch 9. See, similarly, Pillsbury (n 13) at 727-729. 
24 At §1.A(1). 
25 For an introduction, see J Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (revised edn, 1999) ch 1. 
26 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 21, 55-57. 
27 Moore, Placing Blame 404. 
28 Ibid 404-405. 




 Moore seems now to be in a familiar bind: why is culpability only 
demonstrated when there is a culpable choice? The answer lies in what choices 
demonstrate. “Culpable choice” presupposes that the chooser was aware of the 
possible wrongful consequences of her actions – that she adverted to them29 – and 
could have chosen to act otherwise. For Moore, this awareness demonstrates that the 
accused’s course of conduct was the product of her will,30 providing a vital link 
between the accused’s agency, her behaviour, the risks it involves and the options 
that she consciously discounted in deciding what to do.31 Furthermore, the fact that 
the accused made a conscious choice to do wrong ensures that she acted freely as an 
autonomous agent committed to a course of action, rather than being coerced into 
acting against her will.32 
To emphasise the accused’s demonstration of autonomy, strict choice 
theorists tend to argue that freedom requires that the actor could have chosen other 
than she in fact did (assuming this was possible).33 This seems intuitively sensible, 
because it is difficult to conceive of a meaningful choice being made in a situation 
where the accused was presented with only one acceptable option (consider the 
extreme example of an agent with a gun to her head). Referring to such choices as 
“autonomous” seems wrong.34 If there are no acceptable options available to the 
accused, she of course still makes a “choice” in deciding what to do.35 But this 
“choice” does not reveal much about the chooser’s will (other than suggesting, in a 
gun-to-the-head situation, that she is not suicidal). As a result, strict choice theorists 
do not count un-free choices as an aspect of responsibility. This holds for risk-taking 
as much as it does for intentional wrongdoing. 
 This account of freedom and choice is controversial, but it at least goes some 
way to explaining why strict choice theorists ascribe such a high value to conscious 
                                                
29 Duff, IACL 44-47. 
30 See, similarly, BM Baker, “Mens rea, negligence and criminal law reform” (1987-1988) 6 Law & 
Phil 53 at 69. 
31 T Baldwin, “Foresight and responsibility” (1979) 54 Philosophy 347 at 354. 
32 See, further, RA Duff, “Choice, character and criminal liability” (1993) 12 Law & Phil 345 at 346. 
33 Cf HG Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (1988) ch 1. The conflict between free 
will and determinism which this argument raises cannot be resolved here (see §1.A(5), above). 
34  See: J Raz, “Autonomy, freedom and the harm principle”, in R Gavison (ed), Issues in 
Contemporary Legal Philosophy: the Influence of HLA Hart (1987) 313 at 316-318; J Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom (1988) 373. See, also, Duff (n 32) at 351. 
35 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 65. 




choices. When the discussion is related back to the context of risk-taking, it 
nevertheless becomes clear that there has been a sleight of hand which seeks to 
unravel the core contention of strict choice theory. 
 
(b) Freedom and responsibility 
To see this, consider the following example, which emphasises the value of free 
choice in the context of risk-taking. In deciding to speed through a red light, the 
conscious risk-taker has demonstrated clearly her attitude towards the risks that she 
poses to the interests of others (and, indeed, to herself).36 Absent extraordinary 
circumstances (see below), the driver had the free option – which, in making her 
conscious choice, she will have appreciated and discounted – of driving safely and 
stopping at the red light. In these circumstances, a clear line may be drawn from the 
accused (as an agent), through the insufficient concern that her action demonstrates, 
to the consequences of her risk-taking (if any). The inquiry into culpability is 
relatively sanitised,37  with difficult moral and political questions sidestepped.38 
Where the driver was inadvertent, however, strict choice theorists argue that this 
exercise of will – and thus culpability – is not apparent. 
The sleight of hand becomes plain when attention is paid to the way in which 
some strict choice theories use freedom to choose to draw a connection between an 
actor and wider aspects of her agency. Ferzan, for instance, points out that – when 
faced with a free choice between alternative courses of conduct – agents might hold 
conflicting desires about how to act.39 For instance, the accused might have had a 
strong desire to kill (she wants an inheritance) and a strong desire not to (she values 
the relationship she has with her parent). In such situations, a free, conscious 
decision to act in a certain way indicates the desire which relates most closely to the 
                                                
36 This should not be read to mean that all drivers who run through red lights are conscious of the risks 
involved in that action. It is far more likely that they are not, and this idea is explored below and in the 
next two chapters. 
37 KW Simons, “Rethinking mental states” (1992) 72 BUL Rev 463 at 482-483. Cf J Horder, 
“Questioning the correspondence principle: a reply” [1999] Crim LR 206 at 208. 
38 J Gardner and H Jung, “Making sense of mens rea: Antony Duff’s account” (1991) 11 OJLS 559 at 
575; AW Norrie, “Subjectivism, objectivism and the limits of criminal recklessness” (1992) 12 OJLS 
45 at 58. 
39 KK Ferzan, “Don’t abandon the Model Penal Code yet! Thinking through Simons’s rethinking” 
(2002-2003) 6 Buff Crim L Rev 185 at 209. 




accused’s agency and her preferences.40 Free, conscious choices exhibit the agent’s 
“psychological feeling about the harm she is imposing”.41  
In drawing this connection between the accused, her feelings towards harm, 
and the harm actually risked, Ferzan is again able to make the matter of culpability 
seem simple. She has, however, cast off the shackles of strict choice theory. If 
attitudes and desires are what matter, then what lies behind choices (capacities, 
character, etc) seems important in questions of culpability. The alignment 
explanation of culpability for conscious choices (at least as Moore and Ferzan have 
explained it) has thus not justified the sole concentration on conscious choices in 
some modern theories of culpable carelessness.  
 
(c) Beyond strict choice 
In fact, the alignment view simply makes some fairly uncontroversial points about 
responsibility and liability generally. Few would deny that choices are important in 
drawing links between acts and actors; they are perhaps paradigm instances of 
responsible agency.42 Nor, in a liberal society, would the notion of individual 
autonomy be taken lightly. It is nevertheless plain that the arguments discussed 
above show only that a choice to do wrong may draw a particularly strong 
connection between the actor and her acts. It does not explain why choice is the sole 
mark of culpability.43 
 On examination, it appears that conscious choices are reflections of deeper 
aspects of the agent’s will, feelings and attitudes. This does not sound like a 
promising basis for strict choice theory, but rather undermines it. If agency, feelings 
and attitudes are what matters, it is not clear why these can only be demonstrated 
through advertent risk-taking.44 As will be argued in the next two chapters, a failure 
                                                
40 Cf Moore, Placing Blame 551. 
41 KK Ferzan, “Holistic culpability” (2006-2007) 28 Cardozo L Rev 2523 at 2534. 
42 See §6.B(4), below. 
43 Cf KW Simons, “Culpability and retributive theory: the problem of criminal negligence” (1994) 5 J 
Contemp Legal Issues 365 at 389. 
44 Cf: Duff, IACL ch 7 (discussed below at §6.A(4)); V Tadros, “Recklessness and the duty to take 
care”, in S Shute and AP Simester (eds), Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (2002) 
227 at 233. 




to notice or investigate a risk can show just as strong an attitude towards the interests 
of others as a conscious choice to do wrong. 
 There are also questions over the strict choice theorist’s view of individual 
autonomy. On one view, emphasising individual autonomy through requiring 
conscious, chosen wrongdoing is sensible: individuals ought to be able to exercise 
their freedom and control over the matter of whether they open themselves up to the 
“authoritative disavowal”45 of criminal liability.46 It is still not clear, however, how 
the argument from individual autonomy supports the view that choice is the sole 
mark of culpability. Individual autonomy is not a definite concept: it can be 
understood in wider senses47 which encompass aspects of a person’s capacities and 
character, and her relationships with others, etc. In fact, it might be objected that 
viewing autonomy simply in terms of conscious choice “would treat human beings as 
unreflective, nose-to-the-ground seekers of satisfaction incapable of meeting 
expectations of foresight premised on a capacity for thought”.48 In other words, 
individual autonomy could involve taking responsibility for the kind of individual 
one is, and the aspects of a situation that one could have (but did not) advert to.49  
 The possibility of this wider understanding of autonomy has, in fact, won 
over some “subjectivists”. For instance, Ashworth (a “subjectivist”)50 understands 
that, although individual autonomy is respected through concentrating on advertence, 
it is also given due weight when an inadvertent actor is punished for failing to reach 
a standard of care she could have reached.51 This makes him a different kind of 
theorist (namely, a choice and capacity theorist – see section B, below) and suggests 
that the concept of individual autonomy cannot, in itself, justify choice’s place as the 
sole mark of culpability. 
                                                
45 J Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (1970) 101. 
46 On choice and control, see: E Fruchtman, “Recklessness and the limits of mens rea: beyond 
orthodox subjectivism” (1986-1987) 29 Crim LQ 315, 421 at 334-336; Duff, IACL 155; RA Duff, 
Criminal Attempts (1996) 332.  
47 See, further, P Allmark, “An Aristotelian account of autonomy” (2008) 42 J Value Inquiry 41. 
48 A Brudner, Punishment & Freedom: A Liberal Theory of Penal Justice (2009) 63. 
49 See: BM Baker, “Mens rea, negligence and criminal law reform” (1987-1988) 6 Law & Phil 53 at 
68; N Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (1988) 77. 
50 See Ashworth, Principles 75. 
51 Ibid 185-188. 




To draw the threads of the argument thus far together, the strict choice 
theorist’s claim that conscious choices explain the entirety of culpability – and ought, 
therefore, to dominate the criminal law’s approach to culpable carelessness – lacks a 
convincing rationale. Interpreting concepts such as culpability, desert, freedom and 
individual autonomy in a way that suits deeper commitments to choice is insufficient. 
Those commitments themselves require justification. It has been noted already that 
strict choice theorists rarely offer such an account, but one notable exception will be 
considered. 
 
(d) Brudner: saving strict choice theory? 
For Brudner, a choice to infringe the rights of others is central to culpability because 
– again – of what it represents. His starting point is a Hegelian conception of social 
interaction,52 which holds that the limits of a person’s autonomy (and her rights) are 
determined by the limits on the autonomy (and rights) of others. Under such a 
system, one person’s freedom ends where another’s begins:53 for instance, a person’s 
right to walk where she pleases is circumscribed by the property and privacy rights 
of others. It is, for Brudner, a fundamental duty of citizenship to respect these 
boundaries of autonomy and rights, and to only cross them with the consent of those 
whose autonomy and rights will thereby be infringed.54 
 Given this view of society, Brudner can explain the centrality of conscious 
choices to culpability. A conscious, knowing55 choice to non-consensually go beyond 
the reciprocal confines of autonomy, and impact upon the freedom of others, is a 
symbolic disavowal of the impeded party’s status as an end, the duties of citizenship, 
and the bonds of society.56 Punishment is a necessary evil, which reasserts the social 
boundaries of autonomy that the offender has threatened. It does so by limiting the 
                                                
52 See GWF Hegel, Philosophy of Right (S W Dyde trans, 1896). 
53 Brudner, Punishment & Freedom (n 48) 59. 
54 See, also, R Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) 58. 
55 If the accused is mistaken concerning the bounds of autonomy, defiance presumably cannot be 
shown: SP Garvey, “Passion’s puzzle” (2004-2005) 90 Iowa L Rev 1677 at 1728. Despite this, 
Brudner only admits of exculpatory mistakes where the “Thinking Agent” would have made the same 
error: Brudner, Punishment & Freedom (n 48) 82. 
56 See, further: J Hampton, “Mens rea”, in EF Paul, FD Miller and J Paul (eds), Crime, Culpability 
and Remedy (1990) 1; WE Conklin, Hegel’s Laws: The Legitimacy of a Modern Legal Order (2008) 
142-143. 




offender’s autonomy.57 Through this process, one failure to respect the socially-
protected thresholds of individual autonomy breeds another,58 apparently reinforcing 
the social structure that the offender’s advertent wrongdoing threatens to undermine. 
 This account of punishment means that the State is involved, necessarily, in 
the violation of offenders’ rights.59 In imprisoning an offender, for instance, the State 
ensures that she is no longer free to exercise her individual autonomy as she could 
before offending.60 Without the offender’s consent, this would – for Brudner – be 
just as wrong as the offender’s wrongful conduct against her fellow citizen(s).61 This 
explains why conscious choice is the cornerstone of his theory: it is only when an 
offender has knowingly chosen to do wrong that she can be said to have implicitly 
consented to (or chosen) punishment.62 In such cases, the offender63 is “treated in 
accordance with his dignity and honour” rather than “as a dog”.64 Absent this 
consent, punishment is an unjustifiable raising of “a cane against a dog”.65 
 Advertent wrongdoing and risk-taking is thus viewed as the core of 
culpability in a (Hegelian) liberal society.66 Brudner therefore supports only the use 
of advertent recklessness in the criminal law.67 
 Brudner’s defence of strict choice theory is intimidating. This is because it is 
linked so thoroughly to a view of the proper boundaries of autonomy, the place of 
punishment and the relationship between citizens in a liberal democracy. The 
difficulty is, however, that the liberal democracy Brudner writes about does not exist 
                                                
57 Brudner, Punishment & Freedom (n 48) 77. 
58 Importantly, Brudner thinks that the unforeseen, but foreseeable, consequences of a choice to do 
wrong may impact on the level of punishment: ibid 62. 
59 Cf DN Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law (2008) 96. 
60 Punishment thus contains an element of “dominance” over the offender. See, further, GP Fletcher, 
“What is punishment imposed for?” (1994) 5 J Contemp L Issues 101 at 110-111. 
61 See, also: Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (n 54) 51-52; CS Nino, “A consensual theory of 
punishment” (1983) 12 Philosophy & Public Affairs 289. 
62 Brudner, Punishment & Freedom (n 48) 78. 
63 Brudner does not require the offender to choose to be punished. Instead, he relies on an “objective” 
“Thinking Agent” who would draw the connection between offending and consent to punishment: ibid 
3-5. 
64 Hegel, Philosophy of Right (n 52) §99.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Importantly, Brudner views negligence as blameworthy; it simply does not fit his view of criminal 
fault: A Brudner, “Is negligence blameless?”, in PH Robinson, SP Garvey and KK Ferzan (eds), 
Criminal Law Conversations (2009) 285. 
67 The same is true of welfare offences, which Brudner distinguishes from “real” crimes. See Brudner, 
Punishment & Freedom (n 48) ch 5. 




here, or in his native Canada. His theory creates a “map of imaginary terrain”;68 a 
criminal law that is so removed from doctrinal situations like those described in 
chapters two and three that it seems alien.69 This makes his efforts to save strict 
choice theory seem devoid of descriptive merit. In fact, it might be wondered 
whether Brudner’s theory is too grand, and that implicit theoretical allegiances cloud 
his treatment of specific issues such as recklessness and negligence.70 He might have 
assumed (wrongly) that a person cannot inadvertently threaten the bonds of society 
by failing to acknowledge a risk that any properly-motivated citizen would have 
foreseen.71 
 These points mean that Brudner’s thesis is not a compelling account of why 
only conscious choices matter when assessing culpability. It is thus not a threat to the 
wider notion of culpable carelessness defended in later chapters. This is fortuitous, as 
addressing Brudner’s theory would go beyond crafting an understanding of culpable 
carelessness for Scots and English law – the avowed purpose of the next two 
chapters. It would mean arguing about the societal infrastructure that Brudner 
constructs his theory around, which would take the thesis far away from law. 
Accordingly, Brudner’s theory will be left to one side. 
 The discussion above shows that, when applied as a normative and 
descriptive theory of culpable carelessness, strict choice theory still begs a 
fundamental question and places conscious choice on a pedestal it does not, without 
argument, deserve. This undermines strict choice theory’s more radical 
consequences, including its denial of culpability for negligence. 
 
(2) Why negligence is not culpable 
Given the deficiencies detailed above, it is not worth considering the argument that 
negligence is not culpable because negligent actors do not choose to do wrong. 
                                                
68 N Lacey, “Contingency, coherence and conceptualism: reflections on the encounter between 
‘critique’ and ‘the philosophy of the criminal law’”, in RA Duff (ed), Philosophy and the Criminal 
Law: Principle and Critique (1998) 9 at 16. 
69 See, also: R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) 65; DN Husak, “Retribution in criminal law theory” 
(2000) 37 San Diego L Rev 959 at 969. 
70 GP Fletcher, The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comparative and International (2007) 57-
58. 
71 Ibid 313. 




Furthermore, it should be noted that most modern strict choice accounts of why 
negligence is not culpable present various objections to arguments for negligence 
liability. 72  This makes discussing many strict choice objections to negligence 
difficult without introducing the arguments they are designed to undermine. As a 
result of this, most strict choice arguments against negligence liability will be held 
over until the next chapter. For present purposes, it is necessary to explore only two 
objections to negligence liability that emerge from strict choice theory. 
 
(a) Negligence is not a form of mens rea 
The first objection rests on the principle that actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea; 
that “[a]n act does not make a man guilty of a crime, unless his mind be also 
guilty”.73 If the negligent actor has not adverted to an unjustifiable risk, then that risk 
cannot be in her conscious deliberation and she cannot, the argument goes, have a 
culpable mental state – mens rea – at the time of taking the risk. She cannot, 
therefore, be held criminally liable for her inadvertence and/or its consequences. 
 The popularity of this argument has waned74 – perhaps because it relies upon 
an understanding of the actus non facit reum... principle that is not settled.75 As 
Fletcher points out, although that “principle is widely quoted, no one seems entirely 
sure of its relevance”.76 It first appeared in the work of Coke,77 and is used in relation 
to two examples: where a person has committed what would now be embezzlement78 
(which was not a crime whilst Coke was writing) and where a person has killed 
himself whilst non compos mentis.79 In both examples, the accused would not be 
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guilty of an offence, but the reason why seems to be different in each case. As 
Fletcher explains:80 
 
The first actor did not have the requisite intent to be guilty of larceny; the second 
was not accountable for his act of suicide. It is tempting to focus solely on the 
larceny hypothetical and argue that in invoking the concept of mens rea, Coke meant 
merely to say that the actor must have the intent proscribed by law in order to be 
guilty of the offence... Yet this interpretation of Coke is hardly compatible with his 
analysis of suicide by a nonresponsible [sic] actor. In the latter case, the absence of 
mens rea is the absence of responsibility, not the absence of a particular intention or 
mental state proscribed by law. 
 
 Mens rea can therefore be understood in a more general sense meaning 
“responsibility”, rather than just “(conscious) mental state”. This would allow 
negligence to be understood as a form of mens rea.81 Admittedly, this understanding 
of mens rea depletes the descriptive significance of that term in modern 
scholarship,82 but it is clearly still at work in parts of English criminal law (e.g. 
“gross” negligence manslaughter).83 
 This suggests two things. First, if negligence is demonstrated (as it will be in 
the next chapter) to be culpable – in the sense that it shows insufficient concern for 
the interests of others – then the wider understanding of mens rea could be 
marshalled in its support.84 Secondly, even if “mens rea” is now understood in a 
“subjective” sense, this is another selective definition. There is nothing in the history 
of mens rea that suggests that it must be understood as “culpable, ‘subjective’ mental 
state”.85 
 One response is to cease using the term mens rea, and instead hold that 
criminal culpability only exists where the accused possesses a culpable mental state. 
If this approach is adopted, strict choice theory is back where it started: why are only 
culpable mental states sufficient for culpability? Furthermore, surely not having 
                                                
80 Fletcher (n 76) at 411-412. 
81 See, similarly: HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (1968) 
139-140; DN Husak, Philosophy of Criminal Law (1987) 135; BM Baker, “Mens rea, negligence and 
criminal law reform” (1987-1988) 6 Law & Phil 53 at 78; K Huigens, “Virtue and criminal 
negligence” (1997-1998) 1 Buff Crim L Rev 431 at 439. 
82 JWC Turner, “The mental element in crimes at common law” (1938) 6 CLJ 31 at 32; G Williams, 
Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd edn (1983) 91 (n 5). 
83 See §3.D(2), above. 
84 Cf GP Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978) 262. 
85 Cf KK Ferzan, “Holistic culpability” (2006-2007) 28 Cardozo L Rev 2523 at 2527. 




certain thoughts can be conceived of as a type of “culpable mental state”.86 The first 
strict choice objection to negligence liability can thus be met. 
 
(b) Negligent acts are involuntary 
A second, flawed argument from strict choice theory holds that negligent action is 
not culpable because it is involuntary.87 Hall argues that this is because actions are 
only voluntary when the actor is consciously aware of their possible consequences.88  
 This argument can be dealt with quickly as Hall misinterprets his main 
source, Aristotle.89 Aristotle argues that ignorance cannot excuse if it stems from the 
actor’s own wickedness.90 As an example of this point, Aristotle states that voluntary 
intoxication should not excuse if it was in the offender’s power not to become 
drunk.91 In this example, Aristotle is indeed concerned with the actor’s control over 
her ignorance: the voluntarily intoxicated offender can avoid becoming intoxicated, 
and so has to answer for the consequences of choosing to drink.92 
 If matters were left there, Hall might have a valid point concerning 
voluntariness. Aristotle requires a conscious choice to lose self-control in order for 
intoxicated ignorance to be culpable. 93  Negligent actors do not choose, Hall 
contends, to be ignorant at a later time.94 If this is correct, then negligent actors do 
not appear to be acting voluntarily when they take an unjustified risk, and it is fairly 
uncontroversial that involuntary actions should not attract criminal liability. 
 Unfortunately, for Hall, Aristotle undermines this view of voluntariness 
through his second example of culpable ignorance: the negligent actor. Aristotle 
contends that negligent actors are responsible where “it was in their power not to be 
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ignorant, because it was up to them whether they took care”.95 He believes that a 
person, in shaping her character, can foster careless habits or, alternatively, 
endeavour to perform the actions of a careful person (habituating herself to perform 
further careful actions and, ultimately, become a careful person). Aristotle is thus 
interested in whether a person’s “chosen” character explains her ignorance.96 If a 
person develops her character in such a way that she fails to foresee risks that she 
ought to (if she were properly motivated), then Aristotle would hold her responsible 
for her ignorance. 
 Hall’s voluntariness argument is thus built on a misunderstanding of 
Aristotle. Although authority is not terribly important here (Aristotle might be 
wrong), Hall should have presented a more developed theory concerning why 
voluntary action requires conscious awareness, that could overcome the Aristotelian 
objection that aspects of a careless character might be “chosen”.97 In the absence of 
such a theory, the argument that negligent actions cannot be culpable because they 
are involuntary is spurious. 
 It is worth noting that Hall’s doubts concerning negligence (once again) arise 
because he has defined a term (voluntariness) so as to accommodate only conscious 
choices to do wrong and exclude inadvertent risk-taking. Wider conceptions of 
culpability for inadvertent risk-taking, which do not share Hall’s underlying 
assumptions (and find Aristotelian support), are therefore possible.98 
 Two popular, strict choice arguments against negligence liability have thus 
been found to be superficial, showing up further instances of arbitrary definition. By 
means of a further example of how definition can affect a strict choice theorist’s 
view on culpable carelessness, the next section juxtaposes two strict choice 
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(3) The inconsistent boundaries of strict choice theory 
 
(a) The “correspondence principle” 
The correspondence principle is described by Campbell and Ashworth as follows: “if 
the offence is defined in terms of certain consequences and certain circumstances, the 
mental element ought to correspond with that by referring to those consequences or 
circumstances.”99 
 This principle may be read narrowly, holding that the accused must have 
foreseen an exact consequence or circumstance and chosen to risk its materialisation 
in order to be culpable.100 On this view, an actor who foresaw the risk of mild 
property damage in throwing a stone at a window to get the attention of someone 
inside would be culpable for choosing to take that risk and would be potentially 
liable for that particular consequence if it materialised. If the window smashed, 
injuring a bystander, a narrow reading of the correspondence principle would 
exclude liability for that injury. Although culpable for taking a risk of a consequence 
(damage), the actual consequences go beyond what the accused chose to risk and, 
accordingly, go beyond the extent of her blameworthiness. 
 The connection correspondence apparently draws between foresight and 
individual culpability is important. It again suggests that conscious choices are the 
sole determinant of blameworthiness. Ashworth contends that the correspondence 
principle is, in fact, an extension of the “subjectivist” focus on individual autonomy 
and control,101 which leads almost inexorably to a “subjectivist” understanding of 
correspondence.102 There are, nevertheless, other approaches to the correspondence 
principle. 
 Some of these alternative perspectives stem from doubts concerning the 
matter of control. As Horder notes, on some views, control over events ceases once a 
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risk is unleashed on the world.103 If individual autonomy and control were taken as 
seriously as proponents of a narrow correspondence principle seem to want, it would 
seem that nobody is ever fully responsible for the results of their risk-taking. In the 
example above, the fate of the window was beyond the accused’s control once she let 
go of the stone. If correspondence is really about control, only the throwing of the 
stone itself seems a proper target for liability. The consequences must be ignored 
entirely.104 
 If read this restrictively, the correspondence principle makes the question of 
culpability very “subjective”. Horder contends that this is unwise, because the 
accused who unleashes a risk changes her “normative position” with regard to the 
world;105 she “makes her own luck” in surrendering full control over events, and the 
(un)lucky results of her conduct should be attributable to her, even if she did not 
advert to these prior to acting.106 This is apparently still a demonstration of respect 
for individual autonomy because the accused’s choice to release a risk upon the 
world is given due weight. 
 To meet Horder’s argument about narrow readings of the correspondence 
principle, a wider understanding might be adopted. It might be asked whether the 
accused foresaw a harm of the sort that resulted from her conduct, which is 
something of a halfway house between Ashworth and Campbell’s “subjective” 
understanding of correspondence and Horder’s “normative position” argument. For 
instance, if the accused foresaw some element of bodily harm resulting from her 
conduct, then a weaker reading of the correspondence principle is satisfied if bodily 
harm (even if much more serious than that envisaged) results.107 
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 Strict choice theorists might baulk at this reading of the correspondence 
principle,108 but more “objective” interpretations are available.109 It could be argued 
that the accused may be held liable for an act of risk-taking if she ought to have been 
aware of the specific risk concerned or, going further still, a similar risk. For 
example, if the accused ought to have been aware of an unjustified risk of serious 
bodily harm (or something like it), a looser principle of correspondence is respected 
if she is found liable for inadvertently taking that risk.  
Correspondence can, therefore, be divorced entirely from conscious choice, 
demonstrating that this principle is not, in fact, thoroughly “subjectivist”. The matter 
of how strictly or liberally the correspondence principle is understood depends on the 
strength of a theorist’s commitment to choice, and not on the concept of culpability 
as insufficient concern for others. 
 This leads to consideration of “opaque” recklessness, which perhaps 
implicitly represents an attempt to save “subjective” understandings of 
correspondence from “objectivism”. 
 
(b) “Opaque” recklessness 
Opaque recklessness is a response by Ferzan to accused persons who are not in 
possession of concrete knowledge of risk at the time they act.110 Consider the driver 
who decides to accelerate, even though the upcoming traffic light is turning from 
green to amber. At this moment, the driver might not think “this is dangerous 
because...” – particularly if she is used to speeding through red lights.111 Instead, a 
more abstract sense of risk or danger might be all that she experienced 
psychologically. 
 Such actors are not “reckless” in the strict choice theory sense – particularly 
if the correspondence principle is read conservatively – and thus they cannot be 
culpable or punished. Ferzan is unhappy about this result because accused persons 
like the red light-running driver will usually be aware that they are engaging in 
“risky” behaviour – they will simply have failed to investigate this dim sense of risk 
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and become fully aware of the specific risks they are taking. Ferzan therefore 
proposes to extend the law’s understanding of “awareness” of risk by concentrating 
on this “opaque”, “preconscious” sense of awareness.112 
 To understand preconscious awareness, it is necessary to explain the 
terminological hierarchy within which Ferzan is working.113 First, consciousness is 
usually understood114 in terms of what the actor is paying attention to; of what she 
experiences, mentally.115 The reader is (hopefully) consciously aware of the words 
on this page because they are the focus of attention. 
 The preconscious is a subconscious state; the information contained within it 
does not occupy the forefront of the actor’s mind.116 It is, however, distinct from 
lower levels of unconsciousness117 (repressed beliefs, etc) because the actor can, with 
an act of will, access the information in her preconscious.118 For instance, the reader 
will be “aware” of the fact that s/he is sitting in a chair (in a library, office, etc) but 
these features of the situation were not being concentrated upon whilst reading (until 
now, presumably). Similarly, the act of turning the page will not normally be 
deliberated over with full conscious awareness.119 An act of will can, however, make 
these features of a situation the focus of conscious attention. The same is true of most 
complex actions.120 For instance, although learning to drive requires concentration,121 
the movements involved soon become habitual, so the thought “time to change 
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gear...” does not occupy the driver’s conscious mind.122 Her conscious intention is 
simply “to drive to work”, or something like it. If the driver wishes to, however, she 
can access the individual aspects of her conduct and make conscious decisions about 
them (consider driving in snow, where such increased concentration is required).123 
But the actor need not do this in order to act successfully. Life would be lived at a 
much slower pace if she did.124 
 To return to the example of a driver approaching a changing traffic light – 
and presuming that it is safe to do so – she could, accordingly, stop and think and 
“immediately prattle off the reasons why running the light is dangerous”.125 She 
therefore has a dim sense of awareness of risk (she knows she ought not to run the 
red light, on a preconscious level) and can access – almost instantly – why this is the 
case. Presumably, if they were aware (on a preconscious level) that there was 
something amiss with their conduct, the racing driver in R v Murphy126 and the 
foolish rifleman in Cameron v Maguire127 were in this position. 
 Ferzan is clear that cases such as these – where the actor has preconscious 
awareness of risk – are at the boundaries of recklessness.128 They certainly push 
narrow readings of the correspondence principle to breaking point. The actor needs 
to be aware of “risk”, but not a specific (or even a similar) risk. Even those who 
subscribe to a liberal “subjective” interpretation of correspondence might find this 
troubling. What Ferzan’s treatment of “opaquely” reckless actors demonstrates, then, 
is that there are significant disagreements amongst strict choice theorists (and 
“subjectivists”, generally), about what their choice-based theory actually requires in 
cases of culpable carelessness. This is a result of their shaky grasp of why choice is 
pivotally important in the first place. 
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 Ferzan still believes, however, that conscious choice is the gist of culpability 
and thus ties preconscious and conscious awareness together. She finds culpability in 
the “opaquely” reckless accused’s conscious choice to not investigate her 
preconscious awareness of risk further and query whether her conduct is 
justifiable.129 Through this manoeuvre, Ferzan maintains her anti-negligence stance. 
She distinguishes the “opaquely” reckless actor from her negligent counterpart on the 
basis that the latter does not have even a dim awareness of risk when acting (but 
ought to have).130 Although a negligent driver might know why her conduct is risky – 
and could stop and think about why this is the case – nothing about her situation has 
put her “on notice” that such an inquiry is necessary. The negligent actor is thus 
apparently in the same position as a person asked, randomly, to explain the risks 
attendant upon running a red light.131 Although she might perceive the light, the 
negligent driver is not engaged enough in what she is doing to appreciate (on a 
conscious or preconscious level) its significance.132 
 In the next chapter, it will be argued that Ferzan is wrong to oppose 
negligence liability. For now, it is sufficient to point out that she has gone quite far in 
unravelling the notion of “awareness” and widened the acceptable range of conscious 
choices which might ground culpability. This poses difficulties for (allegedly) strict 
choice tenets such as the correspondence principle. 
 Ferzan has done this because of an intuitive feeling regarding “opaquely” 
reckless actors – the sense that they demonstrate insufficient concern for others.133 
Her unease about advertent recklessness stems, it is submitted, from the fact that 
culpability is simply not co-extensive with conscious wrongdoing. Ferzan’s efforts to 
tie preconscious awareness to conscious choice are also instructive in this regard, as 
they demonstrate the bind that strict choice theory creates for its adherents. Although 
Ferzan is still concerned, ultimately, with conscious choices it is – as always – 
difficult to discern exactly why. 
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(4) Strict choice theory: conclusion 
The above treatment of strict choice theory has been detailed. This is because strict 
choice theory is dominant in the Anglo-American literature, and is therefore the main 
competitor to the theories discussed hereinafter. 
 Strict choice theorists seem consistent only in their denial of liability for 
negligence, though arguments such as Ferzan’s show that the line between 
recklessness and negligence is occasionally strained. The reasons for Ferzan’s 
manoeuvring deserve repetition. She was confronted with a case where culpability 
seemed present even though conscious disregard of risk was not. Why was 
culpability at issue here? It is submitted that Ferzan’s efforts to accommodate actors 
who were not fully advertent with regard to the riskiness of their conduct arise from 
“deeply held”134 or “rooted”135 intuitions about blame.136 People are blamed for their 
inadvertent carelessness far more than even Ferzan admits.137  
 In morality, then, negligence can be culpable. Although they are not co-
extensive,138 it seems sensible that moral and criminal culpability should not be 
worlds apart.139 The question is, then, why negligence is not culpable in the sense 
required for criminal punishment. 
 It was noted above that, absent a choice-based, Hegelian society such as that 
envisaged by Brudner, strict choice theorists often find it difficult to answer this 
question without simply restating that choice is co-extensive with culpability. This 
makes it entirely possible that fruitful argument about culpability with strict choice 
theorists is impossible. Strict choice theorists disagree with each other (as 
demonstrated above in relation to the correspondence principle and opaque 
recklessness), and wider engagement with them is inhibited by their approach to 
defining key terms. Although the words used by choice theorists are familiar, their 
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meanings are warped, such that talking past each other is a real possibility.140 Strict 
choice theorists might put this down to misunderstandings about culpability on the 
part of non-strict choice theorists, rather than a reason to give up on their 
commitment to conscious choice. There does not appear to be much that can be done 
to convince theses theorists that the narrowness of their account of culpability is the 
real problem. 
 Some choice theorists have, however, “switched horses” 141  in order to 




B. CHOICE AND CAPACITY 
Hart proposes one alternative to strict choice theory. Free choices are of pinnacle 
importance to Hart’s view of culpability, 142  but he nevertheless contends that 
punishment for negligence is appropriate where – at the time of taking the risk – it 
was within the accused’s power to exercise control and get into the state of mind 
required (i.e. carefulness).143 The important question is whether the accused was 
presented with a fair opportunity, given her capacities, to choose to do otherwise than 
she in fact did.144 
 From these points, Hart constructs a two-part test for culpable negligence:145 
 
(i) Did the accused fail to take those precautions which any reasonable man with 
normal capacities would in the circumstances have taken? 
(ii) Could the accused, given his mental and physical capacities, have taken those 
precautions? 
 
These are referred to as the “invariant standard of care” and the “individualised 
standard of care”, respectively. 
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 The influence of Hart’s test can be seen in the acceptance – by Williams – of 
a test, in recklessness, which asks whether the accused could have foreseen a risk had 
she stopped and thought about it.146 As noted in the previous chapter,147 this test was 
rejected in R v G148 in favour of a more strict choice view of recklessness. This might 
make Hart’s theory seem unappealing, but that would be unfortunate. Some of its 
aspects indicate its strength.  
 Primarily, the use of the “reasonable man” standard (in the invariant standard 
of care) ensures that criminal liability for negligence is circumscribed.149 It is not 
culpably negligent, on Hart’s view, to fail to exercise a capacity to appreciate a risk 
unless the accused could be expected – as a member of the community150 – to have 
done better. This should stave off doubts about inadvertent risk-taking being far too 
widespread to be criminalised legitimately.151 
 Furthermore, the “individualised standard of care”, when read together with 
Hart’s requirement of a fair opportunity to exercise capacity, ensures that the accused 
is still treated as a rational being with the capacity and autonomy for thought.152 It is 
not, therefore, only strict choice theory which can claim to respect individual 
autonomy.153 In fact, it seems that choice and capacity theory accords more respect to 
individual autonomy; it treats citizens as capable of further thought, rather than as 
self-interested, unreflective automatons.154 
 These points combine to make Hart’s theory seem attractive. There are, 
nevertheless, difficulties with it. 
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(1) Objections to Hart’s theory  
First, although Hart’s theory can deal with cases such as Elliott v C (A Minor)155 in a 
sensible manner (by considering the accused’s individual shortcomings),156 there 
remains a question over which of the accused’s attributes are relevant to the question 
of capacity. For example, C was both of subnormal intelligence and extremely tired 
(having spent the night wandering the streets). Both of these factors could impact 
upon her capacity to appreciate risk. Are both equally relevant to the question of 
culpability? 
 Any answer to this question is likely to be controversial. It might be assumed 
that a tired person is less alert to risk than a rested one, which might count in favour 
of considering C’s tiredness as relevant to her culpability. It could be countered, 
however, that C was free to have slept at home. She was not forced into being tired, 
or breaking into the shed and setting fire to the white spirit she found inside. 
 Even taking C’s low level of intelligence into account might provoke 
controversy. If C knew, for instance, that she did careless things and took risks with 
the interests of others without noticing, it might be argued that she was at fault for 
going out unaccompanied in the first place. C’s decisions, in light of her knowledge 
about her capacities with regard to risk-perception, might well have showed a facet 
of her agency which merits a criminal sanction. 
 The boundaries of capacity are thus difficult to draw,157 and Hart does little to 
clarify what he envisions them as being.158 It might be thought that, in view of the 
value pluralism that permeates modern British society, it is unlikely that real 
consensus could be reached on when “incapacity” should excuse.159 
 A second difficulty is that there is a danger of conflating Hart’s “invariable” 
standard (the reasonable man) with the “individualised” standard (the individual 
accused’s capacities). Hart asks what the reasonable person would have done in the 
                                                
155 [1983] 1 WLR 939 (discussed above at 3.C(3)). 
156 Cf OW Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 108. 
157  SH Pillsbury, “The meaning of deserved punishment: an essay on choice, character and 
responsibility” (1991-1992) 67 Ind LJ 719 at 748. 
158  Furthermore, Hart thinks only “gross forms of incapacity” (whatever these are) could be 
demonstrated in practice: Hart, Punishment & Responsibility (n 142) 155. 
159 N Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (1988) 65. 




accused’s circumstances.160 Which circumstances matter? Is the circumstance that 
the accused is a sociopath to be considered? If it is, the finder of fact is left asking – 
somewhat paradoxically – which risks the reasonable sociopath (i.e. an unreasonable 
person) would have noticed and attended to.161 Inevitably, the invariable standard 
would be in danger of individualised contamination and no accused would ever be 
adjudged culpably negligent.162 The accused’s conduct will never vary from the 
reasonable person’s because the reasonable person will be the accused.163 
What is more, although Hart differentiates clearly between his two standards 
(by holding that only the individualised standard of care would consider the 
accused’s peculiar characteristics), 164  this distinction may prove unsustainable. 
Without modification – such as the drawing of a distinction between circumstances 
relating to the situation and those relating to the actor165 – Hart’s test might, in the 
hands of a jury, lead to the acquittal of both those who intuitively deserve it (e.g. C) 
as well as those who perhaps do not (e.g. the defendant in R v Parker).166 
Thirdly, Hart establishes culpability by means of a hypothetical “what if...?” 
test. Strict choice theorists argue (again, without much explanation as to why)167 that 
the important matter is simply what was chosen, rather than what might have been 
chosen.168 The worry is that Hart’s test distracts attention from the individual accused 
and her actual situation. 
The problem with Hart’s theory is not, however, that it fails to link actors 
with the harm that they cause inadvertently – he makes this connection through 
                                                
160 Hart, Punishment & Responsibility (n 142) 154. 
161 JB Brady, “Punishment for negligence: a reply to Professor Hall” (1972-1973) 22 Buff LR 107 at 
115. 
162 For similar concerns in the context of provocation, see R v Dryden [1995] 4 All ER 987 at 997 per 
Lord Taylor CJ. 
163 G Williams, Textbook on Criminal Law, 2nd edn (1983) 94-95; L Alexander, “Reconsidering the 
relationship among voluntary acts, strict liability and negligence in criminal law”, in EF Paul, FD 
Miller and J Paul (eds), Crime, Culpability and Remedy (1990) 84 at 98. 
164 Hart, Punishment & Responsibility (n 142) 155. 
165 Or, alternatively, between the accused’s attributes which relate to the matter of reasonable respect 
for the law (which ought not to be considered) and those which relate to other matters (which ought to 
be taken into account). See: K Greenawalt, Law and Objectivity (1992) 104; RA Duff, Criminal 
Attempts (1996) 175. 
166 Assuming, contrary to the Court of Appeal’s judgment, that Parker was negligent rather than 
wilfully blind/reckless. See §3.B(1)(b), above. 
167 Cf §6.A(2)(c), below. 
168 Cf A Brudner, Punishment & Freedom: A Liberal Theory of Penal Justice (2009) 72. 




focussing upon the individual accused’s capacities. Rather, the difficulty is that Hart 
is, like all of the theorists discussed thus far, attached too strongly to the idea that 
conscious choices are the defining mark of culpability: capacity is relevant insofar as 
it suggests a better choice could have been made. If capacity is divorced from 
conscious choice, it is a far more useful concept. This will be seen in the proceeding 
chapters. 
 
(2) Choice and capacity: conclusion 
The choice and capacity theory espoused by Hart is significant in its acceptance of 
culpability in the absence of a conscious choice to do wrong. It does not excuse 
automatically persons who fail to live up to standards of carefulness expected by the 
community. Rather, Hart’s approach is to ask whether the accused could have done 
better. This is an important advance, as it incorporates “objective” aspects of 
culpable carelessness without surrendering the opportunity to deal with cases like C 
on a just basis. 
 Hart’s theory is nevertheless open to objections, and it is clear that his 
viewpoint suffers for its lack of precision. Primarily, he is unclear on the issue of 
what qualifies as a non-culpable “incapacity”, and this vagueness has led some 
“subjectivists” to adopt a third approach which concentrates on choice and character. 
 
 
C. CHOICE AND CHARACTER THEORY 
Choice and character theories are concerned with a person’s responsibility for 
developing her capacities and abilities. Its proponents believe that the law should 
inquire into why the accused chose, or why she lacked the relevant capacity to foresee 
risk at the time of acting by looking at the accused’s earlier choices concerning her 
character formation. This approach allows for liability where the accused was 
inadvertent as a result of her faulty character choices.  
 There are, however, two main difficulties with choice and character theory 
which suggest it should be discarded. 
 




(1) Choosing character 
First, choice and character theories adopt a strange view of character formation. This 
difficulty is clear in Hampton’s work.169 She contends that culpability consists in 
choosing to defy the law’s commands, and that punishment is the means of 
educating170 defiant offenders in what society requires of them.171 This defiance is 
demonstrated typically in conscious choices to do wrong, in the knowledge that the 
law deems the conduct wrong and with the freedom to choose to do otherwise.172 
This does not, however, lead Hampton to the conclusion – reached by 
Brudner173 – that inadvertent risk-taking is not culpable in the sense required by the 
criminal law. Hampton argues that negligence can be culpable if defiance is 
evidenced “not at the time of the act [of inadvertent risk-taking], but earlier, during 
the process of character formation”.174 
 Hampton’s theory thus maintains a focus on (conscious?)175 choices, but 
recognises that there might be blameworthiness attendant upon later, inadvertent, 
unjustified risk-taking. Her view is, nevertheless, based on a bizarre notion of 
character development. To see this, it is necessary to return to Aristotle’s theory of 
character formation. It will be remembered that Aristotle admitted of liability for 
inadvertent risk-taking and harm-doing where it was “in the power” of the accused to 
have developed her character differently and been more careful.176 If the accused 
could have possessed a different character (understood as a set of stable traits 
concerning conduct and value),177 then she could be held responsible and liable for 
the consequences of her inadvertence. 
 Any resemblance to Hampton’s theory is fleeting. On Aristotle’s view, 
virtuous traits (such as acting with appropriate care in the circumstances) were 
internalised through the performance of careful actions: repeated careful action 
                                                
169 J Hampton, “Mens rea”, in EF Paul, FD Miller and J Paul (eds), Crime, Culpability and Remedy 
(1990) 1. 
170 See, also, J Hampton, “The moral education theory of punishment” (1984) 13 Phil & Pub Aff 208. 
171 Hampton (n 169) at 5, 12. 
172 Ibid at 14. 
173 See §4.A(1)(d), above. 
174 Hampton (n 169) at 27. 
175 Hampton is unclear on the type of choices involved in character formation. 
176 See §4.A(2)(b), above. 
177 There is not space here to discuss the best definition of character. 




begets careful character (which, in turn, leads to the consistent performance of 
careful action).178 Aristotle did not contend, as Hampton appears to, that a person 
chooses to act in such a way as to demonstrate cruelty, or carefulness, or bravery, 
and that this choice immediately transforms a person into a cruel, careful or brave 
person who will defy the law’s commands.179 Instead, Aristotle required a long 
commitment to certain types of action, and it is not entirely clear that becoming 
vicious (for instance, becoming cruel) required a conscious choice to do vicious acts. 
Although it is difficult to become virtuous,180 it seems possible, in theory, for an 
actor to become vicious inadvertently. Perhaps this happens entirely by chance,181 
where – for instance – the accused was brought up in a community that simply does 
not exhibit virtue.182  
 The problem for Hampton is therefore that her theory “adopts the eccentric 
notion that people choose the characters... and the dispositions that they want to 
have, almost as if these were goods in a shop.”183 It is very unlikely that this sort of 
control over character – and, in particular, vicious character traits – exists.184 
 This strikes a large blow for choice and character theorists. If they are to 
maintain their focus on choice, then this comes at the price of a convincing view of 
character formation. 
                                                
178 This gives rise to arguments concerning the potential deterrent value of punishing negligence: if 
inadvertent actors were punished, this would encourage them (and others) to develop more careful 
characters to ensure that they do not miss unjustified risks in the future. See: HLA Hart, Punishment 
and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (1968) 156-157; SJ Schulhoffer, “Harm and 
punishment: a critique of emphasis on the results of conduct in the criminal law” (1973-1974) 122 Pa 
L Rev 1497 at 1541. 
179 See, also: R Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999) 12; SR Moreau, “Reasons and character” (2005) 
115 Ethics 272 at 277. 
180 See §5.C(6)(b), below. 
181 EL Pincoffs, “Legal responsibility and moral character” (1972-1973) 19 Wayne L Rev 905at 919. 
182 Such actors might be “ethically disabled”: see J Jacobs, Choosing Character: Responsibility for 
Virtue and Vice (2001) 3. This situation would be almost unimaginable in the modern (Western) 
world, but it is plausible that certain remote communities might cultivate vice and persons brought up 
in that environment might simply fall, ignorantly, into following that example. These situations pose 
special problems for the acceptance view of responsibility (discussed below at §5.C(3)), which will be 
ignored here. See, however, S Wolf, “Sanity and the metaphysics of responsibility”, in F Schoeman 
(ed), Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (1987) 46. 
183 J Horder, “Criminal culpability: the possibility of a general theory” (1993) 12 Law & Phil 193 at 
197. 
184 PJT O’Hearn, “Criminal negligence: an analysis in depth” (1964-1965) 7 Crim LQ 27, 407 at 421; 
SH Pillsbury, “The meaning of deserved punishment: an essay on choice, character and 
responsibility” (1991-1992) 67 Ind LJ 719 at 749; Moore, Placing Blame ch 5; Moreau (n 179) at 277. 
Cf ch 5, below. 




 A second doubtful aspect of choice and character theory concerns an attack 
on the choice and capacity theory described above. 
 
(2) Attacking capacity 
To understand this assault, it is useful to appropriate an argument made (in a 
different context)185 by Tadros. 
 Tadros contends that:186 
 
[A]n agent’s capacities with regard to action are generally the subject of his 
responsibility. And in that case, a lack of capacity cannot be sufficient to undermine 
responsibility. For an agent’s lack of capacity may simply be a facet of his agency, 
and hence an appropriate target for responsibility. 
 
 Building on this, Tadros contends that capacity development is related 
inextricably to the taking – or passing up – of various opportunities.187 For instance, 
a person gains the capacity to x through choosing to take the opportunity to enhance 
that capacity; a person can only take the opportunity to x if she has the capacity to x. 
This is visible in the context of risk-perception. People gain, for example, the 
capacity to foresee a risk of serious illness through fostering that capacity (reading up 
on the signs of illness, etc). Those who choose to take these steps have the capacity 
to foresee the risk of illness in themselves and others; those who do not take these 
steps do not. 
 Taking this example further, it is clear that a person who fails to foresee the 
risk that a child who is vomiting persistently is ill, because she failed to learn the 
relevant signs, is not yet automatically beyond the cusp of (at least moral) 
responsibility or liability for failing to, say, call for an ambulance.188 She still has to 
answer for why she failed to learn the signs of illness and form the capacity to 
recognise it, and – if the criminal law becomes involved – the matter of culpability 
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186 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 58. 
187 Ibid. 
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should depend in part on whether her reasons for not gaining such a capacity were 
sufficient to defeat a finding of insufficient concern for others (culpability).  
It is certainly possible that the accused could offer such an explanation: 
perhaps the information was not readily available in the small, closed off community 
in which she lived;189 or she had had a very basic education and was afraid the child 
would be taken into care if she contacted a doctor.190 Nevertheless, it might be that a 
failure by, for instance, a parent to learn to spot the signs of serious illness in her 
child demonstrates insufficient concern for that child’s interests (and the 
responsibilities attendant upon the role of parenthood).191 In such a case, the parent 
lacked a capacity to foresee risk, but this does not appear to prohibit a finding of 
culpability. 
 This suggests that, as it can be up to a person to choose to take various 
opportunities open to her, she can be held responsible and liable if (as a result of 
passing up an opportunity for reasons which demonstrate insufficient concern for 
others) she lacks a certain capacity.192 If this is correct, then the inquiry into 
responsibility and fault should not – as Hart has it – stop at the point of capacity. It 
should further be asked whether the agent was culpable for failing to have chosen to 
foster a certain capacity.193 This is the further stage of investigation that choice and 
character theory proposes. 
 It is important to state again that Tadros’s argument is being appropriated 
here for purposes other than those he intended. He is not concerned with choice and 
character theory.194 It is nevertheless clear that choice and character theory adopts a 
similar view of capacity, and risks taking matters too far. It verges on the illiberal to 
say that actors are bound (legally) to constantly test the bounds of their capacities 
(physical and mental) in case these require development, and it is difficult to see how 
this is consistent with a life that is, in a meaningful sense, “free”.195 If the State may 
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interfere when a person is – in a distant sense – at fault for not forming a capacity 
(for instance, to act carefully and pay attention to risks), criminal law seems a 
didactic tool rather than a mechanism for communicating shared social values which 
have been seriously violated by the accused’s “public” wrongdoing.196 It is for this 
reason that choice and character theory must again be recognised as misguided. 
 The objections continue. Later in Criminal Responsibility, Tadros cautions 
against exploring the reasons behind an accused’s ignorance too deeply in the 
criminal context.197 As well as obvious empirical difficulties connected with proving 
that the accused made a choice to be ignorant of risk at a later time,198 there are 
complicated questions concerning the foresight that attaches to such a choice. Must 
the accused have chosen to be incapable of perceiving specific risks, or are more 
general choices satisfactory?199 Must the accused choose to “be a jerk” (and thus lack 
capacity for sympathy), or choose to be the type of person who is rude to people 
when firing them (a specific instance of incapacity)?200 However this question is 
answered, problems remain. As Zimmerman points out, “it is... often the case that 
when people engage in precipitate actions... there is no such cognitive connection 
between these precipitate actions and their consequences”.201 This is why the rules on 
“reckless” intoxication, both north and south of the border,202 are troubling and ought 
to be reserved for cases where the accused knew – from previous experience – that 
she was, for instance, prone to becoming violent whilst intoxicated. 
 Even if there is foresight of the consequences of a character choice, there 
might be significant problems in showing causation. 203  Consider the tenuous 
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connection between a choice at age fourteen to not develop a careful character204 and 
an action of inadvertent, unjustified risk-taking at age thirty.205 Between these stages, 
there is the possibility that the “choice” to be a certain way has been reformed 
(perhaps through another choice) by the time that the relevant trait is manifested in 
action, and it is difficult (if not impossible) to investigate this possibility.206 This 
might mean that the inadvertence was not, in fact, the outcome of the earlier 
character choice – thus muddying the waters in terms of culpability. This might be 
enough to break any causal link that the criminal law would seek to draw. It is 
certainly enough to allow extreme epistemic doubt to infiltrate the criminal process. 
 Finally, in order for the accused to be culpable for her earlier character 
choices, those choices would themselves have to demonstrate insufficient concern for 
others. Absent exceptional circumstances,207 it is difficult to see how this would be 
possible. There might also be a significant mismatch between the culpability of the 
character choice (for instance, becoming a jerk) and the culpability which is 
attributed to the actor for her later inadvertent risk-taking (for instance, the 
culpability attached to the failure to notice signs of non-consent in a sexual 
partner).208 This makes choice and character theory seem merciless in its approach to 
culpability. If the choice and character view is accepted, it comes at the cost of 
sensible appraisals of culpability for inadvertence. 
 
(3) Choice and character theory: conclusion 
It is commendable to draw a link between the accused’s conscious choices and her 
wider character in a blatant manner, rather than try and hide these facets of decision-
making (like strict choice theorists who subscribe to the alignment view).209 The 
difficulty is that this has been done backwards: choices surely demonstrate character, 
                                                
204 It is perhaps more accurate to speak of various aspects of a careful character (e.g. attentiveness to 
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205 See, similarly, Ferzan, “Opaque recklessness” at 640. 
206 Cf H Smith, “Culpable ignorance” (1983) 92 Philosophical Review 543 at 559.  
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not the other way around. This explains the difficulties experienced by choice and 
character theorists. They are blinded by a focus on conscious choice, leading them to 
endorse unrealistic views of character formation, and miss wider aspects of a 
person’s character – her attitudes, her beliefs and her desires. As will be 
demonstrated in the next two chapters, these should be central to the criminal law’s 




This chapter has reduced “subjectivism” to three connected schools of thought. Strict 
choice theory cannot justify its stance that only conscious, chosen wrongdoing is 
blameworthy. On one view, choice and character theory is a response to this point, 
but it relies on a conception of character formation which seems bizarre. 
Furthermore, the choices on which it relies seem disconnected from the eventual act 
of wrongdoing which concerns the criminal law. This leaves choice and capacity 
theory. It was contended that Hart’s approach remains too connected to the idea of 
conscious choice as the mark of culpability. Although it will be argued in the next 
two chapters that capacity ought to be central to any defensible theory of culpability 
for risk-taking, it is important that choice not be placed on an undeserved pedestal. It 
is only through considering choice, capacity and character together as equal partners 
that a more defensible theory of culpable carelessness can be developed. 210 This is 
the task of chapters five and six.  
                                                







5 Two Ways of Being Culpably Negligent 
 
This chapter argues that, in certain instances, inadvertence/negligence can be 
culpable in the sense required by the criminal law. After explaining some preliminary 
points in section A, the chapter outlines two types of culpable negligence: negligence 
as failure of conduct (section B) and negligence as failure of belief (section C).1 
Section D then asks to what extent criminal liability for negligence is compatible 
with individual autonomy. The chapter concludes that addressing doubts concerning 
autonomy and negligence requires consideration of both culpability and 
criminalisation. When both of these matters are given sufficient attention, it becomes 
clear that negligence liability should be employed in Scots and English criminal law. 
 
 
A. GETTING PERSONAL 
Negligence liability is typically presented2 as being about a failure to act as the 
reasonable person would have. This is how it is understood in civil law,3 subject to 
the proviso that it is “fair, just and reasonable” that the defender owed a duty of care 
to the pursuer.4 
 If negligence is understood similarly in the criminal context, it is plain why 
many authors doubt it is properly punishable:5 if the accused is censured simply for 
not acting as another (hypothetical) person would, the criminal inquiry seems anti-
individualised.6 Punishing the accused thus tells her (and others) little about herself 
and the concern that she failed to show for others’ interests. Without this 
                                                
1 The distinctions drawn here resemble those in KW Simons, “Rethinking mental states” (1992) 72 
BUL Rev 463 (particularly at 547), but this thesis does not aim to restructure mens rea in the way 
Simons does. 
2 See e.g.: PT Smith, “Recklessness in dolus eventualis” (1979) 96 SALJ 81 at 90; G Williams, 
Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd edn (1983) 88; Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability 81-85; MS 
Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals and Metaphysics (2009) 178.  
3 See, further, KW Simons, “Dimensions of negligence in criminal and tort law” (2002) 3 Theo Inq L 
283 at 292. 
4 Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 at 618 per Lord Bridge. 
5 See §4.A, above. 
6 See, similarly, GP Fletcher, “The fault of not knowing” (2002) 3 Theo Inq L 265 at 277. 




personalised message of condemnation,7 the communicative aspect of punishment8 is 
diluted or absent. The same criticism can be levied at other “objective” standards, 
such as Horder’s “ideal agent”.9  
 The challenge for proponents of criminal liability for negligence is thus to 
“get personal”10 and demonstrate that punishment for inadvertent, unjustified risk-
taking communicates something meaningful about not only the standards of conduct 
expected of “reasonable persons”, but also about the accused, her culpability and the 
community criticism her wrongdoing attracts. This means, from the outset, 
distinguishing two matters: whether taking a risk was justifiable; and whether the 
accused was criminally culpable in failing to notice an unjustified risk attendant upon 
her actions.  
These will be considered in turn. 
 
(1) Justification and risk 
Justification has not yet been considered expressly.11 The opportunity has not, 
however, presented itself until now: there is scant judicial discussion of justification 
in Scots or English law; “subjectivists” seldom mention the matter.12 Justification is 
nevertheless crucial to a defensible theory of culpable carelessness and will therefore 
be examined here. 
 It is contended that the question of justification should be resolved by asking 
what can legitimately be expected of citizens by other citizens in terms of risk-
                                                
7 Condemnation might be too strong a term for the reactive attitude attendant upon conviction: Tadros, 
Criminal Responsibility 82. Tadros prefers the term “moral indignation”, but there are myriad other 
terms that might be employed: see J Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of 
Responsibility (1970) 98-118. The difference between them seems mainly semantic. 
8 See §1.A(4), above. 
9 J Horder, “Criminal culpability: the possibility of a general theory” (1993) 12 Law & Phil 193 at 
207. 
10 J Gardner, “On the general part of the criminal law”, in RA Duff (ed), Philosophy and the Criminal 
Law: Principles and Critique (1998) 205 at 236. 
11 There are political aspects to justification which, for concerns of space, this thesis ignores. See AW 
Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law, 2nd edn (2001) 79-80. 
12 Cf Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability 59-63. 




taking.13 This approach is captured well in Fletcher’s conception of unjustified risk-
taking as non-reciprocal risk imposition.14  
The basis of this view is the oft-neglected, point that “[w]e… live in a 
dangerous world”:15 social interaction necessitates the imposition of some risk on all 
citizens.16 To facilitate movement of persons and goods, for instance, driving is 
tolerated despite the substantial associated risk to life. Risk-taking only properly 
becomes the concern of the criminal law when it goes beyond this “essential”, 
socially-sanctioned level (for instance through driving too quickly). It is only then 
that the act of risk-taking becomes unjustified and an instance of wrongdoing. Then, 
the question of culpability can be posed.17 
 In employing Fletcher’s conception of unjustifiable risk-taking, the 
“reasonable person” is a helpful heuristic device. It can be asked whether the 
reasonable person (or citizen)18 would view the relevant act of risk-taking as socially 
justifiable. It is important to stress that this is a normative, not empirical, standard.19 
An act of risk-taking might be “objectively” unjustifiable even if a majority of people 
in society perform it.20  
 This switches focus from conduct to what could legitimately be expected of 
the accused in the circumstances surrounding her action. 21  More scientific 
approaches have been proposed, but these remain reliant on normative, indeterminate 
standards. Consider approaches which appraise the social costs of risk-taking and its 
                                                
13 See, similarly, P Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (1997) 42. 
14 GP Fletcher, “Fairness and utility in tort theory” (1971-1972) 85 Harv L Rev 537 at 548. Cf 
Rawls’s conception of “reasonable” conduct as honouring fair terms of cooperation and interaction (J 
Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993) 49-50) and Scanlon’s “contractualist” approach to justification 
(TM Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (1998)). 
15 G Williams, “The unresolved problem of recklessness” (1988) 8 LS 74 at 89. 
16 See: H Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice (1979) 86; HM Hurd, “The deontology of negligence” 
(1996) 76 BUL Rev 249 at 264; J Steele, Risks and Legal Theory (2004) 35. 
17 Culpability can exist independently of wrongdoing. A person might take a risk which she believes 
to be unjustifiable and be mistaken. Here, the accused is culpable if she showed insufficient regard for 
others, but not a wrongdoer. Such free-floating culpability is ignored here. 
18 The term “reasonable citizen” reflects better the fact that the accused is called to account as a 
citizen before other citizens (not merely “persons”). See Duff, AFC ch 2. 
19 See, further, C Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the Criminal Courtroom 
(2003) 12. 
20 Cf DN Husak, Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays (2010) 342. 
21 DC Hubin and K Haely, “Rape and the reasonable man” (1999) 18 Law & Phil 113 at 136. 




social benefits.22 Social costs and benefits cannot readily be broken down into 
determinate units (such as monetary value), and so this approach will also have to 
rely upon “objective”, indeterminate notions such as community expectations about 
the social worth of risk-taking. 23  Even economical, cost/benefit approaches to 
justification cannot avoid controversial value judgements24 – they merely cloak these 
behind the rhetoric of economics. This distraction is unnecessary: the matter of 
justification ought to be transparent in its consideration of “objective” value 
judgements concerning the limits of socially-acceptable risk-taking. 
 It cannot be denied that this approach to justification is, to a degree, 
“impersonal”,25 and this might make a “subjective” approach to justification, which 
asks what the accused thought with regard to the justification of her action, and 
allows this to be determinative, seem attractive. It is clear, however, that this 
approach would leave the law (and citizens’ interests) “subject to the views of 
heretics and fanatics”.26 To see this, consider if the accused “subjectively” believes it 
is justifiable to shoot a shotgun out of her window without first looking to see if this 
might put anybody in danger. The very fact that she believes she is justified in acting 
in this way might demonstrate her insufficient concern for others.27 Such an actor, 
although “subjectively” innocent, seems to overstep the “objective” boundaries of 
socially acceptable risk-taking. The “subjective” view misses this point. In order to 
capture it, the question of justifiability of risk-taking should be answered 
“objectively”: to be acting wrongly, the accused must have taken an “objectively” 
unjustified risk. 
 Although, for ease of reading, the thesis will continue to talk in terms of 
justification (or a lack thereof), a further requirement exists. The accused must also 
                                                
22 See G Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd edn (1961) para 26. Cf JC Coffee, 
“Paradigms lost: the blurring of the criminal and civil law models – and what can be done about it” 
(1992) 101 Yale LJ 1875 at 1876. 
23 JL Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 
(2001) 11. 
24 C Finkelstein, “The inefficiency of mens rea” (2000) 88 Cal L Rev 895 at 905. Cf CF Cranor, 
“Towards a non-consequentialist approach to acceptable risks”, in T Lewens (ed), Risk: Philosophical 
Perspectives (2007) 36 at 45.  
25 Insofar as it bars the accused from relying on her own preferences to argue that her act of risk-
taking was justified: L Katz, “Harm and justification in negligence” (2003) 4 Theo Inq L 397 at 408. 
26 E Fruchtman, “Recklessness and the limits of mens rea: beyond orthodox subjectivism” (1986-
1987) 29 Crim LQ 315, 421 at 321. 
27 Duff, IACL 163. 




have taken a substantial risk.28 This is because the criminal law’s demands should 
concentrate upon the most serious instances of wrongdoing, not “minor” lapses.29 
Thus, in order to evidence negligence as failure of conduct or negligence as failure of 
belief (or, indeed, recklessness), the accused must, through her action or inaction, 
have first taken an “objectively” unjustifiable and substantial risk.30 
 The question of justifiability will now be left to one side. The matter of 
culpability is approached more directly in the next sections, which introduce two 
forms of culpable negligence. 
 
 
B. NEGLIGENCE AS FAILURE OF CONDUCT 
It is sensible to begin with negligence as failure of conduct, as it is relatively 
straightforward. Consider Shelly – a doctor – who is treating a patient, Martin. There 
is no emergency, but Martin has an infection. Shelly omits to check if he is allergic 
to penicillin and administers the drug to him. Martin dies. 
 When called to account for Martin’s death,31 Shelly accepts that the risk that 
Martin might die from the penicillin was substantial and, given the circumstances 
and interests involved, unjustifiable to take. She does not, however, accept that she 
was criminally culpable. She agrees that it would have been obvious to the 
reasonable doctor that Martin might have an allergy, but contends that – as this risk 
did not occur32 to her at the time of acting – it could not play a part in her practical 
reasoning. Being a strict choice theorist, Shelly thinks this should exculpate her, and 
prepares to be sued by Martin’s relatives. The argument of this chapter is that civil 
damages would be insufficient recognition of Shelly’s fault. The message of criminal 
                                                
28 H Wechsler, “On culpability and crime: the treatment of mens rea in the Model Penal Code” (1962) 
339 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 24 at 29; J Dressler, “Does one mens rea fit all? Thoughts on 
Alexander’s unified conception of criminal culpability” (2000) 88 Cal L Rev 955 at 957-958. See, 
further, the requirement of a “gross deviation” from expected risk-taking in Model Penal Code ss 
2.02(c)-(d). 
29 DN Husak, “Reasonable risk creation and overinclusive legislation” (1997-1998) 1 Buff Crim L 
Rev 599 at 606. 
30 Cf Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability 25-27. 
31 Shelly would be charged with manslaughter in England (R v Adomako [1995] AC 171 – see §3.D, 
above). The position in Scotland with regard to inadvertently-caused death is unclear following 
Transco plc v HM Advocate 2004 JC 29 (see §2.B, above).  
32 The word “occur” is necessarily vague as to the standard of awareness required. Cf §4.A(3)(b), 
above. 




culpability ought to be expressed to her, Martin’s family and the community more 
generally.33 
 This culpability might take a number of forms. Shelly may have evidenced 
negligence as failure of belief34 or even recklessness, but it should first be asked 
whether Shelly’s failure to meet the standard of conduct expected of the “reasonable 
doctor” is itself culpable. To answer this question, it is necessary to consider 
Horder’s work on negligent conduct. 
 
(1) The assumption of responsibility 
Horder argues that failing to meet a set standard of conduct can demonstrate 
something about the actor’s culpability.35 This becomes clear when certain other 
features of Shelly’s situation are emphasised. First, presumably Shelly came to be in 
charge of Martin’s care as a result of voluntarily choosing to become a doctor.36 
Although she might occasionally face emergency decisions, this does not undermine 
the fact that Shelly chose to become a doctor. It can be assumed that, when making 
this choice, she was aware of the practical and ethical responsibilities attendant upon 
that role (if not, Shelly surely became aware of these as her studies progressed).37 
This means that she had “fair warning” of the responsibilities she would assume if 
she ultimately became a doctor (rather than, say, a medical researcher). 38  By 
choosing to become a doctor, Shelly has therefore fairly assumed the prospective 
responsibilities associated with that role39 and agreed to be governed by a well-
known code of conduct and ethics. This, it is submitted, fixes responsibility (i.e. 
answerability)40 upon her. 
                                                
33 Few doubt that some medical errors should give rise to manslaughter convictions. Disagreement 
centres over whether “gross” negligence is the appropriate standard of fault. See O Quick, “Medicine, 
mistakes and manslaughter: a criminal combination?” (2010) 69 CLJ 186. 
34 See §5.C, below. 
35 Horder, “Gross negligence”. Horder also describes a form of negligence which concentrates upon 
the accused’s attitude of indifference: see §6.A(2)(a), below. 
36 Shelly must have made a series of choices to become a doctor (taking the correct exams at school, 
applying to medical schools, etc), demonstrating her commitment to that goal. 
37 Cf the term “role responsibility” in HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the 
Philosophy of Law (1968) 212-214. 
38 See Horder, “Gross negligence” at 516-517. 
39 On prospective responsibilities, see: P Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (2002) 31-35; 
Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 21-22; Duff, AFC 30-36. 
40 See §1.A(1), above. 




 What exactly has Shelly accepted she will be answerable for? The code of 
conduct and ethics that governs her profession gives rise to certain restrictions on 
action. For instance, if a procedure is not carried out in the accredited way, this might 
be cause for professional (and perhaps legal)41 censure. This is the sort of conduct 
element that some theorists concentrate on in their denials of culpability for negligent 
risk-taking. Up until this point, it could even be argued that – if punished for 
Martin’s death – Shelly is being held strictly liable for the consequences of an 
omission to follow guidelines: the polity has decided to declare certain conduct – and 
its consequences – criminal and Shelly has (for whatever reason) fallen short of its 
expectations. Understood this way, the element of personal culpability demonstrated 
by Shelly’s action is unclear.42  
 There is, however, another aspect of Shelly’s assumption of the 
responsibilities of being a doctor which shows more transparently the root of her 
culpability for Martin’s death. This wider aspect of responsibility comes from the 
voluntary undertaking of a doctor to act in the patient’s best interests at all times. 
 
(2) The provision of exclusionary reasons 
This commitment to patients permeates the codes of conduct to which doctors 
subscribe, and it ought to motivate a doctor’s reasoning and make her act in selfless 
ways which would not be required of other citizens.43 Although the hospital janitor 
may leave Martin alone, Shelly must treat him in line with his best interests. Walking 
away is not an option for her in virtue of her role – she would have to answer (to her 
colleagues, to Martin and/or his family, perhaps to the criminal courts)44 for acting in 
that manner. Shelly’s assumption of responsibility for others has thus done more than 
simply provide her with accredited ways of carrying out medical procedures – it has 
also provided her with what Raz calls “exclusionary reasons”.45 
                                                
41 Cf Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200; R v Adomako [1995] AC 171. 
42 Strict liability is ignored in this thesis. 
43 Horder, “Gross negligence” at 515. Whether citizens should have legal duties to assist others is a 
difficult question. See A Ashworth, “The scope of criminal liability for omissions” (1989) 105 LQR 
424. 
44 On the matter of to whom a person is responsible, see Duff, AFC ch 2. 
45 See J Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (revised edn, 1990) 37-45. 




 As their name suggests, exclusionary reasons exclude certain other reasons 
from consideration.46 For example, that a person has promised to lend her car to her 
mother ought to exclude reasons which would point towards selling the car.47 Even 
though selling the car would normally be a viable option (it might, on the balance of 
reasons, be the right thing to do), the exclusionary reason – the promise – changes 
things. Exclusionary reasons can thus “tip the scales” against the balance of 
reasons.48 
 Similarly, Shelly’s assumption of responsibility over Martin’s healthcare 
alters her situation by excluding certain reasons and closing off options that would 
otherwise be open to her (walking away, etc).49 A prohibition on giving a patient a 
drug without – when the opportunity presented itself – checking for allergies would 
exist because acting in that way would detrimental to that patient’s best interests. 
Through taking exactly that course of conduct (even if for the first time),50 Shelly has 
done more than merely act contrary to an “objective” standard. She has also acted on 
reasons that ought to be excluded; that should not even have occurred to her.51 In 
doing so, Shelly “has betrayed her very role as a doctor”,52 because the thought “I 
will just give him the drug” should never have entered her mind without the caveat 
“... if he is not allergic” and the attendant motivations (to check for allergies, etc). 
The fact that it did suggests that Shelly was insufficiently motivated, in her 
reasoning, by Martin’s legally-protected interest in bodily integrity and life.53 This is 
so even though Shelly did not consciously disregard the risk that Martin had a 
penicillin allergy.  
                                                
46 Ibid 190. 
47 Ibid 39. 
48 Ibid 41. Clashes between exclusionary reasons are resolved by weight: J Raz, “Facing up: a reply” 
(1988-1989) 62 S Cal L Rev 1153 at 1168. 
49 Cf Raz, Practical Reason (n 45) 39. 
50 Cf: MD Bayles, “Character, purpose and criminal responsibility” (1982) 1 Law & Phil 5 at 10-11; 
MD Bayles, Principles of Law: A Normative Analysis (1987) 299. 
51 B Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985) 185; Raz, Practical Reason (n 45) 181; 
Horder, “Gross negligence” at 514-515. 
52 Horder, “Gross negligence” at 516. 
53 Cf Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 85. 




 Not all failures of conduct are thus “minor moral lapses” to be dealt with 
through strict liability offences or the civil courts.54 They can be culpable in the 
sense that criminal law usually requires.  
The caveat “can” requires explanation. 
 
(3) Avoiding culpability 
Shelly might be able to rebut the inference of culpability for Martin’s death by 
offering an excuse for her failure to check for allergies which explains why, despite 
appearances, she showed sufficient regard for Martin’s interests. 
 Such an excuse will be difficult to make out in Shelly’s circumstances. There 
was no emergency, so she had time to stop and consider Martin’s best interests. Even 
if Shelly was distracted with thoughts of other, sicker patients, she would still show 
herself to be insufficiently motivated by Martin’s interests in failing to act in line 
with the exclusionary reasons which bore upon her. Her duty was to Martin and her 
other patients – not just her sickest patients. It is Shelly’s demonstration of 
insufficient concern for Martin’s interests which matters for criminal culpability, and 
– unless she can rebut the inference of insufficient concern – she ought therefore to 
be convicted of a criminal offence (such as manslaughter) for her part in Martin’s 
death. 
 Two points should be made before proceeding. First, as her culpability related 
to Martin’s interest in life, a weak sense of “correspondence” appears satisfied even 
in the absence of a conscious choice to do wrong. This reinforces the argument in the 
last chapter that correspondence need not be a “subjectivist” doctrine.55 Secondly, the 
culpability outlined above surely is personal to Shelly in that she voluntarily 
accepted a standard of conduct and failed to act in line with the exclusionary reasons 
that flowed from it. Although these reasons come from an external body (such as the 
General Medical Council), it is still Shelly’s reasoning and the way she conducted 
herself – not the reasonable doctor’s imagined reasoning or conduct – which matters. 
                                                
54 KW Simons, “Culpability and retributive theory: the problem of criminal negligence” (1994) 5 
Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 365 at 386. 
55 See §4.A(3)(a), above. 




 It is useful to consider the boundaries of negligence as failure of conduct, 
before proceeding to introduce negligence as failure of belief. 
 
(4) The boundaries of negligence as failure of conduct 
It is envisaged that negligence as failure of conduct is applicable to a range of social 
interactions undertaken daily by non-specialist citizens. For instance, (legal) drivers 
voluntarily assume a range of responsibilities, in line with a well publicised (and 
examined) code of conduct,56 which fosters the demonstration of sufficient regard for 
the interests of other road-users, thus providing drivers with exclusionary reasons 
which ought, in normal circumstances,57 to prohibit the contemplation of selfish 
conduct. Options which would otherwise be open to a person are excluded by virtue 
of her assumption of the responsibilities of being a driver.58 
 This show of consideration for others is essential to being a proper driver.59 
By not following the legal regulations surrounding driving, a driver thus 
demonstrates her attitude towards those regulations and, more importantly, her lack 
of concern for the values that they promote. This close connection between 
responsibility, conduct and culpability is perhaps the source of the misconception 
that negligence is just about action. Through separating out these elements in cases 
of negligence as failure of conduct, this view is exposed as simplistic. 
 It is important, however, to be mindful of the limitations of negligence as 
failure of conduct. Its boundaries arise from the six criteria which must be satisfied 
before responsibility, wrongdoing and culpability are present: 
 
(i)  A voluntary decision to undertake an activity (responsibility); 
(ii)  A well publicised code of conduct governing that activity (responsibility);  
(iii)  Exclusionary reasons arising from the code of conduct (responsibility); 
                                                
56 The Highway Code and the various pieces of Road Traffic legislation. 
57 Cf McNab v Guild 1989 JC 72, where the accused thought his passenger needed medical attention. 
This motivation might suggest that he did show sufficient concern for others in driving as he did, 
despite “objective” signs to the contrary. 
58 Even an unlicensed (and/or uninsured) driver could have assumed these responsibilities, implicitly, 
by driving on public roads. The same argument could be made where the accused has undertaken a 
regulated activity without expertise (e.g. “fixing” a faulty gas fire – see R v Singh [1999] Crim LR 
582). 
59 Horder, “Gross negligence” at 517. 




(iv) The opportunity to act in accordance with those exclusionary reasons 
(capacity); 
(v) A failure to act in accordance with exclusionary reasons resulting in 
substantial, unjustified risk-taking (wrongdoing); and 
(vi) A demonstration of insufficient concern for the interests of others 
(culpability). 
 
 These criteria mean that, although negligence as failure of conduct explains 
well the blameworthiness in failing to drive safely, or follow medical procedure, it 
fares less well in other situations60 – making a general, duty-based approach to 
culpable carelessness seem overambitious.61 This is for a number of reasons.  
 First, some activities are not regulated sufficiently to give rise to 
responsibility, wrongdoing and culpability. Consider walking on the pavement:62 
there is not a system of legal regulation (or, presumably, sufficient social consensus) 
on whether it is acceptable to, for instance, walk along engrossed in reading a text 
message to make doing so wrong and a matter of responsibility and culpability, even 
if this conduct puts other people at risk of injury or worse.63 
 Secondly, it might be wondered whether citizens have any real choice in 
entering certain spheres of conduct. Is it possible to avoid using a pavement? If not, 
then the element of “voluntariness” (and, consequently, the assumption of 
responsibility) appears to be vitiated. There is, therefore, no basis for premising 
criminal responsibility and liability upon any associated failures of conduct.  
 Problems are also encountered when citizens have no acceptable choice but to 
enter areas of specialist expertise. Consider laypersons forced, by the circumstances, 
into giving medical aid:64 although there are well publicised expectations concerning 
how this should be undertaken, which promote values and provide exclusionary 
                                                
60 Cf the discussion of rape in ibid at 518. See, further, RHS Tur, “Rape, reasonableness and time” 
(1981) 1 OJLS 432 at 437. 
61 See §§2.D(4), 3.D(1)(a)-(c), above. 
62 Cf Evgeniou v R (1964) 37 ALJR 508, where the deceased had wandered into the road – without 
looking – and was run over by a speeding driver. Although the defence of contributory negligence was 
rejected at the driver’s trial for manslaughter, the deceased was arguably negligent in acting as he did 
if it was inconsistent with the responsibilities attendant on crossing the road. 
63 Cf driving whilst using a mobile phone, which is now criminalised: Road Traffic Act 1988 s 41D. 
64 Cf R v Stone; R v Dobinson [1977] QB 354. 




reasons, the layperson has not (meaningfully) “volunteered” to enter that sphere of 
regulation and meet its expectations. Negligence as failure of conduct should not, 
therefore, be in issue.65 
 Negligence as failure of conduct is thus a special case of negligence. It relies 
upon the voluntary assumption of responsibilities, a well publicised code of conduct 
(and/or ethics) and the provision of exclusionary reasons, rather than simply a failure 
to act (or omit to act) as others might have. Furthermore, through asking which 
reasons motivated the accused – and which reasons ought not to have motivated her 
– the criminal inquiry is centred upon her, rather than a hypothetical “reasonable 
person” (embodying community expectations). 66  It might, therefore, be termed 
“subjective” – demonstrating (again) that this label is unhelpful in seeking to draw 
useful distinctions in relation to culpable carelessness. 
 Given its limited sphere of application, some opponents of criminal liability 
for negligence might accept the argument made above.67 It seems appropriate that 
those who adopt special roles (which might mean the difference between another 
person living or dying) are held, on pain of punishment, to a high standard of conduct 
and reasoning. Negligence as failure of belief is a wider realm of culpability which 




C. NEGLIGENCE AS FAILURE OF BELIEF 
As its name suggests, the second form of culpable negligence concerns the failure by 
the accused to form a belief – specifically, that an unjustified risk exists in the 
circumstances – when she was able, and could legitimately be expected, to have done 
so.68 
                                                
65 Horder, “Gross negligence” at 519. 
66 It should be noted that the reasonable person probably does not accurately reflect community 
standards. See, generally, M Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian 
Reconstruction of the Objective Standard (2003). 
67 See e.g. JC Smith, “Subjective or objective? Ups and downs of the test of criminal liability in 
England” (1981-1982) 27 Vill L Rev 1179 at 1204. 
68  The account below owes much to Tadros, Criminal Responsibility ch 9. Tadros discusses 
negligence and recklessness in the relevant chapter (perhaps collapsing the two): see §6.B(3), below. 




 Faulty beliefs are envisaged here as being central to many cases of 
negligence,69  and – again – it is possible to conceive of this idea in purely 
“objective” terms: “the defendant was not aware of a risk, but a reasonable person 
would have been”.70 It will be contended that this is, again, a simplistic view. 
 It is useful to begin by considering an example. 
 
(1) Unjustified beliefs in safety 
The accused in Cameron v Maguire71 thought he was acting safely in firing his rifle 
in his back garden; he had a positive belief that he was not acting in a way that 
unjustifiably risked the interests of others.72 The argument here is that this belief 
should not, without more, exculpate him. The same applies to actors who, when 
acting, held no positive beliefs about safety.  
 To see this, it is necessary to consider the process of belief formation itself. It 
will be assumed that beliefs are formed through a process of combining information 
gleaned from perception73 and background beliefs (or “background knowledge”)74 to 
form additional beliefs. For instance, if a person smells rotting cabbage upon 
entering a room, and has the background belief that gas smells like rotting cabbage, 
then the ingredients are there for the formation of a belief that there is a risk of a gas 
leak. Assuming additional background knowledge, a further belief that turning on the 
light would be unjustifiably risky may be formed.75 The matter is whether, and – if so 
– when, a person would be responsible for failing to form this belief. That is the 
subject of the following sections. 
                                                
69 AP Simester, “Can negligence be culpable?”, in J Horder (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: 
Fourth Series (2000) 85 at 95; Tadros, Criminal Responsibility ch 9. 
70 KW Simons, “Culpability and retributive theory: the problem of criminal negligence” (1994) 5 J 
Contemp Legal Issues 365 at 373. 
71 1999 JC 63. 
72 The accused’s admission can be interpreted in two ways: (i) he did not think about the risks 
involved in his conduct at all; or (ii) that he had thought about the risks and discounted them as 
marginal. 
73 Here, “perception” simply means the process of receiving information from sensory organs, even 
though some perceptions might emerge from elsewhere (e.g. cases of brain manipulation). See DM 
Armstrong, “Perception and belief”, in J Dancy (ed), Perceptual Knowledge (1988) 127 at 129. It 
might be objected that perception is a matter over which agents can exercise control, meaning a failure 
to perceive might be culpable. Consideration of this issue is deferred until §6.A(3), below. 
74 Some writers prefer the term “latent knowledge” (e.g. Duff, IACL 159-160). 
75 It is accepted that perceptions and background information may exist in degrees. See, further, 
Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 141. 




 Before getting to this point, it is important to emphasise that the two 
ingredients for belief – perception and background knowledge – are essential.76 A 
person who did not know that gas smells that way, or has a blocked nose, would be 
missing a vital part of the belief formation puzzle involved in the example above.77 
Holding a person responsible and liable for her failure to form a belief in these 
circumstances would be unfair insofar as the agent could not have done otherwise. 
Assuming “ought” implies “can”,78 criminal responsibility would be inappropriate 
here.79 
 It is submitted that this holds even if it is the accused’s fault that she lacks a 
background belief.80 Consider Tadros’s example of a person who does not know that 
water conducts electricity.81 She would not be able to form a belief that she was 
putting others at risk by leaving a plugged-in radio close to the bath because she 
lacks the necessary background knowledge.82 Accordingly, attributing responsibility 
or culpability to her for her failure to form a belief in risk would be unmerited. 
 It might be countered that this absence of knowledge was the person’s 
“fault”. For instance, she might have played truant from school when the 
conductivity of water was covered. Had she not, she would have had the relevant 
knowledge (provided she had not forgotten it) and been able to form a belief in risk 
and put it into action.  
 Although this might be true, connecting this type of “fault” to the eventual 
failure to form a belief will be problematic. The difficulties which arose in chapter 
four in relation to choice and character theories of culpable carelessness are 
encountered again here: there are significant problems involved in showing adequate 
freedom, foresight and culpability in an earlier decision not to gain a piece of 
                                                
76 See, similarly: ER Keedy, “Ignorance and mistake in the criminal law” (1907-1908) 22 Harv LR 75 
at 81; PJT O’Hearn, “Criminal negligence: an analysis in depth” (1964-1965) 7 Crim LQ 27, 407 at 
419. Cf Simester (n 69) at 99-100. 
77 Keedy (n 76) at 81. 
78 This principle will be used as though it was an uncontroversial premise. It is not – see: JW Smith, 
“Impossibility and morals” (1961) 70 Mind 362; S Ryan, “Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of 
belief” (2003) 114 Philosophical Studies 47. 
79 See Elliott v C (A Minor) [1983] 1 WLR 939 (see §3.C(3), above). 
80 Cf Simester (n 69) at 96. 
81 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 251-252. See, also, J Dancy, Practical Reality (2002) 57. 
82 Cf R v Whybrow (1951) 35 Cr App R 141 (it is “common knowledge” that water conducts 
electricity). 




knowledge.83 Did the accused know what was on the lesson plan the day that she 
played truant? Did her decision to miss the class on electricity and conductivity 
demonstrate insufficient concern for others? These questions, and many more 
politically-charged ones (Can the State legitimately expect that citizens obtain and 
store certain information, on pain of criminal punishment?), cannot easily be 
resolved in the criminal courtroom. For the sake of feasibility, the focus ought, 
therefore, to be on the background beliefs the accused had, rather than those that she 
should have had.84 
 Knowledge that has been irretrievably forgotten can be considered 
similarly. 85  The actor must be able to actualise her background knowledge, 
employing it to form new beliefs, for it to be relevant to culpability. She must, 
therefore, have the knowledge stored on at least a preconscious level.86 If not, she has 
no immediate control over accessing the knowledge, and this should negate 
responsibility, making the question of culpability void. 
 Belief formation thus requires a combination of extant background 
knowledge and perception. The next matter for consideration concerns a person’s 
control over the formation of beliefs.  
 
(a) Beliefs and the will 
The need for control has been emphasised in the discussion thus far, but it poses 
problems for any theory premised on culpable beliefs. This is because belief 
formation often does not seem to require a positive exercise of will.87 On entering a 
room smelling of rotting cabbage, a person might immediately believe that there is a 
risk of a gas leak and that turning on the lights would be unjustifiably risky. In such 
                                                
83 See §4.C(2), above. 
84 One objection is that a person’s ignorance might routinely endanger others. Consider if the accused 
was a bathroom installer who might routinely endanger herself and others through her ignorance of 
conductivity. Assuming this trade is regulated, it is possible that such actions demonstrate negligence 
as failure of conduct. They cannot, however, demonstrate negligence as failure of belief, because the 
accused lacks a vital ingredient for forming a belief in risk. 
85 Cf the treatment of accused persons whose capacities to retain information and form justified beliefs 
in risk have deteriorated, subtly, over time in RL Rabin, “The fault of not knowing: a comment” 
(2003) 4 Theo Inq L 427 at 431-432. 
86 See JR Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction (2004) 167. 
87 J Raz, Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action (2002) 13; Tadros, Criminal 
Responsibility 240-241. 




circumstances it seems peculiar to speak of that person having to try and form the 
beliefs that she in fact formed.88 There seems little role for the conscious will or 
deliberation here.89 This type of belief formation will be called “cognitive”.90 
 This automatic aspect of belief formation and action might cause difficulties 
for an examination of the connection between beliefs and culpability.91 If the actor 
had no control over what she believed (or did not believe), then any finding of 
responsibility, culpability or liability seems illegitimate.92 Again, “ought” implies 
“can”.  
 There are, nevertheless, cases where the will plays a more pronounced role in 
belief formation. These beliefs are described by Tadros as “evaluative”. Tadros gives 
the example of forming the belief that a garden of roses is beautiful.93 The formation 
of this belief requires consideration of the actor’s perceptions – the sensory 
information available to her – and her other beliefs (about what constitutes beauty, 
for instance).  
 The actor who deliberates over an evaluation is clearly exercising her will in 
the process of belief formation when she considers – or is asked to consider – 
whether the garden of roses is beautiful (contrast this with the formation of the belief 
that the roses in the garden are red or white). She engages her capacity for reason 
based on the (perceptive and background) evidence available to her, meaning that 
evaluative beliefs need not simply “happen upon” a person.94 A person can will 
herself to form a new evaluative belief, making any general claim that the formation 
of a belief is utterly beyond the control of a person – and therefore not a matter of 
responsibility – too strong.95 There is still a plausible basis for a theory of culpable 
negligence that is premised on the accused’s beliefs (or lack thereof). 
 It is important not to overstate the claim made here, however. It is not being 
suggested that persons can control the content of their beliefs.96 Without remarkable 
                                                
88 Cf B Williams, Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972 (1973) 143. 
89 Raz, Engaging Reason (n 87) 10. 
90 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 241. 
91 Ibid 239. Cf B Winters, “Believing at will” (1979) 76 J Phil 243. 
92 Duff, AFC 59. 
93 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 241. 
94 See, further, Raz, Engaging Reason (n 87) 9-10. 
95 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 241. 
96 Cf ibid 240. 




self-deception,97 a person who believes (after reflection) that the garden of roses is 
not beautiful is not in control of that feature of her belief.98 
 
(b) Evaluating beliefs 
If a person can exercise control over the formation of her evaluative beliefs, then it is 
possible to sketch an argument that she be held responsible, and potentially found 
culpable and liable, for the evaluative beliefs that she has and does not have which 
then manifest themselves in wrongdoing. This is particularly true in the context of 
risk-taking, as beliefs about whether it is unjustifiably risky to act in a certain way 
are inherently evaluative.99 The question is how to decide whether a belief is suitable 
for praise or, alternatively, criticism, including the special criticism implied by a 
criminal conviction. 
 Beliefs can be evaluated in a number of ways. First, on the assumption that 
beliefs aim at truth, it might be asked whether a belief is true or false.100 A belief that 
the Supreme Court sits in Liverpool is false, and this might lead to a negative 
evaluation of those who hold it. They might want the Supreme Court to sit in 
Liverpool (viewing State power as unduly centred on London), but this does not 
make their belief beyond criticism. In cases such as this, it seems legitimate that the 
agent be expected to make her beliefs fit the world as it is, not how she would like it 
to be.101 In light of this expectation, a number of questions follow logically when 
asking if the belief-holder deserves censure. Why did the agent come to her belief? 
Did she demonstrate some form of epistemic or investigatory failings in doing so?102 
                                                
97 Assuming that self-deception can successfully result in the formation of false evaluative beliefs. 
Some argue that the content of beliefs is simply beyond an agent’s control: e.g. D Scott-Kakures, “On 
belief and the captivity of the will” (1994) 54 Journal of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 
77.  
98 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 241. See, further: Williams, Problems of the Self (n 88) 149-151; P 
Hieronymi, “Responsibility for believing” (2008) 161 Synthese 357. 
99 It might be objected that the agent might not experience deliberation over a belief (she immediately 
recognises danger). This does not, however, seem fatal to the use of deliberation as an analytical 
device in negligence as failure of belief. See Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 247. 
100 See, further, Williams, Problems of the Self (n 88) 136-137. 
101 MC Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (2003) 48. 
102 This question brings in consideration of the intellectual virtues and vices, which are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. See, however, LT Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of 
Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (1996). 




 Already, the discussion has moved away from talk of truth or fallacy alone.103 
Reconsider Tadros’s garden example: beauty is not a fact, like the Supreme Court’s 
location. It is a judgement. Although in ordinary discourse104 it is sometimes 
assumed that evaluative opinions and judgements simply are “true” or “false”, 
“right” or “wrong”, this language might be misleading.105 It is preferable to talk of 
whether a belief in the beauty of a garden is justified or unjustified.106 The question 
again then becomes how the belief came about (in terms of the evidence that was 
considered to weigh in its favour), not whether that belief was empirically true or 
false.107 
 Truth and justification can, therefore, come apart.108 A person can have a 
belief which is true, but nonetheless unjustified (she guessed);109 or vice versa (she is 
– through no fault of her own – ignorant of information which would have led her to 
a different conclusion).110 It is submitted that the criminal law ought to be concerned 
only with the justification (rather than the truth) of a belief in risk or safety111 when 
assessing culpability. This is because empirical truth is an “objective”, impersonal 
matter, whereas justification “gets personal” in the way that culpability ought to 
require. 
 To see the importance of justification, it is useful to consider Jamieson v HM 
Advocate.112 The accused apparently believed the complainer was consenting to sex. 
He was wrong, but this should not, in itself, make him culpable for rape.113 The 
resolution of that question depends on whether Jameson was justified in forming his 
                                                
103 Cf S Shute, “Knowledge and belief in the criminal law”, in S Shute and AP Simester (eds), 
Criminal Law: Doctrines of the General Part (2002) 171 at 183-184. 
104 See P Pettit and M Smith, “Freedom in belief and desire” (1996) 93 J Phil 429 at 430. Similar 
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105 C Elliot, “Beliefs and responsibility” (1991) J Value Inquiry 233 at 240. 
106 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 244; Duff, AFC 267. 
107 See, similarly, Hieronymi (n 98) at 359. 
108 MC Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law (2004) 25; Tadros, Criminal 
Responsibility 244. 
109 Cf AP Simester, “Can negligence be culpable?”, in J Horder (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: 
Fourth Series (2000) 85 at 105. 
110 TM Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (1998) 26. 
111 Simester (n 109) at 106. The matter of whether the beliefs that led to the formation of the ultimate 
belief are themselves justified is left to the side here. See, however, J Dancy, An Introduction to 
Contemporary Epistemology (1985) 55-57, 127-130. 
112 1994 JC 88 (see §2.E(1), above). 
113 See, similarly, Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 245. 




belief in consent. However convinced or deluded the accused was in his belief,114 the 
question should be whether it was based on adequate grounds to show that he was 
sufficiently motivated by the interests of the complainer. 
 The question of sufficiency of evidence is, accordingly, central to 
justification.115 Ultimately, the issue is resolved by asking what it means to be a 
responsible citizen in forming beliefs.116 In most contexts, and certainly those with 
which the criminal law is concerned, it is submitted that there should – at least – be 
some evidential basis for a belief which would justify holding it.117 The quality of the 
evidence required will change with the circumstances and the gravity of the 
consequences of any failure to form a justified belief. For instance, more can be 
expected of those assessing whether there is consent to sex than those who are 
investigating whether they might damage a non-valuable piece of property. 118 
Connectedly, as the importance of forming a justified belief increases, the inferences 
that the accused draws from the available evidence should demonstrate a greater 
regard for the interests of others.119 
 Jamieson argued that the complainer removing her boots and tights was 
sufficient evidence upon which to premise his belief in consent.120 This evidence 
might be sufficient in certain contexts (a relationship where such conduct is a normal 
prelude to sex), but there were outward signs of non-consent: the complainer – a 
stranger to the accused – said repeatedly that she did not want “that” (i.e. sex) and 
had screamed at and bitten him.121 In the light of this conflicting evidence, more 
could legitimately be expected of Jamieson in forming his belief in consent. 
Assuming he had background knowledge that women do not always consent to 
sex,122 and perceived the complainer’s signs of unwillingness, he should have “put 
                                                
114 Cf Rusk v State 406 A 2d 624 (1979), where the defendant’s (in fact incorrect) belief in consent 
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116 See, similarly, Simester (n 109). 
117 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 245. 
118 Simester (n 109) at 105. 
119 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 248. 
120 Jamieson at 89. 
121 Ibid. 
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two and two together” and formed a belief that there was a risk of non-consent which 
called for further investigation.123 That he did not makes his belief unjustified and the 
conduct which he carried out in light of it open to potential criticism, including the 
specialist criticism at issue in a criminal trial. The resolution of that matter depends, 
ultimately, on why Jamieson failed to form the relevant belief,124 and that subject is 
returned to again below.125 
 
(2) Reasonableness and justification 
Negligence as failure of belief can, thus far, be categorised as the demonstration of 
an “intellectually irresponsible attitude” with regard to belief formation.126 It is 
present in familiar cases of mistake in defences127 – for instance in self-defence128 – 
and is generally captured in a legal requirement of reasonableness. Reasonableness 
calls for justification,129 which in turn calls for sufficient grounds for belief.130  
 The difference between a person faced with an immediate decision over 
whether to kill an aggressor and the accused in Jamieson is that nothing prevented 
the latter from taking time to consider his beliefs more carefully.131 The law can 
afford to be more forgiving to the former, as the situation forces her to act with less 
reflection.132 
 Returning to Cameron v Maguire, it is plain that the accused had the time to 
be more critically reflective in forming his belief in safety (considering his 
                                                
123 If he had formed this belief, the question would be whether he was reckless. See ch 6, below. 
124 Cf PJ Fitzgerald and G Williams, “Carelessness, indifference and recklessness: two replies” (1962) 
25 MLR 49 at 51. 
125 At §5.C(3). 
126 See JA Montmarquet, “Culpable ignorance and excuses” (1995) 80 Philosophical Studies 41 at 43. 
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“Involuntary manslaughter” at 346 (n 58). Cf S Sverdlik, “Pure negligence” (1993) 30 American 
Philosophical Quarterly 137 at 139-142. 
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perceptions and background knowledge). Given the risks attendant upon his activity, 
this much could legitimately be expected of him. His failure to form a belief that he 
was posing a risk to the lives of others was, therefore, potentially unreasonable, 
unjustifiable and culpably negligent (though not necessarily “reckless”, as the 
Scottish courts thought). 
 To establish whether Cameron and Jamieson were culpably negligent, in the 
sense that ought to be required for a criminal conviction, it is necessary to consider 
the reason why they failed to form a belief in unjustified risk. 
 
(3) The influence of desire 
To summarise, two cases of faulty belief formation are envisaged as being relevant to 
negligence as failure of belief: those where the accused formed an incorrect belief 
that she was acting justifiably; and those where no belief about risk or justification 
was formed. The discussion thus far has centred on the former, but it is submitted 
that, in both cases, the accused has similarly failed to put “two and two together” 
when she could be expected to have done so. 
 As Garvey explains, such omissions typically result from the failure to 
control a desire which then overwhelms the actor’s belief formation process.133 The 
agent is prevented, by an aspect of her motivational set-up, from putting the pieces 
together in the way that she could, given her perceptions and background knowledge, 
have done.134 
 Garvey summarises his argument as follows:135 
 
An actor who creates a risk of causing death but who was unaware of that risk is 
fairly subject to retributive punishment if he was nonwillfully [sic] ignorant or self-
deceived with respect to the existence of the risk, and if such ignorance or self-
deception was due to the influence of a desire he should have controlled. The 
culpability of such an actor does not consist in any choice to do wrong, but rather in 
the culpable failure to exereise [sic] doxastic self-control, i.e. control over desires 
that influence the formation and awareness of one’s beliefs... the actor could and 
should have controlled his wayward desire, thereby allowing the relevant belief to 
form and surface into awareness. 
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 To apply Garvey’s argument to Cameron v Maguire, a strong desire to fire 
his rifle may have prevented the accused from forming a belief that he was 
(unjustifiably) putting the lives of others at risk. Similarly, Jamieson’s desire to have 
sex may have led him to give insufficient weight to obvious prompts that the 
complainer was not consenting.136 Even if he had formed an unconscious belief in 
non-consent, Jamieson’s desire may have warped his perception of the facts so that 
this belief was unable to surface into preconscious or conscious awareness, putting 
him “on notice” that investigation into the matter of consent was required.137 
 Garvey is correct to emphasise the aspect of control over desires which might 
prevent the formation of a justified belief138 through hiding aspects of the situation 
from the accused’s conscious deliberations, or leading to reliance being placed on 
what might be called “non-evidential reasons” for belief (e.g. biases). 139  He 
nevertheless underplays the role of culpability. The matter of when a failure to 
exercise self-control is culpable is not addressed convincingly. At one stage, Garvey 
argues that a failure to maintain control over desires is culpable in itself.140 This does 
not seem right: consider a person on a diet who allows her desire to eat cake to 
prevent her from forming the belief that eating cake would be inconsistent with her 
losing weight. Such a person is surely not “culpable” in the sense required for the 
criminal law (her “fault” does not even appear to implicate the interests of others), 
but she has failed to exercise doxastic control in the manner that Garvey describes. 
She has failed to turn her attention away from her desire, and towards features of her 
situation which would encourage her to abstain.141  
 It is thus necessary to add a further condition to Garvey’s treatment of 
doxastic self-control. To be culpable, a negligent agent must – through her failure to 
                                                
136 See, similarly, Horder (n 132) at 476-477. 
137 Cf I Haji, “An epistemic dimension of blameworthiness” (1997) 57 Journal of Philosophy & 
Phenomenological Research 523 at 537. 
138 See, similarly: P Arenella, “Character, choice and moral agency: the relevance of character to our 
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(1990) 59; Sverdlik (n 127). 
139 This is not always wrong – blindness to others’ failings may be virtuous: Tadros, Criminal 
Responsibility 249. 
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control her desires – manifest insufficient concern for the interests of others.142 When 
modified appropriately, Garvey’s account switches focus from the actual beliefs a 
person has (and their justification), towards the management of her desires and her 
attitude towards the interests of others. This point about the accused’s control over 
her desires immediately complicates matters, because it raises the question of which 
desires the accused could have controlled.  
 
(a) “Alien” desires 
Consider Lindsay, who has never been tempted to steal. One day, a sudden desire to 
steal a necklace comes over her. Caught off guard by this desire, Lindsay decides – 
somewhat hesitantly – to act upon it.  
 On the strict choice view discussed in the previous chapter, Lindsay appears 
culpable: she has made a conscious choice to engage in wrongdoing and has shown 
insufficient concern for a legally-protected interest (in property) of another (the shop 
owner). A finding of culpability should, however, be troubling: although Lindsay did 
make a choice to do wrong, it does not seem to be “truly representative” of her 
character;143 to belong to her “in the deepest sense”.144  
 It is submitted that this disassociation ought to matter, because it is not 
Lindsay’s choice or action which will be punished and condemned.145 Rather, it is 
Lindsay that is punished. Aspersions will be cast on her character and she will bear 
the criminal record.146 To reflect this, it is submitted that there should be some 
connection drawn between Lindsay’s choice, her desire and her wider character to 
make the exercise of punishment an honest communication of moral indignation 
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towards her. Otherwise, the message of liability is shallow and worthless, addressing 
orphaned choices and actions rather than the agent who made and performed them.147  
 It is submitted that the same conclusion holds if no connection is drawn 
between an actor, her desires and her beliefs. If a person is alleged to have failed to 
form a belief because she failed to control a desire, it is important that this desire is 
not “alien” to her.148 
 This is because “alien” desires are not susceptible to control in the way that – 
at least in enkratic (self-controlled) actors – other desires are, because they are not 
woven into the agent’s more general motivational system.149 This point concerning 
control might undermine any contention that the actor was able to manage her 
desires, and this would again make asking the question of culpability illegitimate. 
“Alien” desires thus pose a problem for desire-based accounts of culpability such as 
that proposed by Garvey and adopted here. If a desire may be “alien” (i.e. 
unrepresentative of the agent that acts upon it), then the accused’s failure to form a 
justified belief concerning the riskiness of her conduct might be nothing to do with 
her. 
 One way to overcome this difficulty would be to disregard “alien” desires and 
claim that they are not an aspect of character at all. This is difficult: absent any 
external forces,150 alien desires must spring from somewhere within the agent;151 they 
may surely properly be described as part of her “character” in a general sense.152 
This leads to an alternative, more compelling, strategy, which is to deny that “alien” 
desires are representative of a person’s true character.153 This latter approach is 
adopted in this thesis. A desire should only give rise to a finding of culpability if it 
                                                
147 Arenella (n 138) at 83. 
148 This is how “out of character” acts should be understood in this thesis. See also Fields (n 146) at 
411. 
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has been accepted as being representative of, and in-line with, the accused’s wider 
motivational framework.154  
 “Alien” desires are, at least initially, outwith this framework. When an actor 
is confronted with such a desire, it seems appropriate that she engage in self-
reflection about how she is motivated towards it.155 If the agent recognises the desire 
as inconsistent with her values – those interests she views as important to promote – 
then she might try and remove the desire (or prevent it from habitually occurring to 
her),156 to show her commitment to those values.157 She might fail no matter how 
hard she tries,158 but such a failure is not acceptance. It is submission, and this should 
not be enough for blameworthiness to attach to a failure to exercise doxastic self-
control and form a justified belief concerning risk.159 
 Acceptance may, nevertheless, take a number of forms. For example, the 
agent might realise that a desire is inconsistent with her values, and yet not attempt to 
remove it.160 This is surely acceptance through acquiescence. Alternatively, the agent 
might realise that she is simply deceiving herself, and that her true character is 
revealed by the “alien” desire. This is surely a comprehensive form of acceptance, 
which might lead the agent to change other aspects of her character to accommodate 
the new desire.  
 The method of acceptance does not matter, and in many cases it will be 
subtle. The issue of concern is whether the desire has been accepted – in some sense 
– into the agent’s wider system of desires and values prior to the act of risk-taking.161 
Only then can it be subject to control and the proper basis for a finding of culpability 
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for beliefs.162 This is because the beliefs the accused will hold in these circumstances 
will be unjustified and could have been avoided had she performed better in the 
management of her desires.163 
 Even if a desire is accepted, uncontrolled and able to prevent the accused 
from forming a justified belief in risk, culpability is not yet established. Again, 
capacity seems important. It must be asked whether the accused had the capacity and 
an opportunity to exercise doxastic self-control and form a belief in risk.164 If this 
capacity – and the opportunity to exercise it – were not present, then the law’s 
demand that the accused exercises self-control is illegitimate, as discussed above.165 
If the law’s demand was legitimate, and there was an opportunity to exercise control, 
then the final matter is whether the accused showed – in her failure to exercise self-
control – insufficient regard for the interests of others. If she did, then there is no 
obvious bar to attributing culpability to her. 
 The above account of negligence as failure of belief has been detailed in 
order to address some familiar objections to approaches such as Garvey’s. In the next 
section, further objections will be considered and some clarifications made. 
 
(4) Objections and clarifications 
Thus far, the concentration has been on factors internal to the accused: her beliefs, 
her desires, etc. It is necessary to now consider the physical element of negligence as 
failure of belief. 
 
(a) Significance in action 
The first matter of concern is what is referred to as the “significance in action” 
problem.166 Those who raise this difficulty suggest that, in theories such as Garvey’s 
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(and, therefore, in the account offered above), there is a gap between the accused’s 
act of wrongdoing (the taking of an unjustified risk) and her culpability (her failure 
to exercise doxastic self-control and form a justified belief). This apparently makes it 
illegitimate to hold an actor responsible and liable for the actions she performs in 
light of her beliefs (and their consequences).167  
 The significance in action problem is most clearly associated with accounts of 
culpable carelessness which deal with attitudes. For instance, Simons concentrates on 
the attitude of “indifference”.168 As Alexander, Ferzan and Morse explain,169 an 
attitude of indifference plays no part in an accused’s practical reasoning, and so is 
disconnected from action. Indifference is not a reason for acting; it is a mood 
contemporaneous with action. It can thus only explain behaviour, and not why that 
behaviour was culpable.170  Allegedly, character-based approaches to negligence 
(such as that defended above) suffer from the same problem.171  
 At the most basic level, as Madden Dempsey points out, there is nevertheless 
a necessary connection between actions and (accepted) character: “[a]n actor is not 
properly criminalised for being a jerk: but he might properly be subject to criminal 
liability because, in virtue of being such a jerk, he ended up killing someone”.172 The 
same connection may be drawn between an actor who is negligent in her beliefs and 
the wrongful actions which she performs as a result. Jamieson would not properly be 
blamed for the belief accompanying his action. He is, instead, blamed for the fact 
that – as a result of his failure to intervene in the belief formation process and 
control his desire to have sex – he had non-consensual sex with another person.173 On 
this account, there is no problem connecting Jamieson’s culpability with the act of 
wrongdoing. The connection between the two is more than simply explanatory. It is – 
if anything – causal. 
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 Drawing this connection between character and action endorses properly the 
expectations that bore upon Jamieson with regard to his self-management and belief 
formation, and emphasises his culpable failure to meet them (which resulted in an 
inadvertent act of wrongdoing). “[T]he ultimate judgment of fault concerns the 
actor’s conduct in light of his beliefs”174 and punishment is for that action, not a 
contemporaneous character trait.175 
 If this point is accepted, a further objection presents itself. It was noted above 
that even “alien” desires can ground findings of responsibility if the bar of 
acceptance is overcome. This means, Ferzan suggests, that punishing failures of 
doxastic control is simply punishing for omitting to remove desires that are 
inconsistent with the agent’s wider character.176 This omission is again apparently 
divorced from action.177  
 This restatement of the “significance in action” objection is not compelling. 
Arguably, it misses the point, which concerns what could legitimately be expected of 
the accused in terms of doxastic self-control. The contention is that only desires 
which have been accepted – in some sense – by the accused are susceptible to 
control. Agents are not faulted for failing to remove a desire but rather for, once this 
desire has been accepted, failing to exercise control over it when this was possible 
and expected, and – as a result – engaging in wrongdoing. Ferzan’s objection 
conflates these two issues. 
 The “significance in action” problem can now be left behind. A separate 
concern arises from confusion over the significance of action in character formation.
  
(b) Significance of action 
Actions might be seen as evidence of existing character traits.178 On this view, a 
character trait can exist even if it has never been manifest in action179 – a person is 
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first a callous character and then, when given the opportunity, performs callous 
actions.  
 The difficulty, it might be suggested, is that surely it is not clear from one 
callous action that a person has a callous character. Acts might give rise to 
ambiguous estimations of character, making them of dubious evidential worth. As a 
result, it might be argued, talk of character should be abandoned, and chosen 
wrongdoing concentrated upon when considering isolated acts of wrongdoing.180 
 This conclusion is too rash. To begin with, actions provide more than just 
evidence of an existing character trait: they are partially constituent of character. 
Duff gives the example of a person performing a dishonest act.181 Before the act is 
performed, the accused has dispositions to act in a certain way but is not yet a 
dishonest person. It is only through performing a dishonest action that, as well as 
evidencing a trait, the actor confirms that trait as part of her character. In short, a 
person cannot be dishonest without acting dishonestly.182 
 Actions are not therefore simply evidence of character, but play an important 
part in confirming that the accused is insufficiently motivated by the interests of 
others in the management of her desires.183 Acts can secure culpability, strengthening 
the connection between character, desire, belief and action which – the strict choice 
theorist alleges – cannot exist absent advertent wrongdoing.184 Although they can 
give rise to dubious estimations of the accused’s motivational structure, it is 
submitted that epistemic uncertainty around the inferences drawn from action is not 
fatal to character theories of culpable carelessness. If they were, then “objective” 
means of proving “subjective” mental states also seem indefensible.185 
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 The two prominent objections concerning the role of character in action have 
thus been dispensed with. A final criticism to be considered at this stage concerns the 
role of “objectivity” in negligence as failure of belief. 
 
(c) The role of “objectivity” 
At the outset of the chapter, it was noted that standards such as the “reasonable 
person” are viewed as impersonal. “Objective” standards will have a role to play in 
assessing culpability as well as justification under the theory presented here. The 
court will have to establish whether the accused demonstrated, in her failure to 
control her desires, insufficient concern for the interests of others. This assumes a 
standard of sufficiency, which will presumably be set by “objective”, impersonal 
standards for largely the same reasons that justification must be “objectively” 
assessed. It might, therefore, be objected that the theory of negligence as failure of 
belief presented here is not in fact as “personalised” as it claims to be. 
 Although this point is sometimes missed by theorists,186 relying on concepts 
such as insufficient concern or “indifference” veils the “objective” elements of 
culpable carelessness, but cannot eradicate them. Even if choice is the mark of 
culpability, Alexander, Ferzan and Morse only admit of culpability where 
insufficient concern was demonstrated, necessitating an “objective” estimation of 
sufficient concern for others. “Objectivity” is inescapable.187 
 It is not envisaged that this “objective” aspect of negligence as failure of 
belief is troubling. Absent a strong attachment to “subjectivity” – which, as chapter 
four showed, requires justification – the presence of some “objectivity” is not fatal to 
a defensible theory of culpable carelessness. Where there is disagreement over the 
proper social expectations concerning risk-taking and belief formation, important 
moral and political questions are, of course, raised.188 But these exist under the 
current approach to culpable carelessness in both Scotland and England, and it is not 
the aim of this thesis to remove them from the attribution of criminal responsibility 
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and liability. If anything, through considering “objective” matters beyond 
“subjective” foresight, the thesis makes these considerations more transparent. 
Even with these clarifications made and objections considered, negligence as 




From the discussion thus far, negligence as failure of belief has five components 
beyond the taking of a substantial, “objectively” unjustified risk (i.e. wrongdoing): 
 
(i)  Background knowledge concerning the risks involved in conduct (capacity); 
(ii) Perception of indicators of risk (capacity); 
(iii) An accepted desire that prevents the formation of a belief (responsibility); 
(iv) A fair opportunity to exercise doxastic control over that desire and form a 
belief (capacity); and 
(v) A failure to exercise doxastic control over that desire and form a belief, which 
demonstrates insufficient concern for the interests of others (culpability). 
 
To see these elements in action (and how difficult decisions about negligence can 
be), it is useful to consider State v Williams.189  
 The defendants’ child became seriously ill. Despite obvious indicators of this 
fact, the Williamses decided that their son had toothache and failed to take him to a 
doctor. He died and his parents were charged with manslaughter which, under 
Washington law, required “simple”, civil negligence.190 With just these facts, it 
remains unclear whether capacity, responsibility, wrongdoing and culpability were 
present. 
 Assuming wrongdoing, the first important matter is whether the defendants 
had the relevant background knowledge and perceptions to form a belief that there 
was a risk of serious illness. With regard to knowledge, the defendants had received 
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only a basic education.191 Although they had perceived that the child was sick, there 
is thus a possibility that the Williamses lacked background knowledge concerning 
how sick their child was. This makes it questionable whether they had the ingredients 
required to form a belief that their child might die if medical attention was not 
sought. If they did not possess the relevant background knowledge, then negligence 
as failure of belief cannot be made out. Once again, “ought” implies “can”. 
 If it is assumed that the Williamses did have the relevant background 
knowledge and perceptions to form a belief that seeking medical attention was 
warranted, consideration turns to the reason(s) why a justified belief to that effect 
was not formed. The Williamses were of Native American ancestry, and feared that 
their child would be taken by social services if they took him to a doctor.192 This fear 
was apparently well founded.193 The primary desire that prevented the Williamses 
from seeking medical attention was, thus, to ensure that they remained connected to 
their son. The question is, then, whether this desire was accepted as consistent with 
the values of the parents. It is assumed that it was,194 and it might also be assumed 
that the Williamses could have exercised self-control, meaning that their failure to do 
so could be a potential basis for a finding of responsibility. 
 The matter of culpability can then be addressed: did the Williamses – in their 
failure to exercise doxastic self-control and form a belief in risk – show insufficient 
concern for the interests of their son? This is a complicated question, but it seems 
that the Williamses were deeply concerned with their child’s welfare. Although this 
(ironically) led to the child’s death,195 it is submitted that the Williamses showed 
sufficient regard for his interests.196 They ought not, therefore, to have been adjudged 
culpably negligent and declared manslaughterers. 
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 Williams is no doubt a powerful example because of its emotive facts.197 It is 
thus prudent to consider a less highly-charged case, Cameron v Maguire. Assuming, 
again, that Cameron had the background knowledge of the risks of firing his rifle and 
that someone might be in the woods around his home, etc, and perceived that he was 
firing a gun in the direction of the woods, the question becomes whether his desire to 
fire his rifle was accepted as part of his character. Was it the first time he had had 
this urge? Had he just bought the rifle and got carried away? If the desire was 
“alien”, then it does not appear that Cameron evidenced negligence as failure of 
belief (given that his conduct is regulated and licensed,198 however, it is plausible 
that he evidenced negligence as failure of conduct). 
 If Cameron had accepted his desire and could control it, then the question is 
whether his failure to do so and form a belief in risk demonstrated insufficient 
concern for the interests of others. It is unclear why, other than wanting to check the 
accuracy of his rifle, Cameron was shooting in his back garden. As a result, it does 
not seem that his failure to control his desire demonstrated any regard for the lives of 
others. In such circumstances, it is submitted that he ought to have been convicted of 
a crime. As he believed it was safe for him to be shooting in his back garden,199 
however, it is again difficult to conceive of his crime as one of “recklessness”, rather 
than negligence. 
 These two examples explain how, in principle, negligence as failure of belief 
establishes culpability for wrongdoing. In practice, some assumptions might need to 
be made, and chapter seven explains these.200 For now, it is important to consider 
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(6) Further objections 
 
(a) “Fatal circularity” 
Alexander and Ferzan worry that Garvey’s account of culpable negligence is “fatally 
circular”.201 This is because, if the accused was inadvertent at the time of acting, 
there was no psychological prompt to urge her to engage in doxastic self-control.202 
For instance, the accused in Jamieson was inadvertent with regard to the risk of non-
consent – he believed that the complainer was consenting – and Alexander and 
Ferzan worry that there was nothing to put him “on notice” that he needed to control 
his desires. 
 This objection is weak. Assuming he was not in a state of automatism, 
Jamieson was presumably aware that he was engaged in sexual intercourse. Consent 
is a core component in sexual relations.203 Furthermore, the risks of non-consensual 
intercourse are grave; it is an inherently risky activity. 204  These features of 
Jamieson’s situation put him “on notice” that he ought to consider the possibility that 
his desire to have sex might prevent him from forming a justified belief about 
consent.205 Although “subjectively” Jamieson’s desire may have dominated his mind 
to the extent that he did not investigate his beliefs,206 the point of negligence as 
failure of belief is that he could legitimately be expected to have controlled that 
desire. The same reasoning can be applied in relation to the other examples above, 
and there is nothing “circular” about it. Alexander and Ferzan again seem blinkered 
by their focus on conscious choices.207 Once wider features of situations (and 
characters) are considered, culpability becomes transparent. 
This leads, however, to a second complaint concerning this chapter’s reliance 
on character. 
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(b) Does character exist? 
Doris, for instance, argues that character – understood as a set of stable traits 
concerning conduct and value – does not exist and that philosophy (and, presumably, 
the law) should look to other concepts when discussing responsibility and liability.208 
Doris’s argument is premised on empirical evidence, which suggests that 
circumstances, rather than character, determine conduct. Asking whether a person 
has a certain character, and whether a desire fits in a wider nexus of desires and 
values, is thus useless. 
 This conclusion is too strong. First, it is not required that every opportunity to 
perform an in-character act is taken by agents. Someone with the trait of dishonesty 
does not have to lie at every given opportunity. This means that, even if a focus on 
character is maintained, circumstances can play an important explanatory role in 
demonstrating why a person disposed to perform action x performed action y.209 
Secondly, the studies relied upon by Doris surely show only that few (as opposed to 
no) people have a virtuous character which will defy authority when told to, for 
instance, electrocute another person or animal. Some test subjects did, after all, defy 
authority in Milgram’s infamous experiments.210 It cannot, therefore, be objected that 
the theory presented above relies on an illusionary notion. The fact that it is difficult 
to exercise self-control over desires and form justified beliefs concerning risks does 
not detract from the fact that failing to do so sometimes shows insufficient regard for 
others. 
This segues into a third complaint: that the approach defended above aims to 
punish those who do not display virtue, rather than those who display vice. 
 
(c) Virtue ethics? 
Negligence as failure of belief might be alleged to enforce virtue ethics through the 
criminal law, which is controversial.211 This objection is, however, misguided, 
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because culpability is only legally relevant where an agent shows insufficient 
concern for the legally-protected interests of others in failing to form a belief in risk. 
There are, therefore, two limitations on negligence as failure of belief. First, 
insufficient concern should be imagined as quite a high standard to meet, given the 
serious consequences attendant upon a criminal conviction. This will ensure that 
punishment is for obvious displays of viciousness, rather than mere failures to attain 
virtue.212 Secondly, the ambit of negligence as failure of belief can be circumscribed 
by limiting the range of legally-protected interests which become relevant. This idea 
is developed in the next part of the chapter. 
 
(7) Negligence as failure of belief: summary 
This section has demonstrated a second way in which a failure to notice an 
“objectively” unjustified risk can be culpable in the sense required for criminal 
liability. Given that it is not connected to a specific context, this aspect of negligence 
liability is wide-ranging and likely to be controversial, necessitating the above, 
deliberately comprehensive discussion. An issue has, however, been left to one side. 
This concerns the efficacy of punishing culpable negligence and the connected 
relationship between negligence liability and liberal notions like individual 
autonomy. The next, final section considers these matters. 
 
 
D. NEGLIGENCE IN A LIBERAL STATE 
Although it is found in the positive law, negligence liability is relatively rare. This 
makes a wide-ranging argument for negligence liability seem suspicious.213 It is 
submitted that the main reasons for negligence’s limitations in the positive law come 
from “policy” arguments and (more importantly) from principled concerns about 
autonomy. The interaction between these concerns and the account of culpable 
negligence defended in this chapter is discussed below. 
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Some proponents of culpability for negligence doubt that it would be good policy to 
criminalise negligent risk-taking.214  First, expanding the criminal law to cover 
inadvertent, unjustified risk-taking would – particularly in England, where 
“objective” recklessness/negligence is used less frequently – result in a greater 
number of trials, leading to higher costs for the criminal justice system.215 This 
argument means that limiting the ambit of negligence liability to severe instances of 
inadvertent risk-taking should be taken seriously (see below). 
 Secondly, some authors doubt that punishing negligence could deter potential 
wrongdoers.216 This argument assumes that convicting and punishing citizens for 
their negligent risk-taking would not encourage them (and others)217 to alter their 
motivational structure to ensure that they take more care in the future.218 This 
assumption requires empirical backing, which is never presented.219 
 This objection also relies on deterrence being the purpose of punishment. It 
thus dissipates if communication of culpable wrongdoing and community standards 
concerning risk-taking is adopted as an alternative rationale. 220  There remain 
concerns over the use of such a severe sanction against inadvertent wrongdoers,221 
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but these can be allayed by limiting punishment to particularly egregious instances of 
negligence as failure of conduct or belief (again, see below). 
 Thirdly, there might be concern over using negligence liability too liberally 
as it relies on the court’s estimation of what sufficient concern is, which might allow 
excessive jury/judicial discretion.222 If this is a real concern, then surely it cuts 
deeper than negligence liability. As noted above,223 even advertent recklessness 
relies on estimations about the concern that citizens should show to others in 
considering the risks attendant upon their conduct. If this gives the jury undue 
discretion, then advertent recklessness liability is also problematic in the criminal 
context, and nobody makes this argument. 
 Many of the “policy” arguments that might be raised against the theory in this 
chapter are thus weak. Of more concern is a final, more principled point: that 
punishing negligence too zealously would result in an overly intrusive criminal law, 
which requires citizens to investigate aspects of their conduct at all times to ensure 
that there are no attendant, unjustifiable risks that (because of their desires) they are 
failing to form beliefs about. This seems to be the logical conclusion of Gardner’s 
view that – as a “concomitant of their partaking in the life of the planet” – citizens 
should investigate all possible dangers attendant upon their activities.224 
 This proposal is fraught with difficulties.225 Primarily, it is incompatible with 
any meaningful conception of individual autonomy.226 In fact, it would surely stymie 
(to quite a large extent) personal development. How many citizens would have time 
for hobbies, leisure activities and other aspects of a “good life” if their lives were 
spent incessantly testing their beliefs?227  
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 Furthermore, there are instances where investigating a risk will be 
impractical. Consider Tadros’s example of a substance which might be poison, but 
the only way to be sure is to conduct “an expensive ten-year study”.228 Surely a 
citizen is not duty-bound (in virtue of her citizenship or participant “in the life of the 
planet”) to carry out this study, assuming she had the tools available to do so.  
 Connectedly, it is possible that being overcautious when carrying out some 
activities might increase their riskiness.229 Driving at ten miles per hour might be a 
display of commendable caution on a blind bend,230 but adopting the same strategy 
on a motorway – for fear that driving faster would allow certain desires to prevent 
the formation of justified beliefs about risk – is likely only to increase the risk of a 
collision. 
 These objections are all good ones, but the most critical reason for not 
adopting a duty to investigate all potentially unjustifiable risks at all times is that it 
would result in many people being punished.231 It would be difficult for citizens – 
however well meaning – to avoid being culpably negligent. This would dilute 
substantially the message of the criminal sanction, and cause undue, widespread 
hardship through punishment.232 
For all of these reasons,233 negligence liability (for failures of conduct and 
belief) should be used sparingly in the criminal law. As noted above, negligence as 
failure of conduct readily suggests limits on criminalisation.234 Negligence as failure 
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of belief is more difficult to limit, but the next subsection considers how this might 
be done.235 
 
(2) Limiting negligence as failure of belief 
The key to limiting negligence as failure of belief is to consider the interests being 
(inadvertently) put at risk.236 For instance, citizens could be put under a legal duty to 
form justified beliefs about whether their conduct endangers unjustifiably237 interests 
x, y or z, rather than interests in general.  
 Identifying interests x, y and z will, naturally, be difficult for any polity. In 
effect, it must decide which interests are important enough that risks to them must be 
paid attention to by all citizens at all times. Some common ground is, surely, 
imaginable. For instance, life, bodily integrity and sexual autonomy are sacrosanct in 
the criminal law.238 It would therefore appear sensible to start with these interests,239 
making it a crime to – for instance – take an unjustified risk with the life,240 bodily 
integrity241 or sexual autonomy of another through acting on negligently-formed 
beliefs. It is instructive that Scots and English law arguably possess some of these 
offences already, 242  and some Continental systems contain more wide-ranging 
offences of negligence.243 
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 Beyond these cases, the situation seems less clear. Consider property – 
another important interest in the criminal law. Should it be a crime to inadvertently 
put property at unjustifiable risk of damage or destruction? Intuitively, the answer 
might appear to be yes, but there is reason for deeper inquiry.244 Are risks to all 
property serious enough to be investigated by citizens when engaging in any 
activity? The answer will surely depend on the property: consider the negligent 
burning of a copy of Heat magazine as opposed to the negligent burning of the Mona 
Lisa. 
 The question thus becomes which factors are relevant to discovering whether 
a piece of property is important enough to be protected from negligently-caused 
damage. A number of factors might be imagined: cost, purpose, uniqueness, 
sentimental attachment, etc. However easy it is to imagine these criteria, it is clear 
that they would be impractical. Consider cost: if it were a crime to inadvertently (and 
without justification) put property of a value above £1000 at risk, it might be difficult 
for a non-expert citizen to assess whether she should stop and form a belief about the 
riskiness of her actions, and attempt to engage in doxastic self-control if necessary. 
She would have to do an investigation into monetary value prior to her risk 
investigation, which sounds even more burdensome and potentially illiberal. 245 
Furthermore, given the difficulty of predicting accurately the financial worth of an 
item of property (Is that television worth over £1000?), it is possible that virtually all 
mistakes would be “reasonable” and this would presumably negate any finding of 
culpability.246 
 For these reasons, it is submitted that criminal negligence liability would be 
inappropriate in cases of property damage or destruction.247 If a legal remedy is to be 
available, it should be extracted via the civil courts or insurance.248 
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 It is possible, through debates such as these, to limit the impact of negligence 
as failure of belief on the criminal law. This is, however, a question of 
criminalisation, rather than of culpability. This demonstrates that issues of culpability 
and criminalisation cannot be considered in isolation. Not all culpable negligence 
ought to be criminal, and the debate sketched immediately above shows the process 




This chapter has outlined two forms of culpable negligence and sketched an answer 
to the question of when a display of negligence should result in a criminal 
conviction. This has crossed the boundary between criminalisation and culpability, 
indicating that – at least in the context of culpable carelessness – these two topics 
cannot exist entirely separately. When understood in terms of insufficient concern for 
the interests of others, culpability is – after all – capable of being deployed in a 
variety of contexts. All kinds of actions demonstrate insufficient concern for the 
interests of others, but are not criminal (consider barging in front of others in a 
queue).249 
 The only limit on outright legal moralism (understood as the prosecution and 
punishment of all culpable actors)250 is to require that the accused demonstrated a 
serious lack of concern for the interests of others, and classify the specific interests 
which the polity declares251 it would be “publicly wrong” to put at inadvertent, 
unjustified risk.252 In the context of negligence as failure of conduct, these limits are 
defined by the voluntary decision to enter a regulated sphere of activity; in 
                                                
249 This, it is submitted, accounts for Tadros’s unwillingness to define clearly the “moral vices” (vices 
which demonstrate insufficient concern for others). See: Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 86-89, 252-
254; M Plaxton, “Review of Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility” (2007) 1 Crim Law & Philos 
223 at 226. For this reason, the thesis prefers to rely simply on the notion of insufficient concern itself. 
This standard has rarely been developed in criminal law theory, but for a sketch of its possible 
meanings, see KW Simons, “Retributivism refined – or run amok?” (2010) 77 U Chi L Rev 551 at 
556-558. 
250 Admittedly, this is a caricature of legal moralism. 
251 The language of declaration is preferred over the language of “prohibition”, for the reasons 
explained in RA Duff, “Crime, prohibition and punishment” (2002) 19 Journal of Applied Philosophy 
97. 
252 See §1.A(3), above. 




negligence as failure of belief, they must be set by the polity in defining its public 
wrongs. When these limits are respected, there is nothing “unethical”253 about 
criminal liability for negligence. 
 Negligence will now be left to one side. The next chapter explains the 
element of culpability in recklessness. 
                                                
253 J Hall, “Negligent behaviour should be excluded from criminal liability” (1963) 63 Colum L Rev 






6 Reconsidering Recklessness 
 
This chapter presents a non-choice-based conception of recklessness. Section A 
examines a popular approach to reconceptualising “subjective” recklessness which 
concentrates on the accused’s attitude of indifference towards (rather than her 
conscious choices concerning)1 risk. The various “indifference theories” – which 
count at least some inadvertent risk-takers as reckless – have weaknesses, making 
them unsuitable as theoretical explanations of recklessness. Section B thus takes a 
different tack, and presents a belief-centred account of recklessness. In common with 
indifference theories, this approach considers the accused’s attitude (of insufficient 
concern) towards her beliefs in risk and the interests threatened by her actions. It 
nevertheless avoids the problems exposed in section A, making it a preferable 
account of recklessness. 
 To demonstrate the coherence of the theory of culpable carelessness 
developed in this thesis, the chapter then explains the connections and distinctions 
between negligence as failure of belief and recklessness.2 Thereafter, Section C 
examines how recklessness and negligence as failure of belief interact with other 
mens rea terms such as wilful blindness, knowledge and intention. 
 
 
A. INDIFFERENCE THEORIES 
Indifference theories of recklessness posses alleged explanatory appeal: as seen in 
chapters two and three, the language of indifference has occasionally appeared in 
directions on recklessness in Scots3 and English criminal law.4 It has also been 
                                                
1 Cf §6.A(3), below. 
2 As explained in ch 5, negligence as failure of conduct is a special case. It is thus largely ignored in 
this chapter. 
3 See §2.D(2), above. 
4 See §3.C(2), above. 




employed in other jurisdictions, such as Australia.5 Indifference theories might 
therefore be thought superior to the choice theories discussed in chapter four when 
explaining theory and doctrine. This part of the chapter undermines that view by 
pointing out the shortcomings of various indifference theories. 
 Before this examination can begin, three general points should be made.  
 
(1) General points 
First, indifference theories are rarely labelled accurately. To be indifferent is to have 
“no particular interest or sympathy”; to be “unconcerned”. 6  Most indifference 
theorists do not in fact require that the actor was utterly unconcerned with the 
interests she put at risk.7 Rather, they tend to focus on actors who do not care enough 
about the interests of others.8 Simons, for instance, is concerned with “whether the 
actor cared much less than he should about bringing about a harmful result”;9 
Pillsbury with the vice of “not caring enough”.10 Of the indifference theorists 
discussed below, perhaps11 only Duff talks truly of indifference – of actors who 
“cared nothing for” the consequences of their actions.12 
 Given this lack of fit between label and theory, Tadros suggests that most 
indifference theorists are actually interested in culpability in general; in actors who 
                                                
5 See: D Lanham, “Murder, recklessness and grievous bodily harm” (1978) 2 Crim LJ 255 at 263-265; 
I Leader-Elliott, “Recklessness and moral desiccation in the Australian law of murder”, in J Horder 
(ed), Homicide Law in Comparative Perspective (2007) 143. 
6 See http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0407440#m_en_gb0407440. 
7 WJ Winslade, “Recklessness” (1970) Analysis 135 at 136; JB Brady, “Recklessness” (1996) 15 Law 
& Phil 183 at 190-191. 
8 See Winslade (n 7). Accepting this point allows most indifference theorists to explain cases where 
the actor took an acknowledged risk, whilst apparently caring somewhat about whether harm resulted 
or not. See PJ Fitzgerald and G Williams, “Carelessness, indifference and recklessness: two replies” 
(1962) 25 MLR 49 at 54-55. Cf JB Brady, “Recklessness, negligence, indifference and awareness” 
(1980) 43 MLR 381 at 387-388. 
9 KW Simons, “Culpability and retributive theory: the problem of criminal negligence” (1994) 5 J 
Contemp Legal Issues 365 at 390. See also: KW Simons, “Rethinking mental states” (1992) 72 BUL 
Rev 273 at 487; KW Simons, “Does punishment for ‘culpable indifference’ simply punish for ‘bad 
character’? Examining the requisite connection between mens rea and actus reus” (2002-2003) 6 Buff 
Crim L Rev 219 at 226. 
10 Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 107.  
11 Horder’s “strongly indifferent” actors might be utterly unconcerned with risk, but this is far from 
clear: as explained below, “strongly indifferent” actors fail to show adequate respect to “agent-
neutral” values. This surely allows an actor to be “strongly indifferent” through not caring enough. 
12 Duff, IACL 163 (though see R A Duff, “Recklessness” [1980] Crim LR 282 at 284). See, further, 
AR White, “Carelessness, indifference and recklessness” (1961) 24 MLR 592. 




show “insufficient difference” to the interests of others.13 Although an improvement, 
Tadros’s term still does not capture accurately the wrong with which indifference 
theorists are concerned. They deal with actors who show insufficient concern for 
others in a particular way, through their specific attitude towards the risks (and the 
associated circumstances and consequences) attendant upon their conduct. No logical 
shorthand presents itself,14 and so “indifference theorists” will continue to be used in 
this chapter. The point is that – absent the caveat presented here – this label might 
mislead. 
 Secondly, the indifference theorists discussed here15 do not all aim to explain 
recklessness: Horder views indifference as the mark of “gross” negligence; 16 
Pillsbury is equivocal on the recklessness/negligence issue;17 and Simons claims that 
– as the criminal law’s traditional mens rea categories (including recklessness and 
negligence) are “seriously inadequate” – indifference should be understood as a 
completely new aspect of culpability.18 Only Duff aims at explaining recklessness, as 
distinct from negligence.19 
 It might, then, be wondered why indifference theories are being considered 
only in the context of recklessness. The answer is that the account of culpable 
negligence offered in chapter five is envisaged as being the most defensible one 
available. Horder’s attempt to explain “gross” negligence in terms of indifference is 
less compelling in comparison, and his theory will consequently be dealt with as 
though it concerned recklessness.20 Furthermore, it is assumed that existing mens rea 
terms can continue to do useful work if their attitudinal and desire-based elements 
                                                
13 Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 259 (n 24). 
14 Cf the clunky “insufficient moral aversion” label alluded to in KK Ferzan, “Don’t abandon the 
Model Penal Code yet! Thinking through Simons’s rethinking” (2002-2003) 6 Buff Crim L Rev 185 
at 214. 
15 Some indifference theories are not discussed here because they are either undeveloped (e.g. B 
Mitchell, “Culpably indifferent murder” (1996) 25 Anglo-American L Rev 64) or insufficiently 
distinct from the other theories discussed here (e.g. White’s theory, mentioned in various footnotes 
below). 
16  Horder, “Gross negligence”. See, similarly, HW Edgerton, “Negligence, inadvertence and 
indifference: the relation of mental states to negligence” (1925-1926) 39 Harv LR 849. 
17 Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 106. 
18 KW Simons, “Culpability and retributive theory: the problem of criminal negligence” (1994) 5 J 
Contemp Legal Issues 365 at 371. 
19 Duff, IACL ch 7. 
20 It is doubtful that Horder would object to this, given the doctrinal confusion over “gross” 
negligence and recklessness in the law on manslaughter (the subject of his article). See §3.D, above. 




are emphasised. Pillsbury and Simons’ attempts to avoid or explode the existing 
mens rea hierarchy can thus be ignored. 
 Thirdly, some indifference theories are relations of the choice theories 
discussed in chapter four. Pillsbury, for instance, is concerned with conscious 
choices pertaining to perception and what these demonstrate about the accused’s 
attitude to others’ interests. This feature of his theory reinforces the point that “bright 
lines” between the theories of culpable carelessness discussed in this thesis are 
difficult – if not impossible – to maintain.21 
 Now these preliminary points have been made, attention will be turned to 
substantive indifference theories. As noted already, these differ in approach and will 
accordingly be dealt with in stages. 
 
(2) Horder and Simons: counterfactual scenarios 
It is helpful to consider Horder and Simons’ arguments together, as they adopt a 
similar approach to identifying culpable indifference.22 Both focus upon how the 
inadvertent accused would have reacted to risk if, at the time of acting, she had been 
aware of its existence. 
 
(a) Horder’s “strong” and “weak” indifference 
Horder’s account of indifference is – like his theory of negligent conduct23 – built on 
Razian foundations. 24  He begins by exploring the distinction between “agent-
relative” and “agent-neutral” values, and their impact upon practical reasoning.25 Raz 
explains that everybody has reason to respect agent-neutral values when deciding 
what to do; they ought always to count in practical reasoning.26 Agent-relative 
                                                
21 See, similarly, J Horder, “Criminal culpability: the possibility of a general theory” (1993) 12 Law & 
Phil 193. 
22 See, also, A Micheals, “Acceptance: the missing mental state” (1997-1998) 71 S Cal L Rev 953. 
23 See §5.B, above. 
24 J Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (revised edn, 1990) 34. 
25  Horder, “Gross negligence” at 502. Raz calls agent-neutral values “objective”, but Horder 
recognises that employing this term would be confusing in the context of culpable carelessness (ibid at 
501 (n 31)). Cf §1.D(1), above. 
26 Raz, Practical Reason (n 24) 34. 




values, by contrast, need only be respected by the person who holds them.27 This 
means that agents may ignore the agent-relative values of others in deciding what to 
do.  
 Horder thinks this distinction is important because indifferent actors will, 
contrary to what Raz’s morality requires, place their agent-relative values ahead of 
the agent-neutral values of others. To make this less abstract, it is useful to consider 
an example. In Transco plc v HM Advocate,28 the accused company had failed to 
maintain a gas supply to a house, resulting in an explosion which killed a family, the 
Findlays. Assume, for the moment, that this failure occurred because it would have 
harmed Transco’s profits to check the supply as often as would be ideal. This 
profiteering would seem an agent-relative value: only Transco (i.e. its management 
and employees) had reason to promote the making of as much profit as possible. It 
was not the case that everybody had reason to promote Transco’s profit-making 
enterprise when considering what to do. 
 The interests of the Findlay family in life were, by contrast, agent-neutral 
values. Everybody has reason to promote the interests of others in life, and to place 
this interest above their own, self-centred values.29 Transco’s management, in the 
counterfactual turn of events proposed here, appears to have confused this situation, 
and put an agent-relative value (profit) above the agent-neutral values involved in 
their activities (the lives of the Findlays and other people whose gas supplies were 
maintained by Transco).  
 What matters, for Horder, is what would have happened had this fact been 
pointed out to Transco’s management. The company’s board might have been 
persuaded to change the company’s policies, accepting that the business had – as a 
point of morality – to be less profitable. This would reflect a proper recognition of 
the agent-neutral values at stake and show Transco plc’s management to be, in 
Horder’s terms, “weakly indifferent”.30 They had failed to react according to the 
                                                
27 Ibid. Persons other than the agent may, of course, promote her agent-relative values (consider 
family members supporting and furthering one another’s interests). 
28 2004 JC 29. 
29 There are difficult questions concerning how far this interest should be promoted, as the discourses 
around alleviating poverty and assisted dying demonstrate. These cannot be resolved here. 
30 Horder, “Gross negligence” at 502. 




reasons that bore upon them, but would have corrected that error had it been pointed 
out to them. 
 Weakly indifferent actors can be contrasted with “strongly indifferent” 
ones.31 Horder explains that:32 
 
The strongly indifferent person is not swayed by agent-neutral values, such as the 
victim’s interests, but is moved only by his own agent-relative values... like the 
weakly indifferent person, the strongly indifferent person is usually too obsessed by 
his agent-relative values to appreciate the existence of the agent-neutral values at 
stake... But, even if the strongly indifferent person discovers agent-neutral values 
giving rise to reasons not to act on his agent-relative values, they make no difference 
to his practical reasoning. 
 
In short, the strongly indifferent actor would not have been persuaded to act 
differently if she had been consciously aware of the risks attendant upon her conduct. 
She was both ignorant and indifferent;33 a person who – if aware of the interests that 
she threatened – would view them as obstacles to getting what she wanted rather than 
reasons worthy of respect.34 In consequence, if Transco’s management had been 
strongly indifferent, they would not have endeavoured to check the gas supply more 
frequently, even if consciously aware of the significant risk that this posed to the 
lives of others. 
 Horder concludes that “gross” negligence in manslaughter 35  should be 
understood as strong indifference: to convict, the court should be convinced that the 
actor would have acted in the same way even if she had been aware of the risk of 
death.36 
                                                
31 See D Ruimschotel, “The psychological reality of intentional and negligent criminal acts”, in PJ van 
Koppen, DJ Hessing and G van den Heuvel (eds), Lawyers on Psychology and Psychologists on Law 
(1988) 83. Ruimschotel distinguishes between knowledge (weak indifference) and value (strong 
indifference) deficits. For further use of this distinction, see: Mitchell (n 15) at 72-78; C Wells, 
Corporations and Criminal Responsibility, 2nd edn (2001) 116-117. 
32 Horder, “Gross negligence” at 503. 
33 It might be objected that Horder (and Simons) fails to tie culpable indifference and the accused’s 
ignorance concerning risk to her act of wrongdoing. This might give rise to a “significance in action 
problem”. On such problems, see §5.C(4)(a), above. Some suggest that ignorance must arise through 
indifference for the accused to be culpable (e.g. RA Duff, “Caldwell and Lawrence: the retreat from 
subjectivism” (1983) 3 OJLS 77 at 97). This avoids the “significance in action” difficulty. 
34 See, similarly, J Kennett, Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology (2001) 
179-180. 
35 See §3.D(2), above. Horder is equivocal on whether his indifference theory applies to other 
contexts. 
36 Horder, “Gross negligence” at 504. 




(b) Simons’ “culpable indifference” 
Simons also believes that the indifferent actor is culpable, even if she was not 
consciously aware of the risks she was taking.37 He does not rely on Raz, but instead 
seeks to distinguish amongst “the different cognitive (belief-related), conative 
(desire-related), and conduct-related senses of both negligence and recklessness”.38 
He identifies “culpable indifference”39 as the conative state which best explains 
blameworthy inadvertence. This:40 
 
[I]s often described as a form of recklessness (though it could also be categorized as 
a form of negligence). An actor who is culpably indifferent to a harmful result 
neither desires the result nor desires to avoid it. Rather, she cares much less than she 
should about bringing it about. This... attitude could genuinely be described as 
“unreasonable” or “negligent”, since it is explicitly linked to the attitudes and desires 
that a reasonable person would have. 
 
 This riddle-like explanation of culpable indifference is not particularly 
helpful, and Simons complicates matters by suggesting that indifference can be 
present in both recklessness and negligence. The distinction between these two types 
of indifference is, apparently, that the former “is a more aggravated degree of 
blameworthy indifference”.41  This was not edifying in distinguishing civil and 
criminal negligence,42 and it is scarcely more helpful in discerning Simons’ thoughts 
concerning culpable carelessness. 
 Simons might reply that the line between negligence and recklessness is 
unimportant. After all, he argues that traditional mens rea categories are 
misconceived.43  Accepting this point, for now,44  it becomes clear that Simons 
believes – in common with Horder – that culpability is present where the accused’s 
conduct demonstrates “that he would not have avoided the risk even if he had 
                                                
37 Simons thinks he is following Duff: KW Simons, “Culpability and retributive theory: the problem 
of criminal negligence” (1994) 5 J Contemp Legal Issues 365 at 370. Their theories are, however, 
distinct. 
38 Ibid at 366. 
39 Simons initially distinguished three forms of reckless indifference: KW Simons, “Rethinking 
mental states” (1992) 72 BUL Rev 463 at 486-487. 
40 Ibid at 377-378. 
41 Ibid at 378. 
42 See §2.B, above. Cf KW Simons, “Deontology, negligence, tort and crime” (1996) 76 BULR 273. 
43 See n 18, above. 
44 Cf §6.B(4), below. 




appreciated it”.45  This “callous insensitivity”46  to the interests of others seems 
synonymous with “strong” indifference. 
 Now that the theory underlying Horder and Simons’ counterfactual approach 
to culpable indifference has been explained, its shortcomings can be considered. 
 
(c) Criticisms 
First, there is room for significant epistemic doubt concerning what the accused 
might have done had she been aware of the risks involved in her conduct.47 Consider 
Simons’ example of a babysitter who “departs the children’s house for her 
boyfriend’s as soon as the parents have left”.48 Simons contends that the babysitter’s 
“willingness to abandon the children entirely may suggest that, had she been present 
in the house and heard noises calling for further inquiry and action, she would not 
have inquired further”.49 The operative word in this sentence is surely “may” – with 
these bare facts, there is no reliable basis upon which to infer what the babysitter 
would have done had she been aware of indicators that the children might, for 
instance, have fallen and injured themselves. Her irresponsible attitude might stem 
from naive overconfidence in the maturity of the children left in her care, rather than 
indifference towards their welfare. There is therefore, in one of Simons’ few concrete 
examples of culpable indifference, little upon which to hang culpability. The same 
difficulty infects Horder’s account, though (perhaps tellingly) he provides fewer 
concrete examples of “strong” indifference. 
 The obvious reply is that mental states are almost always evidenced in 
epistemologically-questionable ways.50 A jury might interpret conduct as pointing 
towards awareness of a risk, when features of the situation, of which the jury cannot 
be certain (perhaps the accused’s own memory), point to the opposite conclusion. 
                                                
45 Simons (n 37) at 381. 
46 Ibid. 
47 AJP Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (1978) 62; L Alexander, “Inculpatory and exculpatory 
mistakes and the fact/law distinction: an essay in memory of Myke Bayles” (1993) 12 Law & Phil 33 
at 63; AP Simester, “Can negligence be culpable?”, in J Horder (ed), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: 
Fourth Series (2000) 85 at 89; KK Ferzan, “Don’t abandon the Model Penal Code yet! Thinking 
through Simons’s rethinking” (2002-2003) 6 Buff Crim L Rev 185 at 212. 
48 Simons (n 37) at 381. 
49 Ibid. 
50 See: B Mitchell, “Culpably indifferent murder” (1996) 25 Anglo-American L Rev 64 at 81-82; C 
Crosby, “Recklessness – the continuing search for a definition” (2008) 72 J Crim L 313 at 325. 




Unless the jury is told (honestly) of all features of a situation – if this is even possible 
– their verdict is always going to be epistemologically imperfect. The means by 
which juries reach verdicts are, however, accepted as appropriate in matters of 
criminal justice. The bare presence of epistemic doubt cannot, therefore, undermine 
Horder and Simons’ theories. It is nevertheless clear that there are greater 
epistemological difficulties involved in conducting counterfactual enquiries than 
there are in interpreting factual behaviour, and that Horder and Simons would 
presumably need to propose changes to the law of evidence for their theory to work 
properly in practice.51 They do not.52 
 A second difficulty is that it is unclear why the criminal courts should be 
involved in inquiries into what the actor would have done had the circumstances 
been different. The nature of this objection becomes clear through consideration of 
an example. In asking whether the accused in Cameron v Maguire53 might have 
acted more carefully, it could be asked whether he in fact had the background 
knowledge of the risks involved in his action, the relevant perceptive information to 
prompt recall of that knowledge, and the opportunity to consequently form a new 
belief concerning risk.54 This is relatively straightforward compared to asking what 
Cameron might have done had the weather conditions been different; or a walker 
wearing a high-visibility jacket had been nearby (perhaps waving and shouting a 
warning); or an officious bystander had asked Cameron to reflect further on what he 
was doing; and so on. Such pure speculation about what might have been is 
inappropriate in the context of a criminal trial: citizens should be called to account 
for what they do, and their actual capacities, beliefs and (accepted) desires at the 
time of acting, rather than what they might have done, been capable of, believed or 
                                                
51 G Williams, “A reply to Mr Duff” (1982) 41 CLJ 286 at 287-288; DJ Birch, “The foresight saga: 
the biggest mistake of all?” [1988] Crim LR 4 at 13.  
52 With regard to Horder’s thesis, changes to the law on bad character evidence in England might 
allow the prosecution to adduce evidence to show that, even if the defendant had been aware of risk, 
she would have carried on regardless: Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 101; Crosby (n 50) at 325. The 
Scottish Law Commission is presently considering changes to the law of bad character evidence in 
Scotland: Discussion Paper on Similar Fact Evidence and the Moorov Doctrine (Scot Law Com DP 
No 145, 2010). 
53 1999 JC 63. 
54 See §5.C(1)(b), above. 




desired.55 Otherwise, the criminal inquiry risks becoming an unreal journey into pure 
fiction, rather than a personalised assessment of wrongdoing and blameworthiness. 
 A third, connected, concern is raised by Ferzan: if hypothetical inquiries into 
what the actor would have done were she aware of risk are worthwhile, why stop 
there?56 Why not ask what Cameron would have done had he not only been aware 
that a person was walking in the woods, but that it was his enemy and there were 
unlikely to be any witnesses around? In this alternative universe, Cameron might 
have intended to kill when he fired his rifle. 
 Other than an intuitively sensible desire to keep as close to reality as possible 
when speculating about what might have been,57 nothing in Horder or Simons’ 
theories prevents the rampant supposition that Ferzan envisages. Given these 
concerns, it seems epistemologically safer – and normatively more appropriate – to 
return to a more definite, personal inquiry into culpable indifference. This is the 
approach taken by Pillsbury, whose theory will now be analysed. 
 
(3) Pillsbury’s perception choices 
Pillsbury aims to dispel the “moral magic” of awareness in contemporary debates 
concerning culpable carelessness.58 He starts by considering the limits on perception 
that are imposed upon human beings. It is obvious that human beings cannot 
consciously perceive every aspect of their situation. This is primarily because of the 
limitations of the sensory organs:59 without technology, for instance, it is impossible 
to see further than eyesight allows. 
 It would be wrong, Pillsbury contends, to think that these physiological 
features of perception set boundaries on culpability; that all failures to consciously 
perceive an aspect of a situation are accidents of biology and thus not an instantiation 
of agency. Instead, he notes that “the gathering and selecting of relevant information 
represents an affirmative mental activity. Information processing is something we do, 
                                                
55 See, similarly, A Brudner, Punishment & Freedom: A Liberal Theory of Penal Justice (2009) 96. 
56 Ferzan, “Opaque recklessness” at 622-623. 
57 See L Katz, Bad Acts and Guilty Minds: Conundrums of the Criminal Law (1987) 232-233. 
58 Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 141. See, also, SH Pillsbury, Judging Evil: Rethinking the 
Law on Murder and Manslaughter (1998) ch 9. For a philosophical account which shares Pillsbury’s 
ambitions (but not his approach), see G Sher, Who Knew? Responsibility without Awareness (2009). 
59 Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 142. 




not something that is done to us.”60 By this, Pillsbury is appealing to the idea that, 
even given their limitations, the sensory organs take in far more information than can 
be appraised consciously. He explains that the filtering of information is thus 
necessary to avoid becoming overwhelmed, and argues that this is a “learned 
activity”. 61  Human beings avoid clouding their conscious mind with sensory 
information by making “decisions about what to hear or see and what to ignore”.62  
 For Pillsbury, these perception choices apparently “follow our interests”;63 
they reflect what the chooser cares about:64 
 
A kind, sensitive person is kind and sensitive because she places a high priority on 
addressing the needs of others... Callous individuals set a low priority on respecting 
others’ needs, explaining why they may consciously disregard the harmful 
consequences of their actions...  
 
By drawing these connections between perception, value and agency, Pillsbury is 
able to explain culpable indifference. He contends that blame is appropriate where 
the accused’s perception choices show indifference towards (or insufficient concern 
for)65 the interests of others.66 In such circumstances, the accused is blamed not for 
her eventual inadvertence, but for her prior choices about what to perceive and what 
these demonstrate about her values.67 Pillsbury’s account of culpable indifference is 
thus another example of a choice-based theory which attempts to accommodate 
inadvertent risk-taking by pointing to decisions made prior to the act of 
wrongdoing.68 This type of theory was rejected in chapter four, and Pillsbury’s view 
is susceptible to the same criticisms. 
 
                                                
60 Ibid at 143. See, further, JR Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction (2004) 179. 
61 Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 143. See, similarly, H Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice 
(1979) 92. 
62 Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 144. See, also, DC Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991) 
308. 
63 Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 144. 
64 Ibid at 151. See, similarly, the text accompanying n 99, below. 
65 See the text accompanying n 10, above. 
66 Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 151. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See §4.C, above. 





The first problem is that – as Pillsbury accepts – not all perception preferences are 
chosen by the agent.69 It might be a person’s genetics or environment (rather than her 
values) which determine what she pays (and does not pay) attention to. This raises 
the spectre of determinism, and suggests that accused persons will be adjudged 
responsible, culpable and liable when they could not have done otherwise than they 
did. As assumed consistently throughout this thesis, such absences of control seem 
fatal to any meaningful conception of criminal culpability. Worryingly, Pillsbury 
does not appear to view this deterministic slant as a problem for his theory.70 It 
nevertheless undermines severely the plausibility of his thesis.71 
 Other criticisms are perhaps less damaging, but still make Pillsbury’s view on 
indifference look unworkable. In his examples of culpable perception choices, 
Pillsbury tends to concentrate on actors who decide not to perceive certain matters 
almost immediately before acting.72 This might be telling: if a choice to not perceive 
a certain fact is made immediately before inadvertence takes hold, then responsibility 
for inadvertence, and any attendant finding of culpability, seems relatively 
straightforward. The situation becomes complicated when the perception choice was 
made hours, days or even years before the relevant act of inadvertent, unjustified 
risk-taking. This problem of linking historical choices (and attendant attitudes) to 
future inadvertence – which dogged choice and character theory73 – is not dealt with 
by Pillsbury, but it poses significant difficulties for his account. Without showing a 
meaningful connection between historical perception choices and contemporary 
unjustified risk-taking, it seems that his indifference theory explains only a small 
percentage of cases. 
 Another (by now familiar) problem concerns the nature of perception choices 
themselves. Pillsbury is clear that such choices need not be made consciously74 
(again raising concerns over control), but – if they are – what exactly does the actor 
                                                
69 Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 151. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ferzan, “Opaque recklessness” at 640. 
72 See e.g. Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 151-152. 
73 See §4.C(2), above. 
74 Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 151. 




have to choose in order to demonstrate her culpable indifference?75 Does the choice 
have to be specific (such as the choice to never perceive the signs of non-consent in a 
sexual partner), or more general (such as the choice to not perceive social signs in 
others)?  
 Pillsbury does not reach a settled view on this issue. At points, he suggests 
that culpable indifference must relate to a specific interest – such as the signs of non-
consent in sex, rather than simply social signs generally.76 If this is the case, then 
Pillsbury’s account seems to encounter difficulties. The question is whether many 
alleged rapists can be said to have consciously chosen, during their character 
development, not to perceive the signs of non-consent to the extent that these fail to 
register with them at all at a later time.77 Is it not more likely that no such conscious 
choice is made, and that it is rather the accused’s indifferent attitude, divorced from 
conscious choices, that prevents such signs from registering properly with him?78 
 Even if a specific perception choice is made, Pillsbury does not give an 
adequate account of why such actors are indifferent, as opposed to advertently 
reckless (i.e. consciously aware of the unjustified risk that the other person is not 
going to consent, and choosing to disregard it) or wilfully blind (i.e. consciously 
aware of the significant likelihood of non-consent, but – for self-interested reasons – 
not taking steps to confirm or deny that suspicion).79 In other words, Pillsbury’s 
indifference theory seems to unnecessarily complicate matters which seem relatively 
straightforward. 
 Finally, in order for the accused to be blameworthy for her inadvertence, 
surely a culpable perception choice is required.80 Ferzan points out that this element 
of culpability might be absent in the majority of perception choices: “[w]hen an actor 
learns to be selfish, to what extent does he appreciate that he might cause future 
                                                
75 See, further, Ferzan, “Opaque recklessness” at 639. 
76 Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 171-173. 
77 See, similarly: Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability 57; Sher, Who Knew? (n 58) 25. Note that this 
objection relates to choices made some time before the relevant act of risk-taking takes place. If 
Pillsbury means to concentrate on actors who choose not to perceive aspects of a specific situation, 
then his theory is more acceptable, but it is then unclear how indifference is different from wilful 
blindness. 
78 Compare the discussion of “negligent rape”, above (at §5.C(1)(b)) and Duff’s account of “reckless 
rape”, below (at §6.A(4)(c)).  
79 See §6.C(1), below. 
80 G Sher, Who Knew? (n 58) 37. 




harm?”81 The answer, it is assumed, is rarely.82 This makes Pillsbury’s account seem 
weaker still: only exceptional cases of inadvertent risk-taking are going to be caught 
by his expanded choice-based view of culpability, raising questions about the 
wisdom of bothering about “reckless” indifference (as he conceives of it). 
 For these reasons, it is sensible to leave Pillsbury’s account behind and move 
to consider Duff’s more defensible account of “practical indifference”. 
 
(4) Duff’s practical indifference 
Duff’s account of recklessness83 does not suffer from the difficulties identified 
above. This is because Duff does not (unlike Horder and Simons) rely upon 
counterfactual estimations about fault or (unlike Pillsbury) historical, conscious 
choices to perceive or ignore risks. Instead, he builds his account on the basis of 
actions and what these reveal about the actor’s knowledge of, and attitude towards, 
risk. This means rejecting the philosophical school of “dualism” and adopting a fresh 
view of culpable action. 
 
(a) Dualism and “subjectivism” 
It is necessary to consider Duff’s objections to dualism, as these explain his position 
on recklessness. Dualism is the belief “that human beings consist of two distinct 
elements: a physical body, which occupies and moves in space, and a non-physical 
mind, which thinks and feels”.84 It holds that the only way for an external observer to 
ascertain the content of another’s intentions or attitudes is to observe her physical 
actions, in their context, and make inferences back to the mental processes that 
accompanied them. For instance, if Duncan hits Allan, it might be inferred from 
Duncan’s actions that he had the attendant psychological experience of the intention 
to hit Allan or, alternatively (if the circumstances suggest it), that the “punch” was an 
                                                
81 Ferzan, “Opaque recklessness” at 640. 
82 Compare M Vargas, “The trouble with tracing” (2005) 29 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 269 with 
JM Fischer and NA Tognazzini, “The truth about tracing” (2009) 43 Noûs 531. 
83 See, most comprehensively, Duff, IACL ch 7. For earlier versions of Duff’s theory, see his: 
“Recklessness” [1980] Crim LR 282; “Recklessness and rape” (1981) 3 Liverpool L Rev 49; 
“Professor Williams and conditional subjectivism” (1982) 41 CLJ 273; “Caldwell and Lawrence: the 
retreat from subjectivism” (1983) 3 OJLS 77. 
84 Duff, IACL 116. 




accidental movement or an involuntary spasm, unaccompanied by mental 
deliberation.85 
 This dualist approach to intentionality and action has clearly influenced the 
criminal trial in Scotland and England: the judge or jury are asked to draw inferences 
from conduct (actus reus) and other “objective” evidence to ascertain the 
“subjective” thoughts (mens rea) accompanying the accused’s actions (or the lack 
thereof).86 Despite its pervasiveness in the practice of criminal law, Duff thinks that 
dualism is a “deeply mistaken doctrine”.87 This is a problem for most “subjectivists”, 
as Duff sees their theories as dualist.88 
 Duff’s main difficulty with dualism (and therefore “subjectivism”) is that he 
believes there is more to discovering a person’s attitudes and intentions than asking 
what thoughts happen to go (or not go) through her head at the time of acting. The 
external observer should thus not understand her role as trying to uncover a “hidden 
mental realm to which only the agent has direct access”.89 Instead, inferences should 
be drawn “from the actions, or aspects of action, which we observe, to the broader 
patterns of meaning of which they are part”.90 On this view, an actor’s intentions are 
revealed as much through her actions, in their context, as through her occurrent 
mental states.91 It does not therefore matter whether, in the example above, Duncan 
thought “I intend to hit Allan” when he threw the punch. The context of the action (in 
a crowded bar, following the spilling of Duncan’s drink) might reveal that intention, 
even if it did not figure in Duncan’s conscious deliberations over his conduct. 
 This point about dualism and intentional action is taken forward by Duff into 
the context of risk-taking. In deciding whether a person was culpable for taking an 
unjustified risk, Duff suggests that the question should not – as “subjectivists” have it 
– be simply whether the accused adverted, consciously, to the risk.92 Instead, the 
                                                
85 See GH Gordon, “Subjective and objective mens rea” (1974-1975) 17 Crim LQ 355 at 359-361. 
86 AW Norrie, Punishment, Responsibility and Justice: A Relational Critique (2000) 133. 
87 Duff, IACL 119. See, further, E Fruchtman, “Recklessness and the limits of mens rea: beyond 
orthodox subjectivism” (1986-1987) 29 Crim LQ 315, 421 at 323. 
88 Duff, IACL 159. 
89 Ibid 131. 
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accused’s latent (or background) knowledge about risk, as exposed through her 
actions, ought to be emphasised.93 Sometimes, the manner in which actions are 
carried out will demonstrate latent knowledge of risks. This knowledge, and how the 
accused’s actions further demonstrate her attitude towards it, is what matters for 
culpability.94 
 By looking to action, rather than just the accused’s mental state, Duff argues 
that the law would be able to better reflect a form of moral equation because:95  
 
[T]here is... no significant moral difference between one who does and one who does 
not notice that his action endangers [others] ... the latter’s very failure to notice that 
risk displays just the kind of practical indifference which is displayed in the former’s 
conscious risk-taking.  
 
For Duff, indifference can – therefore – be a mental attitude which is associated with 
conscious appreciation of risk96 or an aspect of conduct.97 In some instances, this will 
not make a (moral) difference to the question of culpability for unjustified risk-
taking. The law should not, therefore, draw a sharp distinction between conscious 
advertence (recklessness) and inadvertence (negligence). 
 This means that (contrary to the “strict choice theory” discussed above)98 a 
person who does not consciously consider the risks attendant upon her conduct may 
still be reckless. In a similar vein to Pillsbury, Duff contends that the need to extend 
recklessness beyond the choice-based paradigm arises because of what a failure to 
notice risk demonstrates about the practically indifferent accused’s values: “[w]hat I 
notice or attend to reflects what I care about; and my very failure to notice something 
can display my utter indifference to it”.99 If the accused cared adequately, she would 
have actualised her background knowledge concerning risk (which is displayed 
                                                
93 Ibid 159-160. Duff used to distinguish between “explicit”, “tacit” and “latent” knowledge: Duff, 
“Caldwell and Lawrence: the retreat from subjectivism” (n 83) at 80. This tripartite categorisation 
disappears from Duff’s later work. 
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American, Comparative and International (2007) 315. Cf AR White, Grounds of Liability: An 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1985) 109; AR White, Misleading Cases (1991) 37. 
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through her action) and consciously noticed the dangers inherent in her action.100 She 
would then have been in a position to choose whether to take those risks or not. The 
absence of choice is thus an indicator, rather than (as the strict choice theorist would 
have it) a defeater, of culpability.101 
 Importantly, Duff does not view all instances of unawareness of risk as the 
product of practical indifference. If he did, then his theory would seem over-
inclusive, and recklessness would be indistinguishable from negligence (a point 
returned to below). Furthermore, a simple attitude of insufficient concern for the 
flourishing of others which is not connected intimately with action would seem 
indistinguishable from culpable carelessness, making “practical indifference” a broad 
category of fault.102 Instead, Duff argues that – when further context is given to an 
act of inadvertent, unjustified risk-taking – it might become clear that the actor’s 
failure to notice a risk resulted from something other than indifference, such as 
stupidity or inexperience,103 or that her indifference was detached from, rather than 
bound up in, her action. In these circumstances, the accused’s risk-taking does not 
demonstrate indifference in the right way.104 What is important, therefore, are the 
reasons why the accused failed to notice the relevant risk, and what attitude was 
demonstrated by her actions.105 
 It is useful to dispose of some general objections to Duff’s theory in general, 
before moving to consider more specific difficulties with his argument. 
 
(b) Criticisms 
First, Duff – in common with the other theorists mentioned above – adheres to the 
view that “indifference” can exist where the actor was unaware of risk. Other authors 
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have doubted this.106 White presents the example of fearlessness to demonstrate this 
point:107 it would be peculiar to think of an actor as being fearless if she was not 
aware of the features of her situation which ought to inspire fear. If Sophie walks 
into a building which is susceptible to collapse to investigate the cry of a child, and 
rescues the child from imminent death, she can surely only be described as fearless if 
she was aware of the danger she was in. Otherwise, what appears to be an act of 
fearlessness might simply be an act carried out through ignorance – had Sophie been 
aware of the danger, she might not have entered the building.  
The same might be alleged in cases of indifference: 108  without being 
consciously aware of the features of her situation which make it risky, the accused 
could not be described as “indifferent” to risk. The person who is utterly unaware (on 
a conscious or preconscious level) of risk might be better described as ignorant. 
 Two responses are available to Duff. First, as noted above, indifference is 
defined as “having no particular interest or sympathy; unconcerned”.109 Nothing in 
that definition suggests that Duff is wrong about the inadvertent actor being 
“indifferent” in the sense of being unconcerned. Secondly, it has already been noted 
that Duff argues that the acts of the accused, in their context, tell the external 
observer everything about her attitude towards the risks she is taking. White could be 
alleged to have concentrated too much on the cognitive aspects of various traits, and 
ignored their attitudinal components.110 In the example immediately above, Sophie 
might not notice the features of her situation which call for fear precisely because 
she is fearless – fear simply does not register with her.111 
                                                
106  See White, Misleading Cases (n 95) 38. See, also: JB Brady, “Recklessness, negligence, 
indifference and awareness” (1980) 43 MLR 381 at 381; G Williams, “The unresolved problem of 
recklessness” (1982) 8 LS 74 at 83. Cf EW Hautamaki, “The element of mens rea in recklessness and 
‘criminal negligence’” (1951-1952) 2 Duke Bar J 55 at 63. 
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110 If Duff’s response is accepted, this makes indifference different from “disregard” – a term 
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without first regarding it, consciously: G Williams, “A reply to Mr Duff” (1982) 41 CLJ 286 at 287; 
State v Olsen 462 NW 2d 474 (1990) at 476-477 per Sabers J; J Chalmers, “Lieser and 
misconceptions” 2008 SCL 1115 at 1118. 
111 C Hookway, “Epistemic norms and theoretical deliberation” (1999) 12 Ratio 380 at 395. 




 This reply has intuitive appeal, and fits with Duff’s wider view of 
responsibility. This point concerning responsibility is, however, important: the 
dispute between White and Duff seems irresolvable because they endorse very 
different theories of agency and responsibility. This philosophical debate is not the 
topic of this thesis, and so White’s objection to Duff’s theory will be left to the 
side.112 
 A second, more fruitful, objection concerns the matter of establishing the 
accused’s attitude, particularly in the context of a criminal trial. 113 Fruchtman 
contends that:114 
 
Attitudes... are inherently personal, the result of the accused’s particular background 
and history. Ironically, indifference can be seen as so radically subjective that 
ordinary principles of evidence may not provide a satisfactory basis for the requisite 
inferences. 
 
This may be contrasted with cognitive mental states, which are more capable of 
“objective” demonstration in the courtroom. 
 This argument might cast doubt on some of Duff’s examples of practical 
indifference, such as a parent omitting to get medical care for his child: “if the 
child’s need was sufficiently obvious and lasting, we may discern in the parent’s 
failure to notice that need his indifference to the child’s health (he did not notice 
because he did not care)”.115 A comparison with the facts of State v Williams116 – 
discussed in the previous chapter117 – shows how this type of case is not necessarily 
clear-cut when it comes to assessing attitudes (accounting, perhaps, for Duff’s use of 
the word “may”). It will be remembered that fear, not indifference, meant the 
Williamses did not seek medical attention for their son. Fruchtman might marshal 
this case in support of his argument that Duff’s theory is impractical and/or likely to 
lead to intuitively unjust results. 
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 This objection would, however, be too strong. Just as a judge or jury might 
misinterpret certain conduct as giving rise to an inference of indifference (when, in 
fact, the accused failed to advert to a risk because she is stupid), they could surely 
“objectively” misinterpret some accidental conduct as intentional or advertently 
reckless. Again, this element of uncertainty has not prevented the “objective” proof 
of mental states from being employed in criminal trials in the United Kingdom.  
Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish the example Duff provides from 
Williams: once the relevant background facts (the parents’ level of intelligence; their 
motivations) are brought into consideration, these give further context to the act of 
risk-taking. The Williamses’ failure to notice the need for medical attention would 
then take on a different meaning when placed in its context and perhaps would not 
demonstrate a practical indifference towards their child’s interests. Again, context 
and meaning are determinative if the jury is given the relevant information. This 
information will surely be available in many cases, meaning that Duff’s theory is not 
too “subjective” to be useful, even if it requires the jury to ask slightly harder 
questions than they consider at present.118 
 A third, connected, objection levelled at Duff (and applicable to all of the 
theories discussed thus far)119 concerns the use of “indifference” in his theory.120 The 
concept is not well defined121 and it is entirely possible that a judge or jury could 
share a completely different view of “indifference” from the accused and other 
members of society.122 This opens Duff’s theory up to the objection that it allows 
unmitigated jury discretion on the question of culpability. This is problematic 
                                                
118 It should be noted that juries are often asked difficult questions (e.g. What constitutes a 
“reasonable” belief in consent?) and seem to cope: D Kimel, “Inadvertent recklessness and the 
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119 See, similarly, DJ Galligan, “Responsibility for recklessness” (1978) 31 CLP 55 at 72. 
120 See: A Ashworth, “Principles, pragmatism and the Law Commission’s recommendations on 
homicide law reform” [2007] Crim LR 333 at 338; AW Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A 
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recklessness” (1988) 8 LS 74 at 83. 
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negligence” at 501. 
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because juries do not give public reasons for their decisions and (particularly in 
Scotland)123 their verdicts are virtually unassailable.124 
 An obvious response to this criticism is that the concept of recklessness is 
vague in Scots law and certain areas of English law (for instance, involuntary 
manslaughter),125 but juries still manage to reach decisions (although it is not clear 
how consistent these decisions are, which is troubling).126 
 A more developed response is to attempt to concretise the concept of 
indifference through providing examples.127 Some examples might already be found 
in the positive law. In Scotland, the fact that a death followed an assault involving 
“lethal” weapons provides strong evidence of wicked recklessness,128 a concept 
premised on indifference to life.129 The inference is that using a “lethal” weapon 
against another is almost necessarily to demonstrate indifference towards life.130 
Similarly, in order to avoid the vagueness of “indifference” in rape cases,131 the 
Scottish132 and UK133 Parliaments have replaced that standard with a range of 
indicators134 of where the complainer is incapable of giving consent to sex. These 
could be taken as examples of when having sexual intercourse with someone almost 
necessarily indicates an indifference to the matter of consent.135  
                                                
123 See: Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 106(3)(b); F Leverick, “The return of the 
unreasonable jury: Rooney v HM Advocate” (2007) 11 EdinLR 426. 
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125 See §3.D, above. 
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reckless counterparts: B Mitchell and RD Mackay, “Investigating involuntary manslaughter: an 
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 Both of these examples illustrate that the concept of indifference can be 
firmed up. There are, of course, limits on how definite it can become: recklessness is 
employed in relation to a wide range of offences, and it would be difficult (if not 
impossible) to provide a list of examples of indifference for each context.136 Some 
jury/judicial discretion would therefore have to remain. 
 Duff’s general theory of practical indifference is, therefore, defensible against 
popular objections. It will be argued in the next section that recklessness should not, 
however, be understood in terms of practical indifference. This is because Duff has 
difficulty distinguishing recklessness from negligence in a compelling manner.137  
 
(c) Distinguishing recklessness and negligence 
It is useful to consider Duff’s treatment of recklessness and negligence as it appears 
in Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability. Duff begins by discriminating between 
the actor who has no thoughts about the risks that she is taking, and the actor who 
positively believes there is no risk attendant upon her conduct. In relation to the 
former, the distinction between negligence and recklessness is not particularly 
clear.138 Duff explains that:139 
 
What makes a reckless agent more culpable, more fully responsible for the risk she 
creates, is that she displays a gross indifference to that particular risk or to the 
particular interests which she threatens: negligence, however, involves a less 
specific kind of carelessness or inattention which does not relate the agent so closely, 
as an agent, to the risk which she creates. To show that I recklessly endangered 
someone’s life it must be shown that my action manifested a culpable indifference to 
her life: but negligently endangering her life need involve only a lack of attention to 
what I am doing – not a specific indifference to that particular risk. 
 
This distinction may seem too abstract to apply easily,140 but things become clearer 
through Duff’s consideration of examples. The risk of death is apparently specific to 
                                                
136 As seen below, “practical indifference” can only exist in some cases of inadvertence, and so this 
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and “inseparable” from a serious physical assault.141 Therefore, “the assailant’s 
failure to notice [a risk of death] cannot but manifest an utter indifference to his 
victim’s life”.142 A parent failing to notice obvious signs of illness in her child may 
(see above)143 display indifference: “he did not notice because he did not care”.144 A 
driver failing to foresee the risks attendant upon driving at high speed in a busy urban 
street is sometimes practically indifferent to the safety of others; the threat to their 
safety is bound up in her careless conduct.145 
 It is clear that these are extreme examples. The parent who fails to notice 
obvious signs that her child needs medical attention might fail to notice because she 
does not care, but – as noted above – also because she fears social services might 
take the child from her.146 Her action does not seem to be structured around ignoring 
or threatening the child’s interests. Similarly, the driver who speeds in an urban area 
does not seem automatically indifferent to the lives of others. Endangering life does 
not necessarily structure the actor’s intentional action. She might be evading pursuit, 
rather than seeking, through her actions, to threaten the interests of others (and, 
indeed, herself)147 in life and bodily integrity.148 As noted above, Duff holds that 
context is everything. 
 The possibility of explaining away some of Duff’s examples is also present in 
some of the cases where risks are allegedly not “specific” in the sense required for 
inadvertent recklessness. The defendant in R v Caldwell149 apparently “intended only 
to damage property, not to cause injury: his intended action was not so closely 
related to the risk of death which it in fact created; it did not by itself show him to be 
reckless as to that risk”.150 It may, however, be alleged that, through adopting the 
means that he did to achieve property damage, Caldwell necessarily (and 
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intentionally) unleashed the risk of death upon the hotel guests.151 His intentional 
action was to damage property through setting fire to it, and it is not too difficult to 
draw – from Caldwell’s conduct, rather than simply his thoughts – the inference that 
his posing a risk to the interests in bodily integrity and life of those within the hotel 
was intrinsic to his action (that it structured his act of “revenge”) and that he simply 
did not care if they materialised.152 
 These disagreements about Duff’s examples are not nitpicking – they are 
legitimate doubts about the way that actions are described, interpreted and 
understood in their context. The fact that alternative readings of Duff’s examples are 
available suggests that the specific/general line he draws between recklessness and 
negligence lacks structural integrity. 
 This leads to consideration of Duff’s treatment of cases where the accused 
believed positively that there was no risk involved in her conduct. Here, Duff’s 
approach seems far clearer and more defensible. Duff begins from the premise that 
“[t]here is sometimes a significant difference between one who does what he realizes 
will probably cause some harm, and one who does what he realizes might, but 
probably will not, cause such harm”.153 This can be the dividing line between 
recklessness and negligence in Duff’s view. A person who throws debris off a roof 
without checking for passers-by below, for instance, is negligent, not reckless:154 the 
risk of harming another person in this situation is contingent upon, rather than 
intrinsic to, the activity.155 Apparently, this risk would be intrinsic if the debris was 
thrown in order to frighten a neighbour. In such circumstances, a failure to notice a 
risk of injury could be reckless, rather than simply negligent. 
 Duff gives other examples of intrinsic circumstances which, when ignored by 
an agent, can give rise to an inference of practical indifference. For instance, as 
consent is central to a proper understanding of sexual intercourse,156 a person who 
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fails to notice obvious signs of non-consent is practically indifferent – and reckless – 
as to consent, even if he believes that consent exists.157 Consent is not a circumstance 
which floats in the ether (as the circumstance of a neighbour being below floats 
alongside the act of throwing debris off a roof to dispose of it): “his action is 
structured by a disregard for (an indifference to) her integrity, and her right to make 
up and express her own mind about her sexual partners, which does not differ 
significantly from that displayed by one who persists with intercourse realizing that 
the woman might not consent”.158 
 These examples lead to the conclusion that the distinction between attacks 
and endangerments159 (a theme Duff has returned to in later work)160 is central to 
separating inadvertent recklessness from negligence. A person who aims at causing 
serious bodily injury (even if she believes that this will not kill), for instance, 
engages in an attack against the interests of the victim; she acts for the very reason 
that the attack puts the victim’s life in peril.161 A person who engages in the same 
conduct – and fails to be guided by reasons which ought to motivate her162 – but does 
not have the same aim of causing serious injury, merely endangers the victim; her 
action is not structured by the end of causing serious injury or death, and she will be 
happy (even relieved)163 if those consequences are avoided.164  
 It is thus only the attacker who is, through her inadvertence, practically 
indifferent to the “intrinsic” risks she is imposing.165 The endangerer is not connected 
so closely through her intentional action to those risks, and so does not demonstrate 
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practical indifference through her failure to note them. This means that, for Duff, 
inadvertent recklessness is quite a slim category, where the risk is bound up in the 
actor’s intentional conduct, or flows naturally from it.166 Endangerments require 
awareness of risk – i.e. advertent recklessness – in order to be culpable.167 
 Again, this reasoning sounds compelling,168 but some of Duff’s examples 
have proved controversial. It was noted above that Duff views practical indifference 
as relevant in cases of rape.169 Although it is obvious to Duff (and others)170 that a 
person who engages in sexual intercourse without adverting to obvious signs of non-
consent is misunderstanding what sex ought to be about: mutual respect, 
communication, etc, Norrie points out that there is no real coherence in social 
conceptions of what is (and is not) inherent in the practice of (“proper”) sex.171 This 
suggests that explaining what is, and is not, intrinsic to sex (properly understood) is a 
difficult enterprise, making Duff’s example concerning rape at least debatable. 
 Even if such social agreement about the “proper” content of sex existed (and 
few would deny that proper consideration of the matter of consent is crucial), it is 
clear that the rape and serious physical attack examples used by Duff are not making 
the same point. Where the accused does not intend non-consensual intercourse (and 
despite Duff’s best efforts to say otherwise),172 it is difficult to conceive of his action 
as an attack on interests in the way that a serious physical assault attacks the life of 
another person.173 Unless the accused intended to have non-consensual intercourse, 
he surely only endangers his partner’s sexual autonomy; he will not have failed in 
his action if – consistent with his belief – the complainer was, in fact, consenting. 
Contrary to what Duff argues, it appears that the matter of consent is – in the relevant 
sense – contingent, rather than intrinsic, and this leads to the suggestion reached in 
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chapter five: that the accused who fails to note obvious signs of non-consent is 
possibly negligent, but not reckless. 
 Perhaps Duff has warped the rape example to fit his model of inadvertent 
recklessness.174 This move is, to a degree, understandable: negligence is perceived as 
being non-serious by most theorists,175 and it is therefore more palatable to extend 
the concept of recklessness to accommodate cases of seeming culpable inadvertence. 
If negligence as failure of belief (outlined in the previous chapter)176 were taken 
seriously in the criminal law, this manoeuvre would be unnecessary. It would be 
possible to argue that the accused failed to form a belief in risk where he could 
legitimately be expected to take more care and this (rather than practical 
indifference) is why he ought to be convicted of rape. This argument is taken up 
again below.177 
 For now, it is clear that when the rape example (and the other examples 
criticised above) are examined in detail, Duff’s account of practical indifference is 
even narrower than his views in Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability suggest. In 
the assault example (and others like it), the core points that Duff makes about 
attacks, endangerments and risks are defensible in theory.178 It might nevertheless be 
wondered whether a better distinction between recklessness and negligence might be 
proposed. In the next part of the chapter, it will be argued that a belief-centred 
approach to recklessness would reinvigorate this important distinction. 
 Before proceeding to the substantive account of recklessness, it is useful to 
summarise the arguments made above concerning indifference theories. 
 
(5) Indifference theories: summary 
The language of indifference has appeared at times in Scots and English law’s 
treatment of recklessness. It is clear from the discussion above that this term is 
vague, allowing theorists to conceive of different ways of manifesting culpable 
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indifference. Simons and Horder adopted a counterfactual test, which was 
objectionable insofar as it moved the focus of inquiry far from the actual accused. 
Pillsbury’s “perception choices” seem unhelpful insofar as they explain culpable 
inadvertence in a vanishingly small class of cases. Finally, Duff’s theory of practical 
indifference is attractive insofar as it looks beyond the accused’s conscious choices 
and engages with wider aspects of her agency. It nevertheless falls down when trying 
to distinguish inadvertent recklessness from negligence in all but a small range of 
cases. 
 One aspect of indifference theories which is nevertheless laudable is the 
desire to extend the ambit of reckless risk-taking beyond the strict choice model 
explained in chapter four. This ambition is shared by the belief-centred theory of 
recklessness explained in the next part of the chapter. 
 
 
B. RECKLESSNESS: A BELIEF-CENTRED APPROACH 
The discussion in chapter four demonstrated that conscious choices have been placed 
on an undeserved pedestal in contemporary accounts of criminal risk-taking. This 
excludes liability for inadvertent risk-taking, usually identified as being the mark of 
negligence. In chapter five, it was contended that a better approach to most negligent 
wrongdoing is to concentrate upon the accused’s beliefs about risk (or lack thereof) 
and how these related to her desires and her character more generally. In the sections 
below, these foci will be maintained, meaning that much of what was said about 
responsibility and fault in chapter five need not be repeated. For instance, it is again 
envisaged that character plays an important role in explaining culpability;179 that 
beliefs are subject to evaluations which reflect upon those who hold them;180 and that 
certain desires which interfere with the formation of justified beliefs can be 
recognised as part of a person’s character.181 
 A consequence of the belief-centred approach to recklessness defended below 
is that it allows for a theory of culpable carelessness which does not depend 
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exclusively upon (though includes) a distinction between conscious decisions to take 
risks and their absence. It will be contended below that full conscious appreciation of 
risk is not, contrary to what some strict choice theorists think, necessary for 
recklessness (though it is sufficient). If “advertence” is taken to mean 
“consciousness”, then it is possible – as Duff and others have demonstrated – to be 
inadvertently reckless. In contrast to the approaches discussed above, however, the 
account presented below can explain the distinction between recklessness and 
negligence in a more satisfactory manner. 
 It is sensible to begin by explaining how the understanding of recklessness 
defended here grows from the concept of negligence as failure of belief.182 
 
(1) Beyond negligence as failure of belief 
It will be remembered that negligence as failure of belief describes the failure by a 
person to form a belief in risk where she possessed the relevant background 
information, perceptions and opportunity to do so.183 Recklessness, it will be argued, 
concerns beliefs that the accused has formed about risk in the circumstances: the 
reckless agent has managed to combine her background knowledge and her 
perceptions to reach a belief about the safety or dangerousness of her conduct.184 It is 
what happens after this point that matters for culpability, and that element of fault is 
dealt with further below. 
 Before proceeding, it must be asked where the reckless actor’s belief in risk is 
held once it is formed. Is it on a conscious, preconscious or deeper level?185 The 
deeper levels of subconsciousness should be excluded from consideration 
immediately. It will be remembered that a belief held at a level below preconscious 
awareness will not easily be accessible in the accused’s conscious deliberations over 
action.186 If the belief in risk is repressed, for instance, the accused might even deny 
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holding it until counselling can expose her error.187 Absent specialist assistance, the 
accused cannot hope easily to actualise her belief and let it play a part in her practical 
reasoning.188 If “ought” implies “can”,189 then beliefs in risk held at a deep level of 
unconsciousness cannot be proper bases upon which to premise a belief-centred 
finding of culpable recklessness.190 
 It thus seems necessary that – to be relevant for the purposes of recklessness 
– the accused’s belief in risk is held at a preconscious or conscious level.191 It is 
assumed that, in the case of conscious awareness of risk, strict choice theorists have 
almost identified correctly the element of culpability, i.e. the accused’s failure to be 
sufficiently concerned, in light of her beliefs about risk, to take steps to mitigate or 
remove the danger to others’ interests. Their error is assuming that this requires a 
conscious choice to ignore risk. It is envisaged below that a failure to make a choice 
concerning risk can, in itself, demonstrate culpability. 
 Where there is preconscious awareness of risk, it is envisaged that much of 
what Ferzan says concerning “opaque” recklessness (discussed in chapter four)192 
applies. It will be remembered that Ferzan requires the accused to have conscious 
awareness of preconscious belief in risk (which is then consciously ignored) in order 
to be considered (opaquely) reckless.193 In other words, the accused must have some 
nagging, psychological experience of abstract risk or danger stemming from her 
preconscious beliefs and fail to do anything to investigate the safety of her conduct. 
Absent this experiential element of recklessness, it is difficult to see how a reckless 
agent could usefully be distinguished from a negligent one. The discussion above of 
Duff’s approach to the negligence question (and the analysis of Tadros’s theory, 
below) demonstrates this point well. 
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 Beliefs in risk must be formed and held on at least a preconscious level for an 
actor to be reckless. It must now be asked what a person, if properly motivated, 
ought to do when she becomes consciously aware of a conscious or preconscious 
belief in risk. 
 
(2) After belief 
If the accused consciously believes that a risk exists, then she seems faced (absent 
exceptional circumstances such as an emergency) with a choice. She can either take 
steps to investigate, mitigate or avoid the threatened danger, or she can proceed with 
her conduct without addressing the risk. It is assumed that mostly properly motivated 
actors will adopt the former course, whilst mostly culpable actors will take the 
latter.194 It should, however, be noted that it is not required for culpability that an 
actor chooses to ignore risk, in terms of having a thought such as “I will not take 
steps to address this risk...”. The failure to face up to a conscious belief in risk, and 
make a choice about what to do, seems just as culpable. 
 If the agent is properly motivated, and considers the risks in more detail, she 
might make a mistake and still engage in unjustified risk-taking (i.e. wrongdoing). If 
this occurs, then the actor is not reckless, for she has shown herself to be properly 
motivated by her conscious beliefs in risk. As far as she knows, she has taken the 
necessary steps to avoid wrongdoing. The difficulty is that that belief is flawed: the 
accused has failed to form properly a belief about the extent of the risks she is 
imposing and their justification. On that basis, the mistaken actor might be negligent 
(in her beliefs), as discussed in chapter five. It is assumed, therefore, that the 
defendant in Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Shimmen,195 in 
failing to reach a justified belief about the dangers involved in his martial arts 
display, was probably negligent, rather than reckless (as the court thought). 
“Caldwell lacuna” cases – where the accused is satisfied (wrongly) that there is no 
risk at all196 – should be dealt with similarly. 
                                                
194 See, similarly: RJ Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (1994) 138; C Tappolet, 
“Rational capacities, or how to distinguish recklessness, weakness and compulsion”, in S Stroud (ed), 
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (2003) 17. 
195 (1987) 84 Cr App R 7. 
196 See §3.C(4), above. 




 The situation in cases where the accused is consciously aware of her 
preconscious beliefs in risk (cases of “opaque” recklessness, in Ferzan’s parlance) is 
broadly similar to that in cases of fully conscious beliefs in risk. Again, such actors 
seem faced (absent an emergency) with a decision: they can either “actualise” their 
preconscious belief, making it the focus of their conscious deliberations about 
conduct;197 or they can ignore the preconscious belief, failing to investigate its 
content further on a conscious level.198 Ferzan realises this,199 but it is submitted that 
she is wrong to require a conscious choice to ignore the risk attendant upon 
behaviour in order for the accused to have been reckless. Again, the absence of such 
a decision – and the simple failure to be motivated sufficiently to investigate beliefs 
in opaque “risk” or “danger” – may demonstrate the accused’s lack of concern for 
the interests of others.200 A positive choice to ignore a preconscious sense of risk and 
danger is thus a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for recklessness. All that is 
required is that the actor, in light of her preconscious beliefs, comes to engage in 
wrongdoing when she could have better exercised her practical judgement.201 
 This suggests that Duff’s example of inadvertent “practical indifference” in 
murder – discussed above – should be departed from, even if (employing the 
attack/endangerment distinction) it makes sense. It is submitted that finding a person 
was reckless as to life is acceptable only where she had a (preconscious or conscious) 
belief that there was a risk of death attendant upon her action. Duff might be read to 
assume the presence of such a belief, as the attacker’s belief that the complainer’s 
life is under threat gives structure to, and is inherent in, her actions. As noted above, 
however, Duff does not require a psychological experience of that belief.  
 Duff’s example might, however, be attractive precisely because it seems 
incredible that a person could engage in a serious violent assault on another without 
realising (however fleetingly) that there was a risk that the victim might die. Surely, 
absent exceptional circumstances, this belief would be formed, at least on a 
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preconscious level, by those who severely assault others.202 This intuitive belief that 
the actor must be aware of risk (and that this awareness has made it into the 
accused’s conscious deliberations) is, it is submitted, part of the appeal of Duff’s 
example of inadvertent recklessness.203 This should not, however, undermine the 
utility of concentrating on the accused’s actual conscious and preconscious beliefs at 
the time of acting. The important question is whether, in disregarding or failing to 
investigate her conscious awareness of beliefs in risk, the accused demonstrates 
insufficient concern for the interests of others. 
 In answering this question, it is useful to consider why the accused failed to 
respond to or investigate her beliefs in risk. In common with negligence as failure of 
belief, it seems that desire and character have a role to play here. The question is 
whether the accused’s lack of motivation was the result of a desire that was accepted 
as part of her character. If so, the culpability question may legitimately be posed: did 
the accused’s failure, in line with her accepted desires, to respond appropriately to 
her conscious or preconscious beliefs about the risks attendant upon her conduct 
show her to be insufficiently concerned with the interests of others? 
 This account goes beyond most “subjective” conceptions of recklessness, and 
even Ferzan would not endorse it (as no conscious choice to ignore risk is required). 
It is also distinct from another, popular belief-focussed account of recklessness, 
presented by Tadros. In order to demonstrate why the view of recklessness presented 
in the previous sections should be employed over that developed by Tadros, it is 
necessary to engage in detailed analysis of his chapter in Criminal Responsibility on 
the “Ethics of belief”.204 It will be contended that, in common with Duff, Tadros does 
not distinguish adequately between recklessness and negligence. After this, it will be 
demonstrated why making this distinction plain is important.  
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(3) Tadros’s belief-centred account of recklessness (or negligence?) 
It is not clear from Tadros’s discussion of culpable risk-taking whether he is talking 
consistently about recklessness, or whether negligence is introduced at points.205 
Tadros begins by outlining the belief formation process (which was dealt with earlier 
in this thesis),206 before moving on to give an account of carelessly-formed beliefs 
resulting in the commission of an actus reus. For instance, he describes Cameron v 
Maguire as a case where the accused failed to evaluate properly the risks attendant 
upon his activity (firing a rifle) when such investigation would have been 
appropriate, given the accused’s knowledge about risks in general.207 
 Tadros then considers possible limitations on such a duty to investigate risks 
(mainly whether the accused knew that the activity was the sort that involved 
risks),208 which informed the discussion of the limitations of negligence as failure of 
belief in chapter five.209 Following from this, Tadros presents his “negative account” 
of culpability for false beliefs. He refers to cases where the accused simply lacked 
the ingredients to form a belief that her conduct was risky,210 and concludes – as this 
thesis did211 – that such actors cannot evidence culpable carelessness.  
 After this, Tadros moves on to consider a “positive account” of culpable 
beliefs. For present purposes, the most important part relates to careless actors.212 He 
begins by stating that:213 
 
A defendant may form a belief that there is no risk because he is too careless or lazy 
to investigate the risks. The defendant fails to think about the risks or fails to 
investigate them adequately and so does not realise that there is a risk that the actus 
reus of an offence will be performed. In doing so the defendant clearly shows that he 
has insufficient regard for the interests of those who might suffer from the risk 
materialising. 
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It is submitted that, in this quote, Tadros is continuing to describe something akin to 
negligence as failure of belief, rather than recklessness. The accused, perceiving that 
she is engaging in an activity she knows (in a background sense) to be risky, fails to 
apply her background knowledge about the risks involved in that activity and form 
appropriate beliefs for the circumstances. In such circumstances, the accused cannot 
be psychologically aware of the presence of risk, and so can be distinguished from 
the actor who does have conscious awareness that she holds such a belief on a 
preconscious or conscious level (in other words, the “opaquely” reckless or the 
consciously reckless actor). Again, for reasons explored below, this distinction in 
terms of belief is important in terms of culpability. 
 Returning to Tadros’s chapter, it should be noted that, until this point, Tadros 
does not put a name to the form of culpability that he is describing, but there are 
frequent references to “objective” recklessness in the opening pages.214 Beyond this, 
Tadros describes the type of fault he is discussing as “carelessness”, which could 
apply to either reckless or negligent wrongdoing.215 Things become slightly clearer, 
however, when Tadros deals with the “subjectivist” objection that carelessness can 
only be culpable where the accused was consciously aware of the relevant risks.216 
This “subjectivist” position sounds like advertent recklessness. 
 Tadros’s hypothetical “subjectivist” suggests that the accused in Cameron v 
Maguire, knowing that somebody might be coming and, furthermore, knowing that 
there was a risk that that person might get shot, should have carried out further 
investigation.217 This description of the case suggests that the accused did have the 
belief that his action was unsafe which is, firstly, contrary to what the accused said218 
(although he had good reason to lie), and, more importantly, suggests that the 
accused had not failed to form a belief in risk – the position Tadros discusses in the 
body of his chapter. If Cameron had a belief in risk held on the preconscious level 
(and was consciously aware of this), or was focussed fully on the belief at the 
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conscious level, then he was quite properly called reckless for the reasons given 
above. 
 Tadros’s hypothetical “subjectivist” is thus describing at least “opaque” 
recklessness, if not the wider sense of recklessness defended above. In his response, 
Tadros nevertheless dispenses with any need for a belief in actual risk, which Ferzan 
and this thesis require: 219  
 
If the defendant shows carelessness in failing to investigate a particular risk, he need 
not have been aware that there was a risk that this particular instance of the actus 
reus of an offence would come about... His failure to investigate the risks where it is 
appropriate to do so shows only that he has an awareness that his activity is risky to a 
degree and in a way that ought to lead him to investigate. 
 
 It might be wondered (especially by the “subjectivist” critic) what Tadros 
means by “awareness”. It is not clear from Criminal Responsibility, but he does refer 
to Ferzan’s account of “opaque” recklessness in relation to the text quoted above.220 
This might suggest that Tadros thinks the reckless accused needs to be consciously 
aware of at least a preconscious belief that her conduct was risky in general. If this is 
the case, then it is agreed (contrary to what the “correspondence principle” might be 
taken to mean)221 that a further belief about the exact consequences of taking that 
risk is not required for culpability. What matters is that the accused, in her failure to 
investigate her preconscious sense of risk, showed insufficient concern for the 
interests of others; that her failure to be motivated to think harder about her beliefs 
demonstrated culpability. Such a culpable lack of concern does not require awareness 
of the exact risk being taken or, indeed, of its likely consequences.222 This is where 
Ferzan and Tadros are correct, and “subjectivist” supporters of the “correspondence” 
principle are wrong. 
 Can it therefore be concluded that Tadros is considering recklessness as 
understood in this thesis? No: once again, he returns to consideration of something 
like negligence as failure of belief in his view that the culpable accused is aware, in 
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terms of her background knowledge, only that her action is of the type that risks are 
associated.223 All he requires is that – “passively” – the activity is the type with 
which risks are associated – for instance, driving.224 This sounds like the mere 
presence of background knowledge which the accused could, but has failed to, 
actualise in her belief formation processes, i.e. negligence as failure of belief.225 
 This detailed analysis of “The ethics of belief” suggests that, like Duff, 
Tadros has difficulty distinguishing recklessness and negligence. This is a more 
cutting criticism than it was in relation to Duff’s theory of practical indifference: 
Duff at least finds a way to explain the distinction between negligence and 
recklessness in a small category of cases (attacks, as opposed to endangerments). 
Tadros’s difficulty is more pronounced: it is submitted that Criminal Responsibility 
leaves the distinction between recklessness and negligence entirely unaddressed. It is 
not clear what Tadros thinks negligence is, or, indeed, whether a distinction between 
recklessness and negligence is worth having.226 
 It is open to Tadros to complain that this thesis has drawn a distinction 
(between negligence as failure of belief and recklessness) that is unimportant or 
overly fussy in terms of assessing culpability. In the next section, it will be pointed 
out that this distinction draws an important line in terms of relative culpability. This 
is why theories which cannot explain this distinction clearly (such as Duff and 
Tadros’s) ought to be abandoned. 
 
(4) Why distinguish recklessness from negligence? 
The difficulty posed by approaches such as Tadros’s is that – at least for choice 
theorists – there is a significant moral line between chosen and unchosen 
wrongdoing. Chapter four did not threaten this conclusion; it merely pointed to the 
fact that “subjectivists” have not provided a convincing reason why conscious, 
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225 Ferzan also thinks that Tadros is considering negligence, not recklessness: KK Ferzan, “Act, 
agency and indifference: the foundations of Criminal Responsibility” (2007) 10 New Crim LR 441 at 
450-454. See, also, Garvey, “Involuntary manslaughter” at 359 (n 87). 
226 Talk of negligence is largely absent from “The ethics of belief”. It is mentioned only briefly: 
Tadros, Criminal Responsibility 245. There is only one reference to negligence in Criminal 
Responsibility’s index, which directs the reader to a page where Tadros equates it with “objective” 
recklessness: ibid 30. 




chosen wrongdoing explains the whole of culpability. Is the line between 
“advertence” and “inadvertence” which has dominated the recklessness/negligence 
question for at least the last century thus an important one to maintain? No: instead 
the distinction should be drawn on the basis of the actor’s beliefs about the risks 
attendant upon her conduct and her management of them. 
 It was argued above that the reckless actor is consciously aware of her 
preconscious or conscious belief that her conduct is risky or dangerous and has 
either: (i) failed to be motivated sufficiently to investigate that belief to ascertain the 
true extent of the risk (which is beyond “opaque” recklessness); or (ii) consciously 
decided to ignore a preconscious belief in risk and continue with her action (which is 
“opaque” recklessness). To be culpable, this failure of motivation must stem from the 
accused’s accepted character and demonstrate insufficient concern for the interests of 
others.  
 The actor who is culpably negligent in forming her beliefs has, by contrast, 
no conscious or preconscious belief about risk in the particular circumstances.227 As 
the result of a controllable desire, she has not reached that stage, but had the tools, 
the capacity and the opportunity to do so. 
 When recklessness and negligence (as failure of belief) are reconceived of in 
this way, the line between them focuses more readily on the accused’s beliefs about 
risks and what these demonstrate about her attitudes regarding the interests of others. 
This account sees more of the spectrum of culpable carelessness than the widest 
choice theories do, and it is submitted that it marks an important distinction in terms 
of the ease with which the actor could have adverted consciously to the unjustified 
risks attendant upon her conduct and avoided them. The reckless actor has only to 
focus consciously upon her preconscious beliefs about risk (if she is not “purely” 
reckless, already) to be in a position where she can appraise it clearly and decide 
what to do. The negligent actor is a step behind, having not yet formed the belief in 
risk on a conscious or preconscious level. 
                                                
227 See §5.C, above. 




 It is submitted that this difference in terms of belief impacts upon the extent 
of the accused’s culpability.228 This is because of a persuasive aspect of strict choice 
theory: a person is most able to control that over which they exercise conscious 
deliberation, which gives choice “obvious and immediate moral significance”.229 On 
this view, culpability might be conceived of as a sliding scale, which is related to the 
amount of conscious control that the actor had over her actions and their 
consequences.230 The strict choice theorist is correct that agents are most culpable for 
what they consciously decide to do to, and inflict upon, others, for this most clearly 
shows their lack of sufficient concern for the interests of others. But other forms of 
culpability stem from choice, like ripples emanating from a stone dropped into a pool 
of water.231 
 Although there are steps between intended wrongdoing and reckless 
wrongdoing (see section C, below), it is plain that reckless actors are closer to the 
paradigm case of culpability – the conscious choice to do wrong – than negligent 
actors. Acquiring full conscious awareness of the risks attendant upon her conduct is 
easier for the reckless than the negligent actor, and it is submitted that this makes her 
more to blame for her failure to respond appropriately to the element of unjustified 
risk attendant upon her conduct.232 Similarly, a person who is negligent with regard 
to her beliefs seems closer to the paradigm of culpable choice than the person who is 
negligent in terms of her conduct.  
Although it is grand and impressive (and its insights have informed the 
explanation of culpable carelessness in chapters five and six), Tadros’s approach to 
culpable carelessness misses the above important points concerning culpability, 
while Duff’s distinction between attacks and endangerments distracts attention from 
                                                
228 See, similarly, DN Husak, “Negligence, belief, blame and criminal liability: the special case of 
forgetting” (2011) 5 Crim Law & Philos 199 at 215-216. 
229 TM Scanlon, “The significance of choice”, in SM McMurrin (ed), The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values, VIII (1988) 149 at 151. 
230 See, further, J Jacobs, Choosing Character: Responsibility for Virtue and Vice (2001) 53. Cf Duff, 
IACL 139-142.  
231 See J Gardner, “On the general part of the criminal law”, in RA Duff (ed), Philosophy and the 
Criminal Law: Principle and Critique (1998) 205 at 230-231. Gardner ultimately rejects this view of 
culpability (ibid at 231), for reasons which can be ignored here. 
232 See: AJP Kenny, Freewill & Responsibility (1978) 89; PW Low, “The Model Penal Code, the 
common law and mistakes of fact: recklessness, negligence or strict liability?” (1987-1988) 19 
Rutgers LJ 539 at 552. 




them. Through paying heed to the connection between control and culpability, 
however, it is submitted that the theory of culpable carelessness presented in this 
thesis is able to better explain the boundaries of blameworthy, unjustified risk-taking 
than courts and theorists have tended to in the past.  
 After the argument of this section has been summarised, the chapter will 
move on to consider how the varieties of culpable carelessness described in this 
thesis relate to other mens rea terms. 
 
(5) Recklessness: summary 
This section has given a belief-centred account of recklessness. Essentially, 
recklessness is the failure to be motivated sufficiently to investigate conscious or 
preconscious beliefs in risk (when the actor is consciously aware that these exist) 
and, if necessary, alter her conduct. The argument has demonstrated how this view 
differs from similar theories, such as those presented by Ferzan and Tadros. It has 
also been argued that recklessness and the two forms of negligence described in 
chapter five ought to be kept distinct from one another to recognise their relative 
seriousness in terms of culpability. 
 In the final part of the chapter, the lines between culpable carelessness and 
other forms of mens rea will be sketched to show the overall coherence of the theory 
presented in this thesis. 
 
 
C. THE BOUNDARIES OF CULPABLE CARELESSNESS 
The distinction between recklessness and negligence has already been analysed. The 
most important remaining distinctions are between recklessness and wilful blindness, 
recklessness and knowledge, and recklessness and intention.233 
 
                                                
233 For concerns of space, attempts to collapse the existing mens rea categories (e.g. Alexander et al, 
Crime & Culpability ch 2) are not considered. Other mens rea terms (such as “maliciously”, 
“wilfully”, “fraudulently”, etc) and proposals to create new ones (such as mere suspicion: see S 
Matthiesson, “Should the law deal with reckless HIV infection as a criminal offence or as a matter of 
public health?” (2010) 21 KLJ 123 at 127) are also ignored. 




(1) Wilful blindness 
Wilful blindness is employed in both Scots and English criminal law as a proxy234 
for knowledge235 (or, perhaps more accurately, a means of circumventing difficulties 
in proving knowledge).236 It is nevertheless a close relation of recklessness, a fact 
that has led some commentators237 and judges238 to conflate the two concepts.239 
 The reckless and the wilfully blind actor will both be consciously aware of a 
(conscious or preconscious) belief that there is a risk of a certain consequence or 
circumstance materialising. The important difference, which is often underplayed, is 
the motivational set-up of these two actors. The reckless accused is insufficiently 
motivated with regard to the risks attendant upon her conduct because she does not 
value sufficiently the interests that she threatens. The wilfully blind actor is positively 
motivated to avoid the confirmation of her suspicions; 240  she will neglect to 
investigate the risks attendant upon her conduct where a properly-motivated person 
would, for fear that she will acquire knowledge that she would rather not have.241 In 
the criminal context, this is usually knowledge that the accused is participating in 
criminal behaviour (for instance, drug smuggling).242 
                                                
234 Wilful blindness was referred to historically as “connivance” by the courts and early cases 
suggested that the conniving accused actually did have knowledge. See R Charlow, “Wilful ignorance 
and criminal culpability” (1991-1992) 70 Tex L Rev 1351 at 1363. Cf Roper v Taylor’s Garage 
[1951] 2 TLR 284 at 288 per Devlin J. The absence of knowledge in cases of wilful blindness has, 
however, been emphasised in modern times: e.g. Anon, “Wilful blindness as a substitute for criminal 
knowledge” (1977-1978) 63 Iowa L Rev 466 at 473.  
235 See: Giorgianni v R (1985) 59 ALJR 461; Gordon, Criminal Law paras 7.64, 8.82-8.85; Ashworth, 
Principles 184-185. 
236 DN Husak and CA Callender, “Wilful ignorance, knowledge and the ‘equal culpability’ thesis: a 
study of the deeper significance of the principle of legality” [1994] Wis L Rev 29 at 58. 
237 See e.g.: C Howard and ID Elliot, “The concept of recklessness”, in N Morris and M Perlman 
(eds), Law and Crime: Essays in Honour of Sir John Barry (1972) 50 at 52; S Shute, “Knowledge and 
belief in the criminal law”, in S Shute and AP Simester (eds), Criminal Law: Doctrines of the General 
Part (2002) 171 at 198; Ashworth, Principles 184-185. 
238 See §3.B(1)(b), above. 
239 Scots law might even admit of liability where the accused was negligent in failing, in line with her 
working commitments, to pursue avenues of inquiry which would have put her in a position where she 
would become suspicious: Mackay Brothers v Gibb 1969 JC 26 at 33 per Lord Wheatley. 
240 See e.g.: Redgate v Haynes (1875-1876) LR 1 QBD 89; Ross v Moss [1965] 2 QB 396; 
Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange Ltd and Another [1986] 1 WLR 674 at 684 per Lord 
Bridge. 
241 The Zamora No 2 [1921] 1 AC 801 at 812 per Lord Sumner; RM Perkins, “‘Knowledge’ as a mens 
rea requirement” (1977-1978) 29 Hastings LJ 953 at 962-963; Husak and Callendar (n 236) at 54. 
242 Less exotic instances of wilful blindness may be found in the case reports: e.g. Friel v Docherty 
1990 SCCR 351, where the accused had (apparently inadvertently) received stolen HGV test 
certificates. 




 This element of “cheating”243 is not present in cases of recklessness.244 This 
explains one way245 in which wilful blindness can be conceptually distinguished 
from recklessness246 (and also why the defendant in R v Parker was not wilfully 
blind).247  
Recklessness can therefore be separated from wilful blindness – a proxy for 
knowledge. It is far more difficult to distinguish recklessness from actual knowledge. 
 
(2) Knowledge 
Superficially, recklessness requires the taking of an unjustified risk for insufficient 
reasons, whilst knowledge does not.248 Despite this difference, it has been suggested 
that knowledge is the “essence” of (advertent) recklessness,249 which collapses the 
two concepts together. 250 Criminal law writers251  have thus suggested that the 
distinction between recklessness and knowledge is simply one of degree:252 the 
reckless actor has a belief that a certain possibility of risk exists;253 the knowing actor 
holds that same belief but with greater certainty.254 It is difficult to get much further 
than this: some reckless actors will have a clear idea of the risks they are 
imposing,255 others will not;256 some knowing actors will have a great deal of 
                                                
243 D Lanham, “Wilful blindness and the criminal law” (1985) 9 Crim LJ 261 at 267. 
244 A point missed in Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability 33-35. 
245 For another account, which focuses on the accused’s justification for staying ignorant of certain 
facts, see D Hellman, “Wilfully blind for good reason” (2009) 3 Crim Law & Philos 301. 
246 See the summary of wilful blindness in Charlow (n 234) at 1429. See further: Husak and Callender 
(n 236) at 42; D Luban, “Contrived ignorance” (1998-1999) 87 Geo LJ 957 at 969. 
247 See §3.B(1), above. 
248 Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability 32. 
249 JE Stannard, “Subjectivism, objectivism and the Draft Criminal Code” (1985) 101 LQR 540 at 
541. See, similarly, Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability 33. Cf GR Sullivan, “Knowledge, belief and 
culpability”, in Shute and Simester (eds), Criminal Law Theory (n 237) 207 at 207 (arguing belief, not 
knowledge, is central to recklessness). 
250 See, also, Shute (n 237) at 179-182. 
251 In philosophy, knowledge tends to be taken to mean true belief. This has not informed many legal 
treatments of knowledge, but see: ibid at 185; R v Montila [2004] 1 WLR 3141 at para 27 per Lord 
Hope; Ashworth, Principles 183. 
252 See e.g.: H Weschler, “On culpability and crime: the treatment of mens rea in the Model Penal 
Code” (1962) 339 Annals Am Acad Pol & Soc Sci 24 at 29; Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability 32. 
253 It has been argued that reckless actors have an opinion, whilst knowing actors (unhelpfully) have 
knowledge, but this does not cohere with the theoretical account of culpable carelessness discussed in 
this thesis. See IP Robbins, “The ostrich instruction: deliberate ignorance as a criminal mens rea” 
(1990-1991) 81 J Crim L & Criminology 191 at 220-222. 
254 Charlow (n 234) at 1380. 
255 Cf the discussion of “reckless knowledge” in Ashworth, Principles 184-185. Ashworth appears to 
be discussing wilful blindness, which – as seen above – is distinguishable from recklessness. 




confidence in a proposition, whilst others might “know” a fact, but hold some 
reservations. 
 A bright line between recklessness and knowledge thus seems unobtainable. 
Distinguishing recklessness and intention is similarly difficult. 
 
(3) Intention 
Again, superficially there are differences between recklessness and intention. The 
concepts are clearly distinct even in everyday speech: the former is pejorative, whilst 
the latter is not.257 A person may be praised for her (good) intentions, but not for her 
recklessness, or indeed her negligence (as opposed to her risk-taking). Despite this 
fact, the line between recklessness and intention has proved controversial in criminal 
law theory. 
 The difficulty is that, as suggested in the previous section, some reckless 
actors will have a clear idea of the risks they are imposing on others and what the 
likelihood is that the threatened consequence or circumstance will materialise. Some 
writers have (perhaps overly pessimistically) assumed that this means there can be no 
meaningful distinction between intention and foresight of risk, and doubted that there 
would be a significant moral distinction between a (very) reckless and an intentional 
actor.258 
 This view stands opposed to the growing consensus amongst criminal law 
theorists that (reckless) foresight can be distinguished from intention. The popular 
view259 is to distinguish between the accused’s desired ends and the “side-effects” of 
her action.260 On this account, the accused who intends a result aims positively to 
bring it about; it structures her action and she will be disappointed – and have 
                                                                                                                                     
256 Furthermore, it is not clear that knowledge requires conscious awareness of the fact that the 
accused allegedly knows. Cf R v Bello (1978) 67 Cr App R 288 at 290 per Lord Lane CJ, where it was 
suggested that the defendant “knew” a fact if he had the capacity to bring it to the forefront of his 
mind. For criticism, see Sullivan (n 249) at 210. 
257 JA Laing, “The prospects of a theory of criminal culpability: mens rea and methodological doubt” 
(1994) 14 OJLS 57 at 76-77; W Wilson, Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory, 3rd edn (2008) 138. 
258 See H Oberdiek, “Intention and foresight in criminal law” (1972) 81 Mind 389. 
259 For an alternative account, which concentrates on the role of justification in foresight and intention, 
see AP Simester, “Why distinguish intention from foresight?”, in AP Simester and ATH Smith (eds), 
Harm and Culpability (1996) 71. 
260 WJ Winslade, “Brady on recklessness” (1972) 33 Analysis 31 at 31; T Baldwin, “Foresight and 
responsibility” (1979) 54 Phil 347 at 350. Cf GA Ferguson, “Mens rea evaluated in terms of the 
essential elements of a crime, specific intent and drunkenness” (1971) 4 Ottawa L Rev 356 at 366. 




failed261 – if the relevant consequence or circumstance does not materialise.262 This 
may be contrasted with consequences and circumstances that the accused has 
foreseen as mere potential “side-effects” of her intended conduct. Because these do 
not structure the accused’s action, she will not be disappointed – and will still have 
succeeded – if they do not materialise. 
 This analysis allows a distinction to be drawn between (desired) intended 
ends and (undesired) side-effects of action.263 The line between recklessness and 
intention is, on this account, that between foresight and desire.264 Simple as this test 
appears in theory, it cannot be denied that the lines around intention and side-effects 
are “fuzzy”.265 It might be that a person desires a certain end without her actions 
being structured around bringing it about. Consider Kenny’s example of a soldier 
who is ordered to blow up a bridge that her personal enemy is guarding: the soldier 
acts to follow her orders (which thus structure her action), yet desires the side-effect 
(her enemy’s incidental death) be brought about.266  
 Examples such as this have led theorists and judges to propose alternative 
approaches to the dilemma over intention and foresight. In common with the 
treatment of knowledge (see above), some have specified various degrees of reckless 
foresight that will qualify for intention. For instance, Williams distinguishes “moral 
certainty” (intention) from “strong probability” (recklessness).267 This approach is 
inherently malleable and, as a result, the English courts have managed to vacillate 
between various levels of foresight that qualify for intention.268 This distinction has 
                                                
261 Duff, IACL 61-63. 
262 See: DJ Galligan, “Responsibility for recklessness” (1978) 31 CLP 55 at 74; J Finnis, “Allocating 
risks and suffering: some hidden traps” (1990) 38 Clev St L Rev 193 at 201-202. 
263  J Finnis, “Intention and side effects”, in RG Frey and CW Morris (eds), Liability and 
Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals (1991) 32 at 33-35. It should not be assumed that the 
distinction between intended ends and side-effects explains the whole of intention: J Horder, 
“Varieties of intention, criminal attempts and endangerment” (1994) 14 LS 335 at 335. It nevertheless 
explains the most relevant part of intention for present purposes. 
264 G Williams, The Mental Element in Crime (1965) 27; Finnis (n 263) at 49; Duff, AFC 152. 
265 Oberdiek (n 258) at 393. 
266 AJP Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will (1963) 238. 
267 Williams, The Mental Element (n 264) 35. 
268 See, ultimately, R v Woollin [1999] AC 82. For a helpful overview, see MC Kaveny, “Inferring 
intention from foresight” (2004) 120 LQR 81. It is not clear whether the debate over intention is 
restricted to the context of murder (see Ashworth, Principles 176) – the line between recklessness and 
intention has also proved controversial elsewhere: see e.g. R v Belfon [1976] 1 WLR 741 (Offences 
against the Person Act 1861 s 18). 




not been relied upon in Scotland – largely because intention has never been defined 
there269 – and it is certainly “blurry”.270 It is submitted that this approach is too 
dependent on fine distinctions to be useful in the criminal law. 
 An interesting alternative solution to the intention problem is to make a 
motivational distinction beyond the simple desire/side-effect dichotomy discussed 
above.271 It has been argued that a consequence of action is intended if the actor 
accepts its occurrence, rather than shying away from or not caring about it (as the 
reckless actor would).272 This is one understanding of the concept of “conditional 
intention” (dolus eventualis in South Africa;273 Bedingter Vorsatz in Germany).274 
 Conditional intention requires two elements. First, the actor must have 
foreseen that it was “a not entirely distant possibility” that a certain risk would 
materialise. 275  This means that recklessness (as understood in Anglo-American 
systems) would continue to have something in common with intention. The 
distinctiveness of conditional intent arises from its second element: the accused must 
have accepted (i.e. be reconciled to) the fact that the foreseen risk might 
materialise.276 This volitional element of acceptance is not present in recklessness 
because the accused, even if fully aware of the relevant risks attendant upon her 
conduct, need not have accepted those risks as a necessary element of her conduct. 
 What this demonstrates is that the line between conditional intent and 
conscious negligence/recklessness is not dissimilar from that between desired ends 
and side-effects.277 It is nevertheless slightly more robust. In Kenny’s example, 
                                                
269 Cf Sayers v HM Advocate 1981 SCCR 312, where the trial judge adopted the definition of intention 
in Cunliffe v Goodman [1950] 2 KB 237 at 253 per Asquith LJ. Cf E Clive et al, A Draft Criminal 
Code for Scotland with Commentary (2003) 29. Intention is defined (“without restricting [its] ordinary 
meaning”) in section 9 of the Draft Code. 
270 L Katz, Bad Acts and Guilty Minds: Conundrums of the Criminal Law (1987) 187. See, further, 
AW Norrie, Crime, Reason & History: A Critical Introduction to the Criminal Law, 2nd edn (2001) ch 
3. 
271 See A Pedain, “Intention and the terrorist example” [2003] Crim LR 579. 
272 See: ibid at 591-592; M Gorr, “Should the law distinguish between intention and (mere) 
foresight?” (1996) 2 LT 359 at 366.  
273 See PT Smith, “Recklessness in dolus eventualis” (1979) 96 S African LJ 81. 
274 See M Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law (2009) 63-65. 
275 G Taylor, “Concepts of intention in German criminal law” (2004) 24 OJLS 99 at 108. 
276 Ibid at 109. 
277 L Zaibert, Five Ways Patricia Can Kill Her Husband: A Theory of Intentionality and Blame (2005) 
107. 




presumably the soldier would have accepted the death of her adversary even if it was 
a “side-effect” given her orders. She therefore (conditionally) intended to kill. 
 There is, however, reason for caution. Various competing accounts of the 
volitional element in conditional intention exist,278 and this means that it will not 
provide an easy solution to the problem of distinguishing recklessness from 
intention. In fact, some German theorists have called for the creation of a concept 
akin to recklessness to bridge the gap between conscious negligence and (direct) 
intention. 279  Although conditional intent seems like a suitable solution to the 
intention/recklessness problem, the lines it could draw between these mens rea terms 
remain “blurry” at the edges.280 
 
(4) The boundaries of culpable carelessness: summary 
This section has demonstrated that distinctions between negligence, recklessness and 
other mens rea terms can usefully be made. Although some of the distinctions are 
vague at the margins, it is submitted that this is to be expected:281 relationships 
between culpability terms are complicated. Ultimately, assessments of culpability 
involve a host of moral and political issues and so neat distinctions are eschewed in 
favour of some overlap between concepts. There is, arguably, little moral difference 
between a person who foresees, as a virtual certainty, that a side-effect of her action 
will materialise and one who has reconciled herself with its materialisation.  
                                                
278 See: GP Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978) 445-446; J Burchell, Principles of Criminal 
Law, 3rd edn (2005) 481. 
279 Taylor (n 275) at 126. German law recognises conscious negligence (bewusste Fahrlässigkeit), 
which is virtually identical to advertent recklessness, so this might be unnecessary: see DW Morkel, 
“On the distinction between recklessness and conscious negligence” (1982) 30 Am J Comp L 325. 
Confusingly, the volitional element of dolus eventualis is, in South Africa, identified with a “reckless 
disregard”: S v Sethoga 1990 (1) SA 270 at 276 per Smalberger JA. Recklessness apparently just 
means “consent”: S v Ngubane 1985 (3) SA 677 at 685 per Jansen JA. 
280 After reviewing the South African case law, Burchell concludes that the vagueness of the volitional 
element (and its relative practical unimportance) makes it “at best a confusing and, at worst, an 
irrelevant inquiry”: Burchell, Principles (n 278) 484-485. He concludes that foresight of a certain 
level of probability (i.e. the tack adopted by the English courts when considering the mens rea of 
murder) is a preferable means of discriminating between dolus eventualis and conscious negligence. 
See, further, Morkel (n 279) at 328. 
281 Arguments concerning the usefulness of concepts with “blurred edges” are left to one side here, but 
see LJJ Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn (GEM Anscombe trans, 1967) (particularly 
at §§67-71). 




 For the reasons indicated above, however, the mens rea terms found in 
Anglo-American law do useful work in most cases which are not at the borderlines. 
In most cases, the intentional actor is (mutatis mutandi) more culpable than the 
wilfully blind actor, who is more culpable than the reckless actor, and so on. The fact 
that some cases force difficult questions upon a judge or jury is not reason to give up 
on culpability distinctions altogether and simply have one form of mens rea, such as 





This chapter has argued that recklessness is best understood in terms of the accused’s 
failure to be motivated by her conscious beliefs that there is a (“pure” or “opaque”) 
risk attendant upon her conduct. It has shown that many “indifference” theories, 
despite emphasising the attitudinal aspect of recklessness (a lack of concern for 
others), are misguided insofar as they do not connect the attitude to the actor’s 
beliefs, preferring to look at hypothetical questions (Horder, Simons), perception 
choices (Pillsbury) or attitudes as demonstrated through conduct (Duff). Linking the 
attitude of insufficient concern to the accused’s beliefs ensures a link between the 
accused and her culpability, and that any communication of condemnation is 
personal and worthwhile. The belief-centred view of recklessness in this chapter is 
thus preferred over rival conceptions, including the impressive arguments presented 
by Ferzan and Tadros.  
 This chapter has also shown that the understandings of recklessness and 
negligence as failure of belief can usually be demarcated from each other and other 
common mens rea terms, indicating the bounds of culpable carelessness in theory.  
 In the next chapter, some lessons which Scots and English law could learn 
from this theory will be considered. 
                                                
282 Cf Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability ch 2. 






7 Lessons and Compromises 
 
This chapter considers how the theory developed in chapters five and six could 
inform reform of Scottish and English approaches to culpable carelessness. It also 
contemplates the practical challenges that will require theoretical compromises. 
Section A considers possible changes to the substantive criminal law both north and 
south of the border. Section B then addresses evidential matters. Finally, section C 
discusses the “subjective”/“objective” dichotomy, criticism of which has permeated 
the thesis. The chapter concludes that the dichotomy is neither descriptively nor 
normatively useful, and should be discarded. 
 
 
A. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
This part of the chapter asks what changes to the substantive law flow from the 
theory defended in chapters five and six, before considering whether the 
understandings of negligence and recklessness developed in this thesis could be 
translated into jury directions and statute. 
 The first important questions are whether there should be one definition of 
recklessness in the criminal law and – if so – what role negligence should play in 
establishing culpability. 
 
(1) Recklessness: one or many forms? 
Chapters two and three demonstrated that many distinct conceptions of recklessness 
continue to pervade Scots and (to a lesser extent) English criminal law. Some sit 
awkwardly with (“gross”) negligence – the elephant in the room in Scots law,1 and a 
visible problem in the English law of involuntary manslaughter.2  
                                                
1 See §2.B, above. 
2 See §3.D(2), above. 




 The approach defended in chapters five and six was, by contrast, to argue that 
it is possible to understand and distinguish amongst the central elements of fault 
involved in negligence as failure of conduct,3 negligence as failure of belief4 and 
recklessness.5 
 It will thus not come as a surprise that a coherent, unitary approach to mens 
rea terms such as recklessness and negligence will be argued for over the present, 
scattered approach.6 This is due primarily to the failure by the Scottish and English 
courts to define mens rea terms sensibly. This is (most transparently in England)7 
because of the courts’ reluctance to discuss mens rea in general terms: most 
decisions do not express a clear view beyond the context of the specific offence 
under consideration. In Scots law, decisions also tend to be fact-specific, meaning 
that even less of general importance can be gleaned.  
 On one view, this conservative approach is acceptable: courts must decide the 
case before them.8 There is much to be said, however, for a more holistic approach 
(perhaps best not undertaken by the judiciary)9 which aims at simplifying the law and 
ensuring its overall coherence; incorporating elements of the current law which “fit” 
together and abandoning those that do not.10 This would be preferable to trying (as 
Scottish and English writers have, in vain) to explain the existing jurisprudence on 
recklessness and negligence in its entirety as though it had been constructed 
rationally when it clearly has not. 
 Although this sounds straightforward, there is nevertheless a counterargument 
which requires to be addressed. 
                                                
3 See §5.B, above. 
4 See §5.C, above. 
5 See §6.B, above. 
6 See, similarly, N Metcalfe and A Ashworth, “Arson: mens rea – recklessness whether property 
destroyed or damaged” [2004] Crim LR 369 at 371. For a similar argument concerning “consent”, see 
C Elliott and C de Than, “The case for a rational reconstruction of consent in criminal law” (2007) 70 
MLR 225. 
7 See e.g.: R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171 at 188 per Lord Mackay (“gross” negligence); R v Woollin 
[1999] 1 AC 82 at 90 per Lord Steyn (intention); R v G [2004] 1 AC 1034 at para 28 per Lord 
Bingham (recklessness). 
8 Cf the “judicial minimalism” defended in C Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on 
the Supreme Court (1999). 
9 This is, at least theoretically, the function of the law commissions: Law Commissions Act 1965 s 3. 
10 See, similarly: R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) ch 6; DN MacCormick, “Reconstruction after 
deconstruction: a response to CLS” (1990) 10 OJLS 539. Cf J Gardner, “Criminal law and the uses of 
theory: a reply to Laing” (1994) 14 OJLS 217 at 217-218. 




(a) The argument against a unitary approach 
The present, confused state of the law might be explained on the basis of distinct 
principles and policies11 at work in different areas of the criminal law.12 Perhaps 
recklessness should be understood differently in rape, for example, because taking a 
risk with the sexual autonomy of another is categorically distinct from taking risks 
with other interests (a principled argument).13 Or perhaps the law looks so dimly on 
non-consensual sex that, in this particular context, a focus on advertence would get in 
the way of the law’s goals of protecting sexual autonomy (a policy argument). The 
courts have simply not been clear enough about what kind of argument they were 
endorsing (if they thought about this matter), and the legislatures in Scotland and 
England have buried this distinction between general principle and specific policy 
through removing talk of “recklessness” from the sexual offences legislation.14 
 A similar explanation might be given of the Scottish concept of “wicked” 
recklessness. 15 It defies classification on the “subjective”/“objective”, 
advertent/inadvertent dichotomy because murder – “the most heinous of all crimes”16 
– can only be defined in outwardly moral terms such as “wickedness”.17 Again, the 
appeal court has simply not sought to explain clearly the distinction between 
“wicked” and other forms of recklessness (most relevantly the form employed in 
culpable homicide),18 or what this distinction relies upon (a principle or a policy, or a 
mixture of the two). 
                                                
11 The principle/policy distinction is rarely elaborated on – and there is not space to do so here – but 
see R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) 22. 
12 See e.g.: C Wells, “Swatting the subjectivist bug” [1982] Crim LR 209; J Temkin, “The limits of 
reckless rape” [1983] Crim LR 5 at 15; J Gardner and H Jung, “Making sense of mens rea: Antony 
Duff’s account” (1991) 11 OJLS 57 at 578; Gardner (n 10); J Gardner, “On the general part of the 
criminal law”, in RA Duff (ed), Philosophy and the Criminal Law: Principles and Critique (1998) 
205; V Tadros, “The system of criminal law” (2002) 22 LS 448 at 455 (Tadros nevertheless accepts 
that “we can make some general claims about the role of recklessness in the criminal law, and even 
generate some general tests” (at 462)); J Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the 
Philosophy of Criminal Law (2007) 27. Cf M Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law (2009) 
117. 
13 See §6.A(4)(c), above. 
14 See §2.E(2), above. 
15 See §2.F, above. 
16 Gordon, Criminal Law para 23.19. 
17 Cf Duff, IACL 157-167 (see §6.A(4)(c), above). 
18 Prior to HM Advocate v Purcell 2008 JC 131, this line was “at best unclear”: Gordon, Criminal Law 
para 7.60. Now that an intention to do physical injury is required for wicked recklessness, matters 
might be different – but this will depend on the appeal court’s treatment of “intention” in future cases. 




 This way of explaining the decisions concerning recklessness has an intuitive 
appeal, because it seems opposed to a “grand theory” that would explain the entirety 
of the criminal law (not simply the law’s approach to culpability). It is popular (and 
perhaps wise) to be suspicious of such all-encompassing explanations:19 any “grand 
theory” is likely to be unhelpfully vague (or simply lead to absurd results in 
individual cases) because its rules will be abstract and insensitive to “local” 
concerns, such as the difficulties of dealing with certain offences (sexual offences, 
etc). 
 Scepticism about grand theorising does not, however, explain why words 
found throughout the criminal law (such as recklessness) must bear different 
meanings when used in different contexts. For instance, the fact that inadvertently 
taking a risk with the sexual autonomy of another is a serious display of insufficient 
concern for her interests might explain why such inadvertence ought to be criminal. 
It does not, however, explain why “recklessness” should cover inadvertent risk-
taking in the specific context of sexual offences, but not others. The English courts in 
the 1980s, and the Scottish courts of the mid 1990s,20 were misguided to think that it 
did. 
 Rather than treating mens rea terms as mere words which can be given 
various shades of meaning, it is preferable to keep their definitions concrete and 
create a full arsenal of fault concepts to deploy in different circumstances. The main 
reasons for this are coherence and comprehensibility. Unless “recklessness” just 
means “fault” (in which case, it makes little sense to have differentiated mens rea 
terms),21 and is therefore malleable to the purposes of the criminal courts, the 
vacillating boundaries of that term are only likely to confuse. A central 
understanding of recklessness should thus be developed and adhered to. It is not 
useful to make the law’s terminology confusing and inaccessible, particularly when 
one purpose that might be avowed for having the criminal law is deterrence,22 and – 
                                                
19 See: RA Duff, “Theorizing criminal law: a 25th anniversary essay” (2005) 25 OJLS 353; Duff, AFC 
7-8. 
20 See §§2.E(1), 3.C(2), above. 
21 See Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability ch 2. 
22 Sentencers are occasionally obliged to take specific account of deterrence. See e.g. the Prisoners 
and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Act 1993 s 2 (as amended by the Convention Rights 
(Compliance) (Scotland) Act 2001 s 1).  




as assumed in this thesis – the criminal process is supposed to be a communicative 
endeavour.23 It also raises concerns of fairness: if the law is inaccessible, then the 
serious consequences that might follow from conviction might be sprung on citizens 
without warning. 
 This argument supports the contention that it was illegitimate to expand the 
law’s understanding of recklessness solely in the context of rape, but it is quite clear 
why the Scots and English courts turned from advertent recklessness to inadvertent 
(or at least not necessarily advertent)24 “indifference” in the 1980s and 1990s. 
(Advertent) recklessness was a mens rea for rape, but negligence was not. This no 
doubt motivated the courts in developing the law’s understanding of recklessness – 
in rape, at least – to cover inadvertent risk-taking with regard to consent. If faced 
with a choice between destabilising a mens rea term or allowing (what were felt, by 
the courts, to be) culpable accused persons to go free, it is understandable that the 
court went for the former option. If negligence were accepted as being culpable, 
however, such judicial activism would be unnecessary. 
 This leads to a second complication. As seen in chapter four,25 negligence is 
not viewed as particularly serious by some writers, and to hold that a negligent 
accused person could be liable for a serious crime like rape might be thought to do 
two sorts of injustice. First, it might be seen to punish those who – although 
blameworthy – do not deserve the criminal sanction. As argued in chapter five, this 
argument fails in the context of rape. The compromise made towards the end of that 
chapter26 – that widespread use of negligence liability might be illiberal – does not 
stop it from being employed legitimately where the risks involved in the accused’s 
conduct could easily be eradicated (by, for instance, asking about consent)27 and the 
consequences are potentially severe and irremediable. Non-consensual sexual 
intercourse is one such instance. 
 Secondly, and more compellingly, admitting of negligence liability in the 
context of rape might be to devalue the “wrongness” of that crime. If negligence is 
                                                
23 See §1.A(4), above. 
24 See §6.A(4)(b), above. 
25 Particularly at §4.A. 
26 At §5.D. 
27 T Pickard, “Culpable mistakes and rape: relating mens rea to the crime” (1980) 30 UTLJ 75 at 81. 




not viewed as serious, then the wrong done to the complainer in a case of “negligent 
rape” might be viewed similarly. This objection is an important one, but it is 
submitted that it can be marshalled in support of recognising negligence as failure of 
belief28 as seriously culpable in the context of non-consensual sexual intercourse. If a 
serious offence such as rape can be committed through negligence as failure of 
belief, then that communicates clearly the polity’s attitude towards those who do not 
show adequate self-control and epistemic thoroughness in the formation of their 
beliefs about consent.29 
 This point goes beyond the context of rape. Both forms of negligence ought 
to be recognised for what they are: appropriate heads of culpability (though in 
different contexts) which indicate forms of blameworthiness distinct from 
recklessness. Accepting this point would ease the definitional strain that has been 
placed on recklessness both north and south of the border over the last century. 
Rather than having various different types of recklessness – some of which are 
indistinguishable from negligence as failure of conduct (e.g. Allan v 
Patterson/Lawrence recklessness)30 and others which seem to involve negligence as 
failure of belief (e.g. Quinn v Cunningham recklessness)31 – a central nub of reckless 
culpability could be detected and exposed. This could be distinguished, as it has been 
in this thesis, from the two forms of negligence, allowing distinct forms of 
culpability to be identified and punished accordingly.  
 As noted at the end of chapter six,32 there is good reason (in terms of relative 
culpability) in distinguishing recklessness from negligence as failure of belief and 
negligence as failure of conduct: the reckless accused is closer to the paradigm of 
culpable agency – the culpable choice – than the accused who is negligent with 
regard to her beliefs. Similarly, an accused person who exhibits negligence as failure 
of conduct is further away from the culpable choice than one who is negligent with 
regard to her beliefs. As a result, she is less blameworthy. 
                                                
28 Negligence as failure of conduct is not appropriate for use in sexual offences (see §5.C(4), above). 
29 This is why crimes such as “negligent sexual invasion” – see T Honoré, Sex Law (1978) 78-79 – are 
objectionable. They label accurately the accused’s mental state at the time of the offence, but 
undermine the severity of his wrongdoing by failing to give it an appropriately odious label. 
30 See §§2.C, 3.C(1), above. 
31 See §2.D, above. 
32 At §6.B(4). 




 Recklessness, negligence as failure of belief and negligence as failure of 
conduct should, therefore, be understood as general terms which can be applied to 
specific offences by relating them to a specific risk (of damage, of injury, of fire, 
etc). This means that they belong properly to the “general part” of the criminal law 
and, as a result, general descriptions of them are possible. In the next sections, 
statutory definitions of, and jury instructions relating to, each form of culpable 
carelessness will be presented. 
 
(2) Culpable carelessness: statutory formulations 
Criminal law theorists rarely present statutory formulations of mens rea terms. This 
is problematic because an increasing amount of the criminal law in both Scotland and 
England is being legislated upon, and thus theory which cannot be translated into 
statute is of diminishing worth. Even if codification in both jurisdictions seems, at 
present, an unattainable aim,33 it is still a fundamental goal of the law commissions.34 
A codified criminal law should contain codified mens rea terms. 
 It is thus important that the definitions of negligence and recklessness 
provided in chapters five and six could be put into statutory form. It is submitted that 
they could be.  One caveat must, however, be made clear from the beginning. No 
translation from theory to practice is ever going to be perfect: judges and jurors are 
not philosophers or criminal law theorists.35 There are also complicated matters 
concerning proof which pose practical problems for basic and ornate theories alike. 
Given these concerns, it is necessary to try and explain mens rea concepts in 
“everyday” language and allow the judge or jury to use inferences where features of 
the crime (the accused’s beliefs, desires, etc, at the time of acting) cannot easily be 
demonstrated.36 
                                                
33 See: T Bingham, The Business of Judging: Selected Essays and Speeches (2000) 295-297; I Dennis, 
“RIP: the criminal code (1968-2008)” [2009] Crim LR 1; E Clive, “Codification of the criminal law”, 
in J Chalmers, F Leverick and L Farmer, Essays in Criminal Law in Honour of Sir Gerald Gordon 
(2010) 54. 
34 Law Commissions Act 1965 s 3. The Law Commission’s tenth programme of law reform 
nevertheless abandoned the aim of codifying the criminal law – see Dennis (n 33).  
35 GH Gordon, “Subjective and objective mens rea” (1974-1975) 17 Crim LQ 355 at 375. 
36 Even if the accused gives evidence, there are still issues of credibility that might make her 
representation of her beliefs, desires, etc, untrustworthy. Inferences will still, therefore, be necessary. 




 The argument in the following sections is not, therefore, that the theory in 
chapters five and six can be implemented directly. Rather, the contention is that the 
positive criminal law in Scotland and England can be improved upon in line with that 
theory, but that certain pragmatic compromises must be made. The theory defended 
in this thesis will, however, help to explain and justify the law’s approach in 
individual cases, and help to stymie the divergence in approach detailed in chapters 
two and three. 
 Attention can now turn to the statutory definitions of the concepts described 
in chapters five and six. It is sensible, for reasons which will become clear, to start by 




Justification of risk-taking: The accused can only be reckless or negligent with 
regard to a substantial risk that a consequence or circumstance may obtain when it was 
unjustifiable for him37 to take that risk.38 A lack of justification is established where, 
given social expectations concerning risk-taking, the dangers posed by the accused’s 
actions went beyond acceptable limits. The accused’s views concerning justification 
are relevant but not determinative: it is possible for the accused to be convicted of an 
offence of negligence or recklessness even if he thought – at the time of acting – that 
he was justified in taking the relevant risk. 
 
This section sets out the view of justification discussed in chapter five.39 As lack of 
justification and the taking of a substantial risk40 permeate all forms of culpable 
carelessness, they should be set out in their own section, rather than inserted into the 
definition of each form of culpable carelessness.41 This simplifies the wording of the 
substantive sections concerning culpability and gives courts specific guidance on the 
issue of justification. 
 As noted above,42 the court may – in determining the matter of justification – 
have regard to the “reasonable person’s” views on risk-taking. It is not, however, 
                                                
37 Statutory language has historically employed “he”, not “she”, in the United Kingdom. 
38 The language employed in these definitions deals with singular risks. It is – of course – possible to 
be taking more than one substantial and unjustifiable risk at a time. 
39 At §5.A(1). 
40 It was argued above that the risk the accused takes must be substantial for it to be the concern of the 
criminal law: ibid. 
41 Cf Model Penal Code s 2.02(2). 
42 At §5.A(1). 




necessary to set this standard out in statutory form. It is a heuristic device, rather than 
a formal legal requirement. The “reasonable person” could, however, be referred to 
in jury directions (on which, see below). 
 
(b) Negligence as failure of conduct 
 
Negligence as failure of conduct: The accused had voluntarily entered a sphere of 
activity which was regulated by ethical and/or practical codes of conduct. Thereafter, 
the accused acted in a manner contrary to the ethical and regulatory framework 
provided for that activity, and took a substantial and unjustified risk with the 
interests of others, which demonstrated insufficient concern for those interests. 
 
This section sets out the criteria for negligence as failure of conduct which were 
considered in chapter five.43 The term “exclusionary reason”, relied upon in chapter 
five, is not mentioned as it might complicate the statutory language. The court is only 
concerned with when the accused was culpable, and need not – for practical purposes 
– have a detailed philosophical explanation concerning why. Exclusionary reasons 
answer the “why”, but not the “when”, question and are thus more relevant to 
lawyers (and, in particular, law students). 
 The notion of “insufficient concern” is left undefined, but it could be 
explained to a jury that they must decide on the standard, as representatives of the 
community.44 This approach is adopted in the model directions below. 
 
(c) Negligence as failure of belief 
 
Negligence as failure of belief: The accused had the background knowledge that his 
conduct presented substantial and unjustified risks to life and/or bodily integrity 
and/or sexual autonomy of another/others and was conscious that he was about to 
engage in that conduct. The accused then failed to form a belief about the 
justifiability of his conduct and, through continuing to act in this ignorance, showed 
insufficient concern for the interests of another/others in life and/or bodily integrity 
and/or sexual autonomy. The accused may avoid liability by raising reasonable 
doubt concerning: 
 
(1) His possession of the relevant background knowledge required to form a belief 
in the relevant risk(s); or 
                                                
43 At §5.B. 
44 The idea that juries are representative of their community is probably not empirically accurate, but 
there is not space to pursue this matter here. 




(2) The fact that his failure to form a belief was caused by a feature of his character 
or situation which did not reflect his character as a whole (i.e. was “out of 
character”). 
 
This section concerns only risks taken with the life, bodily integrity and/or sexual 
autonomy of another. It was conceded at the close of chapter five that a polity might 
reach the conclusion that negligence as failure of belief which threatens other 
interests should be criminal.45 If this occurs, the section could be amended suitably.  
 It should also be emphasised that the section allows the accused to have been 
negligent with regard to all three interests (consider the accused who fails to form a 
belief in non-consent whilst engaged in violent sexual intercourse which threatens 
the complainer’s bodily integrity and life). 
 The point about belief and desire at the end of the definition is necessary to 
ensure that the accused can argue that she either lacked the relevant background 
knowledge (e.g. that water conducts electricity)46 or that she was motivated by an 
“alien desire”.47 The (evidential) burden of proof with regard to these points is on the 




Recklessness: The accused:  
 
(1) Consciously believed he was posing a substantial and unjustifiable risk to the 




(2) The accused believed consciously that his conduct was risky or dangerous – 
even though he did not advert consciously to the specific reasons why, or to the 
substantiality of the risks that he was taking – and, despite the opportunity to do 
so, failed to stop and inquire further and/or alter his behaviour.  
 
In both (1) and (2), the accused’s failure to alter his behaviour must demonstrate 
insufficient concern for the interests of others. 
 
                                                
45 See §5.D(2), above. 
46 See §5.C(1), above. 
47 See §5.C(3)(a), above. 
48 At §7.B. 




The challenge with regard to recklessness is defining in it in an accessible manner. 
Chapter six relied on the notions of preconscious and conscious awareness and these 
terms are not suited for statutory language as they might confuse a judge or jury. 
Ferzan similarly removes them from her definition of “opaque” recklessness:49 
 
Where the evidence does not establish that the actor consciously disregarded the risk, 
but the actor (1) consciously recognized that her conduct was dangerous; (2) at some 
level appreciated that the reasons why her conduct was dangerous was because it 
presented a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a material element existed or would 
result from her conduct; and (3) she nevertheless chose to engage in the conduct, the 
actor is reckless. The actor is not reckless where she (1) did not realize her action 
was dangerous but should have; (2) realized it was dangerous, but thought the risk of 
harm was not substantial or unjustifiable; or (3) realized it was dangerous but 
defined dangerous in a way that did not include harm that occurred. 
 
 It is submitted that this definition is unhelpful in two respects, which is why it 
is not followed here. First, the language of “at some level” appreciating a risk is 
ambiguous. A person might, in theory, appreciate the risks attendant upon her 
conduct at a level which she cannot access consciously.50 This appreciation cannot 
suffice for recklessness (a fact Ferzan acknowledges).51 Secondly – Ferzan attempts, 
in the latter part of her definition – to exclude negligence from her analysis. This 
causes difficulties because, primarily, definitions should be positive: the court should 
not have to work out what culpability is through excluding what it is not.52 
Additionally, if negligence is defined as a culpability term in its own right 
(something Ferzan would not support, 53  but see the definitions above) then 
discussing it in relation to recklessness becomes unnecessary and, once again, liable 
to confuse. 
 
(e) Statutory formulations: summary 
The sections above have demonstrated that statutory definitions of culpable 
carelessness are possible. It is clear, however, that the explanations of recklessness 
and negligence in earlier chapters require explanation in “everyday” language for 
                                                
49 Ferzan, “Opaque recklessness” at 644. 
50 See §6.B(1), above. 
51 See §4.A(3)(b), above. 
52 G Williams, The Mental Element in Crime (1965) 16. 
53 See Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability ch 3. 




them to be useful in criminal trials. As mentioned above, this is mainly because lay 
jurors might become confused by complex legal concepts. Assuming juries are to be 
maintained, then the statutory provisions imagined above would have to become 
even more basic. This matter is taken up in the next section. 
 
(3) The jury 
There is not space to consider the merits and demerits of the jury system.54 It will 
therefore be assumed that Scots and English juries will continue to grapple with mens 
rea concepts, including recklessness and negligence, even if they were 
reconceptualised in the manner proposed in this thesis.  
 Given this concession, it might be thought that – as a matter of pure 
pragmatism – the current “subjectivist” dichotomy between awareness and 
unawareness is easy to explain to the jury, and is therefore superior to the more 
nuanced approach to these terms defended in chapters five and six. It will be argued 
that this is not the case and that jury instructions can be written which explain (with 
some simplification) culpable carelessness in the way described in this thesis. 
 It is useful to explain briefly why this “pragmatic” argument fails. If the 
argument is that “subjectivism” is in fact a coherent account of culpable carelessness, 
then the inconsistent approaches described in chapter four seem to undermine it. 
“Subjectivists” disagree about what it means to be reckless, and the law does not 
adhere to any one understanding over the others. If, alternatively, the argument is 
that theory is worthless, and that – as a matter of pure pragmatism – the 
“subjective”/“objective” dichotomy is the least-worst option available, then two 
responses might be offered. First, that dichotomy is not an accurate description of the 
positive law (hinting at its limitations – and the fact that the courts are aware of 
them). Secondly, this anti-theoretical standpoint is precisely what has resulted in the 
doctrinal mess discussed in chapters two and three. It cannot be argued that the 
current approach “works” as a system of law even if, through gut feeling, judges and 
                                                
54 For useful discussion, see: M Redmayne, “Theorising jury reform”, in RA Duff et al (eds), The 
Trial on Trial: Volume 2 – Judgment and Calling to Account (2006) 99; T Hörnle, “Democratic 
accountability and lay participation in criminal trials” in the same volume (135). 




juries seem able to reach conclusions regarding whether the accused was reckless 
with scant direction. 
 A further preliminary point that is often neglected – but should, nevertheless, 
be addressed before proceeding – concerns the usefulness of “everyday” terms in 
defining mentes reae for lay jurors. Recklessness does not have a settled, “ordinary” 
meaning which resembles the understanding of that concept presented in chapter six. 
Members of the public – i.e. potential jurors – who label each other reckless do not 
usually conduct inquiries into awareness, belief and desire.55 This lack of a colloquial 
understanding of recklessness allowed Lord Diplock to expand the understanding of 
that term in R v Caldwell,56 and led Williams to (presumably cynically) propose that 
a better term for advertent, unjustified risk-taking might be “conchneg” (a play on 
conscious negligence). 57  As conchneg is not an “everyday” word, Williams 
wondered if the courts might define it more clearly. An important consideration is 
whether Williams had a worthwhile point: should the word recklessness (and, for that 
matter, the word negligence) be used in the criminal law, or could new terms be 
thought up to describe the concepts described in chapters five and six?  
 The difficulties with changing the language of the criminal law in the context 
of culpable carelessness are readily apparent. Primarily, there does not appear to be 
reason to stop at recklessness: there are myriad other legal terms which do not have 
settled meanings in “everyday” language (“consent”,58 “dishonesty”,59 etc) and, if 
recklessness and negligence are too difficult to use, then these other terms might also 
have to be dispensed with. Law would then require quite literally its own language – 
which would presumably bewilder laypersons – thus making the law inaccessible in 
the absence of legal guidance. This would make it difficult to convince citizens that 
the criminal law is their law (rather than that of the sovereign or ruling elite) and this 
is why they are obliged to follow it.60 It would also make unduly parochial the 
                                                
55 Cf G Williams, “Recklessness redefined” (1981) 40 CLJ 252 at 265. 
56 [1982] AC 341 (see §3.C, above). 
57 PJ Fitzgerald and G Williams, “Carelessness, indifference and recklessness: two replies” (1962) 25 
MLR 49 at 56. 
58 See C Elliott and C de Than, “The case for a rational reconstruction of consent in criminal law” 
(2007) 70 MLR 225. 
59 See A Halpin, Definition in the Criminal Law (2004) ch 4. 
60 See, further, Duff, AFC 49-51. 




communicative enterprise that the criminal trial ought to further. Adopting new 
terminology to avoid talking at cross purposes thus threatens to frustrate an important 
purpose of the criminal process. 
 A better response to the problem concerning “everyday” language is to make 
clear to juries that the law develops its own (precise)61 understanding of terms for use 
in a specific context (the trial). 62  Although they may think they know what 
“recklessness” means – and this gives them a useful starting point – they must listen 
to the instructions of the judge as to what recklessness should be, in law.63 Although 
it is possible that a jury might ignore such guidance and apply its own biases and 
presuppositions64 concerning the meaning of recklessness and negligence, this is not 
an argument against using “everyday” language in the criminal law. If anything, it is 
an argument against using juries, a matter beyond the scope of this discussion. 
 With these points in mind, it is prudent to briefly examine attempts by 
criminal law theorists to explain culpable carelessness in a form appropriate for use 
with a jury, to see if any lessons can be learned from them. 
 
(a) Previous theoretical attempts 
Very few criminal law theorists take seriously the practical implications of their 
work, perhaps because of the difficulties in translation spoken to above. Fewer still 
give detailed jury instructions based on their arguments.65 Two notable exceptions 
are the draft jury directions given by Alexander, Ferzan and Morse66 and Pillsbury.67 
 Alexander, Ferzan and Morse suggest an “initial instruction” which provides, 
as far as relevant, that: 
 
It is criminal for an actor to take an unjustified risk of causing harm to a legally 
protected interest or to take an unjustified risk that his conduct constitutes prohibited 
behaviour... For behaviour to be justified, the reasons that the actor has for engaging 
                                                
61 JB Brady, “Recklessness, negligence, indifference and awareness” (1980) 43 MLR 381 at 382. 
62 See, similarly: Caldwell at 357 per Lord Edmund-Davies; Fitzgerald and Williams (n 57) at 55. 
63 Cf RA Duff, “Caldwell and Lawrence: the retreat from subjectivism” (1983) 3 OJLS 77 at 87. 
64 Some studies have, however, indicated that directions can make a difference to a jury’s verdict. See, 
famously, RJ Simon, The Jury and the Defense of Insanity (1967) 74-76. 
65 It is proposed, in the sections below, to deal with theoretical approaches to jury instructions, rather 
than existing model directions. As seen in chapters two and three, existing model directions do not 
speak to a general theory of culpability and are therefore unhelpful. 
66 Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability 327-329. 
67 Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference”. 




in his behaviour should be weighed against the risk that the actor perceives that his 
conduct will cause a prohibited result or results... The actor’s reasons for action 
include not only the reason or reasons that motivate his conduct but also any other 
reason that might justify his conduct of which he is aware. These reasons should be 
accorded weight by (1) their positive or negative force and (2) the actor’s perception 
of the likelihood that the facts underlying the reasons do or will obtain. 
 
This “subjective” direction on recklessness (which the authors think explains the 
whole of culpability)68 requires the jury to ask themselves some overwhelmingly 
difficult questions. Justification must be assessed on the basis of the actor’s 
(presumably inferred, unless he gives evidence) reasons (themselves to be weighed 
in terms of their force and (“subjective”) likelihood) against the actor’s perception 
(again, presumably inferred from “objective” evidence) of the risks his conduct 
involves. It is likely that a jury will simply be confused by this direction and go with 
“gut feeling”. This, it was contended in earlier chapters, is perhaps what jurors do 
when asked whether the accused showed an “utter disregard” for, or “indifference” 
towards risks.69 Although more detailed, Alexander, Ferzan and Morse’s directions 
still provide the jury with little additional assistance.  
 Pillsbury’s direction is much longer, and contextualised because he is 
concerned with “depraved heart” murder (an equivalent of “wicked” recklessness 
employed in some United States jurisdictions) and involuntary manslaughter.70 What 
Pillsbury demonstrates is that juries will need detailed guidance concerning the 
various elements of culpable carelessness, preferably with examples and indications 
of the type of heuristic devices (such as the “reasonable person”) that they may 
employ in reaching a decision.71 He also shows that the jury can be informed of 
matters which need not figure in the statutory definition of mens rea terms. For 
instance, Pillsbury includes a reminder about the accused’s capacities in his 
directions,72 which is helpful in ensuring that the accused was able to conform to 
community expectations regarding risk-taking. 
                                                
68 See Alexander et al, Crime & Culpability ch 2. 
69 See e.g. Judicial Studies Committee, Jury Manual: Some Notes for the Guidance of the Judiciary 
(2011) 37/2 (on culpable and reckless conduct), available at http://www.scotland-
judiciary.org.uk/Upload/Documents/JuryManual_1.pdf. 
70 See Pillsbury, “Crimes of indifference” at 209-212. 
71 Pillsbury actually refers to “one in the defendant’s position”, which is ambiguous: ibid at 209. 
72 Ibid at 210. 




 In the following jury instructions, Pillsbury’s detailed approach will be 
preferred. At first, the directions will not be fleshed out, but – after the instruction on 
recklessness – there is an example of how the jury would be directed if the facts of 
Cameron v Maguire 73  (a case discussed throughout the thesis) were under 
consideration. It should further be noted that questions of evidence (such as the 
requirement of corroboration) are ignored in the directions given below. Their 
concern is primarily with the mens rea component of the offence charged. 
 
(b) Negligence as failure of conduct 
 
POSSIBLE DIRECTION ON NEGLIGENCE AS FAILURE OF 
CONDUCT 
 
Charge [charge number] is of [name of offence]. 
 It is a crime to, through substandard, negligent conduct,74 culpably 
risk that [consequence or circumstance].75 I shall break down these elements 
for you. 
 First, you must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the 
accused [set out alleged act of wrongdoing]. If you are not, then you must 
acquit. 
 To be negligent, the accused must be unjustified in her taking of a 
substantial risk. You must be satisfied that, taking the substantial risk that 
[consequence or circumstance] went beyond the bounds of socially-accepted 
risk-creation. You – as representatives of the community76  – must ask 
whether it was socially acceptable for the accused to put others at risk in the 
manner that she did. If not, you may proceed. If you are not convinced that 
the accused’s risk-taking was unjustified, you must acquit. 
 
 
If the accused gives evidence as to justification: 
In reaching a conclusion concerning the justification of the accused’s risk-
taking, you must consider the accused’s evidence. This is important, but 
should not be determinative: it can be unjustifiable to take a risk even if the 
                                                
73 1999 JC 63. 
74 It is not necessary, in these directions, to distinguish negligence as failure of conduct and negligence 
as failure of belief, because it is unlikely that a case would arise where both were relevant. If they 
were, then specific directions on each form (with the relevant label) would be necessary. 
75 It would be preferable if the law were codified and the circumstance(s) or consequence(s) that the 
accused must be reckless as to was specified clearly. See, however, the text accompanying nn 33-34, 
above. 
76 See n 44, above. 








 If you are satisfied that the accused carried out the alleged action, and 
that it was unjustifiably risky to do so, you must ask whether the accused was 
charged with the responsibility to [set out exclusionary reason]. The Crown 
alleges that the accused failed in that responsibility through acting 
negligently. Negligent conduct is that which falls below the conduct expected 
of a person in the accused’s position and with the accused’s level of 
experience. You have heard evidence concerning this standard of conduct,77 
and you may base your verdict upon it. If you do not find the evidence 
credible or reliable, you must acquit. 
  If satisfied that the accused acted negligently, you must then consider 
whether she voluntarily entered the [relevant sphere of activity] and knew of 
the standards expected of her. You must also be convinced that the accused’s 
failure to act safely displayed insufficient concern for those standards and 
[the victim’s] interests. You, as representatives of the community, must 
decide on the level of sufficient concern which was appropriate in the 
circumstances [taking into account the expert evidence you have heard in this 
case (if relevant)]. 
 If you are convinced beyond reasonable doubt of all of these points, 
then you should convict. If reasonable doubt exists over all or any of these 
elements, you must acquit. Remember that it is not for the accused to raise 
reasonable doubt over her guilt; the Crown bears the only burden of proof in 
this case. 
 
(c) Negligence as failure of belief 
 
POSSIBLE DIRECTION ON NEGLIGENCE AS FAILURE OF 
BELIEF 
 
Charge [charge number] is of [name of offence]. 
 It is a crime to negligently take a risk that [consequence or 
circumstance].78  
 [Set out parts of the actus reus which do not concern justification of 
risk-taking or mens rea]. 
 There is a mental element to this crime [set out mens rea].79  
To be negligent, the accused must take a substantial and unjustified risk. You 
must be satisfied that, taking the substantial risk that [consequence or 
                                                
77 It is assumed that expert evidence will be required in most cases involving negligence as failure of 
conduct. 
78 It should be remembered that only a limited number of interests should be considered relevant to 
negligence as failure of belief – see §5.D, above. 
79 Some offences will have more than one form of mens rea (e.g. recklessness and intention). 




circumstance] went beyond the bounds of socially-accepted risk-creation. 
You – as representatives of the community – must ask whether it was socially 
acceptable for the accused to put others at risk in the manner that she did, and 
it might be helpful to consider what you imagine the “reasonable person” 
would think of the accused’s risk-taking. If you find that the accused’s risk-
taking was unjustified, you may proceed to consider the other matters I will 
direct you towards. If you are not convinced that the accused’s risk-taking 
was unjustified, you must acquit. 
 
 
If the accused gives evidence as to justification: 
In reaching a conclusion concerning the justification of the accused’s risk-
taking, you must consider the accused’s evidence. This is important, but 
should not be determinative: it can be unjustifiable to take a risk even if the 




 If you are satisfied that the accused’s risk-taking was substantial and 
unjustifiable, you can approach the question of whether she was culpably 
negligent with regard to that risk. A person is culpably negligent when she 
knew – in terms of her background knowledge – that the conduct she engaged 
with was risky, but failed to apply this knowledge to her action. [Thereafter 
give an example.]  
 If the accused had background knowledge, the question becomes why 
she failed to apply this in the instant circumstances to form a belief in risk or 
danger. If you find this failure resulted from a factor which shows the accused 
to be insufficiently motivated by [interest] then she was culpably negligent 
and you ought to convict. If you are not convinced beyond reasonable doubt 
that the accused’s failure to recognise consciously the risks attendant upon 
her conduct demonstrated insufficient concern for [interest] then you must 
acquit. Again, you – as representatives of the community – must decide on 




If the accused gives evidence as to capacity: 
You have heard evidence from the accused that, because of [name factor], 
she was unable to form the belief that [circumstance or consequence]. This 
must be taken into consideration – and assigned what you feel to be an 
appropriate weight – when you ask whether the Crown has discharged its 
burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.80 
                                                
80 Self-induced incapacities to form beliefs (e.g. that which results from acute, voluntary intoxication) 
are left to one side. As argued above (at §2.G), intoxication cases are not cases of recklessness except 
in limited circumstances (e.g. where, prior to drinking/taking drugs, the accused believes that there is 
a (substantial and unjustifiable) risk that she will kill another whilst intoxicated). It would be better to 





If the accused gives evidence as to background knowledge: 
You have heard evidence from the accused that, because she did not know 
[relevant fact], she was unable to form the belief that [circumstance or 
consequence]. You must consider this evidence – and decide on its weight – 




If the accused gives evidence as to character: 
You have heard evidence from the defence which suggests that the accused 
failed to form a belief in risk because of [factor]. The law assumes that the 
accused’s character is formed voluntarily, and that her belief formation 
processes work properly, but it might be that the accused’s evidence has 
raised reasonable doubt concerning her ability to appreciate the riskiness of 
her conduct. If this is the case, then you should acquit. I should point out that 
the accused does not need to prove anything; the question for you is simply 
whether – taking all evidence into consideration – you are satisfied beyond 






POSSIBLE DIRECTION ON RECKLESSNESS 
 
[Set out elements of negligence as failure of belief (but replace that term with 
“recklessness” until the matter of justification.] 
 
 
If the accused gives evidence as to justification: 
In reaching a conclusion concerning the justification of the accused’s risk-
taking, you must consider her evidence. This is important, but should not be 
determinative: it can be unjustifiable to take a risk even if the accused 
believes that she is justified in doing so. [Thereafter give an example.]  
 
 
If you decide that the accused’s risk-taking was substantial and unjustifiable, 
you must ask whether she acted culpably. Reckless is an everyday word, but 
it has a specific legal meaning. To be culpably reckless, the accused must 
have been consciously aware that her conduct was – in some sense – risky or 
dangerous, and must have failed to take an opportunity to stop and investigate 
                                                                                                                                     
regard the denial of a “defence” of voluntary intoxication in Scotland and England as being concerned 
with not allowing the accused to profit from her self-induced lack of self-control, or to do with public 
protection, and not conflate it with issues of mens rea. 




why. In colloquial terms, she must have had a “flash of awareness” 
concerning risk, and yet failed to think further about it or take steps to 
mitigate or exclude it. [Thereafter give an example.] 
 
 
If the accused gives evidence as to capacity: 
You have heard evidence from the accused that, because of [name factor], 
she was unable to investigate the risk that [circumstance or consequence]. 
This must be taken into consideration when you ask whether the Crown has 
discharged its burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
 
Caldwell Lacuna-type cases: 
If there exists reasonable doubt over whether the accused was consciously 
aware that the risk existed, then you must acquit. If, for instance, the accused 
has investigated the risk that [consequence or circumstance] and come to the 
conclusion that she has removed it, she cannot be reckless. [If relevant, give 
direction on negligence as failure of belief.] 
 
 
In establishing the accused’s awareness of risk, you must rely on the evidence 
presented by the Crown and the defence. If you have reasonable doubt 
concerning the accused’s awareness of risk, you must acquit. 
 Finally, if you find that the accused had a “flash of awareness” – in 
the sense I have described to you – of the risks attendant upon her conduct, 
the final question is whether her failure to investigate the risk further or alter 
her behaviour appropriately demonstrated insufficient concern for the interest 
in [interest]. You, as representatives of the community, must decide on the 
level of concern that might legitimately be expected of the accused in the 
circumstances in which she found herself. 
 
(e) An example 
The directions above are sketches, and they would need fleshed out in individual 
cases. It is therefore useful to demonstrate how they would work in the context of a 
specific offence, for instance culpable and reckless discharge of firearms. The facts 










POSSIBLE DIRECTION FOR CAMERON V MAGUIRE 
 
Charge number one is of reckless discharge of firearms. 
 It is a crime to take a risk that, through discharging firearms, the 
bodily integrity and/or lives of others will be endangered.  
 
[Here, the judge would set out the parts of the actus reus which do not 
concern justification of risk-taking or mens rea]. 
 
There is a mental element to this crime: the accused must have been reckless 
with regard to the risk that someone might be injured or killed by the 
discharge of a firearm.  
 To be reckless, the accused must take a substantial and unjustified 
risk. You must be satisfied that Mr Cameron, in taking the risk that somebody 
would be injured or killed by a stray shot from his rifle, took a substantial risk 
which went beyond the bounds of socially-accepted risk-creation. You – as 
representatives of the community – must ask whether it was socially 
acceptable for the accused to put others at risk in the manner that he did, and 
it might be helpful to consider what you imagine the “reasonable person” 
would think of the accused’s risk-taking. If you find that the accused’s risk-
taking was unjustified, you may proceed to consider the other matters I will 
direct you towards.81 If you are not convinced that the accused’s risk-taking 
was unjustified, you must acquit him. 
 In reaching a conclusion concerning the justification of the accused’s 
risk-taking, you must consider the accused’s evidence that he thought the 
situation was “safe”. This is important, but should not be determinative: it can 
be unjustifiable to take a risk even if the accused believes that he is justified 
in doing so. Even if the accused thinks it is justifiable to shoot in the direction 
of the woods without checking to see if anybody was there, you do not have 
to reach the same conclusion. 
 If you decide that the accused’s risk-taking was unjustifiable, you 
must ask whether he acted recklessly. Reckless is an everyday word, but it 
has a specific legal meaning. To be culpably reckless, the accused must have 
been consciously aware that his conduct was – in some sense – risky or 
dangerous, and must have failed to take an opportunity to stop and investigate 
why. In colloquial terms, he must have had a “flash of awareness” concerning 
risk, and yet failed to think further about it or take steps to mitigate or exclude 
it. For instance, if you are convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the 
accused thought “this is risky...” but did not stop to think why, he is legally 
reckless. Again, you may have recourse to Mr Cameron’s evidence 
concerning what he thought about his activity at the time. 
 If there exists reasonable doubt over whether the accused was aware 
that the risk existed, then you must acquit. If, for instance, you find that the 
accused had investigated the risk that somebody might be killed or injured by 
his conduct and come to the conclusion that he had removed it, he cannot be 
                                                
81 The possibility of a majority verdict is ignored here. 




reckless in law, even if you consider him to have been “reckless” in everyday 
language. [A charge on negligence as failure of belief might be given here, if 
appropriate.] 
 In establishing the accused’s awareness of risk, you must rely on all of 
the evidence presented by the Crown and the defence; the accused’s own 
testimony is important, but it should be stressed that it is not determinative if 
you do not find it credible or reliable. You must also bear in mind that, if you 
have reasonable doubt concerning the accused’s awareness of risk, you must 
acquit him. 
 
 It is submitted that this direction would be comprehensible to lay jurors, and 
makes clear that recklessness – although an “everyday” term – has a specific legal 
meaning to which they must adhere. The direction also points jurors to the specific 
questions they must ask. This is preferable to the present model direction on 
recklessness that is given in the (Scottish) Judicial Studies Committee’s Jury 
Manual: “[t]he accused must have acted with an utter disregard of the consequences 
of his conduct on the public, with total indifference to their safety.”82 The direction 
proposed above also captures a wider sense of recklessness than “subjective” 
directions based solely on “awareness of risk”. The direction explains in more detail 
the type and duration of awareness required for criminal liability. It is, for these 
reasons, an improvement on the status quo and “subjectivist” theory. 
 
(4) The substantive law: summary 
The sections above have argued that one understanding of recklessness, negligence 
as failure of belief and negligence as failure of conduct should be developed for use 
across the criminal law. Statutory definitions and jury instructions based on these 
concepts have been proposed, showing that practical reform of the law in line with 
the theory presented in this thesis is – with suitable concessions – possible. 
 The next section considers evidential matters which bear upon reforms which 
might flow from chapters five and six. 
 
 
                                                
82 Judicial Studies Committee, Jury Manual: Some Notes for the Guidance of the Judiciary (2011) 
37/2 (available at http://www.scotland-judiciary.org.uk/Upload/Documents/JuryManual_1.pdf). 




B. THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
It was contended in chapter five that difficulties are encountered when a person is 
punished for actions which do not reflect upon her agency in the correct manner.83 
An “alien” desire, not integrated into the agent’s wider system of desires and values, 
should not be viewed as part of her responsibility and any actions performed because 
of it should not ground a finding of criminal responsibility of liability. 
 This point raises difficulties in the trial environment. How is the Crown to 
prove that the desire that motivated the accused’s failure to pay proper attention to 
the risks she believed to exist (or prevented her from forming a justified belief in 
risk) was accepted, and not “alien”? This would presumably be a hard task for the 
Crown to undertake in the majority of cases and might result in unmerited acquittals. 
 The pessimistic answer to this problem is to give up on a character-based 
theory of culpability. A more optimistic response is to propose a presumption that the 
accused was responsible for her character and the desires that motivated her or 
prevented her from forming justified beliefs concerning risks. 
 This proposal is not meant as an empirical claim that agents are usually 
responsible for their character.84 Rather, it is a normative one.85 A useful comparison 
can be drawn with the law on insanity: the law assumes that the accused was sane, 
and this is – at least in part – a normative stance which respects properly the accused 
as a citizen. To, by default, conduct an enquiry into whether the accused is an 
appropriate participant in the criminal trial would be disrespectful to the accused’s 
agency in the vast majority of cases (i.e. cases where it is not immediately apparent 
that the accused is incapacitated). It is submitted that it is important to respect the 
accused – to take her seriously as a full, rather than potential, moral agent – even if 
this means that the accused must (in Scots and English law, at least) overcome the 
presumption of sanity86 by satisfying a reverse (persuasive) burden of proof.87 
                                                
83 See §5.C(3), above. 
84 Doris’s work – discussed above at §5.C(6)(b) – suggests that character does not exist. Again, Doris 
shows that virtuous character is rare – he does not show that character does not exist at all.  
85 I am grateful to Elizabeth Shaw for pressing me on this point. 
86 The Scottish accused also bears a persuasive burden of proof in diminished responsibility. See: 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 51B(4); Lilburn v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 41. 
87 On the defensibility of this burden, see D Hamer, “The presumption of innocence and reverse 
burdens: a balancing act” (2007) 66 CLJ 143 at 162-163. 




Taking this analogy further, it might be presumed that the accused is 
responsible for her character and identified with the desires that motivated her.88 To 
overcome this presumption, she would have to bring evidence (presumably character 
witnesses) concerning her ability to form justified beliefs about risk or, alternatively, 
to attest to her general propensity to not take risks of which she is aware. There is no 
obvious bar to this evidence in Scotland89 or England90 as it would certainly be 
regarded as relevant to the issue of culpability.91 Of more concern are worries over 
reverse burdens of proof. It might be imagined that the accused would have to satisfy 
the jury on the balance of probabilities that the desires that motivated her were 
“alien” and that she should not, in consequence, be held liable for her risk-taking. As 
noted above, this is the approach taken towards insanity. It must, however, be asked 
whether imposing a persuasive burden on the supposedly reckless or negligent 
accused would be compatible with her human rights – particularly her right to a fair 
trial. 
 
(1) Reverse burdens and the right to a fair trial 
Whether a reverse persuasive burden would be compatible with Article 6 the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ guarantee of a fair trial92 is determined by 
the test in Salabiaku v France.93 There, the European Court of Human Rights 
decided that reverse burdens of proof were compatible with the accused’s Article 6 
right provided that they are confined “within reasonable limits which take into 
account the importance of what is at stake and maintain the rights of the defence”.94 
It should be noted from the outset that this decision – and the vast majority of those 
                                                
88 See, similarly, EL Pincoffs, “Legal responsibility and moral character” (1972-1973) 19 Wayne L 
Rev 905 at 922. Note that the prosecution would still have to prove the other substantive elements of 
mens rea, as at present. It might be objected that, in removing part of the Crown’s responsibility to 
prove moral fault, this thesis endorses an illegitimate reverse burden. See I Dennis, “Reverse onuses 
and the presumption of innocence: in search of principle” [2005] Crim LR 901 at 919-920. Dennis 
does not consider a character-based theory of criminal responsibility/liability. His thinking might be 
different if one were adopted. 
89 See ML Ross and J Chalmers, Walker and Walker: The Law of Evidence in Scotland, 3rd edn (2009) 
para 7.8.1. 
90 See P Roberts and A Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, 2nd edn (2010) 636-638. 
91 It is being assumed that the mens rea issue is really concerned with culpability. 
92 On which, see V Tadros and S Tierney, “The presumption of innocence and the Human Rights Act” 
(2004) 67 MLR 402 at 416-420. 
93 (1991) 13 EHRR 379. 
94 At para 28. 




that have followed it – was made in the context of a reverse burden forming part of a 
criminal offence. In the paragraphs below, the focus is on a reverse burden which 
concerns the accused’s responsibility for her character, which – although important 
in explaining culpability in the circumstances of an offence – is not tied to a specific 
criminal offence.95 
 It is submitted that a reverse burden in terms of character would satisfy the 
“reasonable limits” spoken of in Salabiaku, particularly given the normative 
justification underlying the presumption of responsibility for character.96 This is not 
simply a case of a difficult Crown task being eased by placing a burden of proof 
upon the defence;97 it is a matter of respect for citizens that are called to account for 
their alleged wrongdoing. It is thus envisaged that there is a difference between 
asking the accused to defeat an inference of mens rea, or the lack of a defence 
(something that, usually, the accused knows about but the Crown may prove by 
reference to the circumstances of the offence),98 and asking her to show that she 
acted “out of character” (something that the accused knows about but the Crown will 
presumably have great difficulty in showing, even by external evidence relating to 
the specific alleged wrongdoing).99 The latter approach shows adequate respect both 
to the public’s interest in having factually guilty offenders convicted and the 
accused’s interest in self-respect. The former does not. 
 Tadros and Tierney demonstrate the dangers of taking the “difficulty of 
proof” argument too far: rape is difficult to prove, so should elements of that offence 
be presumed to be present, and the accused bear a reverse burden?100 No: the Crown 
should prove the elements of the offence. The argument here is that proving that 
desires were consistent with the accused’s character is beyond the competence of the 
                                                
95 This means that the seriousness of the offence under consideration ceases to be crucial in deciding 
whether a reverse burden is acceptable. For discussion, see: Hamer (n 87) at 149-151; Tadros and 
Tierney (n 92) at 430-432. 
96 It would be for the State to justify the reverse burden: R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545 at para 37 per 
Lord Steyn. 
97 See, further, Hamer (n 87) at 159. 
98 “Usually” because some mens rea terms (e.g. negligence) do not relate to matters which, at the time 
of the offence, the accused was consciously aware of: Tadros and Tierney (n 92) at 427 (n 66). 
99 See Hamer (n 87) at 161. 
100 See Tadros and Tierney (n 92) at 427.  




Crown in most cases. This would lead to (unmerited) acquittals, which would be 
contrary to the public’s interest in the conviction of the factually guilty. 
 An important consideration is, however, whether this burden upon the 
accused would be a persuasive one (requiring the accused to meet the “balance of 
probabilities” standard) or an evidential one (requiring the accused to present 
evidence to make an issue “live” in proceedings). Answering this question requires 
asking whether the accused can realistically bring evidence to meet the standard 
required by a persuasive burden.101 If not, the practice has been to “read down” the 
burden from persuasive to evidential.102 
 It should be practicable to bring character witnesses to attest to the accused’s 
normal tendency towards, for instance, care.103 It might be more difficult for the 
Crown to discover these witnesses, making the case for a reverse burden of proof 
seem compelling. This does not, however, distract too much from the difficulties that 
the accused might encounter in trying to meet the standard of a persuasive burden 
(i.e. proof on the balance of probabilities). These practicalities might lead to 
imbalance in the trial proceedings, rendering them unfair to the accused.104 Just 
because the accused has peculiar knowledge of her character does not mean that it is 
easy for her to establish this in court,105 and it therefore appears that an evidential 
burden – i.e. the presentation of some evidence that the accused acted “out of 
character” – is all that can be imposed.106 
 A connected consideration is whether the Crown should be able to counter 
the accused’s evidence of good character by relying on her past misdeeds, including 
any relevant convictions. At present, the eliciting of bad character evidence is 
permitted in Scots and English law to the extent that it is necessary to correct a 
                                                
101 This factor was emphasised in DPP v Sheldrake; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 4 of 2002) 
[2005] 1 AC 264. See, also, R v Hunt [1987] AC 352 at 374 per Lord Griffiths. This is a negative 
proposition: a burden will be illegitimate if it is difficult for the accused to satisfy it. See, further, P 
Roberts, “The presumption of innocence brought home: Kebilene deconstructed” (2002) 118 LQR 41 
at 65-66. 
102 Sheldrake; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 4 of 2002).  
103 This appears to have been acceptable in early cases of culpable homicide, e.g. HM Advocate v 
McHaffie 1827 Syme 33. 
104 For discussion of when, in principle, a reverse burden is justified on the basis of ease of proof, see 
Hamer (n 87) at 158. 
105 Tadros and Tierney (n 92) at 427. 
106 See, similarly, Hamer (n 87) at 159. 




wrong impression left by the accused.107 This should continue, as it prevents a 
culpable accused from escaping liability by presenting questionable evidence of the 
good parts of her character whilst withholding more negative facets of her past 
conduct. Importantly, however, the accused must first raise the issue of character for 
any negative evidence of past misconduct to be brought forward. This, it is 
submitted, respects the (or at least Scots) law’s present and justified reluctance to 
allow the indiscriminate admission of bad character evidence and its commitment to 
protecting the privacy of the accused.108 If the accused does not mention her 
character, the Crown cannot do so either. 
 
(2) Reverse burdens and absent knowledge 
It is submitted that a similar procedural approach to that adopted above should be 
employed where the accused claims to not possess a piece of background 
information which would be necessary to form a belief in risk.109 This ignorance is 
likely to be peculiar knowledge of the accused and – in the majority of cases – it will 
not be difficult for her to present evidence to point to ignorance. This might justify a 
rebuttable presumption that the accused knew the relevant background fact.  
Again, however, it appears that a persuasive burden would be unmerited. 
Primarily, the issue of background belief is one of mens rea, and it is inappropriate to 
put the accused in the position of disproving such an integral part of the crime to the 
“balance of probabilities” standard. Furthermore, there are issues of credibility 
involved in having the accused placed under a burden that requires her to do more 
than bring evidence of her knowledge. If the piece of knowledge is particularly 
widely-held, then the accused may have a difficult time convincing the jury that she 
did not posses it, particularly if she is not a compelling witness. 
 These difficulties are nevertheless nothing compared to the difficulties 
involved in requiring the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused 
possessed the relevant information (e.g. that water conducts electricity). In cases 
                                                
107 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 270; Criminal Justice Act 2003 ss 101(1)(f), 105. The 
Scottish Law Commission is presently considering the law on bad character evidence: Discussion 
Paper on Similar Fact Evidence and the Moorov Doctrine (Scot Law Com DP No 145, 2010). 
108 This right is itself protected under Art 8 of the ECHR. 
109 See §5.C(1), above. 




where the information is specialist, the Crown might be able to rebut the accused’s 
evidence by pointing to, for instance, the fact that she attended a course where the 
information was passed on to her, or held a licence which implies knowledge. In 
other cases, however, it would appear that inquiring into knowledge in every case 
would unduly prejudice the Crown. Furthermore, as the Crown’s attempt to prove 
knowledge of a certain fact is different from its introducing “bad character” 
evidence, the safeguards discussed above are not required. 
 
(3) The law of evidence: summary 
The above discussion has demonstrated that the law of evidence would not require 
much change to accommodate the understandings of culpable carelessness developed 
in this thesis. It has also shown that the practicalities of the criminal trial require a 
balance between competing interests and this will sometimes require compromises. 
The theory of culpability developed in chapters five and six, if left unaltered, would 
allow the Crown to prove guilt in a frustratingly small number of cases if no 
presumptions were put in place. This would be contrary to the public’s interest in the 
conviction of the factually guilty.110 
 This chapter has thus shown that the theory defended in this thesis could help 
to improve the coherence of the concepts of recklessness and negligence in the 
criminal law, ameliorating the confusion caused by the existing, chaotic Scots and 
English jurisprudence. A final lesson which permeates the entire thesis does not 
concern the substantive criminal law or criminal procedure, but is instead aimed at 
academic lawyers. It focuses on the usefulness of the “subjective”/“objective” 
dichotomy in theoretical discussions around culpable carelessness. 
 
 
                                                
110 The presence of presumptions concerning character and knowledge no doubt opens the door to 
unmerited convictions, but this risk is inherent in all systems of criminal law. It is not, therefore, fatal 
to the argument in this thesis. 




C. THE “SUBJECTIVE”/“OBJECTIVE” DICHOTOMY 
The usefulness of the terms “subjective” and “objective” was doubted in the 
introduction to the thesis,111 and chapters two and three showed how the approach of 
the Scots and English courts have seldom adhered properly to the strictures of the 
“subjective”/“objective”, advertence/inadvertence dichotomy. This finding reduces 
the descriptive utility of the dichotomy in relation to those jurisdictions, which led to 
the suggestion that British writers would be better to abandon it when trying to 
explain the positive law on recklessness and negligence. 
 Subsequent chapters have demonstrated the normative shortcomings of the 
“subjective”/“objective” dichotomy. Chapter four examined the pitfalls of 
“subjective” theory and chapters five and six adopted an approach which, although 
“objective” in some respects (relying on the conception of insufficient concern for 
others) was “subjective” in others (examining the accused’s beliefs, desires and 
character). Although this thesis admits of liability for inadvertent risk-taking (the 
hallmark of “objective” approaches), it does not do so where the accused was 
“subjectively” incapable of performing any better; although it requires “subjective” 
conscious awareness of (a conscious or preconscious belief in) “risk” for 
recklessness, it still appraises the actor’s reasons and conduct in light of what might 
“objectively” legitimately be expected of her in terms of respect for the interests of 
others. Such approaches – like the “mixed” approaches to carelessness found in UK 
sexual offences legislation – are inexplicable in terms of the classical dichotomy. 
 It should be taken from this that the “subjective”/“objective” dichotomy is 
neither descriptively nor normatively useful when considering recklessness and 
negligence. It would be better to accept that approaches to culpable carelessness 
(and, indeed, mens rea in general) lie on a spectrum which runs from “subjectivity” 
to “objectivity” and that advertence and inadvertence tell only part of the story. The 
point – made by Norrie112 – is that neither end of this spectrum provides a “superior” 
approach to culpable carelessness. Any defensible account of criminal risk-taking 
                                                
111 At §1.D(1). 
112 AW Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law, 2nd edn (2001) 
ch 4; AW Norrie, Law and the Beautiful Soul (2005) ch 5. 




must contain “subjective” and “objective” elements;113 it must achieve balance – the 
virtue of the mean114 – rather than be “hijacked”115 by dogmatic adherence to 
extreme theoretical standpoints.116 The theory developed in chapters five and six 
strives for this mediating position. The positive law ought to do so too, and this 




This chapter has addressed how, with appropriate compromises to pragmatism, the 
theory of culpable carelessness defended in chapters five and six can inform reform 
of Scots and English criminal law. Three main lessons can be learned.  
 First, the substantive law should be clarified and simplified, with the 
recognition of both forms of negligence as acceptable forms of criminal fault – not 
outliers to be shoehorned in with recklessness when this suits intuitive feelings about 
culpability and blame. This would allow distinct statutory definitions of each form of 
culpable carelessness to be constructed. However clear the law becomes, it is 
nevertheless plain that – if lay persons are to be involved in trials – mens rea terms 
concerning culpable risk-taking must be translated into accessible jury directions. It 
was shown that this is possible. 
 Secondly, it was argued that the laws of evidence would not require to be 
changed markedly to accommodate a greater reliance on character, or knowledge, 
evidence in some cases, and that a reverse (evidential) burden of proof upon the 
accused in these circumstances would not breach the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
 Thirdly, it was argued that a consequence of the argument in this thesis is that 
the “subjective”/“objective” dichotomy, which runs through many contemporary 
                                                
113 See, similarly: HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (1968) 
153; NP Metcalfe and A Ashworth, “Arson: mens rea – recklessness whether property destroyed or 
damaged” [2004] Crim LR 369 at 372. 
114 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Roger Crisp trans, 2000) II.6.1106a-1107a. 
115 K Amirthalingam, “Caldwell recklessness is dead: long live mens rea’s fecklessness” (2004) 67 
MLR 491 at 495. 
116 RHS Tur, “Subjectivism and objectivism: towards synthesis”, in S Shute, J Gardner and J Horder 
(eds), Action and Value in Criminal Law (1993) 213. 




debates about culpable carelessness and is alleged (tenuously) by some to explain the 
positive law in Scotland and England, is liable to confuse rather than edify. 
“Subjectivism” and “objectivism” are two extreme positions on a spectrum and the 
law must attempt to mediate these two positions, rather than endorse one to the 
exclusion of the other. Accepting this point would help advance the debate over 
culpable carelessness in law and in theory. 








This chapter restates the arguments in the thesis’s six substantive chapters. 
 
 
A. CHAPTER TWO 
Chapter two examined the doctrinal treatment of recklessness in Scots criminal law. 
It began by outlining the sparse, and largely disingenuous, treatment of the topic by 
academic writers. In order to support the claim that the apparent academic consensus 
is misguided, the argument moved on to consider the history of recklessness in the 
criminal law, beginning with its origins in the concept of “gross” negligence. 
Although the language of negligence has disappeared from the law, it is clear that the 
courts have failed to distinguish it clearly from recklessness in some contexts (for 
example, in relation to statutory and most common law offences), leading to 
confusion.  
 It was contended that the route out of this quagmire was to recognise that 
there are at least five forms of recklessness in Scots criminal law, and that – far from 
being wholly “objective” in their approach – these fall on both sides of the 
“subjective”/“objective”, advertent/inadvertent dichotomy or are incapable of being 
placed within it. This undermines the explanatory usefulness of that dichotomy in the 
Scottish context, and it was suggested that a preferable approach is to accept that 
utter confusion reigns in the appeal court’s jurisprudence on culpable carelessness. 
The courts have not pursued a consistent approach, and are badly in want of a theory 
of culpability to guide the development of the law. 
 
 
B. CHAPTER THREE 
English academics have found more success when employing the 
“subjective”/“objective” dichotomy, but chapter three revealed that, in common with 




their Scottish counterparts, the English courts struggled to distinguish recklessness 
from “gross” negligence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
 Although the concept of advertent recklessness had by the mid twentieth 
century solidified in relation to offences requiring malice, “gross” negligence (itself 
identified as a form of recklessness) survived in the law on manslaughter. This dual 
approach culminated in the 1980s when the House of Lords dismantled the 
“subjectivity” of recklessness and made it largely indistinguishable from “gross” 
negligence. The journey back to an advertence/inadvertence dichotomy began in the 
1990s with the re-emergence of “gross” negligence as a form of mens rea in 
involuntary manslaughter, and in 2003 the House of Lords re-endorsed advertent 
recklessness in criminal damage cases, largely extinguishing the fire of inadvertent 
recklessness. Nevertheless, chapter three concluded that there still exist at least three 
forms of recklessness in English criminal law (again diminishing the explanatory 
worth of the “subjective”/“objective” dichotomy). The situation should still be 
viewed as volatile, rather than resolved. 
 
 
C. CHAPTER FOUR 
Given the findings of chapters two and three, the thesis moved on to consider 
theoretical treatments of recklessness and negligence, to see if these offered a clear 
solution to the problems evident in the Scots and English jurisprudence. Chapter four 
began by untangling “subjectivism”, and argued that there were three prominent 
“subjectivist” theories in the existing literature: strict choice theory; choice and 
capacity theory; and choice and character theory. Strict choice theorists typically fail 
to explain why only conscious choices can give rise to culpability and, when such an 
explanation is offered (for instance, Brudner’s argument), it relies on a reimagining 
of society. This provides a poor foundation for strict choice theory’s objection that 
inadvertent risk-taking can never involve choice and can therefore never be culpable.  
 Choice and capacity theory is more defensible as it widens the scope of 
culpability to more intuitively acceptable extents. It nevertheless suffers for its 
commitment to conscious choices.  




 Finally, choice and character theorists rely on a peculiar conception of 
character formation and their insights might be taken to attack capacity in a wholly 
illiberal way, premising liability on the failure to (at all times) test capacity, rather 
than on culpability.  




D. CHAPTER FIVE 
Moving beyond “subjectivism” allowed the thesis to defend liability for inadvertent 
risk-taking (identified with negligence). Chapter five outlined two forms of culpable 
negligence: negligence as failure of conduct and negligence as failure of belief. The 
former was recognised as a special form of negligence which exists where the 
accused had voluntarily entered a sphere of regulated conduct which gave rise to 
exclusionary reasons which should exclude certain options of conduct from 
consideration. Given the need for voluntariness and regulation, negligence as failure 
of conduct was not advanced as the theory of negligence, but rather as a limited case.  
 Negligence as failure of belief is more wide-reaching, and relies upon an 
assessment of the accused’s beliefs concerning risk (or lack thereof) and how these 
came about. The argument was that an accused person who had background 
knowledge about a risk, and could perceive the signs that that risk might exist in the 
circumstances, should – if properly motivated and capable – have formed a belief in 
risk which would have played a part in her practical reasoning. Her failure to do so, 
far from excluding culpability, secured it if it resulted from an accepted aspect of the 
accused’s character and demonstrated insufficient concern for the interests of others. 
 Chapter five concluded by considering the limits that would need to be placed 
on negligence as failure of belief in a liberal democracy. It was argued that a limited 
number of interests should be protected from this variety of negligent risk-taking to 
ensure that citizens are not overburdened with risk investigation. Bodily integrity, 
life and sexual autonomy were mooted as a starting point. It was concluded that these 




interests were important enough that citizens should (on pain of criminal 
punishment) always pay attention to risks to them. 
 
 
E. CHAPTER SIX 
Once negligence as failure of conduct and negligence as failure of belief had been 
outlined, chapter six was free to examine recklessness. The chapter began by 
considering popular, non-choice-based approaches to recklessness which concentrate 
on the accused’s indifference towards risk. It was demonstrated that indifference 
theories possess various weaknesses which make them unappealing explanations of 
recklessness. Even the strongest indifference theory (Duff’s) fails to explain 
compellingly the distinction between recklessness indifference and negligence, and 
this makes it unattractive.  
 The chapter thus moved on to develop a belief-centred account of 
recklessness, which bore much in common with negligence as failure of belief. It was 
contended that recklessness involves actors who have formed a conscious or 
preconscious belief in “risk” or “danger” attendant upon their conduct, but have not 
examined this sufficiently in order to avoid engaging in wrongdoing. This account of 
recklessness was able to explain the line between recklessness and negligence, and 
the chapter concluded by distinguishing it from other belief-centred views of 
recklessness, such as that presented by Tadros, and from other mens rea terms such 
as wilful blindness and intention. 
 
 
F. CHAPTER SEVEN 
The final substantive chapter of the thesis considered how the theory of culpable 
carelessness developed in chapters five and six could inform reform of Scots and 
English criminal law. The chapter first examined necessary changes to the 
substantive law, including the preference for one understanding of recklessness and 
the recognition of culpability for negligence (as failure of conduct and belief). 
Statutory and jury direction forms of recklessness and negligence were then 




presented, demonstrating that the theory defended in this thesis could be applied in 
practice.  
 Next, the chapter considered evidential challenges to the theory defended in 
chapters five and six, and concluded that these would not require an overhaul of the 
existing system.  
 Finally, chapter seven returned to a theme that ran throughout the thesis: the 
usefulness of the “subjective”/“objective”, advertent/inadvertent dichotomy. It was 
contended that this dichotomy did more harm than good in debates over culpable 
carelessness and should, in consequence, be abandoned. 
 
 
G. OVERALL CONCLUSION 
The moral and political questions at the core of the debate over culpable carelessness 
are complex, and are not answered by taking refuge in extreme “subjectivist” or 
“objectivist” positions. The jurisprudence of the Scots and English courts is 
testament to the fact that recklessness and negligence are complicated mens rea 
terms and that any theory which aims to explain them must address some core 
concerns about culpable risk-taking. It has been argued in this thesis that this theory 
should consider not simply the accused’s conscious awareness of risk (or lack 
thereof), but also the role of her character, desires, beliefs and other aspects of her 
agency. Although the resulting theory of culpable carelessness is more complex than 
the “subjective” and “objective” caricatures so often relied upon in textbook accounts 
of the criminal law, it is necessarily so. The law’s approach to culpable carelessness 
must address the moral and political concerns surrounding unjustified risk-taking, 
rather than shying away from them. Only then can the criminal law hope to approach 
culpable risk-taking in a coherent and defensible – rather than a careless and 
haphazard – manner. 
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